Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

DAILY WORLD STATINTL

Bombs against the people

By Vicki Morris

"Whether or not you want to accept as fact that the purpose of this war is genocide, the result is certainly genocide . . . part of the same genocidal policy the American government has carried out in Asia since the nuclear devastation of Japan."

Al Hubbard, a member of the executive board of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, made this comment after his trip to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in March. While Hubbard was relating some of the horrors he had seen as a result of the previous bombing raids on the North, from December 26 to 30 last year, a radio news bulletin announced that American ships were tailing Soviet ships on the way to North Vietnam. Less than eight hours later President Nixon announced his latest "peace" measures to mine all ports in the DRV and step up the air war on that embattled country.

Hubbard, a Black former Air Force pilot (1954 to 1966), is the second Vietnam veteran to be invited to North Vietnam. He also spent two weeks in Japan, and several days in Moscow as a guest of the Soviet Peace Council.

Hubbard said he spent most of his eight-day stay in the DRV in schools and hospitals in the provinces "with the children who were the victims — the targets of those raids."

The type of raids made it clear that they were intended to slaughter civilians and destroy homes, said Hubbard. First, a high-explosive bomb is dropped which terrifies and confuses people, making them run in all directions, he explained. Then there are the second, third and fourth drops of pellet bombs, each containing thousands of tiny steel balls.

"These bombs cannot pierce cement or steel; they cannot destroy bridges, factories, a train or a truck; they cannot destroy military targets," he said. "They cannot destroy anything except unprotected flesh."

The destinations reached:

A hospital in Thanh Hoa, destroyed December 26; clearly marked; no evidence of a military target in sight.

A school in Quang Binh, hit December 27.

The Trung Trach agricultural commune in Bo Trach district of Quang Binh, leveled December 28, surrounding farmland defoliated.

The air invasion of the North was never really halted, Hubbard said. It merely became lighter and less systematic. In provinces to the south, closer to the Demilitarized Zone, U.S. bombers fly over daily, he said, and while he was there, visiting a kindergarten class, he went through an air raid with the children.

"Imagine five-year-old kids in a school room," said Hubbard. "The air raid alert sounds. They grab their little straw thatched helmets and head for the door. Disciplined at first. Then, when the explosion comes, dazed and terrified by an awesome thing you cannot begin to understand, the kids run, in the wrong direction and away from shelter. They try to hide under the tiny straw helmets, so their backs get hit, leaving many permanently paralyzed."

As Hubbard described his experience, he laid out pictures of the victims of past raids for a four-page brochure to be put out by the VVAW. Some he had photographed himself in the hospitals.

Nguyen thi Thau, now seven-months-old, was three-months-old last December when a fragment from a shrike missile went through her cheek and hit her brain. Her mother was lying critically injured in the next room; her father and brother were killed by the same explosion.

Pictures of others had been given to Hubbard by the War Crimes Commission of the DRV. Some had been killed, like Nguyen van Than, three years old, and his sister, Nguyen thi Binh, eight months, struck in May 1970 during an attack on the Le Ninh State Farm. Some were maimed, like Don van Son, pierced through the skull by four fragments of a guava bomb in Haiphong in March 1967.

Despite the bloodshed, the people seemed more determined than ever to succeed in their struggle, he said, "inspired by an absolute hatred of the U.S. imperialist government."

"But I was amazed at their ability to separate me as an individual American and a former participant in the war from the despised murderers of their people," he added. "The Vietnamese looked upon me, particularly as a Third World person, [illegible] than one of its perpetrators.

He later discovered that this "generosity and humaneness" has been part of Vietnamese history for thousands of years. In an ancient cave Hubbard visited, on one of the islands at the mouth of the inlet of Hai Long Bai, his Vietnamese interpreter translated the following proverb carved in the rock centuries ago:

"When the warrior falls from his horse, he is human and therefore it is inhuman to kill him. When the warrior falls from his horse, you must care for him, teach him and send him home."

It was also pointed out to Hubbard that the constitution of the DRV guarantees justice, common defense, peace, welfare and liberty, "the words of the preamble to the U.S. Constitution."

The difference, commented Hubbard, is that the Vietnamese are living the meaning of those words while Americans are not.

One of the most significant effects of the trip was that Hubbard was able to make comparison between the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese from his experiences while in the Air Force. He was struck by the pride and happiness people in the North have in their work, while in the South, he said, people "just fuck-off," either because they are mercenaries only concerned with getting paid or because they oppose the American intervention.

The difference in attitude was evident from the moment he stepped out of the plane in Hanoi, he said.

"At the airport in Saigon," Hubbard said, "the faces of the Vietnamese always bore expressions of resentment, fear and suspicion; guns and uniforms were everywhere." On the other hand, he said, those who came to greet him in Hanoi were relaxed, "actually affectionate. Most important, there was no feeling of fear and the only guns I saw were in the hands of the people, people without uniforms.

"The very idea of being able to walk into the residence of the Premier without being checked by guards at the door; the idea of being able to sit down and rap like two human beings without an army of bodyguards around was almost unbelievable."

Discussions with Premier Pham van Dong and the vice premier Nguyen lung Bang and Le duc Tho, member of the politburo who has played a leading role in the negotiations in Paris, centered around the U.S. peace movement, said Hubbard. Although the Vietnamese expressed gratitude for the support of the anti-war movement, Hubbard said, they were dismayed at the lack of unity.

The movement in the United States, Hubbard said, could learn a valuable lesson from the Vietnamese. "There are 69 minorities in North Vietnam, with

continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

THE GUARDIAN
24 MAY 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006001

[redacted]

world in revolution

LAOS

A heavily censored report revealed May 7 in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee charged the U.S. spends $100 million a year to support a Thai irregular army of 10,000 men in Laos. The report revealed that for the first time U.S. helicopter gunships, under U.S. army command but apparently with Thai pilots, are supporting medical evacuation missions in northern Laos. The report was prepared by committee members James Lowenstein and Richard Moose after their trip to Thailand and Laos in January. The report also noted the CIA and Thai army headquarters in Udorn air force base in Thailand provide contact with the Thai irregular forces; the irregulars are trained in Thailand by U.S. army special forces personnel; payments including bonuses are made by the CIA to the Thai unit at Udorn.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

TULSA, OKLA.
TRIBUNE

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MAY 22 1972

'ACCEPT HANOI TERMS'

Editor, The Tribune:

Nixon has replaced one risky policy decision which failed with another risky and even more dangerous one. The CIA in 1969 advised the President against a blockade, certain that it would fail. In light of the reality that South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will eventually come under the control of Communist regimes (our top officials have already accepted this fact), the best solution appears to be the pull-out of American troops and the creation of a coalition government in South Vietnam.

This way we can be reasonably certain of getting our POWs back. But should the blockade fail (and the odds are against it) we probably will never see our POWs again. Therefore, as a loyal American, I feel that our best policy would be to accept North Vietnam's terms for a settlement, and get our troops and our POWs out forever. This will be a painful decision, but under the circumstances it is the only practical one.

Tulsa B.H.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

DAILY WORLD

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

1972

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A talk with the envoy of revolutionary Laos

By JOSEPH NORTH
Article 8

This is the eighth of a series describing the historic visit to North Vietnam of the delegation of U.S. Communists led by Gus Hall, general secretary of the Party. They were invited by the Vietnam Workers Party. They experienced the resumption of bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong; later they visited key places in the land and had many talks with Party and governmental leaders as well as with workers and farmers.

The delegation included Gus Hall, CP candidate for the Presidency; Jarvis Tyner, CP Vice-Presidential candidate and chairman of the Young Workers Liberation League; Rasheed Storey, chairman of the New York State Communist Party, and Joseph North, author of "No Men Are Strangers" and editor of World Magazine.

Next to traveling the bomb-torn roads to South Vietnam to visit the National Liberation Front—as well as the freedom forces in Laos—we did the best thing possible by calling on their official representatives in Hanoi located in the yellow stucco buildings the long-gone French administrators had built throughout the past century.

The same buildings, but what a difference in the occupants!

The independent flags of Southeast Asia, and the native flowers brought from their regions, now adorned these quarters.

We went first to the Laotian Mission, then to the South Vietnamese.

True, South Vietnam and North Vietnam are one country, but contemporary history has consigned one region the task of building and defending socialism (North Vietnam), and the other region the struggle for national liberation (South Vietnam). The two interlock and affect each other's struggles. Yet one felt shades of differentiation at the South Vietnam mission when we met the two NLF women and others who had made their way here out of Saigon secretly, accompanied by a guerrilla warrior who was decorated five times for heroism and who was all of 16 years old. He was wounded and limped badly. He wore smoked glasses, for his eyes too had been severely hurt in battle.

'Old friends'

The South Vietnam ambassador here, Nguyen Phu Seai, sat under a painting of Ho Chi Minh. He was in his late thirties, a veteran of the war, and smiled his welcome when we entered He said he knew of our presence from "The People," the daily official newspaper, and that he had known Gus Hall a long time because he had read Hall's speeches at international conferences, his articles and pamphlets. "We know you as old friends" he said, offering tea and the little Hanoi bananas and oranges.

The visit to the Laotian delegation was somewhat different. The chief authority, a tall handsome man, spoke in quiet, calm tones which seemed to be the earmark of all the Southeast Asians we met. He said warmly that he remembered John Pittman, our co-editor, who had been on a political and journalistic mission to Laos two years ago, and whose dispatches first tore the veil from the CIA-run military actions in that country.

The ambassador told us of a saying in his country. Since its population is three million and since the U.S. bombers have dropped three million bombs on Laos, they say, "Each Laotian builds freedom even though he is carrying a ton of U.S. bombs on his back."

26 years under bombs

For the past 26 years no day passed without a raid "and many of our people live in caves," he said, "yet our population has trebled since we kicked the French imperialists out." One guide who knew Laotian rendered the Ambassador's words into Vietnamese which was then translated to us in English—from Laotian to Vietnamese to English.

He said you can gauge the way things are going by such facts as this: Before freedom, under the French, all Laos had one solitary doctor, and one hospital. Now Laos has "30 doctors, 4,000 nurses and many medical centers. We have in the main overcome illiteracy; everybody in the Army and all functionaries are now literate."

Before, starvation ruled the country. Today, despite the bombings, "there is no hunger, for the new government has been able to improve the supply by achieving two rice crops a year."

Despite genocidal air attacks, the Laotian authority said, military victories have been continually won, especially recently on the southern end of Route 9.

(In the next instalment, questions about Angela Davis from a young woman freedom fighter at the South Vietnamese mission.)

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 MAY 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
[redacted]
STATINTL

The White House Classifies, and Congress Ossifies

BY TRB

WASHINGTON—Secrecy leads to self-deception. If you want proof of that overlooked political axiom, look at the way we have gotten involved with a secret mercenary army in Laos.

It all started not so innocently a decade ago when the Central Intelligence Agency recruited, directed and supported an army of Meo tribesmen to keep Laos from going Communist. It was like having a Gurkha army of our own, only no one knew we had it and thus nobody cared that we were getting ever more involved in a war in Laos. It was all going splendidly until the CIA sent Gen. Vang Pao and his army on an ill-fated offensive last spring. The Meo "irregulars" got chewed up; they had about 10% casualties. That might not have been too bad except there were no more tribesmen to recruit in Laos. So the CIA started recruiting mercenaries in Thailand, only it called them "volunteers."

Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has discovered that we have a $100 million annual commitment to finance an army of 10,000 Thai "volunteers" fighting in Laos. The Thais like it because they are getting good pay as well as extra military assistance from the United States. Presumably the Laotians like it because the Meo and Thai can do the fighting. But what about Congress and the poor American taxpayer who never knew they were running up a $100 million annual bill in Laos? And what about the present moral character of a nation that 200 years ago won its independence fighting Hessian mercenaries?

Put aside all the moral, geopolitical and financial considerations. It's also a disturbing case of the evils of secrecy in our government and Congress. Secrecy provides a way to subvert the constitutional checks and balances on the war powers.

Oh sure, the CIA informed a few members of the Appropriations Committee. But then it intimidated them by explaining it was so hush-hush they couldn't talk about it to the rest of Congress. After that the privileged few didn't even bother to raise questions—that was until Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and his foreign relations subcommittee started poking around in the secret war in Laos. Even now the State Department and CIA won't 'fess up to what they are doing with the Thai mercenaries. The reason is that Congress last year passed a law prohibiting the use of defense funds to help third-country forces fight in support of the Laotian or Cambodian governments. If all the facts were made public, it would be evident that the executive branch was violating the law.

It's easy enough to blame the executive branch for its secrecy. Everybody knows — including President Nixon, who issued a new executive order on classification recently —that the government business is weighted down with excessive secrecy.

For all its criticism of the executive branch, Congress really likes secrecy. At least those in power do because secrecy means power. "If you only knew what I knew" makes a senator very important in his own eyes and in the eyes of his colleagues.

If you want a bewildering example, take the case of Symington. One day he is deploring the executive branch's secrecy on the Thai mercenaries. The next day he is on the Senate floor questioning whether secrets should be given to members of Congress except those on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Atomic Energy committees. Symington, it should be pointed out, is the only member of all three committees.

Or take the case of Rep. Bella Abzug, who had the temerity to introduce a resolution demanding information on how many bombs we are dropping in Indochina. From the horrified look on the face of Rep. F. Edward Hebert, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, you would have thought Ms. Abzug wanted to reveal the secrets of the A-bomb. But really his consternation was over the fact that she was challenging the power of the Armed Services Committee, which wants to keep such information locked up in its own safes.

Maybe Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska), with his maverick ways, is finally forcing Congress to face up to the problem. He tried the other day to place in the Congressional Record a copy of a still secret national security memorandum that Henry Kissinger had prepared back in 1969 on the Vietnam options open to the Nixon Administration. It was enough to send the Senate sputtering into two days of secret sessions. The basic objection was that Gravel would be violating the law by making public a document classified secret. Then to the amazement of the senators, it turned out that there was no law specifically authorizing the executive branch to classify information. The whole secrecy system, it turns out, just rests on implied powers assumed by the executive branch.

The whole security system obviously is not going to come tumbling down. Nor should it. But once Congress starts questioning it, maybe it will begin to realize that Gravel has a point when he argues that Congress also can determine what information should be made public. Right now it's reached the point of absurdity; the Senate sends its debates in secret session down to the executive branch to be declassified.

Congress ought to understand that it need not be such a willing, acquiescent partner in a secrecy system that leads not only to deception but to the impotence of Congress.

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STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
17 MAY 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

The Southeast Asian Connection

[redacted]

STATINTL

By HANS J. SPIELMANN

BANGKOK, Thailand—The world's attention in recent months has been turned toward the Mideast—Turkey, principally—as the source of illicit supplies of heroin. But the fact is that the fabled "Fertile Triangle" of Southeast Asia — Thailand, Burma and Laos—continues to produce two-thirds of the world's known supply of opium, from which heroin is derived.

The figures alone are eye-catching: in 1970 Thailand's hill tribes contributed 185 metric tons of raw opium to the world's supply, Burma 1,000 tons, Laos 100.

It is true that most of the opium, or about 800 tons, is consumed by Southeast Asians from Rangoon to Hong Kong. Nonetheless, about 400 tons continue to leave the area, bound for addicts around the world. The buyers, not all Americans by any means, range from soldiers in Vietnam to junkies along New York's Eighth Avenue.

So vast are these supplies (U.S. addicts, for example, consume annually the heroin derived from "only" 120 metric tons of opium), so limitless the profits, that governments, armies and revolutionary fronts have played parts in the production and trade through the years. They continue to do so, and even the United States Central Intelligence Agency has had its days in the poppy fields.

"They have been growing poppies for 150 years."

The Vietnam war and the complex and confusing movement of "foreigners" back and forth through Southeast Asia has created a boom in the illicit production of raw opium. Today, in Thailand alone, it is estimated that half of the 350,000 hill people in the elevated areas of the north participate in growing poppies.

Thirty per cent of these workers are addicts themselves, but they turn a tiny profit by the standards of the million-or-billion-dollar deals we are accustomed to associating with narcotics. The average worker earns about $100 a year and has, incidentally, no real knowledge of what he is doing. That is to say, the hill people do not even know that they are producing an illicit product for a world market; they have been growing the poppies and using the opium in lieu of pain-killing medicines for about 150 years.

The production of opium only became illegal in Thailand in 1958, as did trafficking and smoking, and the hill people really could not understand that they were outlaws. Not to worry, as things developed: production went on unabated.

As it is now, there is a sort of Common Market in opium operative in Southeast Asia. National boundaries are crossed by an assortment of rogues who, while moving tons of the stuff, "lose" only 2 or 3 per cent as bribes and tributes and so forth.

The operation begins with the fields in the high country (over 3,000 feet above sea level for the high-quality poppy) of Thailand, Laos and Burma.

The hill people themselves have neither the courage, contacts nor funds to enter into the distribution, so they await the sharp lowlanders. These townsmen come around at harvest time, looking down their noses at the hill people whom they consider to be inferior, and buy the opium at very low prices.

The best buy is in Burma, where a kilo of raw opium sells for $15; in Laos it's $30, and in Thailand $40.

Opium is gathered in the villages and then in ever-larger towns by smugglers, who may be described in the first dealings as petty, but who become rather more than that as the opium changes hands and the supplies pile up. Then highly disciplined paramilitary types take over, with toughness and sure-handedness.

Among these is an outfit known as the Shan of Northern Burma—relatives of the Thais—whose dream, at least back in Burma, was the establishment of an autonomous Shan State. But its fighting wing, the Shan Liberation Army, has generally abandoned politics as it observed the fertile fields of Shan asylum in northern Thailand.

Units of the front transport the opium grown in Burma (and this is the mother lode—700 metric tons for export) to bases in Thailand. Of course, as units cross the Burmese-Thai border, back and forth, back and forth, the talk is all politics and the dream of statehood, but it's camouflage for the real action, which is the opium.

The Shan has somewhat complex, but strict, working arrangements with the notorious Kuomintang (whose parent organization is Nationalist Chinese) troops of the Fertile Triangle. Sometimes the Shan and the Kuomintang trade arms and ammunition, and medicines—often purchased from U.S. stocks in Laos—for opium.

The Kuomintang troops also keep up political appearances, when the real idea is opium. They say that they carry out pro-U.S. espionage in Burma, and even claim forays into China for "anti-Communist" activities. But these units are no longer used and supplied by the United States or Taiwan, as they once were, although they maintain radio contact with each other.

The Kuomintang is said now to have 10,000 men under arms, chiefly in Thailand, but in Burma and Laos as well.

Frequently, Kuomintang caravans of between 300 and 500 men, plus horses and mules carrying contraband for trade, can be seen working toward the north of Thailand and Laos toward Burma. They are supplied along the way with food by villagers eager to please such impressive forces, and eager to make extra money or to acquire some unusual luxuries.

Once they make their contacts—either with Shan troops or with smugglers—the Kuomintang caravan can pack up as much as fifteen tons of opium for the return trip southward. It is said that these troops and their "allied contractors" transport between 450 and 500 tons of raw opium southward each year. Their profit mark-up is 200 per cent.

One arrangement that the Kuomintang and the Shan have is that each Kuomintang convoy that goes into certain poppy-growing territory actually controlled by Shan troops must pay tribute. This amounts to about $1.50 a kilo, and entitles the caravan to a transit letter and Shan escorts back to territory controlled by the Kuomintang. (In other areas Shan convoys must pay tribute to Kuomintang soldiers—the reverse situation.)

As noted, there are a great many addicts in Southeast Asia, and the Kuomintang troops sell off a good deal of the opium back in Thailand. They get four to six times what they paid. But most of it is headed for export—for quick dashes across more borders, to airports and train stations, to seaports, to Bangkok, Singapore, Hong Kong, Vientiane and Saigon. And on and on.

In the last five years, the Kuomintang, discovering among other things that some of the opium it was transporting was bringing in 2,500 times more profit to the ultimate dealer than to its troops, began processing the opium itself. Kuomintang thereby increased its own profits, never inconsiderable, at least threefold.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
NATION
15 MAY 1972
STATINTL

[redacted]

Is Freedom Inalienable?

If not, it will be alienated, and ultimately destroyed. That is the paramount issue of the Victor Marchetti censorship case. [See Marchetti's "The CIA: The President's Loyal Tool"; *The Nation*, April 3.]

Marchetti, now 42, graduated from Pennsylvania State University in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history. He was recruited for the CIA by a professor, who, interestingly enough, was secretly on the agency's payroll as a talent scout. In time, Marchetti was promoted to the CIA executive staff and served finally as executive assistant to Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, deputy director from 1966 to 1969. Marchetti was with the agency for fourteen years, resigning in the same year as did Admiral Taylor. Obviously, Marchetti knows a lot about the CIA—that is part of the trouble.

He was well thought of by his colleagues. Richard Helms, CIA director, presented him with an autographed picture inscribed, "To Vic—With appreciation for his support." But the longer Marchetti served the CIA the less he appreciated it and its work. Among his reasons for leaving he cites "the clandestine attitude, the amorality of it all, the cold-war mentality—these kinds of things made me feel that the agency was really out of step with the times." And: "It's one of my strong beliefs that the CIA has to be more tightly overviewed by Congress. As it is now, the agency operates almost exclusively under the authority of the President." Thus the CIA is one of the factors in the subordination of the legislative branch to the executive. For that matter, once it is let loose on a project, the agency is subordinate to the executive itself only in a very loose sense. As everyone now knows, it is carrying on a war in Laos at a cost of roughly $500 million a year, using tribesmen as mercenaries and running its own airlines, etc. In the Kansas City area it maintains an arsenal, with a "huge inventory" of weapons for its foreign operations; it has bases for training and other purposes elsewhere in the United States.

The Marchetti case assumes constitutional importance because Mr. Marchetti, when he joined the CIA, signed the usual agreement not to write or talk about the agency's activities even after he left it. Marchetti came to the attention of *The Nation* when he wrote a spy novel, *The Rope Dancer*, which had apparent reference to the CIA. Since this was in fictional form it does not appear to have agitated the CIA management; nor did *The Nation* article which, together with some interviews Marchetti gave to newspapers, was read by Admiral Taylor, who had some reservations about accuracy but concluded that there was nothing damaging in any of the material. But when Marchetti contracted with Alfred A. Knopf to write a nonfiction book about the CIA, the government got into action. Although Marchetti is willing to have the CIA review the book for classified material, the government went before U.S. District Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr. in Alexandria, Va., and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting Marchetti from writing the book for Knopf—a book of which he has not yet set down a single line. The American Civil Liberties Union is trying to get the restraining order dissolved, so the case can proceed.

The question raised by the action on behalf of the government is whether a U.S. citizen can agree to waive his freedom of conscience, of thought, of moral sentiment in the manner prescribed by the CIA. The case dramatizes the fact that the CIA is essentially an alien institution—alien to American custom, alien to the Constitution, and incompatible with both the forms and the spirit of democracy. In our view, Marchetti not only has the right but the moral obligation to write his book, just as it was his moral obligation to write the article commissioned by *The Nation*.

A ruling to that effect by the federal courts would not impose an unreasonable limitation on the proper and lawful activities of the CIA, or any other agency. It can set up rules, office policies, and normal administrative means of enforcement, but it cannot compel a former employee to waive his freedom to say or write what he sees fit, once his employment is terminated. If an agency of the government deems something that has been published to be in violation of law, it may proceed against the author and publisher, but pre-censorship is repugnant to American institutions.

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STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

15 MAY 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Jack Anderson

Smugglers Using Thai Connection

DESPITE furious denials by the Thai government, evidence is mounting that members of Thailand's 16-man ruling council have been corrupted by international dope smugglers.

As far away as this oriental intrigue is, it directly affects the alarming rise of crime on America's streets where addicts rob, house-break and shoplift to feed their gnawing heroin habits.

Reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State, Justice and Defense departments, all agree that more and more heroin is pouring into the United States from Thailand, one of America's closest allies.

"Historically, this area has not been an important source of opium-based narcotics for the U.S. market. This is no longer the case," bluntly states a classified CIA report now in our hands.

Buttressing the CIA are other U.S. intelligence sources who allege that at least two of the 16-man Thai National Executive Council protect dope smugglers.

The official U.S. sources also describe in detail heroin trade involvement of a top Bangkok police commander, a former parliamentarian, a Thai border patrol major and a colonel in a northern Thai army division.

The police official, say the sources, is owner of a well-known Bangkok massage parlor-brothel where heroin is readily available from employees. Run by a woman friend of the police official—who himself maintains an office in the building—the bordello is called "The Smack Parlor" by its American patrons. "Smack" is slang for heroin.

While this and other dope hangouts have long operated openly under the noses of Thailand's rulers, the lucrative up-country opium trade has been changing dramatically since this January.

Crude morphine base from the Thai-Burma-Laos border is no longer processed almost exclusively in the laboratories of Bangkok.

Instead, Royal Laotian Air Force fliers and a few pilots of the CIA-run Air America now airlift much of the morphine to warehouses in the "Golden Triangle" along Thailand's northern border.

The warehouses are dutifully protected by corrupt senior officials of the Royal Thai Army and the Thai border patrol who take a cut of the profits.

When the warehouses are bulging with illicit morphine base, chemists from Taiwan fly in, the sources say. They are ceremoniously welcomed by remnants of the old Nationalist Chinese divisions driven from Red China and now living off the land in Thailand.

No longer under Taiwan's control, the Nationalist veterans now support themselves in the dope trade. The Chinese chemists work night and day for 30 days, earning as high as $10,000 for converting the morphine base to pure heroin.

Then the Royal Laotian Air Force and an occasional Air America pilot, who pretends he is unaware of his cargo, ferry out the newly processed white powder. This time it goes to distribution points in Bangkok, Vientiane and other Southeast Asian cities.

From there, it is transshipped to the United States. American intelligence officers are even fearful some may get aboard Air Force KC-135 tanker planes which fly directly to the United States from Thailand. The planes or crews are rarely checked properly by U.S. customs.

In Hong Kong, an important trans-shipment point, British officials are also seething over the corruption of the Thai government officials. Some proof of this dismay is contained in a cautious, classified cable from David Osborn, American consul in Hong Kong, to Secretary of State William Rogers.

Dated March 27, the cable urges secrecy, then confides: "Hong Kong narcotics officials have long-standing belief that Thai officials have been involved in drug traffic for some years."

Yet, despite all this evidence of official Thai corruption, the United States continues to supply Thailand with millions in American arms. And the Thai government smugly dismisses this column's documented reports of heroin in high Thai places as "slanderous accusations."

FOR A welcome change, the government is going to get some return from one of its administrative frills. White House protographer Ollie Atkins accompanied President Nixon to Red China and helped put together a book called "The President's Trip to China." Atkins' share, instead of going into his pocket, will go to the federal treasury along with a check from his publisher for the pictures. Another Atkins book, "Eye on Nixon," will provide royalties to the American Red Cross.

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

BALTIMORE SUN

12 MAY 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006

[redacted]

STATINTL

TRB

Mercenary use in Laos shows evils of secrecy

Washington.

Secrecy leads to self-deception. If you want proof of that overlooked political axiom, then look at the way we have gotten involved with a secret mercenary army in Laos.

It all started off not so innocently a decade ago when the Central Intelligence Agency recruited, directed and supported an army of Meo tribesmen to keep Laos from going Communist. It was like having a Gurkha army of our own, only no one knew we had it and thus nobody cared that we were getting ever more involved in a war in Laos.

It was all going along splendidly until the CIA sent General Vang Pao and his army off on an ill-fated offensive last spring. The Meo "irregulars" got chewed up; they had about 10 per cent casualties. That might not have been too bad except there were no more tribesmen to recruit in Laos. So the CIA started recruiting mercenaries in Thailand, only it called them "volunteers." Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has discovered that we have a $100 million annual commitment to finance an army of 10,000 Thai "volunteers" fighting in Laos.

The Thai like it because they are getting good pay as well as extra military assistance from the United States. Presumably the Lao like it because the Meo and Thai can do the fighting. But what about the Congress and the poor American taxpayer who never knew they were running up a $100 million annual bill in Laos? And what does it say about the present moral character of a nation that 200 years ago won its independence fighting Hessian mercenaries?

Put aside all the moral, geopolitical and financial considerations. It's also a disturbing case of the evils of secrecy in our government and Congress. Secrecy provides a way to subvert the constitutional checks and balances of the war powers.

Oh sure, the CIA informed a few members of the Appropriations Committee. But then it intimidated them by explaining it was so hush-hush they couldn't talk about it to the rest of Congress. After that the privileged few didn't even bother to raise questions—that was until Senator Stuart Symington and his Foreign Relations subcommittee came along and started poking around in the secret war in Laos. Even now the State Department and CIA won't 'fess up to what they are doing with the Thai mercenaries. The reason is that Congress last year passed a law prohibiting the use of defense funds to help third-country forces fight in support of the Laotian or Cambodian governments. If all the facts were made public, it would be evident that the executive branch was violating the law.

It's easy enough to blame the executive branch for its secrecy. Everybody knows—including President Nixon, who issued a new executive order on classification recently—that the government business is weighted down with excessive secrecy. There's probably no cure unless bureaucrats are punished for over-classification, and nobody is about to do that. But much of the blame must be placed on Congress for the way it has tolerated secrecy even within its own ranks.

For all its criticism of the executive branch, Congress really likes secrecy. At least those in power do because secrecy means power. "If you only knew what I know" makes a senator very important in his own eyes and in the eyes of his colleagues. It also is a very good argument to silence any upstart who dares question the wisdom of the Appropriations Committee or the Armed Services Committee.

If you want a bewildering example, take the case of Senator Symington. One day he is issuing a statement deploring the executive branch's secrecy on the Thai mercenaries. The next day he is on the Senate floor questioning whether secrets should be given to members of Congress except those on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Atomic Energy committees. Senator Symington, it should be pointed out, is the only member of all three committees.

Secrecy is also a convenient way for Congress to avoid responsibility it really doesn't like. "Only the President has access to all the secret information and he must know what is right." That's a common refrain around Capitol Hill these days when the President is getting us deeper into the Vietnam war. It's also an easy way to hide behind the President and duck responsibility.

The whole security system obviously is not going to come tumbling down. Nor should it. But once Congress starts questioning it, maybe it will begin to realize that Senator Mike Gravel has a point when he argues that Congress also can determine what information should be made public. Right now it's reached the point of absurdity; the Senate sends its debates in secret session down to the executive branch to be declassified.

Congress ought to understand that it need not be such a willing, acquiescent partner in a secrecy system that leads not only to deception [illegible] Congress.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

MAY 13 1972

Laos On The Brink

Besides the growing number of defeats of the South Vietnamese army on its home ground, another sign of the failure of the Nixon policy is the deteriorating military situation in Laos and Cambodia despite the Administration's expansion of the war into these areas in defiance of the will of Congress.

A newly published censored report of the findings of an investigative team sent to the area by a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee has revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency is training and maintaining 25 battalions of irregular Thai troops in Laos in spite of a congressional ban against United States financing of "third country troops" in that country. The pretense given to excuse this circumvention of the law is that the Thai mercenaries are "local forces."

Even with outside help, both Laos and Cambodia, the Senate report said, are being held in their present precariously defended state only because of restraints which the North Vietnamese have imposed on themselves.

At the same time that the Nixon Administration is ignoring a congressional prohibition against financing a proxy war in Laos and congressional advice calling for a halt in U. S. military operations in Indochina by a date certain, Mr. Nixon continues to defend the corrupt and despotic Thieu regime as the means to provide self-determination for the South Vietnamese.

Meanwhile, the disastrous consequences of the Administration's bankrupt and legislatively unsupported policy are being hidden from the American people by a veil of secrecy which, as noted by Subcommittee Chairman Symington, doesn't keep officials in Laos from publicly talking about the U.S. role there and revealing information that is no secret to Hanoi.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
13 MAY 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006

Elsewhere in Indochina

If anyone requires further documentation of Vietnam's corrosive effect on American institutions, let him read the new Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report entitled "Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: January 1972." In the 1971 Defense Procurement Act, the Congress—with Laos foremost in mind—declared that American defense funds could not be used to support the soldiers of a second country fighting in a third country. But the Nixon administration determined that Laos needed help. So now, says the report, the United States—through the Central Intelligence Agency—provides up to $100 million a year for Thai "irregulars" to fight in Laos. Thailand doesn't acknowledge this arrangement. The United States, deferring to the Thais, acknowledges it just barely. But the Laotian Prime Minister, in a moment of candor shared last January with none other than the Voice of America, spilled most of the beans all the same.

So much for that sordid corner of American policy. The report illuminates others as well. Its chief value, however, lies in its incisive description of the pickle in which Laos and Cambodia are in: victims not only of North Vietnam but of the United States, South Vietnam and Thailand which all "use Laos and Cambodia for their own purposes, regarding them as the preferred battleground on which to engage the North Vietnamese." The United States drops bombs in Laos and Cambodia, South Vietnam periodically invades (or used to, before its current difficulties closer to home), and Thailand sends "volunteers" for money.

So it is, the report concludes, that a partial settlement in Laos and Cambodia, no less than a collapse, would discomfit American policy: "our present strategy requires that these two countries be supported and kept in the war. Without our military and economic assistance, and the leverage which it affords, there would be no way of preventing settlements from being imposed or compromises from being struck."

It is, of course, not a partial settlement in Laos and Cambodia but a settlement or at least a ceasefire throughout Indochina that is President Nixon's goal. He stated it again last Monday. The longer he fails to bring off an end to the war in Vietnam, however, the longer he will feel compelled to attempt devious circumventions of restrictions laid down by Congress. The longer, as well, will Laos and Cambodia remain battlegrounds regardless of their own national wills, and the more vulnerable to eventual North Vietnamese domination will they become.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
13 MAY 1972
STATINTL

Guns And Diplomacy

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Thailand: America's Land-Based Aircraft Carrier'

Last of a series

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Although Thailand has been one of the heaviest beneficiaries of U.S. military aid largesse (in the range of $60 to $80 million a year), its government is not disposed to brag about the fact.

The penchant for secrecy about American military activities and presence in Thailand is as strong as among any of the 46 countries that receive U.S. military aid.

It took the Thais well over a year to acknowledge the existence of six U.S. air bases that were secretly constructed during the mid-60s to attack Communist targets in Laos, North Vietnam and, most recently, Cambodia.

U.S. officials in Bangkok still regularly deny visiting American journalists access to the Thai-owned but American-built and operated bases. Courteously and with deep regret, the embassy explains that the Thais do not welcome visitors.

The Thais, who pursue a supple form of diplomatic *realpolitik*, Asian style, have thrown in their security chips with the United States by way of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and a bilateral agreement signed by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1962.

Free to Extricate

But, with an eye on their Chinese and North Vietnamese neighbors, the Thais want to be free to extricate themselves from the appearance of being in hock to a Western power which is, in turn, trying to disentangle itself from Southeast Asia.

Yet, in making the case before Congress for Thailand's $60 million basic annual ration of military aid it is traditional for administration witnesses to speak of: (1) The Insurgency and (2) The External Threat.

Adm. Thomas G. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed this script when he went before the House Armed Services Committee last March 15.

"Our military assistance program is planned," he said, "to improve the ability of the Thai armed forces to combat insurgency, and at the same time to increase their capability to combat the external threat."

However a week of interviews with official and non-governmental authorities in Thailand suggest a different view of the commitment.

The Insurgency: Yes, there is a worrying sort of insurgency that has slowly grown over the past five years. But from the perspective of Bangkok there is no clear and present danger from the 6,000 armed insurgent soldiers scattered [illegible] the country. Thailand is a country of 35 million. Its armed forces number 170,000—a force that is supplemented by some 70,000 provincial and border police.

Mistrustful of China

The External Threat: There is little visible fear in Thailand's capital of armed invasion by China or by North Vietnam across the Indochinese peninsula. The Thais, though congenitally mistrustful of China, are now exploring possibilities of contact with Peking, after the example of President Nixon. The strategic interests of the North Vietnamese lie to the east of Thailand, along the Laotian portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

If there are fears in Washington of the Thai domino tottering, it is a concern that is not evident in Bangkok.

In the tough, unsentimental view from Bangkok the hundreds of millions of dollars in aid that have been dispensed by the United States has been payment, both to the country and individual members of the elite, for Thailand's willingness to serve as America's "privileged sanctuary" in the Indochina war.

"The Thai government has been anti-Communist, conservative, pro-American and happy to accept enormous amounts of U.S. assistance," said one long-resident American observer in Bangkok.

Thailand has been called an American "land-based aircraft carrier" and events since the renewal of heavy fighting in South Vietnam tend to bear out this description.

Base Reactivated

Since the North Vietnamese offensive started in March the United States has reactivated Takhli Air Force Base in Thailand to accommodate the post-offensive buildup of American airpower in the war zone.

While the U.S. troop presence is still, as the administration claims, drawing down in South Vietnam it is creeping back up in Thailand to match the switch in the American role from the ground to the air. As of last weekend 4,000 new American arrivals had augmented the 32,000 Air Force and Army troops in Thailand.

The United States has spent well over $2 billion in Thailand since 1950, including several hundred million for air base construction alone. This year a combination of military and economic aid together with American military spending will add up to about $215 million—far more if the build-up continues at its present rate.

Personnel Freeze

A striking indicator of the priorities of Americans in Thailand is the fact that only 4,000 of the 36,000 U.S. military men now based there are associated with activities inside the country. [illegible] Air Force personnel carrying out duties that relate to the Indochina war, according to officially sanitized figures released to the staff of the Symington Subcommittee on foreign military commitments.

A personnel freeze similar to the one Congress imposed on U.S. presence in Cambodia has been suggested for Thailand by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) "Thailand," said Symington, "would appear to be planned as the base for all United States operations in Southeast Asia."

In fact, the number of official Americans in Thailand has been substantially lowered from the high point of 48,000 in 1968 to 32,000 last February at the beginning of the offensive.

But the new upward turn of the war has, as Symington suggested, heightened Thailand's importance. From the standpoint of military planners the American investment in Thailand, cemented by SEATO and the 1962 agreement, is paying off once again.

The B-52s and fighter aircraft that are pounding North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are originating—in greater and greater proportions—from the six U.S. bases on Thai territory.

Thailand's agreement to furnish manpower for the teetering defense against Communist forces in Laos is credited by some high-level American officials with having saved Long Cheng, the Central Intelligence Agency base for the U.S.-supervised Meo guerrilla army.

In an interview with The Washington Post at Long Cheng in March, Meo guerrilla commander General Vang Pao paid tribute to the B-52 tactical strikes at Communist forces surrounding Long Cheng. The missions into Laos are normally flown from Thailand.

A more revealing glimpse than has previously been provided at the extent of official U.S. support of the Thai expeditionary force in Laos was provided Monday by the new Symington Subcommittee staff report.

It asserted that the United States had agreed to underwrite a Thai force of about 10,000 men in Laos at a yearly cost of $100 million. CIA officials, the report said, paid the salaries of the Thai irregulars to Thai liaison officers at Udorn base.

The significance of the revelation is that it raised doubts about a Congressional prohibition against Defense Department funding of "third country" forces in Laos or Cambodia. The measure was an expression of the Congressional mood against expansion of American military or financial commitments in Indochina.

The Thai mood is changing, too, in the aftermath of President Nixon's trip to China and the President's alleged desire to disengage the United States from Southeast Asia. When the American military silhouette disappears, the [illegible] Thailand may want its neighbors to forget about the golden pipeline that flowed from Washington.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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CHARLESTON, W.VA.
GAZETTE
M - 63,294
GAZETTE-MAIL
S - 106,775

MAY 11 1972

Is Association With CIA Good?

Some candidates in West Virginia have made certain that their biographies include the information that they had been employes of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We don't know why. The CIA apparently is the world's largest, most powerful and most inept espionage agency.

It was the CIA, you will recall, that didn't have the slightest advance knowledge of the meticulously-planned 1968 Tet offensive launched against all the major cities in South Vietnam.

It was the same CIA, presently busy with its own private war in Laos, that didn't anticipate the North Vietnamese thrust across the demilitarized zone.

The massing of troops, the stockpiling of supplies and other activities that precede large military offensives should have been noticed by somebody on our side, we would think.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

THE LONDON TIMES
9 May 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

[redacted]

STATINTL

CIA behind Thai regulars in Laos

From Fred Emery
Washington, May 8

The Central Intelligence Agency is the paymaster for an expeditionary force in Laos of some 8,000 Thai "volunteers," with plans to increase it to some 14,000 men at a yearly cost of $100m (£40m), it was disclosed today in a staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The numbers and cost involved in this operation have been previously kept secret, with the Nixon Administration invoking Thai Government sensitivities.

However, Senator Stuart Symington, chairman of a Foreign Relations sub-committee, says in a preface to the staff report that the Congressional ban on American support for third country forces in Laos "is apparently being violated in letter as well as in spirit." The Administration's defence is that the troops are "local" forces.

The report questions the Administration's contention that the men are volunteers drawn from the large community of ethnic Lao living in Thailand. It asserts the men are recruited "by the Royal Thai army from all over Thailand" with a specific cadre of officers and ncos from the regular army.

The report, written before the current Communist offensive in South Vietnam, states that "Laos is closer to falling now than any time in the past nine years. Cambodia has lost half its territory, and is insecure in the remainder. . . The North Vietnamese will be able to continue to use the territory of Laos and Cambodia to pursue the war in South Vietnam, no matter how successful Vietnamization proves to be and to keep South Vietnam in a permanent state of seige".

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0[redacted]

U.S. report gives grim Laos, Cambodia facts

STATINTL

By Lucia Mouat
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

While world attention focuses chiefly on the Hanoi offensive in South Vietnam, the war also continues in neighboring Laos and Cambodia—and the prospects for a favorable end are not a great deal brighter.

Such is the thrust of a detailed report just released by the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad.

Based in part on a three-week visit to Southeast Asia last January by subcommittee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, the report essentially updates visits they made to the area over the last couple of years and information gleaned in the course of past committee hearings.

A covering letter from subcommittee chairman Sen. Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri to committee chairman Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas refers in blanket terms to the "deteriorating military, political, and economic situations" in Laos and Cambodia and notes, "We are offered nothing but the prospect of more of the same at higher cost." According to the report, the countries are preserved, in the final analysis, "only by the restrictions that the North Vietnamese have imposed on themselves."

Full access reported

Mr. Lowenstein and Mr. Moose had full access to unclassified information — agreeing in turn to let the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Departments of State and Defense censor what they deemed necessary from the final report. That process has taken the better part of the last two months.

The result is that the 39-page report is as fascinating in parts for what has been left out as for what has been left in.

Sensitivity of the Thai Government, for instance, was given as the reason for deleting such statistics as the number of Thai troops fighting the counterinsurgency effort in Thailand and the number of Thai irregular troops helping to fight the ground war in Laos. Yet left intact in the report are such potentially damaging conclusions as the suggestion by some Thais (with whom the staff members talked) that Thailand's counterinsurgency effort suffered more from complacency than coordination problems and that action taken has been the result above all of American urging.

Among the more discouraging statistics included: Top estimates of the total number of enemy forces in Laos went up from 139,000 in April, 1971, to 145,000 in January, 1972. In the same period, Lao irregular troops, considered the prime fighting force on the other side, dwindled from 30,000 to 27,000. The report also notes that Khmer Communist strength in Cambodia, estimated at 3,000 in May, 1970, is believed to be closer to 20,000, and some estimates put it as high as 50,000.

Delving in detail into United States military and economic assistance in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the report concludes that government cooperation in each is imperative to current U.S. strategy and, despite the lack of formal requirements, forecasts an unending commitment in U.S. funds. The report argues that the situation is such that these countries, dependent on U.S. support, are left with no possibility of agreeing to a compromise that might offer an alternative to the continued fighting.

Strong theme

One theme that comes across strongly in the report is that Washington is far more concerned about the Thai insurgency than the Thais themselves. Many Thais, the report notes, are relatively preoccupied with China and its role in the insurgency and in road building near the Thai border and are not that concerned about the war in the other Indo-China countries.

One of the purposes of this report, as with those that preceded it, is to try to get more information about the U.S. role in Indo-China into the public realm. (Noticeably, Washington is becoming much more open about the role of the CIA in the Laotian war.) This report for the first time, for instance, describes in detail the CIA installation at Udorn air base in Thailand and allows mention of the fact that it serves as the liaison office for the Thai irregular forces in Laos. Also made public for the first time are such details as the number of U.S. planes in Thailand (450), the fact that helicopter gunships are in use in Laos, and a series of figures on tactical air sorties in Indo-China.

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

NEW YORK TIMES
MAY 8 1972

STATIN

U.S. Pledge for Thai Units In Laos Put at $100-Million

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 7—The United States has committed itself to provide up to $100-million a year to support a Thai irregular army of 10,000 men to right in Laos. A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said today.

The report also said that for the first time American helicopter gunships, under United States Army command but apparently flown by Thai pilots, were being used in Northern Laos to support medical evacuation missions and that the Thai Air Force, using equipment and ammunition supplied by the United States, was flying combat support missions in Laos.

The extent to which Thai forces, with United States financial support and encouragement, have become involved in the war in northern Laos, was described in a report by two committee staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, on a study mission they made to Laos, Cambodia and Thailand in January.

A copy of the report, heavily censored by the executive branch, was made public today by Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad.

In an accompanying statement, Senator Symington complained that the Administration was excessively secret about United States activities in Laos, largely in deference to the "sensitivity" of the Thai Government. In particular, he criticized the executive branch for refusing to declassify information obtained by the staff members that, he said, cast doubt on the legality of the payment by the United States of the costs of Thai "irregulars" fighting in Laos.

When pressed by the Symington subcommittee, the State Department acknowledged nearly a year ago that the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, was paying Thai "volunteers" to fight in Laos in support of the Laotian Government.

Defense Provision a Factor

There has been a running disagreement between the State Department and the committee, however, on whether the recruitment and support of Thai soldiers violated the so-called "antimercenary" provision in the 1971 Defense Procurement Act. The provision prohibited the use of defense funds for forces of a third country, such as Thailand, fighting in support of the Government of Laos or Cambodia.

The State Department has argued that the Thai irregulars in Laos are not regular troops but volunteers recruited from ethnic Laotians living in Thailand and fighting under the over-all command of the Laotian Government. It has also suggested that Central Intelligence Agency funds not covered by the Defense Procurement Act were being used.

In spite of numerous deletions insisted upon by the executive branch in two months of negotiations with the committee, the report contains several statements indicating tha the "irregular" forces are built around cadres recruited from regular Thai Army units and are under the direct command of Thai officers who assume Laotian names when they go to Laos. The following information emerged from the report:

¶The "irregulars" are recruited by the Thai Army "from all over Thailand" and "no special effort was made to recruit ethnic Lao as distinct from other Thai."

¶The Thai Army is supposed to recruit cadres of officers and noncommissioned officers for the "irregular" forces on a volunteer basis. The officers "go to Laos in separate Thai units —not individually."

¶Both the C.I.A. and the Thai Army maintain headquarters at Udorn Air Force Base in Thailand that provide "liaison" with the Thai "irregular" forces in Laos.

¶The "irregulars" are trained in Thailand by a 200-man detachment of the United States Army Special Forces on temporary assignment from Okinawa provides 60 per cent of the training. Basic pay plus bonuses—are made by the C.I.A. to the Thai liaison unit at Udorn, which clearly suggests a government-to-government relationship.

Premier Is Quoted

Although the executive branch refused to disclose how many Thai "irregulars" are now in Laos or how many are planned for the future, the Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, discussed the plans openly in a Jan. 14 Voice of America interview quoted in the report.

In the interview, Prince Souvanna Phouma said 15 or 16 battalions of Thai "volunteers" were already in Laos and that "in concurrence with the Americans we have planned for 25 to 26 battalions." There are about 370 men in a battalion.

The report said that the C.I.A. estimated the annual cost of supporting a battalion at $4-million. "Thus," it says, "based on Souvanna's estimate of 25 battalions, the cost of maintaining the present Thai irregular force for a year will be approximately $100-million."

The report clearly suggests that the Thai Air Force is flying combat missions in Laos and that through budgetary arrangements the executive branch is seeking to circumvent the prohibition in the Defense Procurement Act so that the United States can provide support for such missions.

Helicopters on Loan

On the introduction of helicopter gunships into northern Laos, the report said:

"We were told that these helicopters were on loan from United States Army units in Vietnam to the army attaché's office in Vientianne and that they would be under the command and control of an assistant United States Army attaché who would be in the air when they were in use.

"The assistant attaché in charge of the program assured us thta the gunships will be used only for support of medevac missions for the Thai irregulars in Laos and the Lao irregular and regular forces."

A reference to the pilots who would fly the helicopter gunships was deleted by the executive branch.

On the general political situation in Thailand, the report noted "some nervousness" among Thai offiicals about whether "such a close identification with the United States is still an asset," particularly in view of the Nixon administration's effects to improve relations with Communist China and the withdrawal of United Staets forces from Vietnam.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
8 May 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601
STATINTL

CIA Said To Support Thai Force In Laos

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, May 8 — About 25 battalions of Thai irregular troops fighting in Laos are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency at a cost of about $100,000,000 a year, a report to the Senate indicated today.

The report was made public by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, chairman of the foreign relations subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad. Many deletions were made by the Executive Branch from the published version, for security reasons.

"The Administration has said it is lifting the veil of secrecy that has surrounded so many Government activities," Symington said in a statement complaining about the deletions.

"Yet it insists on keeping classified certain information for which we see no legitimate security argument."

The Symington subcommittee report, which the panel received in closed session March 1, said the Thai irregular battalions in Laos were supposed to have a strength of about 550 men each.

Thai private soldiers in Laos were said to be paid about $75 a month from funds provided by the CIA. That is nearly three times the $26 a month received by regular Thai army soldiers in their own country.

Symington said today that the Administration of President Richard M. Nixon still was insisting that the number of Thai troops in Laos was a secret even thought the Laotian Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, has talked publicly about the number involved.

This remains true, Symington said, "even though all of the costs ... are borne by the United States."

The Symington panel's report said United States forces and advisers had been kept out of Cambodia, as required by the Cooper-Church Amendment, but that the Executive Branch had circumvented Congress's ban against American financing of "third-country troops" in Laos.

Symington said the Executive Branch contended that the Tahi irregulars, who have been doing most of the fighting in Laos, were "local forces".

The Thai troops in Laos are trained in Thailand at sites built or rebuilt with Department of Defense Military Assistance Program funds and operated by the CIA. Training is supervised by 60 United States Special Forces personnel sent from Okinawa.

James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose of the subcommittee staff made the 39-page report after a visit to Thailand, Laos and Cambodia last January. Their findings originally were classified secret, making deletions for a public verions took eight weeks.

Symington commented that the picture of the situation in Laos and Cambodia in January "is a gloomy one indeed."

"Now that our attention is focussed primarily on events in Vietnam, with no immediate crisis in either of those two countries, there may be a tendency to forget Laos and Cambodia," Symington said.

"Nevertheless, the weakness of the Government's position in both countries, along with the enemy's ability to continue to prosecute the war, remain vitally important factors when considering the future course of events in Indochina."

The Lowenstein-Moose report said Laos was closer to falling to the Communist foe than at any time in the last nine years. Cambodia, it was said, has lost half its territory and is not secure in its tenure of the other half.

"Both countries are preserved, in the final analysis, only by the restrictions that the North Vietnamese have imposed on themselves," the report said.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
8 MAY 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
STATINTL

Thai Force in Laos Financed By U.S., Secret Report Says

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Foreign Service

In order to prevent a military defeat in Laos, the United States undertook to finance and organize a 25-battalion expeditionary force of Thai "volunteers" at an estimated yearly cost of $100 million, according to a heavily censored Senate staff report released yesterday.

Although the presence of Thai units in Laos was officially acknowledged after press disclosures of their presence, their numbers and costs have been kept secret by U.S. officials in Washington and Vientiane—primarily because of Thai governmental sensitivities.

The Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Defense and State Departments, spent more than two months clearing the staff report which was prepared for the Symington subcommittee on security commitments abroad. The document was riddled with official deletions. It was prepared by Foreign Relations Committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose.

The purpose of the report was to give Congress a comprehensive picture of U.S. financed military activities in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.

As described publicly for the first time in the staff report, the salaries of the Thai irregulars are paid by CIA officials to Thai officers at Udorn Air Base near the Lao border in northeast Thailand. The method of payment, by U.S. government officials to regular Thai officers, has been previously classified.

In earlier statements administration spokesmen have said that the Thai units were primarily ethnic Lao who had volunteered as local forces to fight the Communists in their ancestral homeland. The staff report said, however, that the irregulars were recruited from all over Thailand. An irregular private, according to the report, is paid $76 a month—three times the salary of a regular Thai private.

Portions of the report that apparently tended to question the voluntary nature of the program were deleted from the sanitized version made public.

An example of the intense censorship applied to the staff document was the following paragraph on the Thai presence in Laos:

"At the time of our visit, there were (deleted) Thai irregular infantry battalions in Laos and (deleted) on leave in Thailand. Of the deleted) in Laos, (deleted) were in (deleted), (deleted) in the deleted) and deleted) at (deleted)."

The Thai units, introduced into Laos in 1970, were designated as "volunteers" after Congress adopted an amendment by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) to prohibit U.S. funding of "third country forces" to support the Lao and Cambodian governments. Fulbright's purpose was to limit further American military and financial commitments in Indochina.

Despite the tight secrecy maintained on all details of the irregular operations, the report cited a previously-unnoticed Voice of America interview with Laotian Premier Souvanna Phoum. It provided the first and only official statement on the size of the force.

In the January 14 broadcast Souvanna confirmed that American and Lao officials had agreed on a "volunteer" force of 25 to 26 battalions to fight in Laos but had been able to raise about 15. (Theer are about 400 men in a Thai irregular battalion.)

Souvanna told the VOA interviewer that he hoped to have five or six more battalions recruited for duty by this month. "They can't be called Thai battalions," Souvanna emphasized in the interview. "We must call them volunteer battalions."

Recruitment Moves

Moose and Lowenstein reported interviewing two irregulars at training camps in Thailand to find out how they had been recruited.

"One was a private, and he told us that he had volunteered because (deleted). The other was a non-commissioned officer. He told us that (deleted) . . . We were told subsequently in Bangkok that (deleted)."

Introduction of the Thai forces came at a time when the war started going very badly for the Lao irregulars, who like their Thai counterparts are CIA supervised. Officials in Vientiane, said the staff report, asserted that were it not for the Thais the strategic CIA base at Long Cheng would have fallen to North Vietnamese infantry units during the past year.

The censoring agencies refused to declassify the Thai casualties in Laos, although figures were given for the Lao irregulars as well as regular Laotian army units. News reports at the time of last winter's operation near Long Cheng said there were heavy casualties among Thai artillery units.

The casualty figures showed that the Lao highland irregulars who bear the brunt of the combat were dying in battle at about four times the rate of the regular Lao army units. In 1971, according to official figures, there were 2,259 Lao irregulars killed as against 557 regular army troops.

Heavy Losses

The CIA-supervised irregular force numbered 27,000 this year as compared to 30,000 in April, 1971—another indication of the heavy battle losses among the Lao government guerrillas.

Though strong efforts have been made to minimize the Thai government's role in the irregular program because of Congressional restrictions, the report notes —for the first time publicly —the existence of a $15 million "Additional Aid to Thailand" allocation in the Pentagon's fiscal 1972 military aid budget.

The Defense Department's special military aid budget for Southeast Asia has been used as a means of making extra payments to the Thai government for military services in Vietnam. The "Additional Aid to Thailand" program was described in the Senate report as a "one shot injection" to build up Thai forces "to cope with the greater external threat posed by developments in Laos and Cambodia . . ."

Air sortie raids by American aircraft in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam also were broken down for the first time in the report. The breakdown showed that while the overall rate of tactical air sorties had dropped by 10 per cent during 1971 there was a sharp rise in both Cambodia (from about 9,000 to 16,500) and North Vietnam (from 2,000 to 4,500). There were no figures for the stepped-up air war during the current offensive in South Vietnam.

Moose and Lowenstein note that in Cambodia U.S. Embassy officials had no idea of the extent of B-52 bombing of the county.

"The general impression in the embassy was that there had been only a half a dozen or so B-52 strikes in Cambodia during the past six months," the report said. "In fact there were almost 1,000 in the last six months of 1971 and (deleted) in January 1972 alone."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0[redacted]

Report Bares Role Of U.S. in Laos

Before their current offensive in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese had already retaken sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia and were on the verge of toppling Laos, according to a new Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report.

"Laos is closer to falling now than at any time in the past nine years," the report concluded. "Cambodia has lost half of its territory and is insecure in the remainder."

The 39-page report, released today, was submitted to the Committee March 1 and is the work of James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, who visited Cambodia, Laos and Thailand in January. The text is heavily censored as the result of two months of Senate negotiations with State Department, Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Lowenstein and Moose also have produced for the first time details of how the United States has committed itself to pay up to $100 million to support 25 battalions of Thai irregular troops in Laos.

Many Deletions

Their report also states that another $3 million is going into maintenance and pilot training for eight helicopter gunships flown by the Thais to protect medical evacuation.

The authors suggest that without the Thai irregulars, who have taken heavy losses in Laos, the key CIA base of Long Cheng on the edge of hhe Plain of Jars would have fallen. The constant deletions in the report of words and phrases about the numbers and role of these irregulars—who are labelled "volunteers" in official language—reflects the extreme sensitivity of the Thai government about its participation in the Laotian war.

"At the time of our visit," reads one key section, "there were (deleted) Thai irregular-infantry battalions in Laos and (deleted) on leave in Thailand. Of the (deleted) in Laos, (deleted) were in (deleted), (deleted) in the (deleted) and (deleted) at (deleted). There were also [illegible] battalions deployed."

Regarding Cambodia, Lowenstein and Moose are far more pessimistic than after their last visit in April 1971. Last January, they found Cambodian morale sagging, increasing disaffection with the Lon Nol government, and military disaster embodied in an ill-fated "Chenla II" offensive in October 1971 against North Vietnamese supply and infiltration lines.

Area Retaken

Specifically the report states that a key area which the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were supposed to have cleaned out in the May 1970 incursions, "has reverted to complete Communist control." The border sanctuary area north of route 7 and opposite Military Regions I and II in South Vietnam was to be the staging area for the North Vietnamese thrust toward Saigon in this offensive.

Lowenstein and Moose also found the U.S. military and economic assistance program in Cambodia in disarray. For instance, they found that the American Embassy in Cambodia is not involved in American air strikes in Cambodia—"Indeed, they are not even aware of their extent."

Perhaps the most sensitive part of the report, however, deals with the Thai irregulars in Laos, since a running argument exists between the State Department and Senate Foreign Relations Committee over legality of American financing of them. The State Department claims they are volunteers, and therefore not included under the anti-mercenary provisions of the 1970 Defense Procurement Act prohibiting U.S. support of foreign forces in Laos and Cambodia.

Despite secrecy of numbers, the report quotes an interview Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma gave a Voice of America correspondent Jan. 14 citing how many Thais in Laos now and how many are planned for the future.

Souvanna said 15 or 16 battalions of "volunteers" were already there, and that 25 or 26 were planned for the future. There are about 370 men to a battalion—a total of 9,620 planned for the future.

The report says cost of supporting one battalion of these irregulars is $4 million to the United States. Therefore, using Souvanna's estimate of 25 battalions, it concludes that the cost to the United States will be $100 million a year.—SHERMAN

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

ceeded, special remedial measures are supposed to be taken.

7. GAO reports that "In analyzing the reports available on mortalities for the 3-month period ended June 30, 1971, we found that, for the month of June, the actual deaths exceeded this criterion from 110 percent to 900 percent at 16 locations. For the months of April and May, we found that the criterion was exceeded at 10 locations for each month."

8. "Documentation indicating that Public Health Division officials were aware that the mortality rate was significantly beyond the established criterion was available in only three of the 26 locations referred to above."

FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF THE REFUGEE RELIEF PROGRAM IN LAOS

("SANITIZED" SUMMARY OF CLASSIFIED GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT)

INTRODUCTION

1. Refugee relief in Laos is administered under the terms of a project agreement between the United States Government and the Royal Lao Government.

a. GAO states that "although this is a joint program, the United States has assumed virtually all operational and funding responsibility for it."

b. Although the reference is classified "secret" in the report, it is generally recognized that U.S. assistance is provided jointly through at least A.I.D., the Department of Defense and the C.I.A., and that AID has the overall responsibility for administering this assistance.

2. "Refugees" covered by the U.S. assistance programs include civilians displaced by military conflict, and certain military and para-military forces and their dependents. Although the reference is classified "secret" in the report, it is generally recognized that the number of refugees, officially registered for assistance during the GAO investigation, exceeded 300,000. The number of refugees on official relief rolls, at any given time, has steadily increased in recent years.

(NOTE: The total number of refugees created by the Laos War approaches 1,000,000—more than a third of the population of Laos.)

3. "At the initiation of our review, State Department and AID officials in Washington, D.C., advised us that files would be reviewed to remove (1) documents prepared separately or jointly by other agencies, (2) sensitive information requiring higher levels of review, (3) congressional and White House correspondence, and (4) any classified information determined not to be important to our review.

"Although we have no knowledge of the withholding of any information concerning the matters discussed in this report, we cannot be certain that we had access to all relevant data. It did appear that restrictions were not being applied at USAID/Laos."

AID ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

1. The number of officially registered refugees, at any given time, has "increased by about 11 percent" in recent years, "while the value of assistance provided by the U.S. Government increased by about 81 percent."

2. Refugees programs costs are financed through a number of channels.

a. Unverified costs reported by AID in recent years follow:

Fiscal year:		
1969		$8,423,000
1970		15,776,000
1971		15,850,000
1972	(est.)	16,284,000

b. Unverified costs reported as transferred to USAID/Laos from the Department of Agriculture for PL–480 commodities are as follows:

Fiscal year:		
1969		800,000
1970		600,000
1971		1,300,000
1972	(est.)	1,400,000

c. Unverified costs reported by other agencies are classified "secret".

3. The various elements of AID costs and a breakdown for the last two fiscal years are as follows:

[Thousands omitted]

	Fiscal year—	
	1971	1972
Refugee relief and resettlement	$4,800	$6,285
Air technical support	4,070	3,845
Public health development	2,347	1,649
General technical support	672	690
Development of rural economy	3,570	3,256
Agricultural development	390	492
Education development	51	47
Total	15,850	16,284

4. For assistance purposes, refugees are classified as being (1) fully dependent, (2) partially dependent, (3) in need of no food assistance but requiring other types of support, and (4) paramilitary forces and their dependents.

5. Depending upon the classification of each refugee, assistance to those registered, officially includes some or all of the following:

Food.
Shelter.
Medical assistance.
Water supply.
Educational assistance.
Clothing, utensils and knives.
Vegetable and rice seeds.
Tools.
Fertilizer and insecticides.
Animals, such as pigs and chickens.
Land clearing, wells, and dams.

6. "The ultimate objective of the refugee relief program is to resettle the displaced people and make them self-sufficient. . . . At the time of our review, 51 resettlement villages inhabitated by 45,178 has been established" under the national relocation program created in 1966.

7. Although the references are classified "confidential", the GAO report confirms these independent findings of the Subcommittee:

a. that the successful resettlement of *all* Laos refugees will be difficult because two-thirds of the land in Laos has been lost to the enemy.

b. that there is "no ready solution" to the problem of *hill-tribe* refugees, mainly paramilitary combatants, because there are no mountain areas in government territory large enough to support these people.

8. The "Air Technical Support" category of AID refugee costs is used for "the distribution of commodities and the evacuation of refugees." Up to two-thirds of *total* AID obligations in the overall Air Technical Support Project, involving several U.S. agencies, are "refugee related." Nearly all paragraphs relating to the Project in the current GAO report are classified "secret" or "confidential."

9. The "Public Health Development" category of AID refugee costs was discussed in an earlier GAO report, released by the Subcommittee on March 19, 1972. Among other things, this report documented that AID health funds officially programmed for war victims continued to support CIA activities—after a 1971 assurance to the Subcommittee by AID Administrator John Hannah that the practice would be "terminated" on June 30, 1971.

10. Other categories of AID refugee costs are defined as follows:

a. General Technical Support—"supply management, warehousing, housing, office support, and surface transportation."

b. Development of Rural Economy—"rural self help, rural public works, and well-drilling."

c. Agricultural Development—"general management support, support of irrigation projects, and agricultural extension projects."

d. Education Development—"advisory assistance and certain commodity support."

11. PL–480 commodities:

a. GAO states that "we found that USAID/Laos needed to develop a plan for implementing its policy to substitute Public Law 480 commodities for a part of the food ration. The purpose of such substitution is to reduce dollar expenditures from purchases abroad of rice and protein supplement by USAID/Laos."

b. GAO notes that "in our visits to refugee offices located in the various military regions, we found that PL–480 commodities were not being used and were not being planned for use as substitute for rice in three of the regions. The only region that was using them as substitute was Vientiane. . . ."

c. U.S. commodities are "donated" to Laos under a Government-to-Government agreement under Title II of PL–480.

d. Wide gaps exist between what is programmed, received in country, and actually issued. For example, in fiscal year 1971, out of 8,456 metric tons of food programmed, only 4,585 metric tons were received, and only 2,596 metric tons were issued.

ASSISTANCE TO MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS

1. All paragraphs in this chapter of the GAO report are classified "secret" or "confidential".

2. This chapter, however—as did similar chapters in earlier GAO reports on Laos—continues to document and support independent findings of the Subcommittee. Separate GAO reports on refugee assistance and health care in Laos were initially released by the Subcommittee on February 7, 1971. A follow-up report on health care was issued on March 19, 1972. The report summarized here is the follow-up report on refugee assistance.

3. Some background on the current report on refugee assistance:

a. The decision to involve AID as a "cover" for support of Lao military et al—including, according to an internal USAID memorandum of January 1970, "direct military/logistical support"—was made at a high level of the U.S. government.

b. Early in 1971, the Subcommittee reported that a number of agreements among U.S. government agencies were transferring some portion of the funding responsibility from AID to more appropriate agencies, including Department of Defense. The Subcommittee also reported, however, that a very significant measure of this assistance was apparently continuing.

c. On May 7, 1971, in a letter addressed to Senator Kennedy, AID Administrator John Hannah stated: "I can report to you now that with one shift made early this year and others that will be effective at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the A.I.D. financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated."

4. The current report documents more progress in negotiating and implementing agreements on the transferring of obligations from AID to other agencies—but the report also documents that much confusion remains; that some AID support of Lao military et al continued after "the beginning of fiscal year 1972"; and that a Department of the U.S. Government, other than A.I.D., is also involved in the support of Lao military et al.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
2 MAY 1972

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Ridge Above Ex-C.I.A. Base Reported Taken by Laotians

VIENTIANE, Laos, May 1 (AP) —Laotian troops have regained complete control of vital Skyline Ridge, overlooking the former United States Central Intelligence Agency base of Long Tieng, 80 miles northeast of Vientiane, informed sources said today.

Government 105-mm. and 155-mm. guns softened the way for the Laotian advance against two helicopter landing pads. That gave them control of the ridge Saturday, the sources added.

Both pads were abandoned by Government troops March 14 under a heavy North Vietnamese artillery barrage. The pads are part of an eight-mile defense line on Skyline Ridge just north of Long Tieng village.

American sources expressed "cautious optimism" that Long Tieng could be held until monsoon rains begin in June, when the North Vietnamese traditionally withdraw to North Vietnam to reorganize.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

THE WORD from Washington

A few minutes before midnight on Wednesday, March 15, a State Department courier bearing a message from the President of the United States arrived at the Georgetown residence of Representative William S. Moorhead, the Pennsylvania Democrat who heads the House Subcommittee on Government Information. The Congressman was not entirely unprepared for the unusual visit, for he knew midnight was a deadline—the hour when American aid to Cambodia would automatically be suspended unless the President responded to a five-week-old request from the Subcommittee for a report on U.S. operations in Cambodia. Under a 1961 foreign aid statute, the Administration must supply such information to Congress within thirty-five days—or invoke the President's traditional prerogative of "executive privilege."

Mr. Moorhead might just as well have gone to bed. The word from the White House was that President Nixon would formally avail himself of "executive privilege." Although the papers the Subcommittee had sought —the annual "country field submission" compiled by the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency—had routinely been supplied since the Eisenhower years, Mr. Nixon had decided they were now "internal documents" not suitable for Congressional scrutiny. By invoking the "privilege," he would keep the money flowing while withholding the facts.

The President waited until the last minute to assert "executive privilege," and did so with marked reluctance, because he knows it raises the hackles of Congress and undermines his carefully cultivated image of an "open" Administration. He has formally invoked the "privilege" only three times since entering the White House. In this case, however, there were overriding considerations: to comply with the Moorhead Subcommittee's request would have meant disclosing details of the phantom army operated in Laos by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. This, in turn, might have raised questions about other covert activities carried on by the United States in Laos and Thailand. It might have put Indochina back on the front pages, contradicting the President's assertion of last December that "Vietnam will not be an issue in the campaign as far as this Administration is concerned, because we will have brought the American involvement to an end."

Well, Mr. Nixon miscalculated, as Presidents have had a way of miscalculating about Vietnam for a long time now. As this is written, Indochina *is* back on the front pages, and it *is* an issue in the campaign. The North Vietnamese—holding to the perverse notion that as long as the United States will not make peace, they might as well wage war—have taken the wraps off Mr. Nixon's secret.

As they say at the White House, some fellas just won't get on the team.

When the late Representative L. Mendel Rivers was chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, his Charleston district acquired a measure of notoriety as a sort of military-industrial complex in microcosm. His perennial campaign slogan was "Rivers Delivers," and the Army, Navy, and Air Force obliged by frantically scrambling to locate their installations in his bailiwick. The main entrance to the local Air Force base was "Rivers Gate," and a housing project on the Navy base was called "Men-Riv Park." There were fears that one more military facility might sink Charleston into the Atlantic.

It turns out that the Rivers phenomenon, while a bit on the egregious side, was not unique. A recent survey by *Congressional Quarterly* disclosed that two thirds of the members on both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees come from states or districts in which Department of Defense expenditures constitute the number one source of Federal money. The Pentagon looks after its own.

The figures help explain why the Armed Services Committees have nearly always been eager to meet the military's most inflated fund requests, rarely bothering to look at the cases of mismanagement, waste, and corruption that surface from time to time. "Money is no question," Rivers' successor, Louisiana Democrat F. Edward Hebert, told *Congressional Quarterly*. "I intend to build the strongest military we can get."

Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of New York, one of five habitual (and ineffective) dissenters on the thirty-nine-member House committee, says, "The House Armed Services Committee doesn't control the Pentagon; the Pentagon controls the House Armed Services Committee." By doing so, it also, in effect, controls the Congress. *CQ* found that in the past decade, the Senate has on only three occasions changed the dollar total of the military authorization bill reported by its Armed Services Committee. The House committee has a perfect record: Its recommendation has never been altered on the floor.

Chairman Hebert acknowledges that his power is "awesome," but he doesn't mind. Neither does the Pentagon.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

BOSTON, MASS.
RECORD-AMERICAN
M - 438,372
ADVERTISER
S - 432,963

APR 30 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

STATINTL

[redacted]

CIA Given "Cover" for Secret Operations

AID Denies Laos Funds Used for War

By JOHN WALLACH

Sunday Advertiser Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials in Laos continue to masquerade as Agency for International Development (AID) employes in prosecuting the "secret war" gainst the Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops, Charles Mann, director of the U.S. AID Mission in Laos, disclosed yesterday.

"AID has provided some CIA personnel with cover positions." Mann, director of the U. S., the end of a week of talks here before returning to Vientiene Sunday. 'Let me hasten to add, however, that these personnel have absolutely and utterly no policy functions," he said.

"They have no responsibility whatsoever for the directon of AID programs." Mann also denied allegations, included in a report last month by the Senate Refugees subcommittee, that AID funds were still being misused to support training and resettlement of indigenous Meo tribesmen that make up the government armies.

"There are no funds that are appropriated to AID that are being used for military purposes," he said.

★

AID director John Hannah pledged almost exactly a year ago, in a letter to the subcommittee chairman, Sen. Edward Kennedy, that "at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated."

A new cost-sharing arrangement was created and the CIA refunded the State Department agency for its medical assistance and other services provided the secret Royal Laotian Army.

Under this arrangement, Kennedy's subcommittee charged, about $2.5 million, or about half of the $4.9 congressional appropriation for humanitarian aid in Laos, will be spent this year [illegible] the war against the Communists.

According to Mann, in addition providing "cover" for CIA agents working out of AID offices, CIA officials are still relying on AID for logistical and medical support.

★

He called the cost-sharing plan a "perfectly logical and sensible arrangement" and said that the charge that AID funds have been used to support CIA activities was "basically wrong."

"We have 200 field dispensaries," Mann explained. "Obviously, if a wounded soldier comes to a dispensary or if a dependent of a soldier or a civilian who might have stepped on a mine or unfortunately just been wounded comes to us, you're not going to ask 'My dear friend, are you a soldier or are you a dependent of a soldier?' Are you going to tell him that because you stepped on a mine, therefore I cannot treat you and God bless, good luck, go some place else where there is no medical care.

"For the last year, nobody has hidden the presence of the CIA in Laos and the involvment of the irregular troops fighting there," Mann said.

As far back as 1970, Hannah conceded to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that since 1962 his agency had subsidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a front for secret agents, Mann explained.

But the issue, as framed by Kennedy, was the impossibility of distinguishing between humanitarian and military aid in Laos when both agencies are involved in complementary roles and where soldier tribesmen are almost always accompanied by their families.

Mann also denied that Long Tieng, the base of CIA operations in Laos, had ever been overrun by the North Vietnamese, as reports indicated earlier this year.

Mann said that there had been hard fighting at this southernmost position but "the headquarters of Military Region Two was never abandoned." The AID director praised the government army and said that the holding of Long Tieng was proof of capable performance.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

WASHINGTON POST
5/15 APR 1972

STATINTL

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AID Guise Still Used By CIA, Official Says

Central Intelligence Agency agents still operate in Laos under the guise of American foreign aid officials, according to the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) in Laos.

But he said no AID funds are going for military purposes.

Charles A. Mann, AID mission director in Laos since ~~1968~~, left for Vientianne yesterday after spending a week here in consultations. He said that AID supports the CIA in Laos "in a cost-sharing arrangement."

He made the remarks in an interview with UPI and Hearst newspaper reporters to be broadcast next Wednesday by WAMU-FM, the American University station here.

Mann noted that AID administrator John A. Hannah testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee two years ago that since 1962, AID had subsidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a cover for CIA agents there.

After Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate's Refugees Subcommittee, protested that AID funds were being misspent, Hannah informed him in a May, 1971, letter that "at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
30 APR 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Some Meo Tribesmen Would Rather Resettle Than Fight

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE—In the northern reaches of Laos, in the mountain country where the American embassy and the CIA run their no-longer-secret war, the Meo tribesmen are now being offered an alterntive to the unremitting warfare they have endured for a decade.

For 10 years, armed by the United States and led by their Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo have borne the brunt of the indecisive but debilitating war in the north. Despite cruel losses which have reduced them to a skeleton of their former force, the Meo have unflinchingly followed Vang Pao.

Now, however, a possible rival to Vang Pao has appeared. He is Ly Thek, a stocky, 34-year-old, Western-educated Meo who has established a sprawling refugee colony for Meo who want to drop out of the war.

"Ly Thek's colony is political," he says, referring to himself in the third person, "a political alternative to the war in the mountains. This is tomorrow's Meo. I am working on the future of the Meo."

Thirty-two miles north of Vientiane, for three miles off 13, Ly Thek's Meo villages are in various stages of settlement, pushing westward along barely passable roads into the virgin wilderness.

Along the highway there is a sense of permanence to the homes, pig sties, chicken coops and garden plots.

"Those have been here for two years now," Ly Thek explains. "Those in the wilderness, for only days. These people at the front help those further back, then those help others even further until the very last ones will help the next to come. It is our system for building the Meo home."

So far, approximately 3,000 Meo and Lao Theung have opted for Ly Thek's alternative. The Lao Theung are highland Lao who, in recent years, have helped fill the ranks of Vang Pao's once-all-Meo army.

The Americans are not pleased at the prospect of a pacifist Pied Piper leading the Meo out of battle.

The Meo were armed in the early 1960s, in the flush of Washington's infatuation with guerrilla warfare. Originally it was intended that they harass the Communist Pathet Lao and whatever North Vietnamese they could find behind Communist lines.

The task of arming them fell to the CIA because the American military presence, like the North Vietnamese presence, was in violation of the Geneva agreements. The Meo, in their turn, were willing recipients of American arms because they resented Communist efforts to regulate their lives.

But the buildup in Vietnam brought the North Vietnamese into northern Laos in force, and a decade of relentless bloodletting has given some Americans in Vientiane second thoughts. After all, they say, northern Laos is far from the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Perhaps the whole Meo effort so close to the North Vietnamese heartland had been a needless provocation from the start?

But the official American view is that Vang Pao's army is still the "only effective fighting force" on the government's side, and that therefore it must be preserved.

Nearly everyone knowledgeable in Laos agrees that the Meo have been bled to the point of near collapse, and that alternatives must be found soon if the Meo are to have a future. But American officials note quietly that alternatives now will speed that collapse.

Therefore Ly Thek's alternative has not found official favor, and, according to Ly Thek, the Americans have refused to give him the rice and refugee relief they give to Vang Pao's Meo.



Meo refugee colony has been set up 32 miles north of Vietiane off Highway 13, in area marked by crosshatching

"They tell me, 'Ly Thek, your people are not refugees, they wanted to move so we can do nothing.' Okay, maybe that is the best," he says.

"It will teach my people to depend on Meo—not on others. It will break habits they learn all these years with the Americans—to expect to be fed, given clothing, given doctors, given everything so that they will fight the Communists. We will create new Meo people here. We will become sophisticated and give up some of our mountain ways."

American refugee officials in Vientiane say that Ly Thek's settlement poses a special problem because only part of its residents are bona fide refugees eligible to receive assistance, the remainder having left northern Laos of their own choice. Figures on how many are in each category are not available, the sources say.

Traditionally, the Meo have always settled on the highest mountaintops to lead their semi-nomadic lives and perhaps to grow opium as a cash crop. It has always been said that they could not live in the sticky heat of the lowlands, and over the years no love has been lost between the aloof highlanders and the lowland Lao.

But the war has changed all that. Vang Pao's Meo have been driven out of the opium-growing regions and Ly Thek's colony is on the Mekong plain.

Ly Thek believes they will stay. "Look here, you see Meo beginning to learn to live here," he says. "Soon it will be like the Lao villages. We will be Lao people because the Meo and the Lao people will forget about their differences."

"Only time will tell whether their presence on the plain is proof of Meo adaptability or a measure of their willingness to go anywhere to escape the war. In the meantime, Ly Thek's colony has begun experimental plots of sugar cane, pineapple and bananas, and he has already sent five of his people into Vientiane to learn furniture-making.

In Ly Thek's view, "America will end its support for Vang Pao soon . . . Ly Thek respects Vang Pao, but he does not think the Meo will accept Vang Pao after the Americans stop support. Once the Meo army is defeated the Meo will look for a new leader. They already look for a new leader because they know."

Politics is a rough game in Laos, and assassination is something Ly Thek jokes about. But it is a strong possibility, he admits:

"There are some who would like to kill Ly Thek now, but he must do what he must do and not think too much about that."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

THE CHARLESTON, W. VIRGINIA GAZETTE
29 April 1962

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

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Editorials—

Why Isn't There Greater Outcery Against the CIA?

STATINTL

Literate Americans know, but may not care, that a taxpaid government espionage agency is waging a not-so-secret war in Laos against Communist insurgents in that country.

The administration cannot afford to send military troops into Laos, for such a move would be interpreted as an escalation of the war—which it surely would be.

In view of the mounting public distaste for American military adventures in other people's countries, we cannot understand why there is no outcery against the use of civilian CIA "troops" in Laos.

If more were known about the CIA, public indifference might change to outrage. Here are some episodes in which the CIA was involved, each of which outraged us:

►The CIA's spy plane over Russia demolished President Eisenhower's sincere efforts to improve relations with the Soviets. How would you like it if Russian spy planes were dispatched over America?

►The CIA conducted an armed intervention in order to save Guatemala from leftist political elements of which the prevailing powers didn't approve. Internal politics in Guatemala aren't any of America's business. How would you like it if Guatemalan spies worked to discredit one of the American political parties?

►The CIA secretly financed Radio Free Europe, which many of us innocently believed was supported wholly by private contributions. The CIA's takeover of RFE thoroughly stripped the radio station of credibility. How would you like it if a foreign spy network beamed radio messages into America under the cover of "information?"

►The CIA planned and directed the Bay of Pigs fiasco. How would you like it if a Cuban spy apparatus equipped an army of disgruntled American exiles and dispatched them as an invasion force bent on the overthrow of the governmnt?

►The CIA conducted a military operation in the Dominican Republic to prevent a rebellion which would have restored to power a president whom rightist forces had deposed. How would you like it if foreign spies had intervened in the American revolution in support of George III?

►The CIA gave armed support to the overturn of a Congo government and had a strong role in the overthrow of Dictator Diem of South Vietnam, an accomplishment which produced another dictator more pleasing to Washington.

In none of these enterprises has the CIA enhanced the name of the United States of America. To the contrary, it has given support to the spreading viewpoint that the United States is a meddling power which has contributed enormously to the unsettled state of the world.

In all of these enterprises the CIA has been answerable to no one except presidents who, incredibly, had no compunction about conferring the power to make war upon an intelligence agency.

And, if we've got you to thinking about the CIA, think about this: it has 18,000 employes, 6,000 of whom are working in clandestine services, according to Victor L. Marchetti, a former CIA agent, who is writing a book about the CIA. The CIA budget, Marchetti maintains, is $6 billion a year.

Marchetti may be wrong on every count. The number of CIA agents involved in clandestine activities and the annual CIA budget are "secrets" withheld from the American people.

And one more observation: the administration has obtained a temporary order against publication of Marchetti's book. Naturally.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NEWSDAY
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

STATINTL

E - 427,270
APR 26 1972

Companion of Meo Tribesmen: Death

By Arnold Abrams
Newsday Special Correspondent

Kilometer 52, Laos—Because communications are primitive and the Laotian government does not send condolence letters to Meo hill tribesmen, Mrs. Son Cha learned of her husband's death last month in a blunt way.

Mrs. Son

A pick-up truck pulled up to her thatch hut one morning with several beer cases and a bulky canvas bag. The beer was for soldiers stationed nearby. The bag contained her husband's body. "He was killed a few days ago at Long Cheng," said the driver, a young Lao soldier, handing her a sheet of paper. "This is the receipt. Sign here."

She signed, joining more than 10,000 Meo wives and mothers who have lost husbands and sons in a decade-long struggle that shows no signs of stopping. But, unlike most of the others, she did not sadly accept her loss as something inevitable. Instead, a quiet fury welled within.

"I don't understand why we are still fighting," Mrs. Son, 35 and a mother of eight, said. "We have already lost our land and our homes. It is time to stop dying." Her handsome features turned hard as she noted that five of her children were boys whose ages range from 2 to 12. "No more," she said. "One death in this house is enough. My sons will not serve in the army."

Mrs. Son's stand is more than the anguished outcry of a war widow. Having long borne the brunt of battle in Laos, increasing numbers of Meo tribesmen now are refusing to continue. Some 2,500 such dissidents live here at Kilometer 52, a resettlement village whose name stems from its location (52 kilometers, about 33 miles) north of the Laotian capital, on the Vientiane plain.

It is not an ideal site. The climate is hot, the soil arid, the terrain unfamiliar. Yet these traditional mountain dwellers trekked by foot for more than a week because it is said here, "We would rather die to be in the mountains on our own land," says Yon Na Ly, village chief of Kilometer 52, which is about 50 miles south of the northern war zone. "But that has been lost, so we must start a new life."

Kilometer 52 is a politically significant starting place. Its inhabitants, most of whom came here during the past year, are rebelling against Gen. Vang Pao, the Meos' legendary leader. Although his headquarters at Long Cheng was neutralized by North Vietnamese attacks earlier this year, Vang Pao is keeping his CIA-supported guerrilla forces in combat. But people here have had enough.

"At the start, we all felt we had to fight for our freedom," says Ni Pao, 35, a former guerrilla now farming at Kilometer 52. "But it is an impossible fight. It is pointless to continue." After serving four years with Vang Pao, he rejects any suggestion of disloyalty. "I didn't desert," Ni Pao says. "I retired."

Unaccustomed to the lowland climate, Ni Pao and most of the other Meos have been plagued by malaria and dysentery; moreover, they have not learned lowland farming well enough to be self-sufficient. Like their fellow tribesmen in the war zone, Kilometer 52 inhabitants depend upon American aid for medicine and supplementary food supplies. But, unlike their brethren, they claim that such aid is being withheld.

"The Americans say it is a matter of limited supplies and logistics," the village chief says. "But it is not that at all. It is a matter of backing Vang Pao. If we sent our young men back to him, we will get supplies." Predictably, U.S. officials deny that charge, but independent observers note other instances in which dissident Meo villages faced supply cutbacks for refusing to support Vang Pao.

"I don't blame the Americans," says Ly Thek, political leader of the dissident Meos. "Vang Pao is their boy. How can they support people who oppose him?" Ly Thek is a wealthy, well-educated young Meo with high aspirations. Only 32, he plans to succeed the flamboyant general, who is 10 years older and has led the tribesmen since 1960. He is the first such challenger.

Thek, a French-educated university graduate with law and political science degrees, is cultivating a growing following among the approximately 300,000 Meos in Laos. Utilizing his position as a high-ranking official in Vientiane's Interior Ministry, he is establishing other sites similar to Kilometer 52. Knowledgeable Americans describe him as "someone to watch" in coming years. As Meo dissidence grows, he may bear more watching than they realize.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

ST LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
25 April 1972

STATINTL

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Enough Of Covert Action

While the Administration has obtained a temporary order against publication of a book on the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L. Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful to the author. He has already provided outside of book covers some valuable insights and comments on an agency that deliberately hides from the public and Congress.

Without revealing any really hidden secrets, the author uses published reports to note that the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dollars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency has 18,000 employes, and that 6000 of these are working in clandestine services, as opposed to intelligence collection.

As it is, however, the CIA is the President's baby. Congress has proposed various control measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget, or requirements for clearer information about it, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Congress as well as the White House. Congress, after all, foots the bill, but it does not know for what.

CIA officials occasionally surface from secrecy to complain that critics concentrate on CIA failures. If so, that is because the public only hears about the failures, and they have to be big ones at that. They always seem to involve those covert or "paramilitary" operations, which range from a most qualified success in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I don't think we've had a successful paramilitary operation yet."

The clandestine operations are worth review. There was the U-2 spy plane incident that torpedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. There was the CIA's proud armed intervention to "save" Guatemala from leftists, leaving the country to oppression and terrorism. There was the financing of Radio Free Europe which, when disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige of freedom or credibility. And there was the Bay of Pigs.

Then there was the CIA military operation to save the Dominican Republic from a rebellion to return a democratically-elected president. There was armed support for the overturn of a government in The Congo. Of course, there was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening the way for another dictatorship more satisfactory to Washington. And there is presently war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered without any visible success for the American position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace and order.

Aside from the fact that so many of these clandestine activities were inefficient and ineffective, even aside from the fact that they were bound to be failures for America's long-range prospects and reputation even if they did succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in paramilitary functions represents a continuing ability to start hostilities without the knowledge of the people or Congress, and certainly without any declaration of war.

Author Marchetti is fair enough to say that so far various presidents have kept a measure of control over such activities. That is no guarantee for the future, however, and it is Congress, not the President, that is supposed to make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Marchetti recommends confining intelligence activities to a small and highly professional group, and eliminating the covert actions entirely.

Intelligence simply cannot work well when governed by an agency equally interested in activities ranging from propaganda to military action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation does need successful intelligence. It does not need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable power to make war.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

NEW YORK TIMES
23 APR 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

More Diversion of Laos Aid Reported

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 22 — The General Accounting Office has reported that United States refugee relief programs in Laos are being used in part to support paramilitary forces there. These forces, it was said, include Meo tribesmen who serve in the clandestine army operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In reporting that the refugee program was being used as a cover by the C.I.A., the General Accounting Office was expanding on a report that the civilian health program was being used for the same purpose.

The new report, prepared for Senator Edward M. Kennedy's Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, declared that funds from the Agency for International Development and the Agriculture Department's Food for Peace program had been diverted to feed and otherwise assist "paramilitary forces and their dependents." It said that of 306,000 Laotians on refugee relief rolls, entirely administered by Agency for International Development, 125,000 were paramilitary personnel and their families.

Senator Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and chairman of the subcommittee, released today what his office termed a "heavily sanitized" summary of the report by the General Accounting Office, which is the Congressional investigative agency. However, sections of the report itself, including the numbers of paramilitary Laotians on refugee rolls and financial aid details, were obtained separately by The New York Times.

The accounting office's report said that as of June 30, 1971 the refugee programs supported 20,000 "paramilitary personnel" and 105,000 of their dependents. Most were said to be Meo tribesmen in the northern Xiengkhouang Province serving in the C.I.A.'s clandestine army under Gen. Vang Pao.

Agency for International Development refugee programs in Laos during the current fiscal year are estimated to cost $16.2-million, and the cost of food donated by the Agriculture Department is $1.4-million. The accounting office's new report said that the C.I.A. and Defense Department were spending $52.2-million more under the guise of aid to refugees.

One section of the report said that the total United States commitment this year on all forms of refugee aid in Laos was $69.8-million.

The General Accounting Office report last month, also prepared for Senator Kennedy, said that the Central Intelligence Agency had been using the Agency for Internationa Development public-health programs as a "cover" for some of its military activities in Laos. The Agency for International Development's administrator, Dr. John Hannah, publicly acknowledged last year that the C.I.A. had used his organization as a "cover" but said that this practice was being halted.

However, the new accounting office report not only charged that the refugee program was a partial cover for the C.I.A. but also for the first time connected the Agriculture Department with the paramilitary operation.

The report said that the department was providing in the 1972 fiscal year, which ends June 30, commodities worth $1.4-million, a part of which goes to the clandestine army's tribesmen, as well as unspecified funds to transport the food from the United States to Thailand and then on to Laos.

Senator Kennedy, commenting on the report, said that the diversion of Food for Peace commodities to the paramilitary units violated the spirit of Public Law 480, under which this program is administered.

The accounting agency's report said: "Refugee relief in Laos is administered under the terms of a project agreement between the United States Government and the Royal Loatian Government. This agreement provides that basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, medicine, feeds and tools be furnished to persons uprooted by the war and temporarily unable to care for themselves."

The food is supplied under a provision of Public Law 480, providing for "donations" in order "to meet famine or other urgent or extraordinary relief requirements."

But the accounting office said that in Laos refugees had been classified for assistance purposes as "fully dependent, partially dependent, in need of no food assistance but requiring other types of support, and paramilitary forces and their dependents."

Senator Kennedy said in a statement accompanying the summary of the report that the decision to involve the Agency for International Development "as a cover for support of Lao military," including direct military-logistical support "was made at a high level of the U. S. Government."

He said, "Tens of thousands of Laos refugees are still being pushed around and dying needlessly for our strategic reasons —under the cover of humanitarian programs administered by the Agency for International Development."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

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SPOKANE, WASH.
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW

M - 84,759
S - 127,047

APR 21 1972

CIA Role Topic at College Hall

"CIA's role in Southeast Asia" will be the topic at 11:30 a.m. in the Lodge at Spokane Falls Community College on Wednesday by Ken Armstrong, a broadcast and print media journalist.

Armstrong has spent several years in Southeast Asia and won awards for his reportorial work there. Now living in Hillsborough, Calif., he continues to do special work for the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL [redacted]
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
POST-DISPATCH
20 April 1972

Ex-Agent Calls For More Curbs On CIA

By MORTON KONDRACKE

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WASHINGTON, April 20

VICTOR MARCHETTI does not look, act or talk like a top spy. He looks like an overweight bureaucrat and speaks quietly, in a voice that recalls Red Skelton.

Yet in the basement of his split-level Virginia ranch house hang autographed pictures of Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency ("To Vic—With appreciation for his support..."), and of a former CIA deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, whom Marchetti served as executive assistant.

Marchetti says he has hung the pictures "for fun." He has not framed Taylor's recent letter to him, written since Marchetti began speaking out about the Central Intelligence Agency, cautioning him not "to give help to our enemies within and without."

Taylor's letter refers to Marchetti's campaign to rehabilitate the CIA's public image. The CIA has been trying to rehabilitate its own image, and thanks to the press, has been successful. But Marchetti disagrees with the CIA press office's version and with most of the recent reportage on the agency.

BECAUSE OF the Pentagon Papers, Marchetti told me, "the CIA comes out looking good in Vietnam because in the last years it was trying to get the straight poop to the White House. And it does look good by comparison to the military.

"But, one, the CIA was hawkish in the beginning and was pretty late to see the light on the analysis side; and, two, even now it is hawkish on the other—clandestine services—side, where the big money is. After all, the CIA right now is conducting a $500,000,000-a-year secret war in Laos.

"The analysts can say it's a lost cause, just like Vietnam, but in my view the CIA can't take credit for being so great when at the same time they are carrying out policies like this."

Marchetti, 41 years old, graduated from Pennsylvania State University in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history and was recruited for the CIA by a professor there who was secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout. Marchetti says the CIA's job offer was made at a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who identified himself over the telephone as "a friend of your brother."

After spending one year as a CIA agent in the field, Marchetti came up through the "analysis side" of the agency and ultimately was promoted to the executive staff working on the top floor of the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. For three years he was special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, then to the agency's executive director, and finally to Taylor.

IN 1969, Marchetti quit the agency. He has given different reasons for making the final break. He says he told Helms "the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency were just too big and too costly, that I thought there was too much military influence on intelligence—with very bad effects from that—and that I felt the need for more control and more direction.

"The clandestine attitude, the amorality of it all, the cold war mentality—these kinds of things made me feel that the agency was really out of step with the times," Marchetti told one interviewer.

"I just got fed up," he told another. His wife, he said, "knew I was unhappy and becoming more and more just a bureaucrat and said, 'Look, you're young enough to do something else. I'll work.' " So she took a job as a hospital clerk and Marchetti set to work writing a novel, "The Rope Dancer," placed in and around the executive suite at the CIA. In interviews, he guards details on CIA operations or techniques.

He apparently has been more generous with some Senators and Congressmen, including Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, who not long ago led a vain effort to limit the budget of the CIA and the Pentagon's intelligence apparatus to 4 billion dollars a year.

Marchetti does not say, if he knows, what the intelligence budget is, but he has adopted from published sources the figure 6 billion dollars a year, and the estimate that 200,000 persons are employed in American intelligence.

OF THESE, about 18,000 are with the CIA, 6000 of them working in clandestine services — that is, espionage, counter-espionage and covert actions ranging from propaganda to assassinations and paramilitary activity.

Once the Senate got into costs, Marchetti recalls, it became apparent "how much the Congress really doesn't know about intelligence activities." Marchetti says that "even Symington doesn't know. He is on the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee, yet he doesn't know what's going on."

Said Marchetti: "It's one of my strong beliefs that the CIA has to be more tightly overviewed by Congress. As it is now, the agency operates almost exclusively under the authority of the President.

"Add the shroud of secrecy that surrounds intelligence, and all kinds of things can go on. They're arrogant in the intelligence community. They think they know what's good for the country, and that the people and the Congress will eventually catch up. Because they are not tightly controlled, a lot of things can go out of whack."

Marchetti said, "Theoretically, it's possible for the CIA to pull the President into a war with the President kicking and screaming, but it's never been done to my knowledge; and all things being equal, I don't think it's very likely. The major covert activities of the agency have always been cleared with the White House, and, since Kennedy, there has been a mechanism—the 303 Committee, it used to be called, now it's the 40 Committee—chaired by the national security adviser and including the deputy secretaries of state and defense and the CIA director.

"WHENEVER ANY intelligence agency is going to launch a clandestine operation that has high flak potential, it has to be brought to the attention of the commitee. This covers most of the big dirty tricks."

Although it may not be possible, according to Marchetti, for the CIA to start a war without the President's approval, it is most certainly possible to do so without the knowledge of Congress or the people, and, in fact, it has been done again and again.

The United States gets involved in such operations as the Laotian war, according to Marchetti, by initially developing a secret capacity to act, and then by using it. "You establish a phony airline, you make friends, you buy up arms [illegible]," he said. "For example, Civil Air Transport was once a Tawanee national airline run jointly by

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R006001400001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060

TARENTUM, PA.
VALLEY NEWS-DISPATCH
APR 20 1972
E - 39,021

Our opinions

The CIA meddles

AMERICANS seem to be the last to learn what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and now they are learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a Cambodian who had a part in it.

Prime Minister Thanh told a British interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said CIA agents assigned to him assured him of help if existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under left-wing attack.

The government was overthrown in 1970 and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by Sihanouk and that in turn led to a massive American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. So the Southeast Asia war engulfed Cambodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was involved with its private army. The results of all this meddling have been to spread a war without gaining a vestige of victory. If the meddling alone were not bad enough, the disasters following it made it worse.

So far the CIA seems to have done better in its strictly intelligence operations than in its paramilitary and covert actions, but not even Congress knows for sure. Congress might be expected to approve a standing proposal to require that the CIA report to it as well as to the Executive branch. Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to a blank check, and getting reports on Central Intelligence Agency activity through the prime minister of Cambodia.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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CRANSTON) is now recognized for 15 minutes.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two of my assistants may have the privilege of the floor during this debate on Vietnam: Murray Flander and Ellen Frost.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, my purpose, and the purpose of other Senators participating in arranging this discussion of hostilities in Vietnam, was merely to focus the attention of the Senate and, hopefully, through that process the attention of the country, on the tragic developments in Southeast Asia.

I have done my best to insure that there will be a presentation of views from various stances supportive of present policies and the questioning of present policies in Vietnam during the course of this discussion.

The rules and procedures of the Senate as to the allocation of time to each Senator may make this presentation slightly jerky and perhaps a bit disorderly at times, but I am hopeful, as are others who hold varying and contrary views of what is occurring in Vietnam, that we will have a real presentation of the various alternatives, the various views, and the various questions that so many of us have in differing ways about Vietnam.

The first question is: Is this war really winding down? Is the administration successful in winding down the Vietnam war?

It seems to me that this war is winding up and winding sideways, to the air, the set, and to neighboring parts of Indochina, rather than winding down. It is still very much an American war.

The total number of plane losses and combat casualties has jumped to new and staggering heights. The number of helicopters and fixed-wing planes shot down over Vietnam has climbed to at least 7,419. This figure pushes the cost of lost airplanes to a shocking $7 billion.

According to a study prepared by the Indochina Resource Center and Project Air War, one American has been shot down and either captured or listed as missing in action once every 3 days since President Nixon took office.

The number of B–52's in the area has climbed to 130, surpassing the 1968 peak. At least 20 U.S. Marine F–4 fighter-bombers have been sent from Japan. Another 20 F–105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers have been sent from the United States. The Air Force's 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, comprised of spotter and attack planes, will not be leaving Vietnam as planned. The total number of attack planes is now about 600.

Elsewhere, thousands more Americans still form part of the war effort in addition to those inside Vietnam. Some 45,000 air personnel fly bombing missions over Vietnam from bases outside Vietnamese borders.

In the coastal waters, the American armada is swelling toward 47,000 men on almost 50 ships. Naval strength includes two cruisers, at least a dozen destroyers, and four—and soon to be six—aircraft carriers. An amphibious landing force from the 7th Fleet, comprised of a helicopter carrier and 2,000 men, has been shifted to Vietnamese waters.

The number of ships and Navy personnel now off the coasts of Vietnam is the highest since Lyndon Johnson left office. The number of B–52's now flying combat missions in Indochina is the highest since Lyndon Johnson left office. Hanoi and Haiphong are being subjected to American air attacks for the first time since Lyndon Johnson left office. In fact, this is the first time in the history of this increasingly futile and tragic war that those population centers have been attacked by our heavy strategic bombers.

The recent intensification of the air war over North Vietnam shows no more signs of halting the fighting in the South now than in the past. The Department of Defense has estimated that Communist forces require only 15 to 30 tons of imported material per day to maintain a moderate level of fighting in the South. This amount can be carried in 10 to 15 trucks, 75 to 150 bicycles, or on human backs.

While the air war is becoming more impersonal and remote for Americans, the same cannot be said for those on the receiving end of the bomb delivery system. Planes are still routinely armed with antipersonnel and incendiary bombs which inflict hideous suffering. Antipersonnel bombs include: Pineapple bomblets, each bearing 250,000 steel pellets; Guava bombs, with each sortie releasing 400,000–500,000 ball bearing pellets; and Flechette or nail bomblets, each of which contains several hundred 1-inch barbed nails capable of shredding muscles and tissues and difficult to remove.

Incendiary bombs include not just the infamous napalm, but white phosphorus and NPT as well. White phosphorus continues to burn slowly inside the body and can usually be extinguished only when it reaches the bone. Needless to say, the pain is unspeakable and totally unjustifiable. NPT, or napalm-phosphorus-thermite, is the most destructive of all and can be applied to a large area. On the ground, so-called "area denial" mines can be laid by the thousands. The Dragontooth and Gravel mines will not destroy a truck tire, but they will blow off a foot. The Spider mine or WAAPM—wide area antipersonnel mine—has eight fine wire which, when tripped, hurl ball bearing-like pellets for approximately 197 feet.

Yet what can all of this accomplish? According to the Pentagon papers, a CIA bombing study dryly concluded as early as May 1967 that "27 months of American bombing have had little effect."

There is no historical evidence that massive bombing has ever succeeded in breaking the morale of troops fighting elsewhere. A careful and scholarly study of the social impact of bomb destruction reports that—

> Studies made of troop morale after news had reached them of casualties and other air-raid losses during World War II disclosed no evidence that the efficiency of troops had been substantially reduced or that desertions had increased.

This statement is from a book by Mr. Fred Iklé entitled "The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction," which was published by the University of Oklahoma Press.

Bombing North Vietnam has simply not worked. There is a slight difference in the strategic situation now, with a more massive use of troops and more concentration of forces, but bombing targets in North Vietnam certainly does not relate to the immediate events on the battlefields far from those areas.

The failure of bombing raids can be documented elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well. According to figures gathered by Project Air War, 150,000 tons of bombs have been dropped on Cambodia since May 1970, but guerrillas control from 70 percent to 90 percent of the territory. In Laos, bombing undertaken since May 1964 has included a devastating 500,000 sorties dropping 1.5 million tons of bombs. And yet Communist forces control at least two-thirds of Laotian territory today.

What justification is there, then, for this heavy bombing today?

Nowadays all operations in the Indochina theater are primarily justified in the name of protection of our troops. That is what Secretary Laird said yesterday. That is what President Nixon has said in recent days.

This protection apparently is being used primarily as a legal reason and not as a strategic reason. There are questions as to what legal justifications there are now that we have repealed the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolution providing for resorting to this force throughout Southeast Asia.

At the current stage of the fighting, the threat posed to the vast bulk of American forces cannot possibly provide an excuse for extending the bombing to the 20th parallel. The purpose of these raids is clearly punitive, not protective.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from California yield?

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield to my distinguished friend, the Senator from Utah.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I first want to congratulate the Senator from California for bringing this matter before the Senate.

It seems to me that there is no more timely or important discussion that we could be holding at this time in the Senate than the discussion of what is now going on in Indochina, and particularly in North Vietnam. It is my understanding from watching the television that the great emphasis that is being placed on the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi is that it is done in order to protect our troops and, for that reason, is fully and thoroughly justifiable because it is protecting American lives.

I, of course, have observed the map of Vietnam a number of times. In fact, I visited Vietnam about 4 years ago and observed the Tet offensive when it was raging at its height. However, in miles, how far away would Haiphong and Hanoi be from the nearest American troops? Does the Senator have any idea of that distance?

Mr. CRANSTON. The distance is over 250 miles.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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CHARLESTON, W.VA.
GAZETTE
M - 63,294
GAZETTE-MAIL
S - 106,775
APR 18 1972

CIA Latitude

Flabbergasting

Fiscal conservatives and no-nonsense leaders such as the late Sen. Robert A. Taft would be utterly flabbergasted to learn that a free-wheeling agency within the United States government is permitted to spend untold millions in tax funds with only minimal accountability to Congress.

But that is precisely the case. The Central Intelligence Agency, which is waging its own war against undefined enemies in Laos, has a secret budget and a high disdain for the legislative branch of government.

Early in the year it was disclosed that funds voted the Agency for International Development have been diverted to the CIA for use in its Laotian war. The disclosure had the side effect of discrediting much of the fine work of AID in extending technical assistance to the people of other lands. Because of the apparent tie to the CIA, AID now operates in the same suspicious light that falls upon government-sponsored radio stations that are nothing more than CIA espionage tools.

There may be some relief from the excerses of America's best publicized secret agency. Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., has offered a bill which would oblige the CIA to provide congressional committees realing with foreign policy the same information and assessments it now releases only to the White House.

The CIA presently briefs Congress, but only when it has White House authorization to do so. It is an understandable suspicion, under the circumstances, that the CIA's machinations, usually involving the military and political affairs of other nations, are undertaken in giddy and irresponsible fashion. Most of us, given millions of dollars to play with, would be giddy and irresponsible.

Curiously, the CIA has never played a decisive role in any American diplomatic achievement. On the other hand, it has figured prominently in several embarrassments to the nation. It ought to be abolished. If congressional timidity prevents abolition, it should be restricted to certain well-defined work, with full accountability to Congress.

The people are rapidly losing their taste for the cloak-and-dagger skullduggery of Cold War diplomacy, and the Cooper bill might be a good means of

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

MIAMI HERALD
18 April 1971

Lao Spies Help War On Opium

Heroin Makers' Supplies Reduced

By ARNOLD ABRAMS
Miami Herald-Newsday Wire

VIENTIANE, Laos — American-directed teams of native spies are being staked along the mountain trails of northern Laos as part of a $1 million campaign to stop the opium traffic from the opium fields of Laos, Thailand and Burma.

The anti-drug campaign is being waged by a task force that includes a narcotics attache from the American Embassy here and at least 10 U.S. Customs officers who act as advisers to local authorities at border crossings and airport facilities. Embassy officials say they harbor no illusion about stopping the flow of narcotics from the jungle area known as the "golden triangle."

"ONLY A FOOL would say we'll be able to do that," one American said. "But if we can reduce the traffic and cause some opium dealers some trouble, we'll be doing something."

Some experts believe that Vientiane and Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, now rank as the world's largest producers of heroin, an opium derivative, and provide most of the heroin used by American servicemen in Vietnam.

Little of the traffic from the golden triangle gets to the United States, federal officials say, but that could change. "As we cut off other sources (such as Turkey), the triangle is a ready-made source of opium," said Robert Nickoloff, action regional director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. "It's just a matter of developing the trade routes."

As part of the campaign, spy teams of Lao tribesmen trained by the Central Intelligence Agency are providing authorities here with information about drug-smuggling routes and the location of narcotics refineries. That information has led to a series of ambushes against drug-hauling convoys and raids on two large refineries.

IN BAN Houei Sai, a narcotics traffic center about 225 miles north west of Vietniane, a refinery was destroyed by a mysterious fire last year, and last month a raid by Lao police netted large amounts of chemicals and semirefined heroin. American involvement in both actions was said to be significant.

The teams have conducted more traditional spy work, infiltrating South China's Yunan province to spy on Chinese political and military activities. The Nixon Administration ordered those operations stopped last summer. "They (the spies) are well trained for reconnaissance work," one high-ranking source said. "It makes no difference whether they are gathering intelligence on drug traffic within Laos or military traffic outside it."

Despite the successes of the spy teams, here remain huge obstacles to the success of the American anti-drug campaign. One is the involvement of high-ranking Lao military and government officials in drug traffic. Laos' "Mr. Big" allegedly is Ouan Rathikoun, a former army chief of staff, but many prominent figures still in office also have a hand in the action.

THE VICE president of the National Assembly, for example, recently was stopped by airport police in Paris with a suitcase full of heroin. For political reasons, French authorities released the Laotian official, who claimed he had been framed. Knowledgeable observers here were certain, however, that it was less a matter of framing than a bribe backfiring.

Another obstacle is the fact that opium is the stuff of life for the fiercely independent mountain folk of eastern Burma and northern Thailand, who grow most of the opium that passes through Laos. It is their principal cash crop and is used in trade for household and farm utensils, salt, kerosene and silver for ornamentation. Opium profits buy modern weapons — automatic rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR
18 APR 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3
STATINTL

RUSSELL BAKER

Concise Guide to Vietnam War

Here, at last, is something every American has needed for years — a concise guide to the Vietnam war which will help him avoid thinking about the Vietnam war:

1. Start of Vietnam war — Some authorities say the Vietnam war started in 1937; others say it was 1941. Partisan Democrats say President Eisenhower started it during 1950; Republicans say President Kennedy started it. It is best not to think about when the Vietnam war started, because it will not make any difference anyhow.

★

2. Who is President Lyndon B. Nixonger? — It was during the Lyndon B. Nixonger administration that the Vietnam war was escalated, coonskinned, Vietnamized, re-Americanized, simonized and sold to the South Vietnamese as the best used war available anywhere at comparable price. Many people report that thinking about President Lyndon B. Nixonger depresses them, whereas people who do not think about him say they feel fine. It is best not to think about President Lyndon B. Nixonger, since it will not make any difference anyhow.

3. Light at end of tunnel — Ever since the Vietnam war started (and remember, don't start thinking about when that might have been) there has been light at the end of the tunnel, which, decoded from the Pentagonese, means that victory has been just around the corner. Many experts, in fact, say we won the war four years ago when the enemy was defeated at Tet time. Others contend that the war is still going on. It is a waste of time thinking about whether the war is still going on or not, since it will not make any difference anyhow.

4. Anti-war demonstrations — The important thing to remember about anti-war demonstrations is that they don't make any difference. Do not think about them.

5. Why are we in Vietnam? — It is not a good idea to go around asking this question, because very few people know the answer. Those who do know the answer do not agree on what it is. Even if you knew the answer, what difference would it make? We would still be in Vietnam. It is best not to think about why we are there, because it will not make any difference anyhow.

6. Paris peace talks—Peace talks began in Paris four years ago. In the span of time since elapsed—a span in which the Allied Powers were able to defeat the Kaiser in World War I; in which the United States and its allies were able to defeat the Axis in World War II—the Paris peace talks have agreed on the shape of the conference table. Many persons say there aren't any peace talks. Others say that if we were fighting the Kaiser today we would be on his side. It is idle to think about the Paris peace talks, because they will not make any difference anyhow.

★

7. Pitiful helpless giant — Most experts agree that if North Vietnam would surrender, the war could be ended. Because of the childish Oriental insistence on "saving face," however, they will not give up. To do so, they say, would make them look like a pitiful helpless giant. There is no point in thinking about the absurdity of this attitude, because it will not make any difference anyhow.

8. Secret war-ending plan—Four years ago Lyndon B. Nixonger said he had a secret plan for ending the war, but refused to tell us what it was until he was re-elected. Some experts say it has been secretly working beautifully; others insist that Nixonger has forgotten what the secret plan was. There is no point in worrying about the secret plan, since it will not make any difference anyhow.

9. War not an issue—Politicians agree that the war will not be an issue in the forthcoming presidential election. This is because the voters will not think about the war. The reason voters will not think about the war is because it doesn't make any difference whether they think about it or not.

★

10. Laos—There is general agreement that Laos exists, but the United States government resents people who think about it. This is because the war there is being waged by the Central Intelligence Agency, and is, therefore, classified "top secret." It is better not to think about Laos, not only because the Justice Department has several grand juries sniffing about for incipient Ellsbergs, but also because it will not make any difference anyhow.

11. Taxpayer responsibility —You may ask: "Am I, as the purchaser of the destructive wherewithal brought to bear upon Vietnam, responsible for the devastation of that miserable country?" Most experts agree that you are. Some experts say there is no reason to feel bad, because the Vietnamese have brought it on themselves. Others say there is no reason to feel bad, because it is going to go right on happening, no matter how you feel. The best thing is not to think about responsibility, since it will not make any difference anyhow.

12. What can the responsible citizen do?—Vote for the Lyndon B. Nixonger of your choice. When he is re-elected do not make it hard on him by doing a lot of thinking.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR 16 APR 1970

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

[redacted]

Lull in Laos War Theater Puzzling U.S.

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — An unexplained lull in the fighting in northern Laos has military men here a little worried.

"No North Vietnamese units have been seen leaving Laos and we are still getting contact with them especially around Long Cheng and north Laos," a military source said here.

"But apart from some heavy shelling and small probes, the North Vietnamese are not doing anything. We can't understand it. They still have about eight weeks of dry season here left."

Although the major North Vietnamese effort in South Vietnam may be responsible for the lull here, officials still think the Communists will resume their attacks in northern Laos.

"The Communists like to keep everybody jumping and make the Indochina situation look even worse than it is," said a Lao military official. "They can do this by launching offensives in all of Indochina."

Military sources said that with the lack of North Vietnamese activities, the Lao are improving their positions. In the past few days, irregulars have retaken some of the heights along Skyline Ridge overlooking the CIA military operations base of Long Cheng.

Seesaw fighting has been going on in the Skyline area for the past two weeks with North Vietnamese infantry supported by heavy artillery holding the four highest points along the ridge.

Now Lao infantry at great cost have retaken two of those positions.

"They can't get down that bare open south slope of skyline to hit Long Cheng," a military source said.

While the stalemate continues along the 4,000-foot high, 2-mile long Skyline Ridge, now one of the most battered pieces of terrain on earth after 10 weeks of pounding by B52s and other types of aircraft and Hanoi's heaviest artillery, Lao troops have been advancing throughout the rest of the country.

In the south, government troops at the town of Seno found 70 shells and several tons of rice at a Pathet Lao training camp.

In the Laos panhandle, Operation "Fangum" brought Lao troops 10 miles up Route 23 toward the Bolovens Plateau town of Paksong against negligible opposition.

Lao commandos, ferried by U.S. Air Force Jolly Green Giant helicopters, took Long Pot, a village near the junction of Laos main routes 13 and 7 midway between the royal capital of Luang Prabang and here, leapfrogging Pathet Lao forces blocking every road.

Nobody can quite figure what Hanoi's troops are doing.

When we can't find them, that usually means they got something up their sleeve," a military source said.

Some Americans don't agree.

"Maybe they are pullling out of Laos early this year," one said.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

APR 13 1972

CIA Spy Teams Are Hitting the Opium Trail in Laos

By Arnold Abrams
Chronicle Foreign Service

Vientiane, Laos

American-directed spy teams, which used to conduct reconnaissance missions in southern China, have turned their attention to a new target: opium traffic in northern Laos.

The teams, trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, are providing authorities here with information about drug - smuggling routes and the location of narcotics refineries.

The results of such efforts, according to well - informed sources, have included a series of ambushes against drug - hauling convoys, and raids on two large refineries.

Although still reluctant to provide detailed information, American officials are more willing to discuss the teams' new missions than their old ones, which involved infiltrating south China's Yunnan province to spy on Chinese military and political activities.

The Nixon Administration ordered those operations stopped last summer.

The teams, consisting of native hill tribesmen, operate from CIA outposts in northern Laos. "They are well - trained for reconnaissance work," says one high - ranking source. "It makes no difference whether they are gathering intelligence on drug traffic within Laos or military traffic outside it."

In addition to being a major source of opium grown by hill tribesmen, this landlocked mountain kingdom provides transport routes for opium harvested in the "golden triangle" — a heavily jungled area where the borders of Burma, Laos and Thailand converge.

Spy teams and CIA - trained guerrilla units now are being staked along rugged mountain trails traditionally used by mule and coolie convoys to haul poppy produce down through Laos. A major target area is Ban Houei Sai, a narcotics traffic center about 225 miles northwest of Vientiane.

One refinery there was destroyed by a mysterious fire last year; more recently, a March raid by Lao police netted large amounts of chemicals and semi - refined heroin. American involvement in both moves reportedly was significant.

Such missions are part of an anti - drug campaign in Laos by a task force from several U.S. government agencies.

Key force members include a narcotics attache in the American embassy and at least ten U.S. customs officers acting as advisers to local authorities at border crossings and airport facilities.

The American campaign, in which Lao officials were pressured last fall to pass their country's first anti - drug laws, will cost close to $1 million. Nevertheless, embassy officials say they harbor no illusions about stopping narcotics traffic here.

"Only a fool would say we'll be able to do that," says one American. "But if we can reduce the traffic, and cause opium dealers some trouble, we'll be doing something."

A major obstacle remains the involvement of high - ranking Lao military and government officials in drug traffic. This country's "Mr. Big" allegedly is Ouan Rathikoun, former army chief of staff, but many prominent figures still in their posts also have a hand in the action.

The vice president of Laos' National Assembly, for example, recently was caught by airport police in Paris with a suitcase full of heroin.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
12 April 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

Bring The CIA To Heel

Although Congress in the foreign aid authorization bill signed earlier this year imposed some controls over the Central Intelligence Agency, the free wheeling CIA still operates without much accountability to the legislative branch of government. Its budget remains secret. And only last month a study by the General Accounting revealed that Agency for International Development funds intended for public health use in Laos were being diverted to the CIA for use in the guerrilla war in that country.

The record of CIA disdain for the will of Congress underscores the importance of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would oblige the agency to provide congressional committees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting foreign relations and national security. Two former CIA officials, Dr. Herbert Scoville and Chester L. Cooper, testifying for the bill, said the agency should provide Congress with the same analyses it now regularly provides the White House.

At present CIA briefings of Congress are provided only as sanctioned by the White House. Since Congress also has authority in foreign relations and military affairs, there is justification for giving the legislators access to CIA data. Indeed, its machinations in the military and political affairs of other countries suggest that it has arrogated to itself so many improper policy-making initiatives that the agency should be either be abolished or restricted by law to intelligence gathering alone.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER

M - 194,557
S - 260,961

APR 1 0 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160

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STATINTL

Calls Nixon Policy 'Fraud'

Harrington Raps Vietnamization

By MARY TIERNEY

U.S. Rep. Michael J. Harrington, D-Beverly, yesterday attacked President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization as a "fraud." He made the remarks following a visit to South Vietnam last week.

As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, the North Shore congressman has been working for the past month to force the administration to increase the flow of public information about U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia.

Yesterday, at a Parker House press conference, Rep. Harrington said that "Vietnamization has been sold to the American people as a way of withdrawing our presence from the Indochinese war.

"In fact," he continued, "that policy, as it is now being pursued, requires a continued, massive American military presence in Southeast Asia for many years to come.

"It commits us to continue to spend billions of taxpayers' dollars for the support of the armies of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

"IT COMMITS US to spend many billions to pay for an air war as extensive as any this country has ever engaged in — even at the height of World War II.

"It commits us to continued direct involvement by the Central Intelligence Agency in the ground fighting in Laos and Cambodia and to continue to devastate four countries in a war which has long since lost any conceivable justification — militarily, politically or morally."

U. S. REP. HARRINGTON

Rep. Harrington said that since the U.S. has broken off peace talks, the South Vietnamese Army has been unable to hold its ground without full-scale American military support.

"Current American policy requires us to maintain our involvement in the Indochinese War for the forseeable future.

And, as long as we remain committed to the maintenance of a pro-American regime in Saigon and as long as the pro-American forces are unable to sustain themselves in power, American men, money and weapons will be deeply engaged in that war," he said.

Rep. Harrington said that, American involvement is greater than the American people have been told and that it is time "to raise American consciousness to the magnitude of our involvement."

He said he was "particularly disturbed" about the secrecy that surrounds the military operation in Thailand where the U.S. is "spending $5 million a day to maintain 25,000 Air Force men at five large air bases in a country club atmosphere."

He said he would do everything in his power to see that all censorship of news from Thailand would be lifted so that the American people would know where their money was going.

"When the full facts are known there will be public annoyance, anger and frustration in the inability to extricate," he said.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,967
S - 566,377
APR 1 0 1972

Harrington calls war policy a fraud

US Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), reporting on a seven-day tour of South Vietnam and Thailand, yesterday said President Nixon's policy in Indochina is a "fraud" that is leading the United States into an "unending" commitment.

Harrington said the American people are not aware of the extent of US military involvement in southeast Asia.

Harrington said he did not include Laos and Cambodia in his tour because he was told the House Armed Services Committee would not help pay for his trip if he visited those countries. He said he did not know why the same limitation was not put on Thailand.

Harrington said the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "is extensively involved in Laos."

Harrington said he observed among American officials "a noticeable reluctance" to speak frankly about US involvement in Laos. But he said he was most disturbed that the implications of US policy were not being examined.

"Despite saying that we've reduced our presence," he said, "I think we persist in what I would call a no-win, no-lose policy of attempting to influence events militarily — and it's doomed to failure."

Harrington, who represents the Sixth District, criticized the type of weaponry used by American forces. Some are too destructive and others are too sophisticated to be used effectively, he said, adding that they are also too costly.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL [redacted]

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

In considering these figures I believe they should be tempered with consideration of improved medical facilities, better transportation, etc which has increased the productivity of our physicians.

Nebraska medical manpower discussions in the past have usually come around to mention of the fact that thirteen of our ninety three counties have no physicians. It should also be indicated I believe, that nine of these thirteen counties have a 1970 census of 1,054 or less. With fairly adequate roads and transportation most of these areas are reasonably close in time to surrounding medical facilities.

Throughout rural Nebraska, we have some difficulty in providing allied health services, notably in the fields of social workers, physical therapy, and neurology. At present, these services are available, but primarily only with considerable expenditure for travel.

After mentioning some of the problems in health care in rural Nebraska, I would like to briefly mention some of the existing programs aimed at solution of these problems. In order to reduce the time involved in giving my oral remarks I have here some material prepared by the University of Nebraska College of Medicine and the Nebraska Regional Medical Program. I would like to ask that these reports be added as an appendix to my remarks.

To first mention some of the programs which we in Nebraska feel are of proven value, I would like to discuss the preceptorship portion of the University of Nebraska curriculum. This is a four week required exposure of senior medical students to rural practice. The student may select any of fifty practicing physicians in outstate Nebraska to spend this period of time with. We feel this program has been instrumental in locating younger physicians in rural Nebraska.

Rural Health Day is held once a year in Omaha as a cooperative effort between the University of Nebraska, Creighton University, The Academy of Family Practice, and the Nebraska State Medical Association. Every town in our state is invited to send representatives to discuss possible future location with the medical students. This program too has been effective in securing physicians for rural Nebraska. One important ancillary benefit has been that the students have educated the communities as to factors important in attracting today's young physician.

The new Action Agency program recently inaugurated as a consolidation of Vista and the Peace Corps is being promoted at the University of Nebraska College of Medicine. In our state, this is known as NOVA (Nebraska Opportunity for Volunteers in Action). The target date for these students to begin service is September 26, just 17 days from now.

There are two unique programs in Nebraska aimed at improving medical services in rural Nebraska which I would like to mention. Creighton University has recently begun teaching some of their medical students to fly. The purpose behind this is to increase the rural physicians access to surrounding medical centers for referral as well as postgraduate education.

In addition, and under the sponsorship of the Nebraska Regional Medical Program, a 12 foot by 60 foot mobile trailer unit is operational in Nebraska. This is a cancer screening unit aimed at the most common cancer sites. This unit is programmed to supplement the care of patients in areas of low medical manpower as well as the Indian reservations. It will also supplement service to the migrant worker population.

One additional program deserves mention since it is aimed at improving the quality of care as opposed to programs aimed at the quantity of health services. This is the Coronary Care Training Program again under the sponsorship of the Nebraska Regional Medical Program. To date 806 nurses and 55 physicians have been trained in the newest techniques of caring for the patient with coronary occlusion.

Mr. Chairman, I can sum up my remarks by saying that the provision of services and improvement of the socio-economic status of out-state Nebraska is a pre-requisite for preventing the loss of population in our rural communities. These problems are complex to identify as well as to solve.

Thank you for the opportunity to present this statement on behalf of the Nebraska State Medical Association and the people of Southwest Nebraska.

ANTHONY LEWIS ON THE VIETNAM OFFENSIVE—"IN THE NAME OF GOD, GO"

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the columns by Mr. Anthony Lewis, published in the New York Times last Saturday and today, provide an eloquent denunciation of the appalling new escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the fresh agony it brings to the families of our prisoners. As Mr. Lewis states, the U.S. policy of Vietnamizing the war is a policy of perpetual war and perpetual American involvement in the killing and destruction in Indochina. So long as the war goes on, so long as American planes are bombing Indochina, there is no chance whatever that we shall get our prisoners back.

The American people want the war to end. Quoting the words of Cromwell in dismissing the Long Parliament, Mr. Lewis applies that exhortation to the position of the United States in Vietnam—"In the name of God, go."

Mr. President, I share the views of Mr. Lewis, and I believe that millions of Americans share them also. I ask unanimous consent that his columns be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 8, 1972]

IN THE NAME OF GOD, GO

(By Anthony Lewis)

Richard Nixon, December, 1971: "Vietnam will not be an issue in the campaign as far as this Administration is concerned, because we will have brought the American involvement to an end."

LONDON, April 7.—The Nixon withdrawal from Vietnam has always had something of an illusory character. While American ground troops left, other military involvement continued or intensified. From carriers and from enlarged bases in Thailand, American bombers attacked Laos and both parts of Vietnam. American planes and supplies supported a larger war effort in Cambodia. The phantom C.I.A. army fought in Laos.

Many Americans nevertheless believed—because their President said so and they wanted to believe—that their part in the Indochina war would soon be over. Now that belief must be dead—gone the way of all the other officially propagated illusions about Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese, we had been told, were making remarkable progress, their million-man army confident, their political situation stable. The Communists had never rebuilt their southern infrastructure after the losses of Tet 1968. The war was going better than we had hoped.

It took less than a week for the new Communist offensive to shatter that picture and to send President Thieu of South Vietnam crying for help. Of course he cried to Richard Nixon. The response was the familiar one: more B-52's, more destroyers, more carriers, more close air support, more bombing of the North, more U.S. involvement.

Surely now there cannot be any informed person on earth who fails to understand what is the result of the Nixon-Kissinger formula for "peace" and "stability" in Indochina: perpetual war and perpetual American involvement. Unless the war ends on our terms, with Communist acceptance of the Thieu Government, we shall keep killing the inhabitants of Indochina—from a distance.

The Communist offensive did put Mr. Nixon in a difficult position. No American President wants to be seen abandoning a policy under duress, this one least of all. But it was Mr. Nixon and Henry Kissinger themselves who painted themselves into the corner where they have no options except more of the destruction that everyone knows is morally outrageous and politically useless.

When Mr. Nixon took office three years ago, he could have recognized the political realities of Vietnam and left the internal forces there to work out their own balance. Instead he has continued to make the attempt to impose our solution.

He did so, according to report, on the advice of Henry Kissinger that the other side could not indefinitely withstand our superior force and would have to agree to terms. In short, we could bomb them into settling.

But that was the oldest, most tattered official illusion of them all. From Lyndon Johnson's tragedy came the lesson that in a limited war the United States has limited power to impose its terms. If Henry Kissinger did indeed ignore that lesson, he will have a heavy reckoning to pay in history for three more years of pointless death in Indochina—or four or five or ten. For on the present policy, how can anyone pick a date when the war will end?

The Kissinger-Nixon justification for going on in Vietnam is that we must preserve our credibility as a world power. But a great country can justify such relentless destruction of another only if its own safety, its vital strategic interest, is urgently at stake. And virtually no one believes that about Vietnam any more.

A leading British student of international security and war, Michael Howard, has some apt comments in the April issue of Encounter. It is a tough-minded article, cautioning idealists that world stability will always require "the acceptance of necessary injustice"—for example, dealing with the Greek military regime.

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
10 APR 1972

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

world in revolution

CAMBODIA-LAOS

The New York Times reported Indonesia has admitted it is training 60 Cambodian soldiers in commando techniques in preparation for fighting the people in Cambodia. When the U.S. embassy in Jakarta was asked if the U.S. was paying the cost of training the men, an American official replied: "No comment". . . . Pathet Lao forces in Laos continued to move in on the large CIA base at Long Tieng during the last week in March. The liberation fighters have won so many victories that, "Both American and Laotian officials fear that if the defenders of Long Tieng were overwhelmed, the morale of the irregular forces and the 56,000 other (puppet) troops would be shattered. . . . Americans concede a collapse in morale could prove to be an insurmountable problem."

BANGLADESH

Sheik Mujibur Rahman, head of the Awami League regime in Bangladesh, has ordered his police to "shoot down" leftists who "engage in creating confusion and trouble" and blocking his reconstruction efforts. At the same time, reports of massive corruption in the highest government circles and of factions forming in opposition to each other within the Awami League continue. UPI reported several thousand people demonstrated in Dacca, the capital, March 31, "against what they charged were malpractices in the distribution of relief food and supplies." The New York Times reported "some people are using the word 'chaos' to describe the workings of the government." Some in the Awami League, the Times charged, "have taken over truckloads of relief food in daylight, selling it later to the highest bidder . . . . Into the vacuum created by the absence of effective government at the local level have stepped several factions competing for power—Awami League politicians, student groups, former guerrilla leaders with armed followings, trade unions and Communists, whose activities are reviving with Soviet aid" . . . . Meanwhile in Los Angeles, Calif., last month, Eqbal Ahmad, a Pakistani scholar who is one of the Harrisburg 7 defendants, charged Sheik Mujib "has been on the payroll of the CIA for 15 years," according to a Los Angeles News Advocate quote. The News Advocate continued: "Ahmad said that Ysef Harson, a West Pakistani industrialist and trustee of the Chase Manhattan Bank who lives in New York, is (Mujibur's) contact man."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

NEW YORK TIMES
8 APR 1972

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STATINTL

U.S. Plans to Give Dacca $130-Million More in Aid

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 8—The United States is planning to commit $130-million in relief assistance to Bangladesh before the end of the current fiscal year on June 30, senior Administration officials have said.

Meanwhile, there were indications from reliable sources that a joint World Bank-United Nations survey of urgent reconstruction needs in Bangladesh might lead to a call on the United States and other international donors for an additional $600-million for the coming year.

The United States formally recognized Bangladesh on Tuesday. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in a statement distributed to the press, said that the United States intended to be "helpful" as the new nation of 70 million Bengalis "face its immense task of relief and reconstruction."

Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, which is coordinating American relief efforts, said in an interview that the $130-million still to be committed represented the oremainder of the $200-million appropriated for Bangladesh relief by Congress on March 8.

Breakdown of $70-Million

The $70-million already committed, he said, included $31-million recently given to the United Nations in cash for immediate needs in the area; $4-million being used to buy United States trucks requested by the United Nations and $7-million granted to various private American voluntary agencies operating in Bangladesh. In addition, Mr. Williams said, $27-million had previously been provided for Bengali refugees in India.

named head of United Nations relief operations in Bangladesh, has recently returned from a survey trip there. He has reported that owing to widespread disruption of communications, urgent needs include the charter of aircraft, tugs, barges and shallow-draft "minibulkers" for emergency movement of foof grains up rivers and other waterways. Other needs include cargo-handling equipment, repair of port facilities, hiring of stevedores and procurement of roofing materials, cement, fuel, fertilizer, power tillers, irrigation pumps and high-yield variety rice seeds.

Mr. Williams said that aid officials would confer here on Tuesday with Russell P. O'Quinn, a former Douglas aircraft test pilot who flew relief supplies from São Tomé Island into Biafra during the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war.

Mr. O'Quinn, who heads the Foundation for Airborne Relief, a non-profit organization based in Long Beach, Calif., recently visited Bangladesh.

Aid officials said that they were preparing to grant Mr. O'Quinn $1.5-million to launch an emergency food-dropping program in Bangladesh using two Boeing C-97 cargo planes, two Bell helicopters and two Cessna-185 amphibians with pontoons. Mr. O'Quinn said in an interview that his pilots would use a "double-bag" food-dropping technique devised in Laos by Air America, a Central Intelligence Agency unit.

The inner bag, packed with 70 pounds of rice or other food grains, bursts on impact, but 90 per cent of the food is retained by the outer looser bag of tough plastic, he explained.

Since the United Nations issued a world appeal Feb. 18 for $440-million for urgent relief needs in Bangladesh, more than $400-million has been donated. About $115-million of this has been pledged by the United States in food grains and other forms, aid officials reported.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
8 APR 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

'In the Name Of God, Go'

By ANTHONY LEWIS

Vietnam will not be an issue in the campaign as far as this Administration is concerned, because we will have brought the American involvement to an end.

—Richard Nixon, December, 1971.

LONDON, April 7—The Nixon withdrawal from Vietnam has always had something of an illusory character. While American ground troops left, other military involvement continued or intensified. From carriers and from enlarged bases in Thailand, American bombers attacked Laos and both parts of Vietnam. American planes and supplies supported a larger war effort in Cambodia. The phantom C.I.A. army fought in Laos.

Many Americans nevertheless believed—because their President said so and they wanted to believe—that their part in the Indochina war would soon be over. Now that belief must be dead—gone the way of all the other officially propagated illusions about Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese, we had been told, were making remarkable progress, their million-man army confident, their political situation stable. The Communists had never rebuilt their southern infrastructure after the losses of Tet 1968. The war was going better than we had hoped.

AT HOME ABROAD

It took less than a week for the new Communist offensive to shatter that picture and to send President Thieu of South Vietnam crying for help. Of course he cried to Richard Nixon. The response was the familiar one: more B-52's, more destroyers, more carriers, more close air support, more bombing of the North, more U.S. involvement.

Surely now there cannot be any informed person on earth who fails to understand what is the result of the Nixon-Kissinger formula for "peace" and "stability" in Indochina: perpetual war and perpetual American involvement. Unless the war ends on our terms, with Communist acceptance of the Thieu Government, we shall keep killing the people of Indochina from a distance.

The Communist offensive did put Mr. Nixon in a difficult position. No American President wants to be seen abandoning a policy under duress, this one least of all. But it was Mr. Nixon and Henry Kissinger themselves who painted themselves into the corner where they have no options except more of the destruction that everyone knows is morally outrageous and politically useless.

When Mr. Nixon took office three years ago, he could have recognized the political realities of Vietnam and left the internal forces there to work out their own balance. Instead he has continued to make the attempt to impose our solution.

He did so, according to report, on the advice of Henry Kissinger that the other side could not indefinitely withstand our superior force and would have to agree to terms. In short, we could bomb them into settling.

But that was the oldest, most tattered official illusion of them all. From Lyndon Johnson's tragedy came the lesson that in a limited war the United States has limited power to impose its terms. If Henry Kissinger did indeed ignore that lesson, he will have a heavy reckoning to pay in history for three more years of pointless death in Indochina—or four or five or ten. For on the present policy, how can anyone pick a date when the war will end?

The Kissinger-Nixon justification for going on in Vietnam is that we must preserve our credibility as a world power. But a great country can justify such relentless destruction of another only if its own safety, its vital strategic interest, is urgently at stake. And virtually no one believes that about Vietnam any more.

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"Whatever the arguments may be about regional or global stability, about dominoes or deterrence, what the United States has been doing in Vietnam is wrong and ought to be stopped."

The American people have evidently believed for some time that President Nixon's objective—preserving Nguyen Van Thieu—is not worth what we are doing to Indochina and to ourselves. They want an end to American involvement, with its corrupting effects on our reputation abroad and our peace at home. They would say what Cromwell said in dismissing the Long Parliament: "In the name of God, go."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
7 April 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006001

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More CIA Meddling

Americans seem to be the last to learn what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and now they are learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a Cambodian who had a part in it.

Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh told a British interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions of dollars after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said CIA agents assigned to him ("they have three names a month," he added) assured him of help if the existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came under left-wing attack.

The government was overthrown, in 1970, and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by Sihanouk; and that in turn led to a massive American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. So the Southeast Asia war engulfed Cambodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was involved with its private army. The results of all this meddling have been to spread a war without gaining a vestige of victory. If the meddling alone were not bad enough, the disasters following it made it worse.

So far the CIA seems to have done better in its strictly intelligence operations than in its paramilitary and covert actions, but not even Congress knows for sure. Congress might be expected to approve a standing proposal to require that the CIA report to it as well as to the Executive branch.

Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to a blank check, and getting reports on Central Intelligence Agency activity through the prime minister of Cambodia.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NEWSDAY
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
E - 427,270
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STATINTL

Laos Fighting, Incidentally, for Survival

By Arnold Abrams
Newsday Special Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—Both the posturing and the plight of this unhappy country are illustrated by a tale of two cities: Vientiane and Long Cheng.

In Vientiane, where the nation's annual Army Day was observed recently, thousands of Lao army regulars grandly goose-stepped past their king while the capital echoed with the music of marching bands and the cheering of enthusiastic crowds.

At Long Cheng, a bastion in a valley less than 80 miles away, the ground reverberated with the boom of enemy artillery and was stained with the blood of Lao irregulars while mutiny spread through their ranks. Long Cheng has been to Laos what the Pentagon is to Washington: a strategic military headquarters and a major psychological symbol for government forces. It was the northern nerve center for American Central Intelligence Agency advisers and home of the U.S.-supported guerrilla army led by the legendary Gen. Vang Pao.

A series of North Vietnamese strikes against the once-secret center last December forced most defenders and approximately 30,000 civilians, largely Meo tribesmen, to evacuate the valley. Now, with his forces depleted, Vang Pao, himself a Meo, is staging a last-ditch defense of Long Cheng for reasons more psychological than strategic. Bolstered by several thousand Thai mercenaries (officially described as "volunteers"), government irregulars are clinging to precarious positions along Skyline Ridge, overlooking the uninhabited Long Cheng valley. "The place is nothing more than a contested forward position now," a responsible American military source conceded. "It is finished as an operations center."

More than Long Cheng may be finished in Laos, however. Vang Pao's mercurial leadership has come under increasing criticism, and there is growing doubt about the capability of his irregular units, which have comprised the government's only effective fighting force. Symbolic of the crumbling situation was the recent mutiny of more than 500 irregulars who walked off the Long Cheng battlefield while their compatriots—all Lao army regulars—were blithely rehearsing in Vientiane for the Army Day parade. Fed up with fighting superior enemy forces, and claiming that they had not been paid by their officers (who had been given the money by Americans) since being sent to Long Cheng in January, the rebels comandeered a fleet of trucks and started south to Savannakhet, their home base.

Typically, Lao authorities seemed less concerned with stopping the rebellion than retrieving their trucks. They offered to fly the departing troops home from Vientiane, but the troops, suspecting that government planes might wind up back in the battle area, declined the offer. They didn't even stay for the parade.

For all such ludicrous episodes, the situation in Laos, always serious, has never seemed worse. North Vietnamese forces, numbering an estimated 90,000, appear stronger and more determined than ever. They control the Bolovens plateau in southern Laos as well as the Plain of Jars in the northeast. In addition to neutralizing Long Cheng, they have severed road links between Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang, about 150 miles to the north.

For the hapless Laotians, a pacific Buddhist people who number barely 3,000,000, the tragedy is that the bitter fighting in their country is only a sideshow to the war in South Vietnam. No Laotian national objective is involved, except the seemingly incidental one of survival. North Vietnam needs the eastern part of the landlocked country only to maintain its supply route to South Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The main American concern is to cut down the flow of supplies south by continually bombing the trail.

As always, U.S. airpower, furnishing combat and logistical support, serves to slow North Vietnamese advances while taking a sometimes severe toll on the countryside and on the people. But even the staunchest advocates of American air support, including Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley (whose interest in military tactics has earned him the nickname of "Field Marshal Godley") concede that the application of air power is not sufficient to stop enemy forces from advancing.

Still, the deteriorating military situation has not altered American estimates—and they are only that—of Hanoi's intentions in Laos. Top U.S. officials here do not believe that Communist forces will overrun the country. "They have always had the capability for that," explains one embassy source. "They have never been willing to pay the price in casualties."

In addition to tightening its hold on territory bordering on key supply routes to South Vietnam and Cambodia, Hanoi's goal in Laos is still perceived to be pressuring Prince Souvanna Phouma's neutralist government into calling for an end to American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Although few knowledgeable observers believe Washington would comply with such a request, the U.S. mission here wants to avoid that test. However, Americans ultimately may have little choice in the matter.

Only massive U.S. ground intervention, or monsoon rains, seem capable of stopping the North Vietnamese advance. And the former is most unlikely, while the latter is more than two months away.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

5 APR 1972

CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

VICTOR MARCHETTI

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer *has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.*

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

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continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a $500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

continued

NEWSWEEK
3 APR 1972
STATINTL [redacted]
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Squeezing the Balloon

Among U.S. and South Vietnamese military men in Saigon, there is a tendency to view the Indochina conflict as three separate wars—one in Laos, one in Cambodia and one in South Vietnam. The advantage of this approach became abundantly clear last week, when despite dramatic allied reverses in Laos and Cambodia, U.S. analysts continued to sound optimistic. As one American officer expressed it: "The war is going just fine—unless, of course, you happen to be Cambodian or Laotian."

The main source for American contentment was a recently completed South Vietnamese Army operation in the jungles outside the northern city of Hué. Acting on intelligence reports that three North Vietnamese regiments were in the area, four South Vietnamese battalions were ordered to find the enemy. The hunt lasted two weeks and when it was over, the South Vietnamese reported having killed 513 North Vietnamese while losing only 42 men of their own—a better than 12 to 1 ratio in their favor. Despite suspicions that these casualty figures were exaggerated, the operation represented both an impressive victory for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and a boost for the Nixon Administration's Vietnamization program. "The ARVN did it all by themselves," said one U.S. colonel in Saigon. "Our help was minimal. So even if you halve the ARVN kill claims, it was still a hell of a show."

UPI

Dazed Cambodian: 'The war is going fine'

It was a different kind of show in Cambodia, however, where the enemy was clearly in command. In a predawn assault early last week, the North Vietnamese subjected the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh to its heaviest rocket attack of the war. In two hours, an estimated 200 rockets rained down on the city, and their effect was disastrous. In one area of the capital an entire wooden shanty town was set ablaze, and the flames roasted dozens of inhabitants. And near the radio station in the suburb of Stung Meanchey, the shattered remains of women and children were strewn about the streets, and buildings were splattered with blood. In the wake of the attack, the government reported more than 100 dead and more than 200 injured. And before the week was out, the Communists launched a series of smaller actions—including the destruction of a major Phnom Penh bridge—to show their disdain for Cambodian Government forces.

Defenders: Equally grim was the situation in Laos where, less than two weeks ago, the North Vietnamese mounted an all-out drive to capture the former Central Intelligence Agency base of Long Tieng, located at the southwestern edge of the strategic Plain of Jars. Committing an estimated fifteen battalions to the battle and pounding the base with a savage artillery attack, the enemy sent more than 1,000 defenders fleeing for their lives. Despite reports of fierce fighting on Skyline Ridge, which rises above the base and dominates its fortifications, it seemed only a matter of time before Long Tieng would fall.

Even this prospect did not seem to alarm some military men, who pointed out that since its evacuation in January by the CIA, Long Tieng has had little strategic value. In the same vein, there were those who downgraded the Communist military successes in Cambodia. "Sure, the enemy can do whatever they want in Cambodia," said one Pentagon official. "But they're not about to take Phnom Penh. That would be a military liability and a political embarrassment." Over-all, in fact, some American military analysts argue that the enemy's aggressiveness in Laos and Cambodia reflected "his frustration in South Vietnam thus far this year."

Impact: But other analysts took a less sanguine view of the situation. The deterioration of the allied position in Laos and Cambodia has reportedly begun to worry top American officials in Saigon and Washington. And their concern is not limited to these two countries. The North Vietnamese have built two new airstrips in the southern part of their country, they have stepped up military activity in South Vietnam and, despite harassment by American bombers, the buildup of enemy troops in South Vietnam has continued unabated. As a result, there is a growing belief that the long-awaited enemy offensive may now be scheduled for this summer or fall, in order to have a maximum impact on the U.S. Presidential elections. Seen in this light, the setbacks in Laos and Cambodia take on a new significance. For in the words of one American official in Saigon: "It seems as if the price of calm in South Vietnam is chaos in the rest of Indochina. Clearly the Indochina war is not a series of separate conflicts but a totality which, much like a balloon, may be compressed in one area only to blow up in another."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR
2 APR 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00
STATINTL

Copter Rescues of 15 Recounted

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

PAKSE, South Laos — Air America helicopter crewmen returned here to their base tired but exhilarated Friday, after rescuing 15 American airmen downed on the Ho Chi Minh trail 75 miles east of Pakse.

The downed airmen were the crew of the American AC130 Spectre gunship shot down by Communist gunfire over the trail Thursday evening.

The search drama began in the middle of a Pakse cocktail party when the veteran U.S. air operations controller known as the Gray Fox was called out as the first news of the downed aircraft came over the air.

The first report was that the aircraft had been downed near Chavane on Route 96, a main part of the trail running over South Laos' Kasseng plateau, but Air America H34 helicopters and U.S. Air Force Jolly Green giants found the downed crewmen scattered over a wide area.

"Some people were 45 miles apart," an American rescue crewman said. An Air Force Jolly Green Giant pulled eight downed Americans out, leaving the remainder to slow moving, virtually unarmed Air America Sikorskys. "I think we picked up the last two," an Air America crewman said. "These guys were really good. 'Sandys' kept the enemy in their bunkers. They just kept going at it. I couldn't see the first guy. I thought he was in a camouflage suit, but it was a gray flight suit. I saw his face when he looked up about 100 feet below the hoist. That hoist seemed to be coming up about a foot a minute." The hoist is a device lowered into thick foliage to pick up downed crews.

"The other guy said he didn't know where he was but I told him to puff that smoke," the grinning crewman said. U.S. aircrews in Asia usually carry smoke canisters which give off a colored smoke to mark their position.

"Sandys" are U.S. Air Force piston engined Skyraiders. They strafed North Vietnamese troops around downed crewmen and are credited with silencing at least one enemy antiaircraft piece.

Enemy Truck Reported

Another American said he saw a Communist truck just before making his pickup. Air America crews credited the Skyraiders' downed crews' calmness and controller Gray Fox for the successful pickup.

Air America is a private company chartered to CIA, U.S. Aid and other American government agencies. One of its specialties in Laos is search and rescue in combination with USAF Jolly Green Giants based in Northeast Thailand, Jolly Greens, the H53 rescue helicopter, is flown in Laos by a U.S. Air Force outfit (known as "The Jungle Knives."

Jungle Knives specialize in lifting Lao and Thai irregulars into combat areas in Laos.

Following press reports, U.S. Embassy officials now indicate Americans are also flying helicopter gunships in Laos. AC130s, known as "Spectres," have become features nightly on the air ways in both North and South Laos.

Over the Ho Chi Minh trail area in South Laos they are part of an electronic air program code named "Igloo White" which sows the trail area with mass antennae incorporating transistor devices which set off radio signals whenever Communist trucks, tanks and men pass. These signals are translated onto radar tubes in a series of images read by officers at American bases in Thailand and Vietnam to give enemy positions and set into motion American air strikes.

AC130s Use Starscopes

AC130s, which can stay up many hours, also have attack capability, using starscopes which translate starlight to daylight and sensors which pick up heat from truck engines and enemy fires or infrared viewers which see heat and translate it the same way light is translated.

AC130s are also led to a target by magic boxes handled by Lao forward air guides which transmit to planes the number and positions of enemy trucks. Reporters on several occasions watched Lao controllers talking to Spectres in Lao irregular ground positions in forests in both North and South Laos.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600

GUERILLA (TORONTO, CANADA)
APRIL 1970

STATINTL

[redacted]

CIA... Dope Pushers

SAN FRANCISCO-Earth Magazine has announced the preparation of a law suit against a CIA-controlled airline it accused in its March issue of flying heroin out of Southeast Asia with the knowledge of that clandestine government agency.

San Francisco attorney Ron Leachman says the suit will charge Air America, a corporation set up by the Central Intelligence Agency, with allowing its facilities to be used for the traffiicing of opium from the "fertile triangle" of poppy fields in Laos, Burma and Thailand.

The current issue of Earth documents in a feature article by University of Calfornia Prof. Peter Scott, the connection between the CIA, Air America and the heroin trade, Scott charges that "the opium-based economy of Laos is being protected by a coalition of opium growing CIA mercenaries, Air America planes and Thailand troops."

The article charged that much of the heroin wound up being used in Vietnam by U.S. troops or went to the streets of America.

At a press conference announcing the publication of the article, Earth editor James Goode angrily pointed out how corruption abroad has brought disaster back home:

"The CIA helped put our kids in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic turned them on to smack." he said at the press conference. "And we're paying the CIA $6 billion a year for these services."

The impact of this trafficking on American youth cannot be underestimated. In the article, Scott quotes Eliot Marshall's estimate that 25% of all heroin in the U.S. comes from the fertile triangle region of South-east Asia

A further amplification of the problem came from research done by Mike Benner of WRIF news in a recent broadcast about the Earth magazine exposures.

He said, "Studies on the heroin problem in the United States have indicated that up to five billion dollars is spent annually on heroin by an estimated five hundred thousand addicts. More than half of the money spent each year on the purchase of heroin - two and one-half billion dollars - is

U.S. Government studies have indicated that as much as 50% of the crime in metropolitan areas is caused by addicts and medical officials report that heroin presently causes more deaths to people between the ages of 18 and 35 than war, cancer or car accidents."

Most observors feel that the CIA involvement in the heroin trade has not come about through a desire of the U.S. government to poison its troops and young people. But rather through a trap of political alliances with the dealers and marketers of opium, who were often the only forces in Southeast Asia willing to support the U.S. political and military adventures in that region, an area controled by remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army.

Several recent calls for attacks on the trade by the government are not being taken too seriously and Hubert Humphrey even suggested having the CIA itself hunt down the smugglers. Don Strachen writting in the Staff newspaper in Los Angles suggested that this was like asking the Nazi S.S. force to investigate atrocities at the Auschwitz concentration camp.

Earth Magazine and attorney Leachman want GI's vets or other persons with personal knowledge of the drug trade and who would be willing to help them in the suit against Air America, to contact Earth Magazine, The Agricultural Bldg. The Embarcadero at Mission, San Francisco CA 94115 or phone (415) 989-4300. Copies of the above mentioned article can also be gotten from that address

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060

April, 1972 STATINTL

the opium trail



HEROIN and IMPERIALISM

This pamphlet was written collectively by a study group supported by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. The group included Pat Haseltine, Jerry Meldon, Charles Knight, Mark Selden, Rod Aya, Henry Norr, and Mara. Thanks to all who helped, especially Jim Morrell, Tod McKie, and Jancis Long.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Second Edition
April 1972

continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601
NEW REPUBLIC
1 APRIL 1972
STATINTL

CIAid

Senator Edward Kennedy released March 19 a "sanitized summary" of the third in a series of reports he had asked the General Accounting Office to write him on the effectiveness of US humanitarian aid to Southeast Asia. The summary, "sanitized" to purge secret information contained in the full report, deals primarily with medical aid to Laos through the Agency for International Development (AID). Unavoidably it stumbles on something that has long troubled Kennedy and his staff on the Senate refugees subcommittee: the slipperiness of federal budget statistics when they have anything to do with the Indochina war. Two years ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings that publicized AID's link with the Central Intelligence Agency; AID's director, John Hannah, publicly admitted that since 1962 his agency had subsidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a front for secret agents.

As chairman of the refugees subcommittee, Kennedy protested that AID funds were being misspent, and in May 1971 he got a letter from Hannah saying that "at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated." As the latest GAO reports shows, the government had responded to an over literal interpretation of Kennedy's protest and had left the Laos arrangement virtually unchanged. The CIA would still train its secret army in Laos; it would still work out of AID offices and rely on AID for logistical and medical support. But beginning with the new fiscal year on July 1, 1971, the CIA would reimburse AID for services rendered. Technically, AID ceased to subsidize the CIA, but in every other way it remained a front and a supplier.

The GAO report given to Kennedy, a classified document, shows how this new system works. According to *The New York Times*, the report states that the CIA has already refunded $1.3 million to AID for medical assistance during the first half of fiscal 1972, and that more than $1 million will be refunded for the second half—a total of about $2.5 million a year spent by AID on the CIA army in Laos. The conclusion is that either AID is overspending its budget to accommodate the CIA (which is unlikely), or that $2.5 million originally appropriated for humanitarian aid is being diverted to back up the CIA's army. Only the bookkeepers know how the financing is arranged.

To a State Department spokesman, the whole issue is a "non-story" because this "cost-sharing agreement" between AID and the CIA was announced almost a year ago. Furthermore, he believes that it's nearly impossible to distinguish between humanitarian and military aid in Laos where the soldier-tribesmen are accompanied by their families. In any case, that was the line Senator Kennedy's staff got and it is still true. When Congress appropriates a sum for humanitarian aid in Laos ($4.9 million in 1972), about half of it ($2.5 million) goes to support the secret war. Judging from reports last week, the secret war may be coming to an end no matter what Congress does: the base of CIA operations in Laos, Long Cheng, has been abandoned by about 1000 local volunteers who were recruited to defend it against the North Vietnamese. A US spokesman in Vientiane said the situation at the base is "critical and rapidly deteriorating." If it falls, it will be the farthest south the Communists have reached in Laos.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

THE NEW TIMES
April 1972 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
[redacted]

Secret of the Golden Triangle

IN FEBRUARY 1970 *New Times* carried an article by I. Andronov entitled "Opium, Gold and Politics" discussing drug addiction in the U.S. and the international narcotics traffic. The article showed that one of the main sources of the opium smuggled into the U.S. and other countries of the "free world" was Northern Laos and adjoining sections of Burma and Thailand. It also recalled that the problem had been discussed time and again in the U.N. and that President Nixon had called abuse of drugs "a serious national threat." That was more than two years ago. Has anything changed since then?

Many Middle East countries, and especially Iran and Turkey, have established strict control of the cultivation of the basic raw material—the opium poppy and introduced severe penalties for trafficking in drugs. As a result production has shifted more and more to Southeast Asia, in particular the area at the junction of the Burman, Laotian and North Thai frontiers, in close proximity to the South Chinese province of Yunnan. More, the narcotics industry in this area has advanced to a higher stage. If formerly it exported the semi-manufacture -opium- now it trades mainly in the finished product, heroin, the most dangerous of all the drugs which dooms its victims to an early death and brings fantastic profits to the traffickers. The production of heroin out of raw opium has been put on a large-scale footing in the northeast corner of Burma where the remnants of the Kuomintang 93rd Yunnan Division which fled from China have been shel-

tering since 1949. The division commander, General Li My, who with the help of the CIA and the Chiang Kai-shek authorities managed to keep together the core of his force, has set up near the village of Takhylek no less than 50 laboratories for the purpose. Though primitive, these jungle-hut distilleries using the simplest equipment make up the world's biggest heroin producing centre and yield an income which has given the area the name of "Golden Triangle."

Correspondent Jean Pouget of the Paris *Le Figaro* who visited the fringes of the triangle (to try to get into it is to court death) estimates that it processes roughly 1,000 tons of raw opium annually. This can be converted into 100 tons of heroin, enough for 100 million 1-gramme packets or 1,000 million doses.

The Takhylek "firm" works not only on local raw material from Burma, Thailand and Laos. It is connected by a direct road with Kunming, the chief city of the Chinese province of Yunnan.

Jean Pouget asked a Laotian how the Chinese People's Republic army engineers building a highway from Yunnan to Phongsaly province in Laos regarded the Kuomintang ex-soldiers in these parts.

"Their attitude is that of elder brothers towards younger," he was told with a touch of humour. "Whether you are a Maoist or a nationalist makes little difference. You are above all Chinese, a member of a superior race."

Another interesting sidelight. The U.S. officials Pouget talked with during his first visit to Laos in April 1971 all confirmed that the drug traffickers operated under the protection of the Peking authorities. The *Chicago Tribune* recently reported that China annually exports illegally 2,000 tons of opium valued at $500 million. The opium poppy is cultivated on an area of some 1,235,000 acres, mostly in Yunnan and Kweichou provinces and the Kuanghsi autonomous area.

How the heroin gets to the market is wrapped in deep secrecy. It is known, however, that there are several landing strips in the Takhylek area which systematically receive planes and helicopters, mostly piloted by Americans. They bring in canned foods, beverages, and medicaments, and leave heavily laden with crates of heroin. The U.S. journalist David Feingold in his recent book "Opium and Politics in Laos" says that some aircrews working for Air America, a CIA outfit, carry narcotics to Saigon. It is also said that "unidentified" planes drop the bales containing heroin by parachute in the Tonkin and Siam gulfs to be picked up by waiting ships.

There is also the overland route across the Thai frontier to Bangkok. The traffic is so profitable that a single truckload delivered to the Thai capital is enough to pay for the truck.

According to a report submitted in early March in Washington by Federal narcotics co-ordinator and State Department aide Nelson Gross, the chief distributing centre in the illicit opium traffic from Burma, Laos, Cambodia and the Chinese province of Yunnan is Thailand. High-placed Thai officials, the report says, are involved.

Another outlet is Hongkong. Tat-Shing Leung, head of the International Affairs Department of the Hongkong and Kowloon trade unions and member of the Hongkong Government Labour Advisory Board, told our corespondent that narcotics from Bangkok are shipped through Hongkong to the U.S. and Western Europe despite the efforts of the Hongkong authorities to stop the smuggling. As for drugs from South China, this, he said, is often talked about though he personally had no definite evidence.

What is the situation in the U.S. today? On March 2 Senator Charles H. Percy said that according to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics there now are 560,000 regular heroin users in the U.S., as against 315,000 in 1969. The Senator believes, however, that the actual figure is higher. Information at his disposal, also obtained from official sources, suggests that the number of heroin addicts in the U.S. runs to 700,000.

The special United Nations conference on strengthening the international narcotics control system which closed in Geneva on March 25 adopted a number of amendments to the 1961 narcotics convention enlarging the powers of the International Narcotics Control Board. But as necessary as such international measures are to combat the illicit transportation and trade in narcotics, it is obviously impossible to put an end to drug addiction without stamping out the "Golden Triangle" and similar centres.

V. ROSEN

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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RAMPARTS
April 1972

STATINTL

Nixon's Peace Offer

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE at stake in the Indochina war has always been a relatively simple one; is the United States (or the French before it) to have a predominant voice in determining the political and social structure of Indochina, or will this question be settled by the Indochinese peoples themselves, relatively free from outside intervention? It has been fairly clear from the outset that, if external force were withdrawn, Vietnam would ultimately be unified under communist leadership, since the Viet Minh and its successors had "captured" the nationalist movement, as U.S. government analysts express it. In Laos, the Pathet Lao have been unmatched in their ability to construct a popular nationalist political movement, in this case, too, with revolutionary social content. U.S. intervention from the late 1950s has drawn North Vietnam increasingly into Laotian affairs, much as in South Vietnam and more recently Cambodia, where the March 1970 coup, very likely with a CIA hand, and the US-ARVN invasion that followed, shattered a fragile though conceivably stable neutralism and increased the probability that Cambodia too will be brought ultimately into a communist-led federation of some sort if outside force is withdrawn.

For reasons that need not detain us here, the United States has never been willing to tolerate the "loss" of Indochina, and remains unwilling today. The conditions of U.S. intervention have changed over the years, but not the essential goals. Furthermore, the basic problem facing the Western invaders has also changed little during the past quarter century. Several years ago, an American military spokesman formulated the problem clearly: the U.S. has enormous military force but little political power and must defeat an adversary with enormous political power but only modest military force. To this problem the U.S. must find the "proper response"—in Vietnam and elsewhere in the third world as well. (Jean Lacouture, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*, 1966).

This problem dictates American strategy. The basic strategy has been, necessarily, to demolish the social and political structures in which the indigenous resistance is rooted, what is called "nation-building" by some of the more contemptible hypocrites spawned in the course of this endeavor, for example, Robert Komer, chief Presidential advisor on "pacification" in the Johnson Administration. Five years ago, he held out the hope that "erosion of southern VC strength" may be feasible because, though none of the American programs are very efficient, "we are grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass" (*Pentagon Papers*, Beacon, volume IV). After the Tet offensive of 1968, it became clear that the American public would not long tolerate the costs of a continuing military occupation in South Vietnam, coupled with a costly air war against the North. Consequently, the direct U.S. troop commitment was leveled off and then gradually lowered through "Vietnamization"—a policy suggested by Pentagon systems analysts in 1967—while a sharply expanded technological war reached its peak in the early months of the Nixon Administration.

Nixon and Kissinger are gambling that the massive destruction and forced population concentration in the South, with its devastating impact on the rural society, may create conditions under which the U.S.-imposed regime can survive. To use Robert Komer's terms, "thanks to massive U.S. military intervention at horrendous cost," a "favorable military environment" has been created "in which the largely political competition for control and support of the key rural population could begin again" in this "revolutionary, largely political conflict" (*J. of International Affairs*, 1971, no. 1). He fails to add that control of the "key rural population" may be facilitated by the fact that at least half the population, 85 percent rural in 1960, now lives in urban ghettoes (J-C Pomonti, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1972), part of the "horrendous cost" of "massive U.S. military intervention." Much the same is true in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon and Kissinger appear to be moving towards an effective partition of Indochina: the heavily settled areas of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia will, it is hoped, be separated from the resist[illegible] construction, controlled by an elaborate military and police apparatus, and gradually absorbed within the U.S.-Japan Pacific system. The vast areas ceded to the resistance will be subjected to intensive bombardment which will continue to make an organized social life virtually impossible. Parts of Laos may be effectively incorporated within Thailand, as George Ball suggested years ago. It may be that the willingness of the Administration to concede the presence of Thai mercenaries in Laos (in conflict with explicit legislation designed to prevent this) reflects the need to prepare the public for this outcome.

As the very knowledgeable Australian analyst Peter King observes, such "successes" as have been achieved in this program are "no mystery": "It requires more than ordinary courage for civilians to maintain their political allegiances openly in the face of a semi-genocidal counter-insurgent strategy" (*Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1971), the prerequisite for Komer-style "nation-building." It is this counter-insurgent strategy and its results that lead General Westmoreland to believe: "I think particularly significant is that the enemy does not have the strong infrastructure and the guerrilla forces in large numbers, well equipped and highly motivated, that he had in 1968" (Peter Osnos, *Washington Post-Boston Globe*, Feb. 1, 1972). However, as King and many others recognize, "the durability of that success may be doubted."

Given the insistence of the U.S. public on scaling down the direct American involvement, it has been obvious for several years that it would become necessary for the U.S. to engage in some sort of political manipulations within the areas of South Vietnam that remain under U.S. control, or to "get ready for political competition in South Vietnam," as Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington put it in a paper before the May 1969 meeting of the Council on Vietnamese Studies of SEADAG. This collection of scholars, who claim to be concerned with support for research on Vietnam, struggled manfully with the problem of how to ensure control at the national level for "our side," given that the NLF remains "the most powerful purely political national organization," "the

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SR: BOOKS

Book Review Editor: ROCHELLE GIRSON

IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission to Southeast Asia

by Edward Geary Lansdale

Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50

Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky

■ With the exception of the Pentagon Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's memoir could have been the most valuable eyewitness account of the internationalizing of the Indochinese war. Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in his own book, furnished the model for the Ugly American who, from 1950 through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put down the Huk revolution in the Philippines. He then proceeded to Vietnam where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first shaky years when Washington couldn't make up its mind whom to tap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man in Saigon. While the book's time span is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it covers in the Philippines and Vietnam is genuinely important.

There is only one difficulty with *In the Midst of Wars*: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper & Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public—and for $12.50!—several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and *years* after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of our engagement in Vietnam.

The lie on the jacket describes Lansdale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. Indeed, on page 378—the last of the text—he states that at the very time Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force."

For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photographs in his book attest, he certainly wore its uniform. This is irrelevant. Lansdale was for years a senior operative of the Central Intelligence Agency; on page 244 of the Department of Defense edition of the Pentagon Papers, Lansdale, two other men, and Allen Dulles are identified as representing the CIA at a meeting of the U.S. Special Committee on Indochina held on January 29, 1954.

Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale uses repeatedly it is "help"—and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-like urge to offer *spontaneous* assistance. Thus, the first day he ever saw Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help. . . . I voiced this to Ambassador Heath. . . . Heath told me to go ahead." The informal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White."

Further desires to serve inform Lansdale's concern for the "masses of people living in North Vietnam who would want to . . . move out before the communists took over." These unfortunates, too, required "help." Splitting his "small team" of Americans in two, Lansdale saw to it that "One half, under Major Conein, engaged in refugee work in the North."

"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the *Times* and Beacon editions of the Pentagon Papers (see *SR*, Jan. 1, 1972) as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] for cover purposes." The secret report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a paramilitary organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took over . . . the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, on the surface." Aggression *from* the North, anyone?

Lansdale expresses particular pleasure with the refugee movement to the South. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South. . . . [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous participation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale modestly claims that he "passed along" ideas on how to wage psychological warfare to "some nationalists." The Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that the CIA "engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh [illegible] how to behave for the Vietminh take-over of the Hanoi region in early October [1954] including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled."

The refugees—Catholics, many of whom had collaborated with the French—were settled in the South, in communities that, according to Lansdale, were designed to "sandwich" Northerners and Southerners "in a cultural melting pot that hopefully would give each equal opportunity."

Robert Scigliano, who at this time was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michigan State University team on how to "help" Diem, saw more than a melting pot:

> Northerners, practically all of whom are refugees, [have] preempted many of the choice posts in the Diem government. . . . [The] Diem regime has assumed the aspect of a carpet bag government in its disproportion of Northerners and Centralists . . . and in its Catholicism. . . . The Southern people do not seem to share the anticommunist vehemence of their Northern and Central compatriots, by whom they are sometimes referred to as unreliable in the communist struggle. . . . [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they are generally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and provincial officials.

Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Vietnam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States."

Wherever one turns in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He reports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart—until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to President Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional operations. . . . Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."

Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of Diem's success against the various sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. (At every step Diem was advised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic moment, even holds the weeping Chief [illegible] during de-

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STATINT

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
29 MARCH 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
STATINTL

LETTERS

BURCHETT

Della Brown, San Jose, Calif.: We owe a great debt to Wilfred Burchett who has so effectively and clearly reported to us the true facts behind the barrage of administration propaganda regarding what was actually happening to the people of Indochina. His revelations of the CIA activities in Laos, the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the change in government there, have been of tremendous help to us in understanding the true nature of the U.S. policies in those countries.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

VARIETY
29 MARCH 1972

Television Followup

Chronolog

NBC News' monthly primetime magazine took on a noble challenge Friday (24) with an extensive segment on the secret war being waged against the North Vietnamese in northern Laos. Unfortunately the subject apparently was much too tough to handle by the networks' traditional standards of ambivalent journalism.

From what has previously been learned about the secret war, mainly via print, it's a subject which cries out for an adversary approach. But, from all appearances, NBC News was the guest of the Central Intelligence Agency, the organizer, advisor and total bankroller of the "secret irregular army" and sole operator of the clandestine airlines servicing the war—and the network was a polite guest indeed. "Chronolog" host Garrick Utley, in fact, gave the CIA a resounding standup testimonial for its endurance in holding the line, a job handed the spooks, he averred, by the U.S. government.

The segment was launched with an extensive look at the embattled mountain tribesmen, a lead which strongly tended to disguise the over-riding importance of 80,000 mercenaries, the clandestined airlines and saturation bombing by the U.S. in support of the war. The North Laos Communist government, clandestine participation by U.S. special forces and heavy narcotic shipments by the CIA airlines were never mentioned in the piece. (Those opium shipments of the Laotian tribesmen's main commerce were barely hinted at when the NBC cameras for the briefest moment focused on a gag poster in a bar frequented by Americans which carried the slogan, "Fly Heroin Airlines.")

Oversights were often obvious, as when field reporter Bob Rogers, interviewing a mercenary, failed to ask what he was being paid.

Bill.

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STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
29 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00[redacted]

Laotians Reported Killing Own Men to Curb Desertions

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, March 28—The commander of the CIA-supported irregular army battling the North Vietnamese in northeast Laos, trying to reduce desertions, has reportedly ordered his troops to ambush and kill fleeing soldiers.

Civilian refugees are also being killed in the encounters, according to highly reliable Laotian sources.

Ambushes along a mountain road that leads from Ban Son, the new headquarters for the progovernment army of Meo tribesmen and its CIA advisers, are being blamed on enemy action but are actually being carried out by loyal Meo troops under the orders of Gen. Vang Pao, the sources say.

The ambushes are being reported to Vientiane as normal military action.

Laotian and U.S. Government spokesmen, who emphasize civilian casualties in their accounts of the fighting are not believed to know the true situation, sources here say. But the tribal inhabitants of Ban Son and Long Cheng, where the CIA was based until recently, do know it and are warning each other not to flee the area.

U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane, asked about continuing reports that such ambushes are being carried out on Gen. Vang Pao's orders, dismiss them as "vicious rumors."

Unauthorized Departures

They confirm, however, that Vang Pao has been plagued recently by large-scale unauthorized departures of troops under his command, though they hesitate to use the word "desertions."

Most of the departures, they note, are by troops from southern Laos brought in early this year to assist in the defense of Long Cheng.

"They are tired and want to go home," a U.S. spokesman said last week, commenting on the desertion of more than 1,000 troops from Ban Son.

It was this large-scale desertion of southern troops, commandeering civilian trucks at gunpoint and driving them the 60 miles south to Vientiane, that apparently set off the reported ambushes on the road out of Ban Son.

A second group of at least 30 southern Laos troops left Ban Son by climbing aboard two trucks hauling empty gasoline drums back to Vientiane. Midway between Ban Son and the mountain road's junction with the main north-south route to the capital, the trucks were hit by fire from the roadside.

Eight persons, including two civilans, were killed and another 20, also including civilians, were wounded.

Fear for Lives

Several reliable Laotian sources say there is no doubt the ambush of the truck was executed by Meo troops loyal to Gen. Van Pao and that victims of the attack express fear for their lives if it becomes known that they have talked about it. Tribal irregular soldiers at Ban Houei Pomone, the junction about five miles west of the ambush site, told reporters an hour after the action they believed the ambushers were Meo soldiers, and said they believed there would be no attempt to pursue them. Although they would not say they had been among the ambushed themselves, they did have 10 blood-encrusted M-16 rifles they said belonged to dead and wounded soldiers from the ambush site.

Heavy Traffic

The mountain roadway from Ban Houei Pomone to Ban Son bears heavy military traffic with trucks hauling ammunition and gasoline to the military operations center at Ban Son. Incidents involving highly-valuable military cargo are infrequent, according to reports received in Vientiane. When incidents do occur, they seem to be directed against vehicles leaving the base—when they are empty—rather than approaching it, observers here note. It is felt that the enemy would not bother to ambush trucks without cargo.

Prime Target

Americans working in the Ban Houei Pomone area in recent months say they are suspicious of reports that civilians have been the prime target of Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese ambushes, as reports reaching Vientiane indicate. They say investigation usually establishes that soldiers leaving Ban Son were using the transport when it was hit.

Ranking Laotian government sources admit privately that Gen. Vang Pao has had difficulty keeping an estimated 130,000 Meo and Lao Theung tribesmen in and about the Ban Son base and refugee center. The urge to move south and west from Ban Son is very strong, the sources say, and it is largely fear of Vang Pao's troops that keeps the tribesmen there.

For Vang Pao their presence is considered essential. They are the families and fellow-villagers of most of his troops in the Long Cheng area. If they were to begin leaving unopposed, it is generaly believed here that much of his army would go with them, leaving only Thai "volunteers" to hold Long Cheng against North Vietnamese regulars.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
[redacted]

CHICAGO, ILL.
TODAY MAR 26 1972
E - 436,893
S - 483,418

CIA deception in Laos

ALMOST A year ago, the Nixon administration promised that the Central Intelligence Agency would stop using civilian aid funds to help run its secret guerrilla war in Laos. It hasn't stopped, according to a report from the General Accounting Office.

In fact, the CIA is siphoning off $2.5 million a year from public health funds earmarked for Loatian civilians by the Agency for International Development. And the GAO report, prepared for Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's judiciary subcommittee on refugees, is only part of the picture. Another one, to be released later, will deal with CIA diversion of refugee assistance funds as well.

The vehicles for this clandestine use of funds appear to be Air America, a small air line operated by the development agency, and the Village Health Project, concerned with care of "military and paramilitary" groups in Laos. The chief customer of both is the CIA, which depends on them for medical logistic support of its guerrilla bands.

We'll agree that secrecy is essential to some military operations. Deception, tho, is another matter when American taxpayers are being deceived by their own agents abroad. It's reasonable to ask why the CIA continues to use "public health" funds to complicate our involvement in southeast Asia while the administration assures Congress and the public that the war there is being wound down.

The development agency evidently has gone along with the deception. On May 7, 1971, AID Administrator John A. Hannah wrote Sen. Kennedy that by the middle of that year "all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will have been terminated."

So much for the credibility of both these agencies. We hope President Nixon will call their officials to account and find out why they continue to break the promise he made.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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LOS ANGELES TIMES CALENDAR
26 MARCH 1972

STATINTL

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STATINTL

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

His curiosity piqued by Sunset Strip billboard, Diehl investigated the charges with expert on spies, Ladislas Farago

BOOK TALK

Sniffing Around U.S. Spy Network

BY DIGBY DIEHL

A sensational billboard on Sunset Strip a few weeks ago caused me to look into the March issue of EARTH magazine with considerable interest—and great skepticism. Another attack on our government within the government, the Central Intelligence Agency, was leveled in a message 48 feet long, heralding an article by Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott about CIA involvement in heroin traffic in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Although Scott does not "prove" his charges conclusively, his research is impressive and the bulk of circumstantial evidence as well as peculiar coincidence would certainly lead me, if I were a congressman, to ask just what the CIA is up to running Air America, the largest airline in Southeast Asia, and being inconspicuously conspicuous around the opium triangle. EARTH's editor, Jim Goode, says, "All this is terrifying. It has to be stopped and the only way to stop it is to make the CIA—specifically, its secret unauthorized war in Laos—accountable to the public. When a 'secret' agency is allowed to operate beyond the reach of the law, it becomes a criminal agency."

Goode sounds shrill and unrealistic until you recall weird scenes like the Bay of Pigs and read a few more facts. The CIA employs 18,000 people "directly," only we don't know exactly what 6,000 of them do because they're involved in Clandestine Services. The $6 billion annual budget of this organization is spent in ways mainly unknown by the American taxpayer . . . unknown, for that matter, by chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee Allan Ellender who says, "It never dawned on me to ask about it."

My curiosity piqued, I talked to the foremost civilian expert on secret intelligence operations, Ladislas Farago, who is also the author of the current best-seller [illegible] ($11.95). Farago has spent most of his life working in American intelligence services and studying espionage. "The spying operations of the CIA are a big sur joke; they're all playing Alice in Wonderlan games," he says, roaring with laughter like a Hunga rian Santa Claus.

"We're spending something like $2.9 billion bri ing prime ministers in Asia and buying armies i Burma and it's all nonsense. Counterinsurgency not the business of the United States. Nixon woul be better served by getting the facts than by the CIA overthrowing governments."

Actually, according to Farago, the CIA and other intelligence operations do have valuable information-gathering services, mostly run by civilian scholars. "These are useful and necessary services: mainly reading newspapers and official reports from other countries. But the rest could be canned. The United States could have a very adequate intelligence operation for under $100 million. To be informed would be cheap; to play games is expensive."

A comic aspect of the intelligence problem is that even when a spy does come up with information, who knows if he can be trusted? "As I point out in 'The Game of Foxes,' the Germans and the Allies had so completely penetrated each other's information lines with double agents that no one knew what was really happening. Hitler's own men invariably gave him false information because they didn't like him. Of course, they couldn't have known for sure what they were giving him since the British were running the German spy network in England. Then again, the Roosevelt-Churchill hotline was tapped. Sure, a spy can be important—but you never know to how many people."

History proves over and over that the spy game is a waste of time and money, says Farago. "When I worked in naval intelligence in 1935-37, the information published in the New York Times was superior to what was coming through our office. The Korean invasion of June, 1950, wasn't announced to President Truman by our vast spy network; it came over the Associated Press wire. And, of course, the CIA's 'secret' Bay of Pigs was one long farce. Eisenhower turned down the idea in September, 1960, but Allen Dulles (then CIA head) and Richard Bissell (then chief of staff) sold it to Kennedy. It was so cleverly planned that virtually every major news source from the New York Times to the Nation knew about it in advance."

In 1943, Ian Fleming (who was then with British Intelligence and went on to write the James Bond

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

26 MAR 1972 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

Vietnam War:

Hanoi's Target Is The U.S. Election

SAIGON— The Americans and their South Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian allies are fighting three different ground wars these days. The North Vietnamese are fighting one, in three different places. And last week American analysts here, trying to make sense of it all, were saying that the Communists might be concentrating their attacks in Laos and Cambodia because it is easier for them to succeed there now than it is in South Vietnam.

The analysts do not doubt, however, that an important aim of the North Vietnamese is to affect the outcome of the November elections in the United States. "They think maybe that they can embarrass us as easily there in Laos and Cambodia as in Vietnam," one of these analysts said the other day.

At week's end, the situation at the once secret Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Tieng in northern Laos was "fluid." The Laotian defenders of the installation, which has not been a usable military base since the North Vietnamese nearly overran it last January and forced the withdrawal of most equipment and aircraft, were in disarray. Scores of them had thrown away their weapons and fled south, away from the fighting.

Clouds last week prevented the United States and Laotian Air Force bombers from hitting the enemy positions effectively, and American officials here predicted that the North Vietnamese would try to push every defender out of the Long Tieng valley if they could.

To the south, in the Laotian Panhandle, the Communists have widened their hundreds of miles of infiltration and supply trails and brought in more antiaircraft guns and Soviet-built surface to air (SAM) missiles there than ever before. This has hampered the American bombing effort, now at its seasonal peak of several hundreds of missions each day.

And on Tuesday, from one delivery point on the trail, the North Vietnamese launched scores of rockets at the Cambodian capital of Phnompenh, causing more than 100 civilian deaths in a short attack that seemed designed to dramatize Cambodia's tenuous military situation. Further terrorist attacks later in the week destroyed a key bridge and sank and damaged vital supply ships in Pnompenh harbor.

Cambodia is also undergoing a political upheaval stemming at least in part, from a crisis of confidence in its military leadership following a serious defeat administered to Cambodian President Lon Nol's forces along Highway Six north of Pnompenh last December.

As active as the Communists have been outside South Vietnam's borders for the past three months—the dry season during which they normally concentrate their attacks — they have done surprisingly little inside the country so far this year. That is a source both of comfort and of worry for the Americans here. "I think North Vietnam is determined to do something in South Vietnam in the 1972 dry season," said a senior analyst. "I think they want to have a very, very direct influence on the American electoral process."

American officials here predicted a North Vietnamese main force offensive would be launched in February to coincide with President Nixon's visit to Peking. It failed to materialize and now they are saying that it was suddenly called off in the middle of last month because the enemy realized his limitations. Now they expect the big offensive some time next summer. "I think they'd prefer any Democratic candidate to Nixon," an American official said the other day, "and they'll try to do what they can to embarrass Nixon on the Vietnam issue and cause his defeat."

The Americans' protégé, President Nguyen Van Thieu, shares this view, but he would prefer Mr. Nixon to any Democratic candidate. The fear among the Nixon Administration's representatives here is that if the Communists staged a spectacular offensive — by trying for example to cut the country in two in the Central Highlands region — the political impact in the United States would be enough to bring about a change next November.

All this of course is speculation, buttressed only by intelligence reports of the movement of a greater number of North Vietnamese troops — some say 80,000 of them — into South Vietnam than at any time since the great Tet offensive of Early 1968. Most of these reported troop movements of North Vietnamese divisional size forces appear to be aimed towards the Central Highlands, west of the provincial capitals of Pleiku and Kontum, where South Vietnamese forces are most vulnerable to attacks.

But intelligence officers also report signs that the North Vietnamese would like to make a push on the old imperial capital of Hué, a principal target in 1968.

So far, the Communists have avoided main force ground clashes, preferring to stand at a distance to fire rockets and mortars at their enemies, as in Pnompenh last Tuesday, and at several Vietnamese bases just below the Demilitarized Zone and at Tayninh, west of Saigon last week.

The Americans are continuing to withdraw troops — there are fewer than 108,000 in South Vietnam now, and there will be only 69,000 by May — and to rely more heavily on air power. The planes are based mostly outside Vietnam, at five airfields in Thailand and on two aircraft carriers always on station in the Gulf of Tonkin. The only large American air base left in Vietnam is at Danang. But when intelligence reports indicate something big is up, American air power can be increased easily — as it was in mid-February, when the command brought in extra B-52's and a third aircraft carrier to mount a large bombing campaign against the Tet offensive that never came.

"Whether the Communists will commit their main-line units, I don't know," one American specialist said. "But they are in disposition to do so on very short notice. And their buildup in air defenses along the trail and just above the Demilitarized Zone indicates they plan to do something in retaliation for which they expect a very strong bombing reaction."

The North Vietnamese are also building three new airfields just above the Demilitarized Zone. Would they use them to send bombers beyond their borders against their enemies? "That," one source said, "would be an entirely new phase of the war."

—CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES

26 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160[redacted]

STATINTL

Enemy Still Trying to Seize Defenses at Key Laos Base

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 25 North Vietnamese forces, in heavy shelling beginning last Saturday and followed by a series of ground attacks, have driven Laotian troops off four of the nine positions on the ridge verlooking the mountain base at Long Tieng.

But so far the North Vietnamese have been unable to occupy the positions themselves.

American officials have sought to discount the importance of Long Tieng, which is 33 miles northeast of Vientiane the capital, and which served for years as the center for secret Central Intelligence Agency operations in northern Laos. The Americans say that many of its former functions have been shifted elsewhere and that it is no longer of strategic value.

Sisouk na Champassak, the acting Minister of Defense, and Government officials disagree.

Mr. Sisouk said in an interview today that he believed



The New York Times/March 26, 1972

Laotians lost key posts near Long Tieng (1). Foe struck near Dakto (2) and shelled Tayninh (3).

the primary North Vietnamese objective in attacking and trying to capture Long Tieng was to clear the way for a drive south to the plain on which Vientiane lies.

Territorial Drive Seen

For the moment the North Vietnamese and the Communist Pathet Lao are not believed to be interested in taking Vientiane, but Mr. Sisouk and other Laotians think they want to occupy as much territory this year as possible in anticipation of a possible cease-fire and ensuing negotiations. There is a widespread feeling in Vientiane that 1972 could be a decisive year in the long struggle for Laos.

The Communist forces now control about two-thirds of the 91,000 square miles of Laos, according to informed American sources. If they succeed in getting much more territory, the Vientiane Government, headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma, will have very little bargaining power in negotiations.

Long Tieng sits astride one of three natural routes to the south, the central one. In addition to physically blocking movement on this route, it has been useful as a base for launching operations directed at the other trails.

Since the latest North Vietnamese attacks began at the end of December, however, the base has been virtually paralyzed, fighting for its life. No aircraft have been able to use the mile-long MacAdam runway. Supplies have either been parachuted into tehe base or dropped from helicopters.

Enemy Troops Put at 7,000

Mr. Sisouk estimated that there are about 7,000 North Vietnamese in the force besieging the base. Other sources said that perhaps an equal number of irregulars—Meo hill tribesmen, Thai volunteers and other Laotians — under the command of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, were defending Long Tieng.

These irregulars are part of a force of about 30,000 who were trained and recruited by the United States' Central Intelligency Agency. They are considered to be the only viable fighting force on the Laotian Government side.

Both American and Laotian officials fear that if the defenders of Long Tieng were overwhelmed the morale of the irregular forces and the 56,000 other Laotian troops would be [illegible] son for Mr. Sisouk's concern.

Qualified Americans here maintain that any North Vietnamese advance that developed in the event that long Tieng fell could be delayed considerably by a series of retreats to the ridges between the base and the Vientiane plain. Many feel that this tactic should hold off the North Vietnamese until the rainy season begins in late May and military operations in Laos become next to impossible.

But these Americans concede that a collapse in morale could prove to be an insurmountable problem.

Officials currently are denying correspondent's requests to visit Long Tieng, saying that all available helicopters are being used in the battle.

Little Ground Combat Reported

While informed American sources have described the fighting at Long Tieng as "intense," field reports seem to indicate that there has been relatively little ground combat.

Instead, the indications are that the campaign for Long Tieng has been largely an artillery duel, with considerable bombing also being done by American and Laotian pilots.

In the last week of fighting, informed American sources have been able to confirm only 102 North Vietnamese deaths. There was no total available for Laotion Government losses.

Two task forces have moved out several miles beyond Long Tieng in an attempt to cut or at least threaten the North Vietnamese supply lines. But so far neither task force has seen much action.

Both the Americans and Laotians here believe that the odds increase in favor of the Governmnt forces the longer the battle goes on because of the chronic problems of resupply that the North Vietnamese face.

Informed American sources estimate that the North Vietnamese have up to five more days before they bing to feel a pinch in supplis and so far they have given on indication that they intend to do anything but press the battle.

Today Mr. Sisouk said that he was ready to "pay any price" to hold Long Tieng.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0[redacted]

SEATTLE, WASH.
TIMES
MAR 2 6 1972
E - 244,776
S - 310,357

Nixon revelation

50 civilians missing or captives

By SVEIN GILJE

In a rare reference to civilians involved in the Indochina war, President Nixon has revealed that some 50 American civilians are missing or held captive.

The reference came in a presidential proclamation declaring the week beginning today as the National Week of Concern for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

The week will be noted here with a proclamation to be issued tomorrow by Mayor Wes Uhlman. Earlier Gov. Dan Evans issued a similar proclamation.

The President's proclamation noted that "there are 1,623 American servicemen and some 50 United States civilians missing in action or being held captive by North Vietnam and its allies."

The proclamation did not go into specifics as to the civilians. It's known that some civilians were captured or are missing, such as from the 1970 invasion of Cambodia.

But presumably this also refers to civilians missing in Laos, where the Central Intelligence Agency has been active in the so-called "secret war" there. Civilian pilots fly for Air America, which contracts with the C. I. A.

Some of the men have been held or missing for several years.

"At the end of this month," Mr. Nixon said, "the first men to be taken prisoner will begin their ninth year in captivity. This is the longest internment ever endured by American fighting men."

Seven men have been captive or missing more than eight years; 135 more than seven years and 427 more than six years.

One of the men, Lt. Col. Jack W. Bomar, is believed to be dying of a kidney ailment judging from letters his wife has received. A kidney machine and a technician to operate it have been offered through the Red Cross, but there has been no response from North Vietnam.

The men in the P. O. W. or missing categories are aging: 311 are older than 40 years, 15 are over 50 years and two over 55.

The week will be observed at Fort Lewis and the McChord Air Force Base, as well.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000[redacted]

STATINTL

Dusty Junction Key to Laos Defense

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

MONE, Laos—A scattering of ramshackle bamboo huts bared to the sweltering sun, a long red-and-white striped barrier pole, and a wide, dusty fork in National Route 13 mark perhaps the most important road junction in Laos.

Sixty miles south, through mountains and across plains, is Vientiane, the capital and entry point for the equipment of war passing here. North, by way of the left fork, is Luang Prabang, the royal capital, now cut off by Communist Pathet Lao troops.

The right fork is the important one. In a day, dozens of heavily laden trucks rumble to the right through Ban Houei Pomone, shift to a lower gear and begin the ascent into the mountains of northern Laos.

Twenty miles east, the road ends at Ban Son, America's largest refugee center in Laos and headquarters for Gen. Vang Pao and his CIA-supported army, now fighting desperately to maintain a toehold.

Road Vital Link

"Close that road," an American official in Vientiane said, "and you can probably write off Vang Pao."

One day this week, there was a break in the flow of trucks hauling gasoline, ammunition, food, and building material as well as of the buses and taxis taking passengers to and from the town that has sprung up around Ban Son. An ambush midway between the two ends of the road halted traffic.

Drivers waited for word to come down by radio that it was safe to go in.

A flatbed truck loaded with empty gasoline drums from Ban Son and carrying soldiers and civilian hitch hikers had been ambushed. A taxi driver explains that 10 were dead and 30 wounded.

He nodded at a bundle of U.S. M16 rifles in the dust and at a cluster of young soldiers silently watching them. A couple of the rifles were smeared with blood, dried by the blistering sun.

Soldier Dead

One rifle was missing its hand grip. "Dead," a boy-soldier said, nodding his head east, up the fork in the highway.

As the vehicles began pulling out onto the road, a government official remarked that they were foolish to go and that the road was not yet safe. He let them go nonetheless, while the foreigners were told to wait.

The young tribal soldiers waiting for a northbound taxi with their bundled rifles noted our interest in the weapons. The youngest soldier dragged on one cigarette after another. When he spoke to his friends, in clipped phrases in both Lao and mountain dialect, it was evident his voice had not even begun to deepen with adolescence.

None was older than 18. Dark-skinned, shaggy haired, dressed in greasy, baggy combat fatigues, they were fully equipped for war. Hand grenades dangled at their belts. Pockets bulged with ammunition. They wore flack jackets over sleveless shirts.

One of the youths asked a taxi driver if he was willing to take them and the weapons to Vang Vien. The driver refused.

The young soldiers were apparently already here from Ban Son before the ambush took place. Taxi drivers who ferried the dead and wounded into Ban Houei Pomone, transferring them on to Vang Vien, brought the rifles to the checkpoint at the junction.

The soldier in charge of their unit had instructed the boys to carry them to Vang Vein.

East along the road to Ban Son, a Huey helicopter, its sound distinct in the mountain air, chattered a few hundred feet above the road just beyond sight, probably searching for the ambushers, but already too late.

Later, an American explained it was one of the new Thai "irregular" gunships that the CIA now operates around Ban Son, ostensibly doing only medical evacuation.

Although the helicopters are always standing by for emergency needs, like the ambush, the enemy can hear them coming far away and is gone before they get there, the American said.

"There is no answer to ambushes along that road, or any other road they want to hit," he commented.

The American believes the North Vietnamese are planning to seal up the road into Ban Son, the central logistics point for the Long Cheng area, multiplying problems for the CIA and Vang Pao. "It is a hell of a smart move," he remarked.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

THE NEW YORKER
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3
25 MAR 1972
STATINTL

THE TALK OF THE TOWN

Notes and Comment

THE President's trip to China shows that television coverage opens up what is virtually a new field of action to men in power. With television, a President can draw eyes away from the piecemeal, day-to-day unfolding of policy and focus them on complex, powerful, symbolic events that he can manipulate more easily than he can the world itself. It allows him to act directly on the country's imagination, like a high priest. Major events of this kind, which are designed chiefly for the sake of coverage, are more elusive than events of other kinds. It is not only the results of an event like the China trip that are indeterminate but the very nature of the event. When the excitement has died down, one has to wonder even whether anything really happened at all. As we have turned these matters over in our mind, we have found ourself thinking in more than one voice—in a kind of colloquy. The colloquy revolves around the question of appearance and reality in politics, and goes like this:

FIRST VOICE: The trip was the most unreal, and therefore the most deceptive, event in recent memory. It was a circus put on to enhance the prestige of the participants and divert all of us from their real actions in the world. At a time when action was required, they gave us theatre. Instead of agreements and explanations, they gave us tourism and toasts. (The news-starved reporters raised the art of interpreting official handshakes and official toasts to the level of a new academic discipline.) It was all hints and no commitments. The trip fits into an ominous new American strategy—for widespread but "invisible" continued intervention abroad, with our government phasing out the techniques that attract the public's attention. The new strategy would rely heavily on air power combined with electronic battlefield devices, on the C.I.A. (to conduct clandestine wars, like the one in Laos), on allies and mercenaries (like the Cambodians and the Thais), on donations of matériel, and on the deployment of warships (as in the India-Pakistan war). If troops were to be required, volunteers rather than draftees might be used. At home, the government, instead of seeking support, would encourage indifference. Ideological passion in the public at large would no longer be required, or even desired. Already, the public has discovered that China is an unfriendly but basically reactionary power, like the Soviet Union, and that it is as ready to sell out a revolution (as it did in Bangladesh and is doing in Ceylon) as support one. In the new view, the great powers would command the globe like three or four or five giant machine-gun turrets. The China trip set the style for the new international politics. It went a long way toward the Sinification of the American public. It helped get us used to resting content with the pageantry of international relations while leaving the substance to the President and a few experts, who dazzle us from time to time with their startling shifts and unexplained reversals. And while we're watching Nixon and Mao shake hands (live from Peking!) our government is underwriting murder in Southeast Asia.

SECOND VOICE: Your distinction between politically contrived pseudo-events and the "realities," which is indeed often a useful one, has misled you this time, owing to a peculiar circumstance. That is the strangeness and unreality of this country's last twenty years of relations with China, which a high official of the State Department has now gone as far as to call an "aberration." In those years, it was as though the American public wanted to keep the slate on China clear of any information, so that the most hysterical men in our political life would be free to chalk up their worst imaginings there. The President's trip put an end to all this, and to a style of American politics that went with it. And doing so didn't require any of the substance you demand. (In the same period, other people fastened their utopian dreams on China, and their imaginings, too, have now been undercut.) The President's trip *was* a ritual, but it was a beneficent ritual. It was a rite of disenchantment. The hysteria in America and China, which was itself the wellspring of our protracted hostility, and was a potential source of ultimate, global calamity, was calmed in this country, and perhaps calmed in China, too. Here at home, one can already feel a certain lightening in the political mood. To be sure, just before the President's trip a recuperative chorus came out of the White House accusing the Democratic Presidential candidates of, among other things, "aiding and abetting" foreign enemies, but even then the voices seemed to come out of the past. They didn't carry the tremendous coercive weight they once had. (Which enemies? Mr. Nixon's hosts, the Chinese? The North Vietnamese?) Our politics used to be boxed in and confined by charges like these. Now many men in political life, including some of the Presidential candidates, will be able to act with a new sense of freedom, and perhaps lay claim to wider, less fearful constituencies. Whether the President had it in mind or not, his trip can help to liberate new political forces here at home and to move us into a new era.



THIRD VOICE: The question of

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

whether we have really moved into a new era or only done so on television, in the image-world, is crucial. There is no question but that the trip laid to rest the American public's excessive fears of Chinese expansionism, and this is indeed a considerable benefit. Unfortunately; the unreal fears impelled us into a real war and into the quasi-occupation of a province of China. We paid in real blood for our unreal fears. Excuse me. *Are paying* in real blood. The trip has given us relief from our own overheated imaginings, but it has not given us relief from the real war that our imaginings impelled us into. The war continues as an anachronism, and today's bombings are as pale and unreal to us as memories. Has the government found new uses, in new, unannounced policies, for America's war in Southeast Asia, now that the old uses have disintegrated? If this nation has entered a new era, it hasn't yet left the old one behind. Everyone is yearning for the age of peace the President is promising. But we have to hold ourselves back until the old era does actually end. We can't let ourselves enjoy in imagination the fruits of efforts we have yet to carry through to completion in reality. In the present confusion, perhaps the following would be a good rule of thumb: No American may enter the new age of peace until every man, woman, and child in Southeast Asia has entered before him.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER JOURNAL
MAR 24 1972
M - 239,949
S - 350,303

james doussard

Courier-Journal
TV & Radio Critic

'Chronolog' to spotlight CIA's 'secret army'

The Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" in Laos has been anything but secret for a long time.

It has been seen, talked about, written about; until now, nobody has done a detailed documentary film about it.

NBC's Bob Rogers has, and he'll show it on "Chronolog I" at 8:30 p.m. today on WAVE-3.

Recent news about Laos and the army has given Rogers' report immediacy. It also has given Rogers fits updating his script in light of developments.

From Washington the other evening, he talked about the report:

Q. Did you have trouble getting in?

A. No, not too much. I think the situation is so bad that the bureaucrats who—I can't say they erected the wall of secrecy because that was done years ago, at very high levels—I think they've just decided it's counter-productive. I think they believe the evidence is so clear now that the North Vietnamese are invading Laos that they want somebody to go up and take a look at it.

Q. You then were almost invited in?

A. I wasn't invited in, really. The reason I went out there, Ted (the late Ted Yates who was fatally shot in 1967 while he and Rogers were covering the Arab-Israeli war;. Rogers was lying beside Yates when Yates was shot) and I had done a show years ago, called "Laos, the Forgotten War." That was before the "secret army" really got going. There were scattered bands of guerrillas up in the mountains, but they had never been organized.

Q. Was there a leader at that time?

A. Well, Vang Pao has always been the leader up there but at that time he did not command the military region. He's a big man in Laos now . . . I had been so struck by those people's commitment to the United States that I originally thought about going out there for a look at what might happen to them and how they were feeling after about 10 years of fighting on our side with the very good chance that we were going to walk out on them.

Q. You were reasonably welcomed then?

A. Yes, suddenly at least for somebody they considered a reasonably objective reporter people started talking to you. And we got to go to some places I never expected to get. We also got shot at a helluva lot going to those places. But the only ground rule we worked under was: "Don't show the faces of any CIA men."

Q. How many CIA men did you see?

A. In the field, probably about 20, 25.

Q. You talked to at least one?

A. Yeah, he is a very senior one . . . The CIA calls him a "case officer." In any other war but the "secret war," you'd call him a military advisor.

Q. So how have they done?

A. Well, actually they've done a pretty good job over there . . . They were given the job. Certain American statesmen and/or politicians and/or diplomats decided that we wanted to maintain the fiction that the Geneva Accords were still in effect. When they first went into effect in 1962, we withdrew our troops, our 600 green Berets; the enemy did not withdraw their 6,000 regular troops. There's a strong element (of thinking) in the diplomatic corps and in the administrations that have been with us since that time that have always dreamed that someday when Vietnam is settled that the Geneva Accords can go back into effect and thus the United States cannot admit violating them. Thus, the CIA got into this act.

Q. How is your show put together? Does it focus on such political questions as you've mentioned or what?

A. The first act focuses on the "secret army." It includes the footage we got of the fighting around Long Tieng when the North Vietnamese first hit it, including a very wide shot, if you look very closely you'll see a small figure in a blue jacket being knocked down by a mortar round landing.

Q. Is that you?

A. That's me. Best shot my cameraman ever got. Fortunately, Skyline Ridge which is really the keystone of the battle is just like a moonscape, so most of the shells that hit on it are hitting down in holes, and you are in another hole. So, you just get the concussion; you don't get the shrapnel, thank Christ, or this thing would be being done posthumously.

Q. You ever stay home any more?

A. Yeah, I'm gonna stay home tonight. I have to because I'm so darned sleepy. I've been up till 2 in the morning the last two nights trying to get this script written and keep up with the breaking developments. . . . You know what disturbs me as I follow the news is thinking of all those little kids I was with over there, getting killed, because the real basis of the "secret army" is the Moung Hill tribe. They generally are known as Meo, a sort of derogatory term, like "hillbilly." Twenty per cent of the Moung in the "secret army"—and the Moung make up about 40 per cent of the "secret army"—are under 16 years old. In fact, that's my show opening, standing there with an 11-year-old carrying an M16 and saying "This is one of our allies in Southeast Asia."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

NEW YORK TIMES

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

Airfields Build-Up By Hanoi Reported

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 23—Intelligence reports are said to show that the North Vietnamese have recently built up airfields in the southern part of their country and have been promising the Vietcong and their own troops that they will begin using bombers over South Vietnam soon.

Senior American analysts here are inclined to view such promises as propaganda. "They would add a new dimension to the war if it happened," one of them said today.

But the South Vietnamese Air Force moved half a dozen F-5 fighter planes to Danang recently to be ready if North Vietnamese MIG's should dash south across the demilitarized zone.

What the American analysts expect is a gradual upsurge of enemy military action inside South Vietnam — especially rocket and mortar attacks — more shellings of the Cambodian capital of Pnompenh, and a determined North Vietnamese attempt in northern Laos to push the defenders out of the old Long Tieng base.

Expect Summer Offensive

American specialists view the construction by the North Vietnamese of three 3,600-foot airfields, in addition to three operational MIG airfields below the 20th Parallel, as part of preparation for "something for which they expect us to retaliate by bombing," as one American put it today.

Senior American officials here now say that they expect the long-awaited enemy military offensive this year to come in the period from July to September and they believe it will be aimed at affecting the United States Presidential election.

They say that the offensive was scheduled to have taken place last month but that the Communists decided that they would have taken too many casualties if they had gone through with it at that time.

American military officers and civilian analysts here say that it is clear that the primary objective of the North Vietnamese strategy this year, as in the past, is South Vietnam. Though they do not believe an enemy offensive has yet begun, they say that the general level of Communist military activity is gradually increasing within South Vietnam. The best analysis here is that it will continue to mount over the next few months.

"They have found that targets in Laos and Cambodia are easier to hit," one official said. "Things have been pretty hard for them here in Vietnam this year, but they can pretty much romp around most of Cambodia, and there's really very little to stop them in Laos."

Between 6,000 and 9,000 North Vietnamese soldiers began pressing an attack on the Plaine des Jarres in Northern Laos last December and forced the Central Intelligence Agency in January to withdraw most of its equipment and helicopters from Long Tieng, the once-secret base 25 miles south of the plateau.

The Attack Is Resumed

After having effectively put the base out of action in mid-January, the attackers fell back. But a week ago they began pressing their offensive again, retaking most of the key positions on Skyline Ridge, which overlooks the northern side of the narrow Long Tieng valley.

"Weather has very seriously hampered our bombing there in the last few days," a military source here said, referring to both American and Laotian Government Air Force bombing in support of the defenders.

"When the weather breaks the other way . . ." he began, and broke off.

"The North Vietnamese have made a strong decision to take the base this year," he said, "but that does not mean they have the capability to do it."

The American view is that the North Vietnamese are diverting men and matériel to northern Laos as a way of putting pressure on the neutralist Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma to withdraw its consent to American bombing of the Communist infiltration network, which the enemy is widening this year in the southern Laotian panhandle.

Doubt Cambodia Takeover

The Americans feel that while the Communists are always capable of bringing pressure to bear on the ill-trained Cambodians to the south — as they did Tuesday, with the heaviest rocket attack of the war on Pnompenh—they do not intend to take over the country.

With South Vietnamese military capabilities already considerable and growing stronger every week, the Americans say, it is easier for the Communists to demonstrate their own strength elsewhere.

"They think maybe that they can embarrass us as easily in Cambodia or Loas as in Vietnam," an American official said. "I think their plans are guided by their desire to have a very direct influence on the American electoral process this year."

In South Vietnam, American analysts say they discern an enemy pattern of shellings rather than direct, large-scale ground assaults, but they say that the 80,000 troops of North Vietnamese divisions are in position to be committed quickly to action. Those divisions have moved recently or are moving into the Central Highlands and into the jungle mountains below the demilitarized zzone.

Hitting Cambodian Lines

The South Vietnamese, for their part, have been pushing out into the jungles both in Western Cambodia, most recently with a 7,000-man force east of the Chup rubber plantation and south of the demilitarized zone, seeking to cut Communist supply lines and stem an offensive before it can start.

They have reported that they have seized more than 1,100 weapons and 25,000 gallons of gasoline in base areas in eastern Cambodia. "Each of those weapons was carried on somebody's back all those hundreds of miles from North Vietnam." An intelligence specialist said, "I think these spoiling operations couldn't have helped but disrupt their offensive plans."

The Communists retaliated yesterday by shelling the South Vietnamese rear base at Tayninh, blowing up five times as much gasoline as the South Vietnamese Army had seized in the two weeks before.

Shellings have also become frequent just below the demilitarized zone, though so far they have not been accompanied by ground attacks of any size.

Another technique that the enemy has been employing since mid-February inside South Vietnam is to attack the small mud forts and outposts of the Mekong Delta. American sources say now that they expect that tactic to continue.

Yesterday, a district town headquarters in Kienhaoa province only 50 miles south of Saigon was attacked in early morning. Nineteen local militiamen and nine civilians were reported killed.

With 108,000 American troops left in Vietnam, most of the United States effort to deny to the enemy the supplies that make that kind of attack possible is concentrated in the air and over the supply trails in southern Laos where the North Vietnamese have brought their antiaircraft strength to the highest level of the war.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]

THE CIA'S "SECRET ARMY" IN LAOS



Tonight, NBC News' Monthly Special Reports On:

THE VEIL OF MYSTERY shrouding our military role in Laos. It's penetrated for the first time in a detailed documentary about General Vang Pao's "secret army," which is trained, advised, equipped and financed by our Central Intelligence Agency.

VOICES FROM THE HEARTLAND Wisconsin's Presidential Primary is less than two weeks away, so here's a fascinating report on Black River Falls (pop. 3,290), an independent community of voters who cross party lines as casually as they cross Main Street.

IMPROVING THE IMAGE Allan Gardner, an expert in political advertising, assesses recent and current political TV pitches, then measures them against the tube's more familiar commercials.

ON THE LIGHTER SIDE Check in at a 12-room hotel suite (in Texas, of course) that rents for $2,500 a night, including towels.

Garrick Utley anchors the acclaimed successor to "First Tuesday"—

"CHRONOLOG"

Tonight 8:30-10:30pm NBC News 4

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WASHINGTON POST
STATINTL
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24 MAR 1972

THE CIA'S "SECRET ARMY" IN LAOS



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jilians under Pathet Lao control. Congressmen McCloskey and Waldie found, in a U.S. information survey initially concealed from them by the Embassy, that 75% of the 190 respondents from 90 villages had had their homes bombed. In addition 97% had seen a bombing attack and 61% had seen a person killed. Congressmen McCloskey and Waldie also conducted their own interviews, and all 16 refugees queried, from 7 different villages, testified to the aerial destruction of every single dwelling in their hamlets.

A report by U.N. expert Georges Chapelier in December 1970 stated that in the Plaine des Jarres "by 1969 the intensity of the bombings was such that no organized life was possible in the villages . . . Jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night. All of the interlocutors without exception had their villages completely destroyed. In the last phase, bombings were aimed at the systematic destruction of the materials bases of the civilian society.

At one time there were more than 50,000 people living in the Plaine des Jarres. There is virtually no life there now.

One village chief indicated that in 21 hamlets not one home was left standing. In his own village 45 percent of the 2600 inhabitants never left their trenches.

A sample of 25 villages from the Plaine des Jarres revealed casualty rates of 5–10 percent from the bombing It is estimated that 50 civilians are killed for every Pathet-Lao casualty.

In 1968 Jacques Decornoy, the Southeast Asian desk editor for *Le Monde* traveled through Pathet Lao controlled areas. According to his interviews, 65 villages in the Sam Neua district alone had been destroyed by U.S. air power. Traveling through the devastated areas he depicts it as "a world without noise for the surrounding villages have disappeared. The inhabitants themselves living in the mountains."

Such testimony is of course contrary to our government's official position that "never before has such care been taken to spare civilians in bombing raids."

The picture burnt into one's imagination is that of hundreds of thousands of Laotians desperately huddling in caves and trenches as U.S. planes roar overhead. Again it is the enormity of the suffering endured by these poor people which blinds us to our own policy. I will rerun the picture, because we must break through the psychic numbness we have developed.

There are hundreds of thousands of poor peasants, noncombatants, living underground in fear of U.S. air power in Asia. There are entire areas of former civilization reduced to near cave man standards by the most advanced nation in the history of the earth. For what? no matter for what, it is indefensible.

At Nuremberg Teleford Taylor, chief U.S. Prosecutor, argued that where the military profits of any policy are dwarfed by the civilian casualties, such a policy is indefensible. The massive air war by the U.S. against the peoples of Indochina is indefensible. Every B-52 raid, every A–119 K stinger drop is criminal.

The situation in Laos is not appreciably different from what is currently occuring in Cambodia. As the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees noted, the same pattern of destruction is being repeated relentlessly throughout Indochina. It is up to the Congress to terminate it. The President has made it clear that he intends to continue the bombing, stating in February this year, "I will not place any limitations on the use of air power."

Secretary of Defense Laird has indicated that we intend to maintain a naval and air presence in Southeast Asia indefinitely after the last ground troops are withdrawn. The Pentagon, which seems to have statistics available for all categories and contingencies, lacks even an estimate of the likely civilian casualties this presence will cause. Such considerations do not seem to have a high priority in current American decision making. The so-called "gook rule" which haunted the Calley trial has far more profound implications for the air war.

On the afternoon that the U.S. helicopters and attack planes accompanied the South Vietnamese into Laos the President issued a statement on our environmental crisis. Within it he quoted from T. S. Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral." "Clean the air, clean the sky, wash the wind . . ." It would have been revealing for the President to have quoted further: "The land is foul, the water is foul, our beasts and ourselves are defiled with blood.

A rain of blood has blinded my eyes . . . Can I look again at the day and its common things and see them all smeared with blood through a curtain of falling blood? We did not wish anything to happen."

Let us stop the bombing, withdraw our troops and begin to "take stone from stone and wash them."

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD excerpts from remarks I made to the Fund for New Priorities dinner in New York City on January 14, 1972.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CONTINUING AIR WAR

(Excerpts from remarks by Senator MIKE GRAVEL)

The Nixon Administration's recent resumption of heavy bombing of North Vietnam once more raises a basic moral question: what right do our leaders have to kill and maim men, women, and children halfway across the globe who pose no threat to this Country?

As usual, the Administration is claiming that it is bombing only "military" targets. This may or may not be true. One remembers, after all, that the Johnson Administration claimed the same thing.

Even if the Administration *is* bombing only "military" targets this time, there can be no doubt that it also is causing serious civilian casualties. In a rural country like North Vietnam most so-called military targets such as bridges and factories are located in and around heavily populated civilian areas. Hanoi reports that in the most recent raids bombs fell on a hospital, and even military sources admit that American jets hit North Vietnamese army barracks as they went after nearby airfields.

The Cornell Air War Study quotes a memorandum by former Defense Secretary McNamara, in which he estimated that the bombing was causing 1,000 civilian casualties every *week* during the sustained raids of 1967. An equivalent casualty rate in the U.S. would be more than 600,000 per year.

Interviews with U.S. pilots indicate that most of the bombs we drop on North Vietnam are anti-personnel ordnance such as pineapple or guava bombs. These bombs contain hundreds of steel pellets.

One sortie of this type of bomb sends over half a million of these pellets spewing over an area half a mile long and an eighth of a mile wide.

During the Christmas raids alone it was announced that American planes flew over 1,000 sorties against North Vietnam. It is, therefore, not hard to believe the following Associated Press dispatch, dated December 29,: "Hanoi claimed that in Thanh Hoa Province on Sunday the U.S. planes killed 24 civilians and wounded 47. A broadcast said most of the casualties were caused by steel pellet anti-personnel bombs dropped on workers in the fields."

It's not a very pretty thing what our bombers are doing to these people.

But it's still going on right now. This month alone another 50,000 tons of anti-personnel bombs, napalm, and white phosphorous are raining down upon not only the people of North Vietnam, but Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as well.

We won't be told of the victims, of course. To the extent we learn anything it will be of "protective reaction" strikes, "interdiction" missions, and the bombing of supply depots.

But there are human beings under those bombs, and they will continue being killed and maimed until we, the American people, demand an end to this bombing.

In just the eight months since President Nixon told the American people in his April address to the Nation that "Vietnamization has succeeded", there have been an additional 1,302 Americans killed in the Indochinese War, and 4,870 more wounded. Deaths among allied forces in that same period have risen 15,595, and the Pentagon estimate of the number of new deaths among those people it chooses to call the "enemy" is 56,030. That last figure is no doubt conservatively low.

These numbers tell of the *failure* of Vietnamization, not its success.

An Orwellian transformation is taking place in our military policy in Indochina. Due to public pressure American ground troops are slowly coming home, but they are leaving an automated war behind. Computer technology and a small number of troops manning aircraft and artillery are creating a U.S. destructive presence that may literally hover over Southeast Asia for years to come. In the midst of this the public is confused, pacified by the diminishing troops levels, yet vaguely troubled by continuing reports of devastation.

In his mid-December newsbriefing Secretary of the Air Force Seamans sought once again to play down the air war. The basic point Seamons tried to make was that the air war was not escalating, that in fact it had been wound down. As such, his remarks represent a relativistic apology for the continuing raids, a logic more appropriate for 1984 than 1972—the logic of permanent war.

It is an insult to the American people to portray the air war as fading away when in 1971 somewhere between 750,000 and 800,000 tons of bombs were dropped over Indochina. Though down from the peak years of 1968 and 1969, this figure represents:

a) nearly 40% of all the U.S. air ordnance expended during the Second World War,

b) nearly 80% of all the air ordnance expended during the three year Korean War,

c) the equivalent of 37 Hiroshimas, or roughly one every nine days.

Most importantly, the Nixon Administration has made it clear that the bombing is to continue indefinitely even after the last American ground troop comes home (if he ever does). Even if reduced by 50% the air war still would continue at an average level greater than that of the Korean War.

But there are many indications that the reductions in the bombing are bottoming out. Pentagon sources, for example, indicate that B–52 strikes, though currently down 60% from their peak in 1968, are to continue indefinitely at their present rate of 1,000 per month. And although tonnage figures registered a 30% decline from 1969 to 1970, they dropped only 23% from 1970 to 1971.

At a time when the Harris Poll indicates that 65% of the American people feel the war is "immoral", and oppose by a 57 to 29 margin continued American bombing in order to achieve political ends, it is indefensible to continue the strikes at any level.

In regard to Secretary Seamans' "wound down war", it is worth noting that the Senate Refugee Subcommittee found that, "In this year, 1971, more civilians are being killed

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THE CHARLESTON, W. VIRGINIA GAZETTE
23 March 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160[redacted]

CLEVELAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER

M - 409,414
S - 545,032

MAR 23 1972

Blockbuster Tomorrow on Laos

NBC to Air CIA's Secret Army

By William Hickey
Television - Radio Editor

A television network documentary with the same blockbuster potential as CBS' last summer's "The Selling of the Pentagon" is scheduled to be aired tomorrow evening at 8:30 when NBC News devotes a sizable portion of its magazine-format news program "Chronolog" to an examination of the Central Intelligence Agency's secret army in Laos.

HICKEY

The 45-minute segment represents another reportorial coup for NBC News' indefatigable correspondent Bob Rogers and, in a larger sense, for all the broadcast industry's journalistic forces.

Rogers' latest accomplishment is really not surprising to those who have followed his brilliant career with NBC News, for they have come to expect nothing short of major scoops each time he leaves the confines of New York City.

Easily the outstanding combat correspondent currently working in television, Rogers possesses a splendid sixth sense for uncovering the full dimensions of a shootout, whether it be 30,000 feet over the Sinai Peninsula or in a bunker along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the intestinal fortitude to put his feet where his instincts lead him.

HIS STUDY of the once secret army in Laos is typical of his pursuit of the impossibly difficult story. No one, either in print or broadcast journalism, had been able to penetrate so deeply the CIA's web of secrecy, concerning its operations in Laos, but he did—and with a camera crew to boot.

When I asked him the other day how he managed it, he replied matter of factly, "Mac Godley, our ambassador there, helped immeasurably. He has been trying to break down the veil of secrecy surrounding the CIA's activities in Southeast Asia for a number of years now. Once a few ground rules were established, such as now showing the faces of CIA case officers on television, the agency cooperated completely."

HOW DID THE CIA become involved in Laos in the first place? I asked.

"It was very simple. After the Geneva Accords were signed in 1962, we withdrew all our military advisers to the country. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, kept 6,000 well-trained forces there. They called them border security battalions.

"For a while the United States lived with the fictional belief that NVA forces would eventually pull out. Of course, they didn't, so we began sending in CIA agents to work with the hill tribes, who always had been very pro-American, to offset their presence," he said.

What kind of a job did the CIA do—[illegible] forces," he said.

"A FASTASTIC ONE. You've got to give the agency credit. With a bare handful of men, they accomplished what armies of regular soldiers couldn't. They solidified the Meo tribesman better use the word Moung, for Meo is a derisive term meaning hillbilly, into a first-class fighting unit. At best, it was hoped that the hill tribes would become fairly good guerrilla fighters, but to everyone's astonishment, they have been slugging it out with the best North Vietnamese regiments for the past three months and holding their own.

"In fact, if it weren't for the Moung tribesmen and the few thousand Thai volunteers, Laos would have fallen to the Communists long ago," he said.

Well what about the Royal Lao Army and the Pathet Lao? I asked.

"No one over there takes either outfit seriously. The Royal Lao Army and the Communist Pathet Lao have one thing in common—a total dislike of fighting. The war in Laos is being fought by the tribesmen and Thai volunteers against the North Vietnamese," Rogers said.

NO ONE ELSE? I asked.

"I stand corrected. I should have mentioned the CIA has an outfit called Air America, which is composed of young Americans who fly everything from Piper Cub observation planes to four-engine bombers in support of [illegible]

How do the Moung feel about the impending U. S. pullout from Vietnam? I asked.

"They're nervous to be sure, but General Vang Pao, who is their No. 1 man, told me he had absolute faith in America and knew it would never abandon the peoples who joined her in the struggle to keep Southeast Asia free," he said.

How will your report be viewed by our State Department and the Pentagon? I asked.

"No doubt, they'll be upset by the fact that I revealed the extent of our operation in Laos, but I really don't believe they'll say much, because they can't refute anything we have put on film.

"MY JOB WAS simply to show the American people what has been going on in Laos under the direction of the CIA for the past eight years without their knowledge. While we have done this, we fell that our objectivity remained on the highest possible level," he said.

Be that as it may, I have the idea "Chronolog" is going to cause its first big flap and it won't be a secret.

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

MAR 23 1972

TV Comment

'Chronolog' Looks At CIA's 'Secret Army'

By John J. Archibald
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

THE PHONE CALL FROM NBC-TV'S NEW YORK OFFICE came at the appointed time, but the voice was not that of reporter Bob Rogers, but his secretary.

"Mr. Rogers had been delayed because he had to rewrite a large part of the script for his part of the 'Chronolog' show," the secretary said. "The news this morning from Laos made it necessary."



John Archibald

When Rogers called later in the day, he acknowledged that he'd had to update his report because of more recent developments in the Southeast Asian country. He had been caught somewhat by surprise, because until recently there had been little or no news from Laos, despite a heavy United States involvement in the fighting there.

"Our 'secret army' will be shown and discussed on television for the first time in 'Chronolog.' " Rogers said. The show will be on KSD-TV tomorrow night at 7:30.

Rogers happened to be in Laos at the right moment—just when our government decided to stop pretending that nothing much has been happening in that country.

"I was there a few years ago to do an NBC special called, 'Laos, the Forgotten War,' " Rogers said, "and went back a few weeks ago to see how the Moung tribesmen were making out. The Moung—whom the Laotians call 'Meo,' a word roughly equivalent to 'hillbilly'—are our firmest allies in Laos.

"When we got there with our film crew, we found that the barriers on the 'secret war' were collapsing. I don't know why, maybe it is dawning on our government that in a democracy you can only lie so much. Or maybe it is because the North Vietnamese invasion of Laos is so serious now that the United States wants the world to know."

In Laos, according to Rogers, very few Americans are involved in the actual fighting. About 200 Central Intelligence Agency men have helped train and direct an anti-Communist force of perhaps 30,000. "The CIA men have done a hell of a job," said Rogers. "But the Laos forces are facing North Vietnamese regular divisions and are being bled white."

The NBC-TV crew was given virtually complete freedom to take pictures and interview wherever they chose. Rogers reported. "We even have an interview with one of the CIA advisers," he said, "although we were asked not to show his face."

To get more realism in his film for "Chronolog," Rogers flew in a Royal Laotian Air Force fighter plane, which was a T-28 propeller plane used by the United States 20 years ago.

"I guess I'm a fatalist," Rogers said, "but I wanted to see what it was like. The plane was so loaded with bombs and machine guns that I almost was afraid to take my two cameras with me. I wondered if they might be the final straw that would overload the plane."

Rogers doesn't conceal his admiration for the success achieved thus far by the CIA advisers, but their ability worries him.

"I wonder, when other Administrations realize how much we were able to accomplish in Laos while retaining a 'low profile,' " said Rogers, "if our government might be tempted to try it in other places."

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

LOS ANGELES TIMES
22 MAR 1972

STATINTL

Thailand Becoming Staging Area for U.S.-Directed Ground Combat

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—Thailand is gradually becoming the staging area for most American-directed ground operations in Indochina as troop withdrawals continue, from Vietnam and the war and political situations become more tense in Cambodia and Laos.

This has resulted in increased sensitivity by both Thai and American officials concerning the American air bases in Thailand and the camps and bases involved in cross-border operations.

In answer to a newsman's request, American officials disclosed that there are 245 U.S. military advisers in Thailand and 280 members of the U.S. Special Forces. But other than outlining their acknowledged training and advising roles, the officials declined to go deeper into Thai-based American operations pertaining to the Indochina war.

Many Secret Camps

Officially, the role of all American Green Berets is to "train the Thais to be trainers" in counterinsurgency warfare, both of their own troops and those of "third country" armies —that is, Laotians and Cambodians.

But these same American officials acknowledge that there are numerous secret camps—they call them "ad hoc training areas"—at which Americans are located. But they will not discuss the American role in these camps.

It is known, however, that some are border camps fronting on Laos and Cambodia. They are manned by both Thai and American Green Berets engaged in cross-border clandestine operations. Rebellious areas in Burma also are being penetrated from Thai-American camps in the western province of Thailand.

'Volunteers' in Laos

The participation of Thai army "volunteers" in Laos as part of a Western-backed royal Lao army is now an established fact. More than 5000 Thai infantry, artillerymen and airmen are in action on foreign soil. They are American-paid but the Thai government also has its own reason for making the "volunteers" available. The North Vietnamese army and its Communist Pathet Lao auxiliary are closer to the banks of the Mekong River than in past dry seasons and the Mekong is Thailand's border.

Despite contrary evidence, both Thai and American officials continue the pretense that the volunteers sign up on their own. They are, in fact, regular Thai units led by their own officers and taking orders mostly from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

One of the assembly areas for this trans-Mekong migration is the Thai army camp of Saritsena, outside the north central town of Phitsanulok. Air America transport planes fly the men from there directly into Laos.

In the most recent explanation of the Thai presence in Laos, a U.S. State Department spokesman last week described the Thais as "local forces" eligible for U.S. support. This definition is intended to avoid being in violation of the congressional ban on the recruiting and payment of mercenaries for Laos and Cambodia.

Secrecy concerning military assignments in Thailand has reached a point where a visitor with a great deal of aplomb can stumble into an American clandestine camp and stay awhile by pretending that he, also, is on a mysterious assignment.

It happened this way, without a lie being told. The gate guard challenged: "Who are you?" The newsman assumed a serious, knowing look and replied: "Don't ask me!" For emphasis he pressed a finger to his lips. "Oh," the guard said, impressed, "I understand." He opened the gate and directed the visitor to the command post.

Exotic code names also figure into the secrecy. Peppergrinder is the name of a big American-Thai logistical base, way point for weapons and supplies destined for allied forces in Laos.

Despite its various unpublicized roles, the American special forces in Thailand have declined from a high point of 369 in 1969. The reduction was possible after the Thai Field Police assumed their own training. The American advisory force also has been cut back by 25% from its high point.

Other American military activities have offset the reduction.

For more than a year, the American military strength in Thailand has been announced as 32,200. Twenty-six thousand are airmen, as five big bases in Thailand continue to be the major springboard for American bombing of enemy targets in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam missile and antiaircraft guns.

All-Time High Cost

The 6,000 other American military are mostly Army logistical units. They support the American Air Force here and equip the 125,000-man Thai army under the current $60 million military aid program.

This is an all-time high for annual American spending on the Thai army and apparently reflects its support of Thai forces in Laos.

A 10-man American advisory team is presently with a Thai army "sweep and clear" operation aimed at driving a 500-man insurgent band out of north central Thailand and back into Laos. The senior American is Army Col. Charles G. Ray of Browns Mill, N.J. who speaks Thai fluently.

Ray said neither he nor any of his subordinates goes below Thai regimental level and are forbidden to fly or drive into any area where they might be shot at.

Confirming this, an American Embassy official said, "We've never had an American combat casualty in Thailand and we intend to keep it that way."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
22 MAR 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]

CLASHES REPORTED AROUND PNOMPENH

Attacks, One 6 Miles From Cambodian Capital, Follow Shelling That Killed 75

By The Associated Press

PNOMPENH, March 21 — Enemy troops reportedly staged a series of coordinated attacks around this capital city of Cambodia today in the wake of an early-morning rocket and artillery attack that was estimated to have killed 75 persons.

The Cambodian command said that 500 enemy soldiers had entered the town of Takhmau, six miles southeast of Pnompenh, had killed a number of residents and had driven off many others.

Earlier in the day, a Cambodian spokesman reported heavy fighting in the district town of Neak Luong, on the highway to Saigon, 32 miles southeast of Pnompenh, and said it appeared that the North Vietnamese were trying to cut the road and move toward the capital.

Siege Reported to East

Enemy troops were also said to have laid siege to the district capital of Preyveng, 30 miles east of here. Military spokesmen here said Cambodian forces at the Preyveng garrison were trying to break out southward on Route 15 to link up with other Cambodian troops moving north.

The attacks in the Pnompenh area coincided with an enemy offensive against the big base at Long Tieng in northern Laos, where heavy fighting was reported for the fourth day. [Laotian and Thai forces were said to have recaptured one key position on Skyline Ridge, which overlooks the base, The Associated Press reported from Vientiane, but North Vietnamese troops occupying two other positions were said to have kept up heavy mortar attacks on the valley.]

There was speculation that similar enemy attacks might next flare in South Vietnam, where a Communist offensive has widely been predicted in recent weeks.

Cambodia's President, Lon Noi, appealed to the public in a radio broadcast to remain calm and not panic after the rocket attack, the most devastating on Pnompenh since the war began here two years ago. Officials estimated that besides the 75 dead more than 100 people had been wounded.

However, there was no evidence of panic, as the city's populace appeared to be going calmly about its normal business.

The President said he believed the attack was inended to create public havoc during a politically difficult period in Cambodia. He was speaking of his weeklong efforts to form a new Government after proclaiming himself President and suspending the Constitutent Assembly March 10, hours before it was to have finisned drafting a new constitution.

Many of the casualties in the rocket and artillery attack were refugees driven from their homes by the war. One refugee shantytown was wiped out, and more than 100 huts were leveled.

A United States Embassy spokesman said there were no American casualties.

Cambodian officials revised downward the number of rockets that had fallen into three sections of Pnompenh during the predawn attack. Spokesmen said they now believed that about 75 rockets, instead of the 150 to 200 reported earlier, had struck the city.

Battle 4th Day at Long Tieng

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 21 (AP)—As heavy fighting was reported for the fourth day at Long Tieng, American officials here said they believed enemy forces had sustained heavy losses because of waves of assaults against entrenched defenders.

Reports from the field said Laotian and Thai forces had succeeded in retaking one key position on the ridge overlooking the base, the headquarters of General Vang Pao and his American supported guerrilla army of Meo tribesmen. But the base itself was said to be under continued mortar attack from two other positions on the ridge still in enemy hands.

Long Tieng, 78 miles northeast of Vientiane, is considered the most important government base in northern Laos. When it was threatened with capture last December, the United States Central Intelligence Agency pulled out the extensive electronic equipment it maintained there.



The New York Times/March 22, 1972

RISING ENEMY ACTION: A series of attacks on towns near Pnompenh (names underlined on map at left) followed shelling of capital. In northern Laos (map at right), heavy fighting continued for Long Tieng base.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
22 March 1972

STATINTL
[redacted]
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

AID Head Queried On CIA Ties

By a Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, March 22 — Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, today pressed an inquiry into the relationship between the nation's economic assistance program in Laos and the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense there.

Symington invited John A. Hannah, administrator of the Agency for International Development, to testify at a closed session of Symington's Senate foreign relations subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad.

Through the subcommittee, Symington has been instrumental in the last three years in calling attention to the scope of United States-supported military operations in Laos.

Symington made public today a letter asking Hannah to appear before the panel. He framed eight questions for Hannah to answer. He asked that Hannah submit a statement to the subcommittee several days before appearing.

Symington asked Hannah what assurances he had given to Congress on the use of Hannah's agency "as a cover for CIA personnel and programs."

"In particular," Symington said with respect to what is going on in Laos, "how many personnel and what programs are involved; and what CIA funds are channeled through AID programs and by what methods?

Symington strongly criticized American policies in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia March 1 in a letter to Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

At that time, Symington said the Indochina war was increasing in intensity in Laos and Cambodia, even though it might be diminishing in South Vietnam.

The letter summed up a classified report made by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose of the Symington panel's staff. That report has not been made public.

A top AID official confirmed yesterday that U.S.-supported Laotian guerrilla fighters were receiving hospital treatment under an American humanitarian assistance program, but he denied that any aid went for combat operations of the CIA.

"I assure you no AID (Agency for International Development) funds are allocated for military purposes in Laos," a deputy AID administrator, Maurice J. Williams, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Williams said he had not seen the General Accounting Office report that Senator Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy had said showed that AID funds were secretly financing CIA guerrilla fighter activities.

Kennedy (Dem.), Massachusetts, made the statement last weekend.

Williams testified: "We do not provide funds for these purposes. If a mistake has been made, it will be rectified."

Williams confirmed, however, the specific GAO finding, as summarized by Kennedy, that so-called military and paramilitary groups got hospital and health care under the AID program in Laos.

He said Laotian military personnel and their families got both medical treatment at six hospitals in Laos and food support under the AID program along with the rest of the Laotian population.

A staff member of Kennedy's Senate refugees subcommittee said Williams's admissions did not go to the Senate subcommittee's broader longstanding contention that AID funds went to such direct military purposes as support of Laotian guerrilla fighters and helicopter transportation for them.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STAT/INTL

ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
28 March 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

[redacted]

Misused Aid Funds

Lack of confidence in America's foreign aid program has been evident in Congress and among the public for some time. This skepticism as to the uses to which such funds are put will be increased by a report from the General Accounting Office showing that nearly half of aid funds voted by Congress for relief of civilian war victims in Laos is being diverted to the Central Intelligence Agency for its secret guerrilla army activities in that country.

Although the report has been classified secret, a summary of some of its contents was made public by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of a Senate Judiciary subcommittee which requested the GAO investigation.

He said it indicates that about $2.5 million a year of "public health funds" intended for Laos refugee help and administered by the Agency for International Development is going instead to the CIA for its "private army" operations.

While details of the operation are sketchy, it appears that the intent of Congress has been frustrated in order to satisfy aims of the CIA. The situation presents one more argument for greater congressional control over CIA activities. And it is one more addition to reasons for lack of congressional enthusiasm for the AID programs.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00[redacted]

WASHINGTON POST
28 MAR 1972

Enemy Massacres Civilians In Assault on Phnom Penh

From News Dispatches

The Cambodian command said yesterday that some of the Communist forces which attacked Phnom Penh in the biggest rocket assault of the war also raided the homes of civilians in the capital, massacring at least 25, including women and children.

Among the victims were the manager of the government radio station, which the enemy troops put out of action briefly, his French wife and their child.

The Interior Ministry put the death toll from the devastating mortar and rocket attack and subsequent massacres at 102, with more bodies being uncovered as rescue teams searched through wreckage. Another 200 or more were wounded, the government said. Most of the victims were civilians. No Americans were among them, the State Department said.

Fighting Continues

Fighting continued throughout Tuesday on the southeastern outskirts of Phnom Penh. Government reinforcements were sent to join a battle against advancing Communist troops near the town of Tak Khmau, 12 miles from the capital.

Meanwhile President Lon Nol put an end to the country's government crisis by announcing the formation of a new cabinet.

Elder statesman and presidential adviser Son Ngoc Thanh was named prime minister and foreign minister. Of the 17 portfolios announced, eight were given to previous cabinet members and most of the 17 were familiar figures in Cambodian circles. Sisowath Sirik Matak, Lon Nol's closest adviser whose government position was a casualty of student protests against him, is not in the cabinet.

Lon Nol also said he was setting up a government commission to finish a new constitution, a task that the National Assembly had almost completed when he ousted it 10 days ago.

Connivance Suggested

In a radio broadcast, Lon Nol denounced the attack on Phnom Penh as "barbarous," suggested that it might have been carried out with "some connivance from within" and called on the people to remain calm and redouble their efforts in the war.

A South Vietnamese drive against Communist base camps in eastern Cambodia continued yesterday, but the headquarters base for that campaign, at Tayninh, 60 miles northwest of Saigon, was hit by an enemy demolition attack that killed 13 South Vietnamese soldiers.

In Laos, fighting continued around the besieged Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng, with Laotian and Thai defenders reported to have recaptured one key position on Skyline Ridge, the 1,500-foot-high northern rim of the base. The overall prospects for staving off the North Vietnamese assault on the base, however, remained grim.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
22 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]

STATINTL

Hanoi Forces on Move Across Indochina, 4 Units Cross DMZ

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, March 21—North Vietnamese forces and their local allies are on the move throughout Indochina, focusing again on Laos and Cambodia and continuing their ominous buildup in the northern sectors of South Vietnam.

United States military sources said today that at least four of the regiments that had been shifting southward from North Vietnam have crossed the Demilitarized Zone in recent weeks and are now moving through South Vietnam's Quangtri and Thuathien provinces.

The rate of Communist infiltration into South Vietnam in February, the sources said, was the highest since April, 1968, which was the highest of the war.

In the meantime, the renewed offensive against Long Cheng in Laos and today's shelling of Phnom Penh, along with the fighting on Highway 1, follow the pattern set earlier in the dry season of placing maximum pressure on Laos and Cambodia.

In the first round of attacks against Long Cheng in January, the base was rendered virtually useless as a military installation and as regional headquarters for the Central Intelligence Agency operations in northeastern Laos.

Equipment and support troops were withdrawn. Only the army of CIA-backed Meo tribesmen remained.

Now, 16 battalions of North Vietnamese troops are said to be threatening what remains of the base, and if it falls the Communists are certain to claim a major psychological victory.

Reachable Goal

From the start of this year's dry-season campaign in Laos, analysts said the Communists were intent on establishing Pathet Lao control once and for all over northeastern Laos to enhance their political position in any future settlement. That goal now appears to be within reach.

Until today's attack on Phnom Penh, Cambodia had been relatively quiet since government forces on Highway 6 in December — a grievous military setback from which Cambodian morale has never recovered.

The pre-dawn assault today was much like the raid on Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport in January, 1971, that destroyed much of the Cambodian airforce: it was spectacular, evidently caught the Cambodians completely by surprise and could have been carried out by a handful of well-trained sappers.

The difference this time is that most of the rockets and mortars were deliberately aimed at populated areas in an apparent effort to frighten civilians, especially refugees from the countryside who thought they had found a sanctuary in the capital.

The attack comes at a time when the Cambodians are particularly vulnerable. A week and a half ago Len Nor elevated himself to president, scuttled an almost-completed constitution and dismissed his cabinet. The country had no functioning government until selection of a new cabinet was completed today.

In the week that marks two years since Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown, the Communists can make propaganda by pointing to a Cambodian capital that is defenseless and a government that is at least momentarily unstable.

Despite the outbreak in recent days of fighting on highway 1, the road that links Saigon and Phnom Penh, military sources here do not see indications that major new fighting is about to begin in the Cambodian countryside.

Indeed intelligence reports show that elements of a North Vietnamese division that had been camped on western side of the Mekong River in Cambodia have now crossed to the eastern side and are moving toward South Vietnam.

In addition, sources said, an independent North Vietnamese regiment has been spotted for the first time operating in the Parrots Beak area on the South Vietnamese border near an area where Saigon troops recently began a multi-battalion operation.

The movement of Communist troops in the region of Cambodia that borders on the provinces around Saigon is cited as further evidence that the Communists are preparing some kind of heightened activity inside South Vietnam.

In the Central Highlands province of Kontum, where the thrust of the offensive last month had been expected, signs of Communist buildup abound, sources said. They said elements of the North Vietnamese army's 320th Division have been building roads and tracks n the province and have been spotted for the first time to the east of Kontum city.

The arrival of four new regiments inside South Vietnam coincides with the dramatic reinforcement of North Vietnamese air defenses on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and just north of the Demilitarized Zone.

On a non-attribution basis, American military sources produce a barrage of facts and figures to prove that the Communists have significantly increased their resistance to U.S. bombing of their supply routes.

For example, since November 1, the start of the dry season, the number of anti-aircraft guns on the trail, according to aerial intelligence, has increased from 340 to 600.

"High Threat" Areas

The Air Force used to classify areas in Laos as "high threat." Now, that classification is accorded to nine areas.

As to why the offensive in South Vietnam has so far failed to materialize, despite the buildup, U.S. sources speculate that stepped up bombing at critical concentrations and South Vietnamese preparations forced the enemy to postpone his plans.

"There was a lot of second guessing in February," observed one officer." but I'll bet anything that those troops weren't all sent down here for nothing."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

U.S. mine production of nickel in 1968 amounted to 17,294 short tons, nickel content of ore. In 1969, U.S. mine production was 17,056 tons and an estimated 18,000 tons in 1970. U.S. consumption of nickel was 159,306 tons in 1968, 141,737 tons in 1969, and estimated at 160,000 tons in 1970. Imports of nickel were 147,950 tons in 1968, 129,332 tons in 1969, and estimated at 150,000 tons in 1970. Principal import sources for metal are Canada, 87 percent; Norway, 11 percent; U.S.S.R., 1 percent, and others 1 percent.

Method of disposal

The method of disposal is set forth in section 2 of the bill and provides that, unless otherwise authorized by law, disposals may be made only after publicly advertising for bids, except when (1) the material is transferred to a Federal agency, (2) the Administrator of General Services determines that other methods of disposition are necessary to protect the United States against avoidable loss or to protect producers, processors, and consumers against avoidable disruption of their usual markets, or (3) sales are made pursuant to requests received from other Federal agencies in furtherance of authorized program objectives of such agencies.

In this instance, the General Services Administration has advised that the entire amount of nickel to be disposed of will be turned over to the U.S. Treasury.

FISCAL DATA

The average acquisition cost of nickel in the national stockpile was $1,162.28 per short ton. The current estimated market price for standard, commercial type nickel is $2,660 per short ton. Stockpile nickel may or may not be the same quality or grade as the material quoted above.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the acting minority leader seek recognition?

Mr. PACKWOOD. I do not.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS) is recognized for 15 minutes.

(The remarks Mr. HARRIS made at this point on the submission of Senate Resolution 282, dealing with the plight of minorities in Pakistan and Bangladesh, are printed in the RECORD under Submission of a Resolution.)

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Senator NELSON on the introduction of S. 3378, dealing with tax reform, and the ensuing discussion by Senators TUNNEY, MONDALE, KENNEDY, and MANSFIELD are printed in the section of the RECORD devoted to the transaction of routine morning business under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business for not to exceed 30 minutes with a limitation of 3 minutes on each Senator being recognized.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there has been a good deal of talk about certain issues of paramount importance at the present time, not the least of which has been the issue discussed this morning, the need for tax reform.

There are other issues, such as pollution, busing, the condition of the ghettos, crime, justice, drug control, and the like, all important. However, in my opinion, Mr. President, the most important issue now—and it has been for some years past—is the issue of our involvement in Southeast Asia.

It is brought to our attention because of recent events in Laos and Cambodia. According to the latest reports the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese are very close to Long Cheng, the CIA-sponsored base in southern Laos.

According to the latest reports the constitution of the Khmer Republic formerly known as Cambodia, in effect has been overthrown and the position of first responsibility has been taken by Lon Nol.

In Cambodia we are witnessing the folly of the American desire to export its political, economic, and social institutions to foreign lands where they do not need them, do not want them, and should not have them forced upon them.

Two years have elapsed since the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the result has been chaos. Two years later seven-tenths of Cambodia is under the control of hostile forces; and 2 years later, out of an estimated population of 7 million, one-third has become homeless. The net result has been nothing but destruction and ruin.

There is, of course, the makings of a constitutional republic, but when the constitution supposedly was to have been put into effect Lon Nol threw it to one side and said he would not recognize it. So now the constitution and the republic, except in name, have gone down the drain. Marshal Lon Nol dismissed the constitution as unacceptable. He dissolved the assembly and he has taken over complete control as a dictator in his pitiful country.

The South Vietnamese Army, the traditional enemy of Cambodians, is once again penetrating into Cambodia, to the extent of approximately 30,000 or 40,000 troops. Does anyone remember the invasion of Cambodia just about 2 years ago? Does anyone know what has happened since? Well, the North Vietnamese are back where they used to be, in the area of the Parrot's Beak. More of Cambodia is under the control of the North Vietnamese and their allies and more of Cambodia has been destroyed in the meantime.

So I would hope that those who are advocating continued aid to this small country, made up of kindly people—those in the Pentagon, those in the administration, those in the State Department, and those in the aid program—will think and think again, because this is not a prime example of the Nixon doctrine; it is anything but. It proves just how bankrupt the policy of our country has been allowed become, not only in Cambodia, but also in the rest of that part of the world.

Then there is Laos, another small country with a very kindly, peaceful people. What happened there? Hundreds of thousands of Laotians have been made homeless refugees and much of their country has been destroyed. A clandestine army under the control of the CIA has been operating; the overall commander is the proconsul, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. He is the one who directs operations, tells where the strikes will be, whether they will be on the Plain of Jars or in the region of Long Cheng, the CIA subsidized base which is now under siege.

Much could be said about what happened in these two countries in addition to what happened and what is happening in Vietnam. But it is all a tragedy as far as this republic is concerned. It is the worst tragedy in our entire history.

I think if anything is going to be done it is going to be up to King Savang Vatthana in Laos, SRI, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, now in exile in Peking, to put their talents and their efforts to use, so that a degree of stability and peace can be returned to their respective countries.

Let us take a look at the statistics. These are not the latest statistics but they are up to February 19, 1972. Combat wounded, Americans, 302,651; combat dead, Americans, 45,650; dead from other purposes, American, 10,077, for a total of 55,727 Americans dead as of February 19, 1972, and total American casualties as of the same date of 358,378.

As far as others are concerned, we find that the South Vietnamese have suffered death loses of 145,414 and other free world forces have suffered deaths of 4,838. It is estimated that the other side has suffered deaths of 796,458.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD a table supplied by the Department of Defense, which details these casualties.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOUTHEAST ASIA CASUALTIES STATISTICAL SUMMARY

The Department of Defense released today the cumulative casualties reported in connection with the conflict in Southeast Asia as of 19 February 1972.

Total U.S. deaths from action by hostile forces is the sum of the following categories: Killed in Action, Died of Wounds, Died While Missing, and Died While Captured. Lines 1 through 4 subdivide casualties by cause or category. Line 5 provides an additional breakdown of the same totals by environment (air or ground). Totals are cumulative from January 1, 1961 through February 19, 1972.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

Prying at U.S. secrecy lid

By Lucia Mouat
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

Sen. Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri saw no particular reason why the 46-page statement of the Defense Department witness should be classified as "secret." Never a man to mince words, he bluntly suggested as much to the witness.

Only a few hours after the Senate Armed Services Committee executive session, the Senator had his answer in the form of declassification of the entire statement with the exception of two sentences — and even on those, he was told, the need for secrecy was questionable.

The debate in Washington over the executive branch's need for secrecy continues as vigorously as it did in the days when the Pentagon papers were published and behind-the-scenes minutes of the administration's India-Pakistan policy were disclosed.

Only this month, for instance, the President moved to cut the scope of government classification by halving (to 12) the number of federal agencies allowed to stamp "Top Secret" on government papers and by speeding up the automatic declassification procedure.

Much of the prodding for such change, limited as the results appear to some, has come from Congress. Conceding the need for secrecy in certain delicate diplomatic and defense matters, the legislative branch nonetheless continues to try to narrow the radius.

One of the foremost champions of the public's right to know and of a more assertive role for Congress in foreign policy is the tall and courtly Senator Symington. This onetime businessman, secretary of the Air Force, and presidential candidate (1960) who now is serving on three of the Senate's key defense and foreign-policy committees, sees the issues from a unique vantage point.

Despite the military element in his background and his consequent service on the National Security Council, the Senator says he thinks far too much information is being withheld from Congress by the executive branch.

"I don't get enough information on which to make my decisions, and I resent that," he conmmented in the course of a recent luncheon interview. "If we could just get this passion for secrecy out of the way . . . having run quite a few businesses, I have a difficult time voting other people's money in the blind. There's just no true accountability."

Following up his words with action, the Senator from Missouri is trying to obtain declassification of a report recently completed for the Senate sub-committee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad which he chairs. He admits that "the going is a little heavy."

Based on firsthand visits to Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia in January by two subcommittee staff members, the report concludes that while the war in Vietnam is indeed winding down, war in Laos and Cambodia is increasing in intensity. As the Senator describes it in a letter accompaning the report to Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, " We are offered nothing . . . but the prospect of more of the same, at higher cost." Senator Symington further argues that intelligence activities, such as those in Laos and Cambodia, have strong foreign-policy ramifications and are subject to no "true" congressional over-

Stiffer policy urged

To remedy this lack of an outside check, the Senator proposes creation of a select Senate committee on the coordination of U.S. Government activities abroad, to oversee the operations of such influential groups as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The proposal, in the form of a resolution, is in committee.

In the meantime, Senator Symington, who has traveled widely in the course of his work on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, considers control of the purse by Congress an effective weapon for pulling more information from the executive branch.

"If we keep voting the money, we're voluntarily abdicating our constitutional prerogative," he says. "We should refuse the money until we get the facts."

Information and power are closely linked in his view. He is fond of quoting a comment made 15 years ago by the late Dean Acheson, former secretary of state, that the shift of power from Congress to the White House was the greatest change in government in this century.

"If that was true before Kennedy and Johnson, how much more true is it today?" he asks with an amused twinkle in his eye to suggest the conclusion is inescapable.

A supporter of the so-called war-powers bill, now before Congress, which seeks to

Symington argues that national security no longer, if it ever was, a physical, mil tary matter but also a question of having viable economy and of — "remember, I'm Democrat" — credibility and public faith policies of the national government.

He has withdrawn his support of the wa in Vietnam for many reasons, not the lea of which are economic. Also, he sees a U. weakness for pushing people aside and say ing, "Let us show you how to fight." terms of national security, he sees Wester Europe and the Middle East as much mor important to the United States.

Time will tell whether the Senator and h colleagues succeed in getting the informa tion from the White House that they seek It is noteworthy that Senator Symingto secured declassification status last Decem ber for a voluminous, two-year subcommi tee report on U.S. commitments abroad Among its points — bound not to pleas the executive branch — was the assertio that multimillion-dollar U.S. support of th 30,000-man army in Laos could in no wa be considered an intelligence operation.

As for the Senator's role in all this, Re James Symington (D) of Missouri, the Se ator's son, notes in his book "The Statel Game" that in any argument or challeng his father "displays a solidarity of dete mination that matches the jaw line of M Rushmore."

A formidable challenge to any administra tion.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
TRIBUNE
MAR 2 1 1972
M - 240,275
S - 674,302

CIA's hand is still in the till

Two years ago, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee learned that American foreign-aid funds were being used to pay for the Central Intelligence Agency's military operations in Laos. A few months later, Dr. John Hannah, administrator of the Agency for International Development, told an interviewer, "I have to admit that this is true." After repeated protests from senators over the use of AID funds by the CIA, however, Hannah wrote to Sen. Edward Kennedy that "effective at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated."

But it wasn't. According to a report by the General Accounting Office, the congressional investigating body, nearly half of the U.S. funds appropriated to help civilian victims of the war in Laos are still being diverted to the CIA's secret guerrilla army in that country. The report, a summary of which was made public by Kennedy Saturday, showed that about $2.5 million in public-health funds administered by AID are being diverted each year. Moreover, congressional sources indicated that another accounting-office report, expected later this month, will disclose that AID's refugee-assistance programs in Laos have also been diverted to military uses by the CIA.

Despite administration assurances to the contrary, then, the CIA still has its hand in the non-military foreign-aid till. Three explanations for that seem possible. One is that AID's administrator didn't know what was going on in his own agency. Another is that he deliberately misled the Senate. The third is that the administration, after Hannah's letter was written, decided to resume the financing of CIA military activities with AID funds, but didn't bother telling the Senate about it. In any case, some corrective measures are in order.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

THE MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

MAR 21 1972

STAT

[redacted]

Pnompenh Is Hit by 100 Rockets; 10 Killed in Major Attack by Foe

By United Press International

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Tuesday, March 21—Enemy troops launched a major rocket attack against Pnompenh today, killing at least 10 persons and setting blocks of houses on fire.

At least 100 rockets struck the capital city and its suburbs over a period of several hours beginning at 1:30 A.M. By 4 A.M. relative quiet had settled over the city.

There were reports of fighting at the site of a radio transmitter.

Flames from burning buildings lit the predawn skies. Ambulances drove through the streets and rescue teams worked to find the dead and injured. First reports indicated that there were many wounded.

Ten rockets fell near the Ministry of National Defense and set several homes afire. There were no immediate reports about foreigners in the city, but the United States Embassy did not appear to have been hit.

Meanwhile, the military situation in the southeastern province of Preyveng was described as "serious" by the Cambodian command after enemy gunners hit two towns yesterday. A South Vietnamese ammunition dump was destroyed, six persons were killed and at least 24 were wounded.

The command said that Route 15, a secondary road linking the two towns of Neakluong and Preyveng, had been cut off, leaving Preyveng "isolated." Efforts to open the road, 30 miles southeast of Pnompenh, were unsuccessful yesterday, despite close American and Cambodian air support and ammunition air drops.

Field officers on the road said they had called for help from South Vietnamese troops more than 50 miles away at the town of Chipoo on Route 1 linking Saigon and Pnompenh.

Key Base Besieged

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 20 (AP)—A major enemy attempt to capture the key Government base at Long Tieng, just south of the Plaine des Jarres, was reported under way today.

"The situation is critical," one official source said. Other sources said Long Tieng, headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao and his American-supported guerrilla army of Meo tribesmen, was "all but lost."



The New York Times/March 21, 1972

Vast fires were touched off at Pnompenh (1). In Laos, Long Tieng (2) was under heavy attack. In North Vietnam (3), a U.S. jet bombed a radar base.

Long Tieng, which has also served as a base for the operations of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in northern Laos, has frequently come under enemy attack in recent years. But the assaults so far this year — in January and again in recent days — appear to have been carried out with greater force than ever before.

The current all-out offensive was reportedly begun on Saturday morning by 4,500 to 6,000 North Vietnamese troops backed by four tanks and heavy artillery. Informed sources said that the enemy forces first routed Laotian and Thai defenders from all positions in the vicinity of the main support base at Sam Thong, six miles northwest of Long Tieng, and seized control of a commanding position on Skyline Ridge, a 1,500-foot-high natural barrier that overlooks the Long Tieng airstrip. The ridge forms the northern defenses of Long Tieng.

By yesterday afternoon, the informants here reported, North Vietnamese infantrymen had seized three Laotian helicopter pads along the ridge.

Enemy gunners reportedly closed the Long Tieng airstrip today by firing 82-mm. mortars and DK-82 recoilless rifles from the heights into the valley. Other enemy units were said to be pounding the base with long-range 130-mm. artillery from the southern tip of the Plaine des Jarres.

The fall of Long Tieng would be a heavy psychological blow to the Laotian Government. It would mark the farthest southward advance by enemy forces in northern Laos and would open the way, if the enemy chose to take it, to push toward Vientiane, the administrative capital of Laos, nearly 80 miles to the south.

New Strikes in North

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 20 (AP)—The United States command reported today that the 100th "protective reaction" air strike of the year was flown last night over North Vietnam.

The command said a Navy A-6 fighter-bomber made the attack against a radar site about 35 miles north of the demilitarized zone straddling the border between the two Vietnams.

Two other United States jet planes raided an antiaircraft battery and a radar site in the North earlier yesterday. Pilots said they believed the emplacement had been destroyed.

The United States command said the North Vietnamese guns had opened fire on a United States reconnaissance plane before the American planes fired their missiles. The two radar sites were said to be tracking other United States planes.

In other war developments, South Vietnamese forces on the 11th day of their drive to smash enemy base camps in eastern Cambodia reported that they had uncovered more large caches of food and weapons in an area 85 to 100 miles northeast of Saigon and 10 to 15 miles inside Cambodia.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
21 March 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

Peace Funds For War

A new disclosure by Senator Edward M. Kennedy of the misuse of foreign aid funds in Laos provides more evidence that the Nixon Administration is determined to ignore the will of Congress on Indochina. Despite the fact that the Agency for International Development assured Senator Kennedy in writing last year that AID public health funds would not be used to subsidize the Central Intelligence Agency's guerrilla war in Laos, the General Accounting Office has found that the diversion of AID money for military purposes is still going on.

Meanwhile civilian casualties in Laos, for which the U.S. government is largely to blame and for which AID funds are supposed to be allocated, are being neglected. The GAO report to Senator Kennedy's judiciary subcommittee on refugees said: "There is virtually no indigenous medical capability in Laos to meet the immediate or long range public health needs of the general population or to treat casualties in war zones." Yet nearly half of the $4,956,000 in AID funds intended for the relief of civilian war casualties in Laos in 1972 is still being diverted to the CIA's guerrilla war.

Since the CIA has already circumvented previous congressional attempts to cut financing of the secret war in Laos and since President Nixon has said he will not be bound by a congressional act calling on him to set a date for withdrawal from Vietnam, this latest evasion of a mandate from Congress is not surprising. It only adds one more item to the long record of deceit on the war. AID has now made its contribution to the credibility gap and become another agency that has fallen prey to the corrupting influence of an immoral war that has already thoroughly undermined American avowals of humanitarian purpose in Asia.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
21 March 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3
STATINTL

CIA Uses Health Aid Funds For Combat Role In Laos

WASHINGTON, March 18 (AP) —American foreign aid health funds continue to be used secretly to finance a Central Intelligence Agency combat role in Laos even after officials promised the practice would be stopped, the General Accounting Office said in a report made public Saturday night.

The document was disclosed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem.) Massachusetts. It said that despite assurances to Kennedy's refugee subcommittee by John Hannah, administrator of the Agency for International Development, AID funds programmed for civilian war casualties and health care in Laos continued to be used to support military efforts.

Kennedy said much of the report was classified secret and that he was permitted to disclose only a heavily sanitized summary.

Even so, he said, the fact remains that "thousands of civilian war casualties in Laos are continuing to document a shadowy war in which the purpose and degree of American participation are still being kept from the American people.

"The escalating human toll throughout the area continues to be of too little concern to government, which bears a heavy responsibility for contributing to the tragedy," Kennedy said.

The report said, "There is virtually no indigenous medical capability in Laos to meet the immediate or long range public health needs of the general population or to treat casualties in war zones."

The GAO report said a Filipino charity called "Operation Brotherhood" ran virtually the only acceptable hospitals in the country.

The GAO said available data were not complete or reliable enough to allow it to reach any conclusions about the extent of war casualties in Laos.

It said that in a six-month period in 1971, war casualties treated at all U.S. AID-supported medical facilities averaged 1072 a month.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
[redacted]
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 5[illegible]
S - 541,368
MAR 21 1972

Peace Funds For War

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
21 MAR 1972
STATINTL

CIA's Long Cheng Base Reels, Defenders Flee

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 20—North Vietnamese infantry and tanks launched a heavy attack on Long Cheng, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency base 80 miles north of here, and U.S. spokesmen said today base defenses were crumbling under the onslaught.

Enemy forces were said to have captured much of Long Cheng Valley defense lines and the situation was described by U.S. officials as "critical and rapidly deteriorating."

Laotian volunteers were said to be fleeing in large numbers. Enemy artillery has completely closed the base's airstrip.

Between six to eight battalions of irregular Laotian troops, who were flown into the Long Cheng areas in January and February, have mutinied against their commander and abandoned their positions.

Informed sources said about 1,000 Laotian irregulars trained and paid by the CIA rebelled against their commander, Brig. Gen. Thao Ly, claiming he reneged on a promise to replace them. They forced 15 truck drivers to take them to Vientiane.

Long Cheng's defense now depends on CIA-trained Meo and Thai volunteers. The sources said that Laotian troops operating with Gen. Vang Pao's Meo force at Bouam Long, about 50 miles north of Long Cheng, are reportedly balking at going into combat. Thai irregulars are said to be attempting to leave the base.

Meo troops are reported to have attacked the enemy from the rear but the operation was described by the sources as a desperate gamble to draw the North Vietnamese away from Long Cheng.

Defense Network

Long Cheng is a complex defense network encompassing about 15 square miles centered around the former base of operations of Gen. Vang Pao. [illegible]

that of the CIA were moved about 20 miles southwest of Long Cheng recently.

U.S. officials have been downgrading the military importance of the Long Cheng base, insisting that since the shift of all command and supply operations to safer areas the base is now merely a tactical position rather than a strategic area. Other American sources have said the downgrading is an effort by the U.S. mission to hide the significance of the partial abandonment of Long Cheng.

The current assault on Long Cheng began Saturday with simultaneous attacks on government positions along the Skyline Ridge, a 1,500-foot line along the north rim of the Long Cheng valley. Soviet built T-34 tanks are taking part in the assault.

New Road

Communist artillery has been pounding the base. U.S. sources said they believe that the guns were moved into positions on a new road constructed by North Vietnamese engineers from the Plain of Jars across the north side of the valley.

A U.S. embassy spokesman said air strikes by U.S. Phantom F4 jets have "increased considerably" in support of Long Cheng defenders. He said B-52s are "probably" bombing enemy positions.

But military sources here expressed doubts that the government can hold Long Cheng despite Lao and U.S. tactical air support.

Long Cheng, one official said, is "all but lost."

S. Vietnam Troops Storm Enemy Base

SAIGON, March 20 (UPI)—South Vietnamese soldiers and tanks stormed a Communist supply base in eastern Cambodia today, the Saigon command reported.

American warplanes attacked Communist antiaircraft sites in North Vietnam, raising to 100 the number of "protective reaction" strikes against the North so far this year, almost as many as recorded all last year.

U.S. jets yesterday also battered a North Vietnamese flotilla of 100 boats reportedly hauling supplies along a river in the Central Highlands, spokesmen said.

The South Vietnamese command reported 64 government and guerrilla operations during the 24-hour period that ended at dawn today, with 86 enemy soldiers slain, six government troops killed and 17 wounded. The U.S. Command said three Americans also were wounded during the period.

American troop strength in South Vietnam fell 5,900 men last week, the biggest drop in six weeks, the U.S. Command also reported.



March 21, 1972 The Washington Post

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000[redacted]

21 MAR 75

Laos Fight Rages

SAIGON (AP)—Hard fighting raged today for the fourth day at the Long Cheng base in northern Laos.

In South Vietnam, North Vietnamese sappers invaded the big South Vietnamese base at Tay Ninth and killed 13 government troops.

Informed sources in Vientiane, the Laotian capital, said Laotian and Thai forces had recpatured a helicopter pad on the Skyline Ridge overlooking Long Cheng. But North Vietnamese troops holding two other positions in the center of the ridge continued to pound the base in the valley below with heavy mortar barrages.

The North Vietnamese were reported using frontal "human wave" assaults against the entrenched defenders, and American officials in Vientiane said they believed the Communists were suffering heavy losses. But few casualty figures were available.

Long Cheng, 78 miles northeast of Vientiane, is considered the most important government base in northern Laos. When it was threatened with capture in December, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency pulled out the extensive electronic equipment it maintained there, but it is still the headquarters for Gen. Vang Pao's army of Meo tribesmen.

The Meos have suffered heavy losses, and American officilas say the base now is defended mostly by Laotian and Thai irregulars who, like the Meos, are financed, trained and advised by the CIA.

The sapper attack at Tay Ninh, 60 miles northwest of Saigon, came before dawn. The sappers slipped in under cover of a rocket and mortar barrage and hurled satchel charges into a military supply center on the base, killing 13 South Vietnamese soldiers and wounding 14.

The South Vietnamese command said damage to the base was light, and the defenders killed 16 of the attackers and caputured three, along with two rocket launchers, seven AK47 assualt rifles, rockets, mortars and explosives.

At the same time enemy frogmen set off a mine on a ferry nearby, damaging it heavily.

The Tay Ninh base is the headquarters for the drive which 8,000 South Vietnamese troops are making against enemy base areas in eastern Cambodia.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004
MAR 20 1972

Laotians Mutiny At Big CIA Base

Examiner News Services

VIENTIANE (Laos) — About 1000 Laotian troops involved in the defenses of the CIA base at Long Cheng mutinied this weekend and returned to their homes in the South, informed sources reported today.

Long Cheng itself was under siege and its defense was doubtful.

North Vietnamese troops in strength attacked Long Cheng today with tanks, heavy artillery, rockets and mortars.

Government sources expressed doubt their troops could hold out despite assistance from Lao Air Force T-28s and giant U.S. B-52 bombers.

The fall of Long Cheng, a big Central Intelligence Agency base 120 miles northeast of Vientiane, could open the way for a North Vietnamese drive on Vientiane itself. The base is headquarters for Meo Gen. Vang Pao, whose Meo tribesmen and Thai mercenary army is supported by the CIA.

Vientiane

Informed sources said the mutineers were in the Laotian special task force regiments known as "Group Mobile," also trained by the CIA, and that they refused to follow their commander, Brig. Gen. Thao Ly, claiming he reneged on a promise to replace them.

The sources said the mutineers belonged to one of two regiments flown from Savannakhet, 175 miles southeast of Vientiane, to Long Cheng. One group of 1000 men was at Long Cheng itself and second group of 1000 took part in an abortive government offensive on the Plain of Jars last month.

Left for Home

The mutineers were quoted as saying they were promised they would be returned to Savnnakhet within three months.

When the Communists renewed their offensive against Long Cheng last weekend they saw their chances of returning home dwindling and forced 15 truck drivers at gunpoint to take them to Ban Son, a supply base 20 miles southwest of Long Cheng.

They arrived in Vientiane Saturday night and left for home yesterday.

The sources said some members of the Group Mobile who were airlifted to Buam Long during the weekend for operations north of the Plain of Jars refused to leave camp.

Their status was uncertain, but Gen. Vang Pao was reported trying to moust a diversionary move in the area north of the plain to relieve the pressure on Long Cheng.

A North Vietnamese force estimated as the equivalent of two divisions routed Thai and Laotian defenders from all positions in the vicinity of Sam Thong, six miles northwest of Long Cheng, and seized control of a position on Skyline Ridge, overlooking the Long Cheng airstrip, the sources said.

"The situation is critical," one official source said. Other sources said Long Cheng is "all but lost."

The offensive, believed to involve virtually all North Vietnamese troops in the Plain of Jars area, began early Saturday with simultaneous attacks against Thai and Laotian positions.

By yesterday afternoon North Vietnamese infantrymen had seized three helicopter pads along Skyline Ridge, a 1500 - foot - high natural barrier that forms the northern defenses of Long Cheng.

The North Vietnamese were reported this morning to be firing 82mm mortars and DK-82 recoilless rifles from the ridge into Long Cheng valley, closing the airstrip.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]

DALLAS, TEX.
NEWS MAR 1 9 1972
E - 242,928
S - 284,097

CIA's 'Secret Army' Filmed

THE Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" in Laos is the subject—for the first time—of a detailed documentary film which NBC News' "Chronolog" will present Friday, at 7:30 p.m. on the NBC Television Network.

"This is the great untold story of the war in Indochina," Bob Rogers, the documentary's producer and reporter, says. "While the world has been watching Vietnam and Cambodia, the biggest battle this year in Indochina is being fought in Laos with up to three full North Vietnamese divisions committed."

ACCORDING TO Rogers, the brunt of the fighting is being borne by the so-called "secret army" of General Vang Pao, which is paid, trained, equipped and advised by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Their losses have been extremely high," he says, "but so far they have given the North Vietnamese a hell of a fight. I think for the first time we've managed to penetrate the veil of secrecy which has surrounded the war in Laos and have captured it on film."

This inside view of the secret war the Laos was shot last month during the height of this year's North Vietnamese offensive which, in terms of manpower, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns, has been the biggest ever, Rogers notes.

THE FILM includes exclusive footage of the secret army composed of hill tribe guerillas and Thai "volunteers" in action.

The film crew traveled to remote mountain outposts held by the secret army, and covered the heavy fighting around the threatened CIA base at Long Tieng.

The documentary also includes exclusive footage of the secret army's commander, Meo tribal leader General Vang Pao, as he gives front-line directions to his irregular troops in their most desperate battle to date.

It includes, too—for the first time ever in the press or on television—an interview with one of the CIA's advisers to the secret army.

IN ADDITION, the film explores in detail the secrecy-shrouded operations of Air America and its American pilots, whose prime role is to render logistical support to the secret army and to the thousands of hill tribe refugees from the North Vietnamese invasion.

There is also exclusive footage of, and interviews with, the handful of young American Air Force forward air controllers who, in their unarmed light planes, direct the massive and controversial U.S. bombing program in Laos.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601
19 MAR 1972
STATINTL

KENNEDY ASSERTS LAOS CIVIL FUNDS STILL GO TO C.I.A.

Tells of a Secret Report That Practice Continues Despite Assurances

1971 PROMISE IS CITED

$2.5-Million for War Relief Is Said to Be Diverted to a Clandestine Army

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 18—Nearly half of the United States aid funds intended to help civilian victims of the war in Laos are still being diverted to the Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine guerrilla army despite the Nixon Administration's assurances last May that this practice would be halted, according to the General Accounting Office.

A summary of the secret report by the G.A.O., the Congressional investigating body, was made public today by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts. The report was prepared at the request of his judiciary subcommittee on refugees.

Based on the report's figures, the diversion of public health funds, which are managed by the Agency for International Development, mounts to an estimated total of $2.5-million a year.

Another Report Expected

Congressional sources said that another secret General Accounting Office report would disclose details on the continuing use of A.I.D.'s refugee-assistance programs in Laos by the intelligence agency for the guerrilla army, in addition to diversion of the public health funds.

The second report is expected to be presented later this month to the Kennedy committee by the accounting office.

The accounting office's report on the "civilian health" programs in Laos contains a chapter on "assistance to Lao military and paramilitary forces and their dependents." A summary provided by Senator Kennedy says that that section "is classified 'secret.'"

While the Kennedy summary provided no details on the relationship between the Agency for International Development, which administers foreign aid, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Senator commented that "A.I.D. continued to furnish substantial amounts of medical support to Lao military et al." with "little or no control over the distribution and use of the medical support items."

Figures and other details of the G.A.O. report were made available to The New York Times today in Congressional quarters, and they showed that last month the intelligence agency refunded to the development agency $1.3-million for medical assistance to clandestine army activity and related air support between last July 1 and Dec. 31.

Refund Called a First

It was reported that the accounting office estimated that these services by A.I.D. to the C.I.A. would be in excess of $1-million between Jan. 1 and June 30, 1972, the second part of the 1972 fiscal year for which the over-all commitments were made.

The Kennedy committee estimates, therefore, that the present annual figure for the diversions of public health funds to the intelligence agency is about $2.5-million.

Last month's payment by the C.I.A. to the other agency was, according to the accounting office, the first refund. The accounting office estimates that the nonreimbursed cost to A.I.D. for supporting the clandestine army's medical needs was about $1.6-million each in the fiscal years 1970 and 1971.

These totals, however, were exclusive of air support for military medical aid under the international development agency's air technical support program. The accounting office estimated that in each year, "$500,000 to $600,000 additional is also applicable to these projects for air transport of commodities and personnel."

As part of its over-all air program in Indochina, the Agency for International Development operates Air America and charters planes from commercial airlines. Earlier estimates by the accounting office had the C.I.A. providing about 70 per cent of the business for the air support program.

A comparison of the G.A.O. estimates with the development agency's public health obligations in Laos shows that about half the money is diverted for the guerrilla force of the intelligence agency.

The total A.I.D. commitment for public health programs in Laos in fiscal 1972 is $4,956,000, and the accounting office assumes that nearly $2.5-million will have been transferred to the intelligence agency.

An Unlinked Project

Medical support for the C.I.A.'s army is channeled by the development agency through the "Village Health Project," which is said to include two hospitals, numerous small dispensaries and a hospital functioning as a dispensary, all in rural areas.

The G.A.O. report said that the purpose of the "Village Health Project" must be classified "secret." But, elsewhere, accounting office documents stressed that the purpose was "to provide essential care to military and paramilitary groups, refugees and local village communities."

The development agency's other public health activity in Laos is the "Operation Brotherhood Project," which assists in the operation of hospitals in six urban areas. This has no known links to the intelligence agency.

Investigators in the accounting office were said to have found that under existing practice, A.I.D. functions in Laos as the medical arm for the guerrilla army, providing full medical logistic support on the ground and in the air.

C.I.A. use of the A.I.D. as a screen for military operations in Laos first came to public attention two years ago. On March 4, 1970, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that it had received confirmation from the intelligence agency of press reports concerning the use of the other agency as a cover.

On June 8, 1970, Dr. John A. Hannah, the A.I.D. administrator, said in a radio interview that "I just have to admit that this is true" and said the link between had been established in 1962.

Today, Senator Kennedy said that, on May 7, 1971, following his protests over the use of aid funds by the intelligence agency, Dr. Hannah had written him that "I can report to you now that with one shift made early this year and others that will be effective at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the A.I.D. financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated."

The accounting office reported, however, that under an "understanding" reached between the two agencies on Feb. 1, 1971, the C.I.A. had agreed "in principle" to assume certain costs" of A.I.D. support for the clandestine army.

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

STATINTL

Balkanized Indochina Held Nixon Aim

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

The Nixon game plan for a Vietnam settlement, say U.S. officials, supposes private Chinese and Soviet readiness to contain Hanoi in a balkanized Indochina peninsula.

According to these sources, the President made limited headway during his trip to Peking. The Chinese refused to consider the Nixon "pitch" for mutual cutbacks in outside aid to North and South Vietnam.

Publicly the Chinese have gone to great lengths to reassure North Vietnam that Nixon was told he could make peace directly with Hanoi and the "resistance groups" in Laos and Cambodia.

But underneath, officials here find, Hanoi is still sullenly suspicious of this Peking line. Analysts believe the reassurances foresee a settlement which would combine total American withdrawal with denial to Hanoi of the hegemony it desires outside Vietnam in Laos and Cambodia.

Traditional Suspicion

It is taken as an article of faith in this capital that both history and the dynamics of rival revolutions dictate suspicion between Hanoi and Peking. For centuries the Vietnamese have been resisting the suzereignty sought by their giant neighbor to the north.

Now, in the expert view, the Chinese used the Shanghai communique issued by Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai to warn Hanoi that it must not expect to expand into its own neighbors. While supporting the "people's independence struggles" in Indochina, the Chinese included a sentence that "All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries."

True, the immediate target was the Unied States, but officials here point out that in any peace settlement, this sentence would also apply to the North Vietnamese troops currently in Cambodia and Laos. Also the joint Sino-American endorsement in the communique of [illegible] interfernce in other nation's affairs could also apply one

Problem For Moscow

These Hanoi suspicions present a subtle but quite real problem for Moscow. On the one hand, U.S. analysts find, the Russians have used all the distrust engendered by Nixon's visit to Peking against their Chinese rivals. They have accused China of stabbing Hanoi in the back.

On the other hand, U.S. officials believe that Moscow is equally worried about becoming too committed to Hanoi's designs on Indochina. Through the Romanians and other East European diplomats in contact with Washington, the Russians have hinted that they have no desire to turn North Vietnam into an "Asian Albania" on the southern borders of China.

Two principal reasons are given. One is the continuing cost of supporting the Hanoi war effort. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird last week told Congress that Moscow—the chief military supplier of North Vietnam—is spendiing the equivalent of $600 million a year on the war.

Russians Worried

Second, and more important politically, the Russians are said to be worried about Hanoi involvement in the whole of Indochina which might drag Moscow into a confrontation with Peking. In this view, the Soviet Union wants to curtail Chinese power in Southeast Asia by bolstering Hanoi—but not to the point of a military showdown with Peking.

The conclusion, therefore, is that both the Chinese and the Russians—for different reasons—might support a settlement which would turn the three countries of Indochina—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—into the "Balkans of Asia."

Hanoi would be guaranteed its independence—and at least the real possibility of using its political skills and infrastructure in the South to take over Saigon. But the North would not run Laos and Cambodia, nor would any of the [illegible] et Union, the United States, Japan—either dominate or be excluded completely from Indochina.

According to U.S. officials, Nixon is prepared to make the same pitch in Moscow in May as he made in Peking in February—that the U.S. and, this time, the Soviet Union agree to limit their aid to Hanoi and Saigon.

No official here believes the public response in Moscow will be any less negative than that from Peking. Should an aid cut-back happen, these sources say, it will be an informal action by the outside powers, not through formal agreement.

Nonetheless, the consensus here is that Hanoi is deeply worried about just such outside pressure for a compromise settlement. Intelligence reports reaching here, plus official Hanoi comment on Nixon's summitry in both Peking and Moscow, show that the North Vietnamese are not at all certain of unyielding Soviet support.

Hesitancy Cited

Specialists here go as far as to suggest that recent North Vietnamese hesitancy on the military front may be partly due to this uncertainty. Hanoi has stationed seven divisions in north Laos, opposite the northern part of South Vietnam and in the central highlands, and in Cambodia. Yet they have failed to launch the all-out m litary action freely predicted here.

In north Laos, the North Vietnamese could certainly take the psychologically important CIA base at Long Cheng, thus opening their way onto the plain of Vientiane, and generating pressure on the Laotian government for Hanoi-sponsored compromise.

That formula would have Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma agree to reorganize his government and call upon the United States to stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail through southern Laos. At the same time, experts admit Hanoi certainly has the capability to launch embarrassing — if not decisive — attacks on provincial towns in the north and central parts of South Vietnam.

The question is whether Hanoi will stick to these uncompromising military tactics for taking the South — and controlling Laos and Cambodia — if it finds Moscow and Peking wavering in their support. At the moment, the most officials here find is that the seeds of uncertainty are certainly there.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

DAILY WORLD
18 MAR 1972

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

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

CLEVELAND, OHIO
CALL & POST
WEEKLY MAR 18 1972
29,183

The CIA-A Pusher

TO THE EDITOR:

In reading different periodicals, particularly one by Richard Morris, I find there are three communities of America; famine, misery, and government incompetence. Narcotics entering the black community is one of the many instruments of oppression that has stifled the mental and physical capabilities of many blacks in America.

It (narcotics) is a multi-billion dollar commodity. So with the highly advanced technology of America that allows us to venture in outer-space or show full-length movies of the privacy of the late Martin L. King's sex life... Then I am convinced that there is no way the drug traffic can flourish in this county without the full knowledge of the law enforcement and political officers.

When I read articles that tell me that Southeast Asia is the world's opium producing giant with a yearly production of an estimated 1,200 tons which constitutes 80% of the supply to the world and Burma alone delivers 400 tons of opium to the world, or that the CIA base in Long Cheng is reported to be the central collecting point for the majority of opium exported outside of Southeast Asia, or even that methadone is a replacement for heroin so the government can reap some of the profits, then I begin to wonder about our so-called democratic state of order which is supposed to create conditions where by my fulfillment and progressiveness as human beings will be recognize and respected.

Although I am no expert on drug addition, as far as consumption is concerned, I have been exposed to the sickness and it has brought me to agree with Richard Morris, that it is conditions within the social order of things which turns one to drugs as a solution or pleasure. These conditions being famine and misery. Morris states that famine is when the normal urge for food cannot be sufficiently satisfied the result to the physiogomy of the human being is disorganization and a general lack of initiative to indulge in any other activity other than securing food to adequately arrest the hunger pangs. Famine coupled with filthy and over-crowded living conditions has a tendency to make people irritable, anti-social, immoral, unethical and apathetic. Misery results from socially introduced emotional problems stemming from just ordinary conditions of every American ghetto: disease infested living quarters; rats dashing across the bedroom floor; an army of roaches scurrying up the kitchen wall; a recently used toilet that doesn't flush; three families in a one family apartment and a perennial shortage of money.

These favorable conditions which are created by America's system of capitalist democracy and racism should be dealt with as severely as the black pusher who spends his prime in prisons because he's trying to survive. When this country deals with the CIA, the FBI, local police and politicians who profit from the sell and distribution of illicit drugs, then I can see America well on its way to eliminating drugs.

Yours truly,
Henry Robinson
13409 Forest Hill Ave.
Cleveland, Ohio 44112

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060

DAILY WORLD
16 MAR 1972

International News

Millions show solidarity with Indochina peoples

Demonstrations and rallies involving millions of people in many countries this week protested the Nixon government's escalation of bombings and expressed solidarity with the peoples of Indochina. These observances of the World Wide Week of Solidarity called by the World Peace Council coincided with important new developments in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The 146th session of the Paris talks on Vietnam was scheduled today (March 16) as the Hanoi and PRG delegations agreed to resume meetings postponed by the U.S.

In South Vietnam growing opposition to the corrupt and repressive Nguyen Van Thieu regime is reflected in demands for Thieu's resignation by a number of political organizations, including the "Popular Front of Struggle for Peace," "Association of Buddhists," "Catholic Movement for Peace." These groups denounce the Nixon 8-point "peace plan" as a move to preserve and consolidate puppet neo-colonialist regimes in the Indochina countries. Another reflection of the growing opposition was the arrest and imprisonment by Thieu of 15 South Vietnamese intellectuals, including Professors Ngo Kha and Bui Quang Phu, composer Phan Tran and the journalist Thieu Sun. Saigon student leader Huynh Tan Mam has been handed over to U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agents. In Hanoi a public meeting denounced Thieu and expressed solidarity with these most recent victims of his regime.

In Phnom Penh, Cambodian university students have again opposed former Prime Minister Sisowath Sirik Matak as a flunkey of U.S. imperialism. Placards and posters calling for Matak's ouster came after Gen. Lon Nol, the paralytic puppet who proclaimed himself President and Prime Minister, embraced Matak in public following the U.S. favorite's resignation Sunday. On March 15, Lon Nol broadcast an appeal for more time to replace Matak's regime. His plea was seen as a move to stall off further opposition until the U.S.-Saigon 50,000-man invasion force has won control of the country.

In Laos, despite ceaseless bombings by U.S. Air Force planes flying from Thai bases, forces of the Laotian Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat) continued to wipe out puppet and mercenary troops of the U.S. CIA headquarters in Vientiane. In Hanoi, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's foreign ministry said in the past few days the U.S. Air Force has sharply accelerated the raids on Laos, dumping thousands of tons of bombs on areas thought to be populated.

Meanwhile, participation in the World Peace Council's World Wide Week of Solidarity with the Peoples of Indochina was reported in a number of countries. Protest demonstrations and rallies are being held in Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, Sweden, Britain and the Soviet Union.

The Union of Democratic Women of Austria sponsored a meeting in Vienna which sent a message to President Nixon protesting the bombing of Indochina countries, and coupling their expression of solidarity with the peoples of Indochina with a similar expression of support for Angela Davis. A similar telegram was sent to Nixon by the executive committee of the British Communist Party. Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krister Wickman addressed a meeting and denounced Nixon's "Vietnamization" program as intended to continue the aggression. Czechoslovak trade unionists at a conference in Karlovy Vary said the continued U.S. aggression in Indochina shows the aggressive reactionary essence of imperialism remains unchanged.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST

STATINTL

[redacted]

U.S. Seen Violating Ban in Laos

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, March 15—Thai air force helicopters, some of them armed, are being used in combat here in apparent violation of the congressional prohibition against U.S. financing of third country forces here.

Thai pilots are flying both medical evacuation and combat support missions in the area of the Long Cheng military complex 80 miles north of here, according to knowledgeable U.S. sources. The Thais are using UH1-E (Huey) helicopters on loan from the United States, the sources said, and fly from Udorn airbase in northern Thailand.

Command of the helicopters is said to lie with CIA advisors to Gen. Vang Pao, commander of the irregular forces fighting around Long Cheng. The craft are said to be controlled through a U.S. Air Force plane circling the area.

[A State Department source said the Thai pilots were not under U.S. command.]

U.S. Mission spokesmen, while acknowledging that the helicopters are armed, said that they are only flying armed medical evacuation missions under the command of Gen. Vang Pao. The spokesman will only describe the pilots as non-American and non-Laotian irregular volunteers who are present in Laos under the same program that covered the entry of Thai soldiers.

Informed sources said it was unlikely that Thailand could supply enough civilian helicopter pilots for the program because of the shortage of trained personnel in the country. Use of Thai military pilots in American aircraft would seem to violate the ban against U.S. funding of third country forces here.

(Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), commenting on the report of Thai-piloted helicopters being used in Laos, said, "This is but another illustration of disregard for the law which states that U.S. funds shall not be used in Laos for military support of third countries. To my knowledge it is the first introduction of gunships.")

Information on the helicopters came to light last weekend when one of the Hueys crashed just north of Vientiane during a violent thunderstorm, killing at least four crew members.

U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane denied categorically that the craft was carrying Americans, although it was an armed U.S. craft of a type not possessed by the Lao military. Various other spokesmen confirmed it was U.S. owned, that it was serviced by the Air America Corp., and that it was going from Long Cheng to Udorn, Thailand when it crashed.

Heavy American participation in investigations following the crash raised widespread suspicion here that Americans were aboard. But now, it's generally accepted that concern over the loss of crew and an American craft assigned to a sensitive new program caused the flurry of official excitement.

There is nothing new in Thai pilot participation in the Laotian war, according to knowledgeable sources. Thai pilots have secretly been flying AC-47 "spookie" gunships and T-28 bombers on combat missions over Laos in recent years. It is the type of aircraft and their closeness to combat that has changed.

Aside from pilots, Thai troops now operating in Laos may number as high as 10,000 reliable sources here say, with more expected as the current military situation continues to deepen.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

DAILY WORLD
13 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

Fighting intensifies in South Vietnam

Daily World Combined Services

Heavy fighting continued yesterday in Laos and South Vietnam, while reports indicated a rise in mass desertions from the Saigon puppet army.

In Laos, the major U.S. Central Intelligence Agency base of Sam Thong, 100 miles north of the capital city of Vientiane, fell to Lao Patriotic Front forces over the weekend.

Seven miles further south, a major battle was swirling around Long Cheng, center of Laos operations for the CIA.

Giai Phong ("Liberation") News Agency said yesterday that in South Vietnam last year a total of 148,000 Saigon puppet troops had deserted, including more than 50 percent of the troops who took part in the inglorious February, 1971, invasion of southern Laos. The GPNA said that more than 5,000 U.S. and Saigon servicemen were killed or wounded last year during actions aimed at putting down mutinies within the Saigon puppet army, which steadily grew in number during the year.

There were 2,730 known cases of entire Saigon puppet army units refusing to obey orders to go into battle, the GPNA said, indicating that there were probably a great many more which the U.S.-Saigon authorities succeeded in covering up.

More battles

In South Vietnam yesterday, the heaviest fighting reportedly was going on in the far south, on the Ca Mau peninsula, an area which had been repeatedly declared "completely pacified" by the U.S.-Saigon military commands.

In nearby Rach Gia province, which a few months ago was blanketed by poisonous aerial spraying, the Saigon puppet troops lost 120 killed and wounded in three days of hard fighting.

More battles erupted east of Saigon, near the old imperial city of Hue, and in the Central Highlands, which U.S. B-52's have been bombing for the past week.

The Saigon puppet regime's military command reported yesterday that its troops had won a "big victory" in the Central Highlands with only "negligible" U.S. air support, and said their troops were fighting "the North Vietnamese 320th Division, the victors of Dien Bien Phu." However, the "victory" communiques sounded rather suspicious to a number of newsmen in Saigon.

As United Press International reported from Saigon, "the area (of the battle) has been a major target for eight-engined B-52s flying their bombing missions out of Thailand and Guam." It is known that other Saigon forces nearby are receiving heavy U.S. air support from fighter-bombers, helicopter gunships and heavy bombers.

A top Saigon puppet army commander in the region was fired following U.S. political pressure a short time ago, and the U.S. has openly tied in the Central Highlands "victory" campaign with President Nixon's "victory" prospects in the U.S. elections.

Later field reports by U.S. newsmen stated that the Saigon puppet troops were being led by U.S. advisers, one of them identified as Sgt. Frederick Weekly of Waterloo, Iowa, and that "a few U.S. Cobra helicopter gunships" from the U.S. 52nd Aviation Battalion at Pleiku, "helped out" in the Central Highlands battle.

In Vientiane, Laos, U.S. sources admitted that a Royal Lao helicopter, which crashed 15 miles north of the city on Saturday killing all aboard, had contained five high-ranking Thai Army officers.

They admitted that the helicopter had been flying from the big CIA base area of Long Cheng to Udorn in Thailand. Udorn is a major U.S. Air Force base in Thailand and a center for the CIA. It has been reported that about 4,000 Thai Army troops are taking part in the Long Cheng battle. The crash of the helicopter was blamed on "engine trouble."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
MAR 15 1972

STATINTL

CIA Base in Laos Imperiled As North Vietnamese Attack

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 14—North Vietnamese infantrymen launched heavy ground attacks today against the Long Cheng Central Intelligence Agency base 80 miles north of here, informed U.S. sources said.

Long Cheng is in "serious danger," the sources said, adding that the general offensive against the base appears to be under way at last, after weeks of thrust, parry and counterthrust between the attackers and the progovernment defenders.

If the offensive succeeds, it could open the way for a new Communist drive down Highway 13 toward Vientiane. Most sources here say they believe the action at Long Cheng may well be one of the most important battles of the decade-old Laotian war.

The North Vietnamese first threatened Long Cheng in December, when they captured the Plain of Jars to the northeast earlier in the dry season than usual, and began a drive southward.

In January, they overran Long Cheng briefly but withdrew. The current situation is more serious, sources here said, because this time the Communists have the supply and artillery capability to sustain an offensive to the south.

It is generally believed the North Vietnamese are attempting to smash Gen. Vang Pao's army of Meo tribesmen in the name of the Communist Pathet Lao. If they eliminate Vang Pao's army, they will eliminate the Laotian government's only effective fighting force.



March 15, 1972 The Washington Post

Location of CIA base at Long Cheng threatened by attack.

Sources here have suggested recently that a major attack on Long Cheng would probably be followed by a push down Route 13, the highway that connects Vientiane and Luang Prabang.

Such a drive, the sources say, would probably halt at the river crossing of Ban Hin Heup, 50 miles north of Vientiane, from where new calls for negotiations would originate. Ban Han Heup is the 1962 division and ceasefire line for establishment of the current government in Vientiane.

Today, under cover of a heavy artillery barrage fired from 15 miles away, Communist troops struck along the entire length of Skyline Ridge, the inner defense ring on the north side of Long Cheng valley. Heavy fighting was reported in the area of a helicopter pad known as Charlie Whiskey, which was used in the January attacks on Long Cheng to infiltrate the valley.

Skyline Ridge is a 5,000-foot strip of high ground overlooking the runway and headquarters of Long Cheng, the base used by the CIA to train the Meo tribesmen in guerrilla fighting.

[Gen. Thongphan Knocksy, spokesman for the Laotian defense ministry, said shelling has made Long Cheng inaccessible except to helicopters. He said 12 government soldiers have been killed, United Press International reported.]

Sources here said an element of the defending force attempting to make its way back to Long Cheng from nine miles to the east was hit by 600 North Vietnamese troops Sunday morning.

Those defenders were believed to be part of a guerrilla task force that Vang Pao sent into the mountains in an attempt to relieve the pressure on the base and forestall the Communist offensive. That task force was unsuccessful, acording to sources here.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01

BALTIMORE SUN
MAR 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

Laos, Still a Shadowy War

Over the past decade Americans may have known a bit more about events in Laos than in Timbuktu; but not by much. Laos was a place of mysterious activities and shadowy struggles, engaged in and waged by persons and groups of no clear identities. Laos was important, of course, because it was a "domino," in the years when the word was assumed to have some sort of sense, but the degree and character of its importance were explained to the American public but vaguely, if at all.

Now, we learn from a Michael Parks dispatch to *The Sun*, the long official secrecy about the war in Laos is "going public"; in part. The partial publicity has been forced mainly by American congressional interest as to what expenditures come to in Laos and what the money was being used for, along with an AID requirement that none of that agency's funds go into Lao military assistance or for programs of the Central Intelligence Agency.

And so some facts are coming out, but others remain obscure. Mr. Parks has listed them as: The exact number of Thai "volunteers," or mercenaries, present there; just what the activities of some 100 military attaches and an estimated 300 CIA "case officers" and "field technical representatives" amount to; the figures on American air combat; American involvement in Lao politics; the extent of thefts from American supplies and money.

What it adds up to, it seems to us, is a slight lifting of a veil that still leaves Laos shadowy and mysterious and that raises more insistently, rather than answers, the questions of just what our precise purpose is, or ever was, in a small country whose people have become increasingly unconsidered by all the combatants in the Indochina war.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
18 MAR 1972 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000[redacted]

Hanoi Exhibit Depicts '71 Victory in Laos

The writer of the following dispatch is a freelance journalist who won the Pulitzer Prize in 1970 for his disclosure of the Mylai massacre.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

HANOI, North Vietnam, March 11—The defeat of South Vietnamese troops during the Laos "incursion" a year ago was a disappointment to American military planners, but it has been widely described in Washington as only a setback along the inevitable road to successful Vietnamization.

In North Vietnam, however, the battle of Route 9, as it is known here, is presented as an epic turning point in the Indochina war and a heroic victory second only to the 1968 offensive at the time of Tet, the Lunar New Year.

The operation, code-named Lamson 719 by Saigon, involved 45,000 of the most highly trained South Vietnamese troops, supported by a vast array of United States aircraft, artillery and supplies.

Fled Within Weeks

The initial goal was to cut all communications along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos from the border to the city of Tchepone, about 25 miles to the west. Instead, the South Vietnamese forces were sent fleeing in full retreat within weeks.

American correspondents in South Vietnam were refused permission to observe the battles in Laos and officials discouraged interviews with participants. But there is no such reluctance here. Last summer the National Military Museum in Hanoi was converted into a virtual shrine commemorating the victory.

The display includes dozens of photographs of Pathet Lao and Vietcong troops attending planning sessions before the battle, moving supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and attacking in Laos.

There are also scenes of deserted Vietnamese fire bases housing many seemingly undamaged artillery pieces and thousands of neatly stacked shells. In a grassy area behind the museum are a number of undamaged guns, an armored personnel carrier, two heavy tanks that appeared to be in perfect condition and a damaged but largely intact helicopter gunship. All had United States markings and all were said to have been captured during the Laos operation.

In the museum are dozens of smaller arms, including American-made mortars and grenade launchers, as well as displays of Vietnamese identification cards and uniforms.

A large poster apparently prepared by the Third Brigade of a South Vietnamese paratroop division bears a greeting to foreign correspondents. The North Vietnamese said the poster had been made in advance for press briefings that Saigon officials expected to conduct after the capture of Tchepone.

First Stage of the Battle

Tran Manh Thuyen, director of the museum, described the three main stages of the battle as seen by North Vietnamese analysts.

The first stage, he said through an interpreter, lasted from Feb. 8 to Feb. 28 and involved attacks on the South Vietnamese units that were carried by helicopter onto hilltops along Route 9.

"This was a new tactic used by American planners," Mr. Thuyen said, "using the high ground to airlift puppet troops who would then theoretically leap from peak to peak."

By the end of the month, he continued, all the hilltops had been seized and the paratroops had retreated.

During the second stage, from March 1 to March 23, Mr. Thuyen continued, Tchepone was abandoned as an objective and the main South Vietnamese forces were reassembled at Bandong, just inside the Laotian border. The museum official, who said he did much of the research for the exhibit, explained that three brigades were grouped there.

"On the one hand," he said, "they could not reach their objective of Tchepone and on the other hand they could not withdraw to South Vietnam."

The museum features a large simulation of the scene at Bandog, complete with helicopters that crash and burn, during the three-week siege.

Mr. Thuyen said the South Vietnamese were forced to dig deeper and deeper foxholes under heavy artillery barrages from their foes and could not rally despite waves of B-52 bombings and close helicopter support. The South Vietnamese supply and equipment loses were extensive, Mr. Thuyen said.

The widely circulated photograph of soldiers clinging desperately to the skids of an evacuation helicopter was prominently displayed in the museum. According to Mr. Thuyen, many helicopter pilots were forced to apply thick grease to their skids to make it more difficult to grab hold.

The third and final stage described by Mr. Thuyen came at Khesanh, in South Vietnam, where the American and South Vietnamese forces eventually withdrew under heavy shelling, again leaving equipment behind.

The North Vietnamese claimed a toll of 23,400 South Vietnamese killed or wounded during the two-month operation, more than half the original attacking force. The statistic is far larger than the official total, although some roughly equivalent figures were reported unofficially later.

Other Claims by Hanoi

Other North Vietnamese claims, which were of course impossible to verify, included 230 personnel carriers; tanks and other vehicles destroyed or captured; 72 cannon destroyed; more than 700 helicopters and airplanes shot down, and four supply dumps destroyed.

"According to our estimates," Mr. Thuyen explained, "this was a turning point in the Indochina theater. It was the first time the forces were employed under the new Vietnamization formula" — using South Vietnamese troops and American support and firepower—"in such a major fashion."

A ranking Vietcong official in Hanoi similarly described the battle as a sign that "basically the Vietnamization policy has failed."

"Of course," he continued, "it doesn't mean that Vietnamization has failed completely yet but that from now on the United States policy only has to fail."

Whether that judgment is right cannot be assessed adequately from here, but there is no question that every Government official interviewed in Hanoi is convinced of the importance of the victory.

An informed Western diplomat explained that the battle came at a "critical time for the North Vietnamese—it was their test case against Vietnamization."

Results Widely Reported

The diplomat, a longtime observer in Hanoi, said that the battle came in the aftermath of the joint allied offensive into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, the heavy bombings of North Vietnam in the early fall and the November raid on the Sontay prison camp.

Results from the front in Laos were widely reported in Hanoi's newspapers and a film strip was shown on the state-run television station, which began operations in February, 1971.

"We could see films of soldiers in the ditches along Route 9 as supply trucks rolled past only a few yards away with South Vietnamese troops abroad them," the diplomat related. "It was fantastic!"

The museum exhibit constantly speaks of Vietcong and Pathet Lao troops as doing the actual fighting, but no foreign observer disputes the obvious fact that North Vietnam played a major role in the battle.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

BALTIMORE SUN
10 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

Laos's public secrets

U.S. now tells the truth, but not all of it

By MICHAEL PARKS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—After a decade of official American secrecy, the war in Laos is going public.

United States Embassy officials here say that the broad outlines of the American involvement in the war with the Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese are known now although many specifics still are classified.

Groups of newsmen have toured formerly top-secret bases with the chief U.S. intelligence agent as their guide.

Open about raids

The frequent B-52 bomber raids over northern Laos now are acknowledged and their targets identified. A substantial part of the American war budget in Laos now is open to congressional and public scrutiny.

"Some people have gotten the feeling that the intensity of the war up here is increasing," says a senior American official. "Actually what is increasing is our visibility.

"We are just letting people know what is happening here. After all, the North Vietnamese war up here is increasing," says a senior American official. "After all, the North Vietnamese are the aggressors, not us."

A more cynical European diplomat takes a different view:

"The Americans have, it is true, told in general terms what they are doing. But they have revealed only 50 per cent of the facts, many of which were known anyway.

"They make the big points, they omit the details. Many of the details are important though."

Such details include:

1. The exact number of Thai mercenaries the United States is supporting in Laos, how they were recruited and what they are paid. The number reportedly is being doubled to 12,000.

Disclosing any information about the Thais, American officials here indicate, would lead to substantiated charges that the Nixon administration is violating a congressional ban on the hiring of foreign mercenary troops.

2. The activities of the more than 100 military attaches and the estimated 300 "case officers" and "field technical representatives" the Central Intelligence Agency has here.

This information would provide proof for charges that the United States is violating the Geneva accords that neutralized Laos and banned foreign military and paramilitary personnel.

3. The number of American fighter-bomber strikes and B-52 missions flown in northern Laos, which would show an increase in the number of B-52 raids and a 60 to 70 per cent decline in those by the smaller planes since 1970.

Carrots, sticks

4. The inducements and threats the U.S. Embassy uses with various Laotian political factions to keep the "neutralist" government of Prince Souvanna Phouma, the premier, on an even keel as the country is devastated by a war that has increasingly less to do with the Lao.

5. The thefts of supplies and money by Lao officials from American aid programs, which the U.S. embassy ignores in order to keep good relations with the Vientiane government.

The American hierarchy here and the Nixon administration in Washington may never address these points.

A first accounting

But further details are expected to become public when the administration makes its first six-month accounting of expenditures under the Laotian war budget.

The accounting was ordered by Congress as part of legislation limiting American military and economic assistance to Laos to $350 million in the 1972 fiscal year.

This represents a potential jump of $65 million over last year. The limit does not include the cost of American bombing missions over Laos, which has been estimated at between $1 billion and $2 billion annually.

The American establishment's increasing acknowledgment of U.S. activities here is attributable primarily to this budget limitation—"We have to account for everything we do now," one American officer complained—and to the preceding congressional debate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which triggered the legislative interest.

But there are a number of indications that the current rate of spending here exceeds that allowed on an annual basis by Congress and that the Nixon administration, rather than seeking legislative approval for increased spending, will attempt to camouflage the higher costs through accounting gimmicks.

Shuffling the count

"Washington just asked us how many bombs and bullets we used. They are figuring how much they cost," said a top U.S. official.

"The cost can be figured lots of ways. Do you include handling and transportation costs? Do you include development costs?

"Do you include pay for the Thai volunteers in the Lao or the Thai aid budget? Do you include costs already in the budgets at the bases in Thailand? . . . . I guess the answers depend on how much we spend."

Officials here say that the Nixon administration might seek a supplemental appropriation, but wants to avoid a congressional clash over the war in an election year.

American military-aid administrators in Laos, however, have exceeded their budgets almost every year, sometimes by almost 100 per cent.

Ironically, Congress's spending limitation is likely to result in more American air strikes in northern Laos because the cost of bombs and fuel used in these missions are excluded from the $350 million.

"What you are going to see, come April, May and June when the money runs short, is a lot of American pilots doing the job Lao pilots have been doing," says a U.S. Air Force officer stationed here.

Laotians bitter

The budget limitation, called the Symington amendment after its sponsor, Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), also has stirred bitterness among the Lao.

"I don't care if the Americans want to tell the whole world exactly what they are doing here, but we can't fight a war counting each bullet and bomb and rifle," said Sisouk Na Champassak, the acting Laotian defense minister.

American officials here are also under orders from the U.S. Agency for International Development, which runs the American foreign aid program, not to use any agency funds for Lao military assistance or for CIA programs.

Many of the recent disclosures here have been anti-climatic, simply official acknowledgements of what already was widely known.

When correspondents were flown to the headquarters of the Laotian irregulars at Long Cheng, described as the CIA's top-secret command post for years, they were disappointed to find most of the radio and electronic gear gone.

But American agents were seen wandering nonchalantly around directing air strikes—just as everyone knew they did.

A British correspondent taken up to the Plain of Jars to cover a government operation came back wondering why he had been barred from covering previous operations.

"Lord only knows what they thought they were hiding," he said.

Top U.S. officials here say they have ordered greater efforts to provide accurate and complete information about the military situation to corre-

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
16 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

[redacted]

Australian Wanderer Roams Jungles With Pathet Lao

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, March 9 — "When two soldiers wearing Pathet Lao uniforms stepped into the trail to stop me, I knew the worst had happened. I had taken a wrong turning at the wrong time. A month later I know different. It was a wrong turn in the right direction."

John Everingham, 22, of Brisbane, Australia, has made many wrong turns during the four years he has known Laos. In the past it was usually just a matter of retracing his steps back along the narrow, steep paths that criss-cross Laos' mountain country, going back to ask a Meo or Lao villager the way.

But on Feb. 7, it was different. The two Pathet Lao soldiers were not hostile, they simply would not allow him to turn back. They beckoned and prodded him deeper into the mountains, where he would spend the next four weeks as an "honored captive" of the Communists. This week, soldiers guided him to the outskirts of Luang Prabang, the Lao royal capital 130 miles north of here, and told him to go home. The following day he arrived in Vientiane.

Everingham is six feet tall and weighs almost 200 lbs. He is a former weightlifter, now an adventurer and free-lance photographer with a special desire to know, understand and photograph the embattled Meo tribe of Northern Laos.

In four years he has come to be famous here for long treks into the wilderness, unarmed, guarded mostly by his flowing yellow hair, tiny goatee and sheer luck.

"The first four days were the worst," he recalls. "It was not that I felt really afraid after the first few minutes, but there was a gut reaction to the quiet hostility whenever we moved into a new area on the march away from Luang Prabang. All the people thought I was an American pilot or spy they had captured.

"Everyone wanted to tell me how his village had been bombed. I was lectured by women, children, officers, everyone, about the bombing of their village and the spookies," the aerial gunships that spew machine-gun bullets into suspected enemy troop concentrations.

"But I was never physically harmed, nor did anyone try to hurt me. They just glared until I explained that I was not a pilot, not an American. Of course they usually did not understand what either an Australian or a journalist is—they did understand photographs and many asked me to photograph the bombing."

From the first meeting on the trail Everingham's papers and camera had been held by the guards. After a day and a half march south from Luang Prabang he was placed in what he calls a "log cabin jail" to wait for clearance of his papers by officers at another camp. Two days later a Pathet Lao officer appeared and released him into what he calls "open custody."

Apologetic Officer

Everingham speaks Lao, and when the officer appeared "he was most apologetic that they had jailed a non-American and a photographer. He gave instructions to stay close to the camp and allowed me open custody, which meant I could wander around unguarded."

Later, "we moved deep into Pathet Lao territory, going east toward Moung Soui," the old Laotian neutralist stronghold 60 miles southeast of Luang Prabang.

"I really learned what war was there," Everingham says. "On the first day we were bombed, injuring one soldier, then strafed by spookies and Spectres," the latter being a C-130 cargo plane outfitted with machine guns.

In the area near Muong Soui, where he was being held captive and through which he had passed under guard, "I saw no traditional Lao villages," Everingham says. "All of them had been bombed and the people where living in the forest. The people and soldiers were safe because they could hear the planes long way off and get into their tunnels on mountainsides."

Everingham says he was most surprised about the ineffectiveness of bombing on the roads in the area.

"A couple of times I was taken on truck rides along Route 7, which cuts across northern Laos near Muong Soui. When a bomb hits dead center in the road they just drive down into the crater and up the other side. When a landslide is made, the driver gets out, sets up about seven small TNT charges and bam! It is blown away. I had always assumed it took an army of people to keep roads open under the bombs. Nothing like it."

Friendly Vietnamese

At one point, marching east toward Muong Soui, Everingham saw the only North Vietnamese he would encounter, a group of eight resting in a village in Pathet Lao uniforms and armed with Russian-built AK47 rifles. "All the time we were there they showed great deference to the officer in charge of me. They were curious and even more friendly than the Laotians —which is something. They asked about Saigon, about Australia. No military questions, no hostility."

"There was no shortage of anything as far as I could see and while in there we ate wonderful," he says.

Chinese canned pork luncheon meat, pork egg rolls and fish, all prominently marked with their Chinese origins, were given to him in abundance, Everingham says.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006

THE ARIZONA DAILY STAR
7 March 1972

STAT INTL

Curbing The CIA

Very quietly — and very properly — curbs have been placed on the Central Intelligence Agency.

This super-secret arm of the United States government too often has been engaged in practices which, when revealed, have shocked the American public. CIA activities in Southeast Asia have attracted widespread criticism.

For most Americans, the cloak and dagger work of the CIA smacks more of totalitarian regimes, of banana republics, than of an open and free democracy.

Attached to a foreign aid authorization bill last month were the first controls placed on the Central Intelligence Agency in a quarter of a century. Congress passed the bill and President Nixon signed it.

Under these new controls the CIA will have to answer — well, at least partly — to Congress. It will have to submit quarterly reports to Congress on its operations in Cambodia. It also will have to report on its "foreign aid" programs. However, it is not expected to have to spell out details.

It is the CIA which pays the Thai mercenaries to fight in Laos. Under the new controls, such pay cannot be above the salary scales of the U.S. military. As further curbs, there will be a reduction in military personnel working for the CIA, and the agency has been included in a $341 million ceiling placed on aid to Cambodia.

The controls can be considered hardly more than minor restraints, but Congress, by acting, has demonstrated it is not entirely happy with the Central Intelligence Agency. In that attitude Congress is reflecting the feelings of the people.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

BALTIMORE SUN
7 MAR 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

[redacted]

STATINTL

CIA reported shifting attention in Laos from Communists to opium

By MICHAEL PARKS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos — American intelligence agents here are turning their attention from Communists to drug runners, according to informed sources.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency has been given a top-priority assignment, American officials say, of discovering the routes used to smuggle opium from northern Burma through Laos to Thailand and pinpointing opium refineries in the area.

One result was a mysterious fire that destroyed a key refinery for turning opium into heroin last year.

A recently reported series of ambushes on mule trains and caravans bringing opium from Burma and Thailand are also attributed by knowledgeable observers here to the American anti-drug campaign.

Knowing smiles

When questioned directly about the fire at the refinery near the Laotian town of Ban Houei Sai or the caravan raids, American officials only smile knowingly and shrug their shoulders.

Other intelligence sources report, however, that some of the small guerrilla teams that used to probe China's Yunnan province for the Central Intelligence Agency have been shifted to tracking and occasionally attacking the opium caravans.

Last summer, American officials were discussing the possibility of bombing an opium refinery at Houei Tap, near Ban Houei Sai.

"There are so many bombing sorties that one could easily go astray, if you know what I mean," said one U.S. Embassy official.

Eventually, officials here now say, bombing was discarded as "imprecise."

"Besides, everyone would know we did it," an American here said recently. "With a fire, people are not sure. It may be a business rival."

The American Embassy, which for years had condoned and indirectly helped Laotian traffic in heroin, morphine and opium as a part of the war against the Communists, has now brought in a task force of U.S. Customs and drug officials to help the Vientiane government enforce its first drug law. Their budget may run to $1 million a year.

The Customs officials are helping tighten inspection of cargoes on domestic and international air flights, the principal avenue for the drugs to move from northern Laos down to Bangkok, Thailand.

Some of the inspections on flights of Air America and Continental Air System planes, which are under contract to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, are too cursory to be effective, and some planes still escape inspection completely, as do most military flights.

In addition, private planes still land at Vientiane's airport from Thailand and Cambodia to pick up mysterious cargoes and fly off again, having avoided both Customs inspections and filing of flight plans and manifest by bribing the airport officials with $200.

Americans here hope that pressure from the prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and his intelligence chief, General Khamou, will reduce this traffic.

An agent from the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has been assigned to work with General Khamou and coordinate the American and Lao efforts.

American advisers working with the Lao national police have also been ordered to press for enforcement of the new Lao drug law, enacted under U.S. pressure last summer.

The law prohibits the processing and transportation of heroin, opium and related drugs, and the cultivation and use of opium, a traditional crop among hill tribes, is restricted. A second law, passed recently, bars unauthorized importation of chemicals used to refine opium.

The U.S. efforts are directed less at stopping the cultivation of opium than in reducing the large volume of drugs flowing through Laos to Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Hong Kong.

Details of the budget for the anti-drugs program, which is being coordinated with similar efforts in neighboring countries, are still being worked out, but U.S. officials frequently mention $1 million as the total annual cost.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 MAR 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]
STATINTL

In Laos cross fire: Meo tribesmen fight on

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Ban Xon, Laos

One hears so much about the low morale of the Meo tribesmen in Laos that one expects to see nothing but sullen faces here.

But there is incredible strength — and somethimes laughter — in the faces of the Meo whom the war has deposited here.

Incredible, too, is the daily effort that is made from this American-run relief center to keep alive 120,000 refugees, half of them Meo. Scarcely a minute goes by, it seems, without a small aircraft lifting off the runway with a load of rice for refugees living near scores of scattered drop zones and landing sites in north-central Laos.

Two companies, Continental Air Services and Air America, provide the airplanes, under a contract with the U.S. Government. The pilots are tough, well paid, and expert at zooming in on small landing strips slashed at haphazard angles into the jungle and mountains.

Despite its importance as a refugee supply center, Ban Xon is hardly secure. The Americans who work here fly up every day from Vientiane, 70 miles to the south, and return to Vientiane in the evening. It's not safe to stay here overnight.

A year ago, the North Vietnamese attacked Ban Xon, burned warehouses and vehicles, and killed 14 persons. But American relief workers with the U.S. Agency for International Development, who are dedicated to the Meo and speak the Meo language, note with pride that despite the attack, the Ban Xon center didn't miss a single day of operations.

The airplanes distribute salt and canned meat and a daily average of 44,000 pounds of rice to refugees in the area. If the refugees are on the run because of North Vietnamese pressure, they can get blankets, clothing, straw mats, and cooking pots.

Thanks to the relief program, there is no starvation among the Meo. But North Vietnamese attacks have driven the Meo farther and farther to the south, to the point where they now are threatened with being forced out of the mountains into the lower altitudes, which they find unbearable.

The Meo, the largest ethnic miniority in Lacs, migrated into Laos from southwestern China in the 19th century. They practice a slash-and-burn system of agriculture on the mountain slopes and like to live above the 3,000 foot level. For them, Ban Xon, at 1,000 feet, is a hot and unhealthy place.

With the support and advice of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Meo have been the most effective fighters against the North Vietnamese in all of Laos. But forced marches have taken a heavy toll among them.

Children cared for

And, having fought for more than a decade, their casualties in battle have been horrendous. For a population estimated at 300,000, the losses have been so serious — and the advance of the North Vietnamese so unrelenting — that some observers have been asking how much longer the Meo will be able to maintain their present way of life in their beloved mountains.

Fortunately for their children, there is virtually no such thing as an orphan among the Meo. Even if both parents are killed, someone will take care of the child.

If the child is a male, he stands a good chance of becoming a soldier when he grows up, and a Meo is considered a grown man at the age of 14 or 15. According to one estimate, about 20 percent of the Meo soldiers now are under 15 years of age.

Why did he join?

When a 13-year-old Meo soldier named Je Yang was asked why he joined the Army, he and his comrades laughed. They'd obviously never really thought much about the matter. There's been a war on for as long as they could remember, and it was simply expected that they would join the Army.

"We are attacked, and we fight," said Je Yang, who is expert with an M-16 rifle.

Much older men fight, too. Vang Yee Vang, 50, said that he had fought for many years — until a bullet wound in the leg stopped him at the age of 44. But retirement from the Army has not given him a peaceful life. He said that the war had forced him and his family to move seven times in three years.

Ten moves for family

A Meo who works for the U.S. Agency for International Development mission said that his family had been forced to move 10 times in only half as many years.

"Certainly these people, more than any other people I've known, can put up with tremendous suffering," said Jack Williamson, head of refugee affairs for the AID mission.

"They have a fatalistic attitude, and they make the most of moments of pleasure," he said. "They can laugh and joke. But the joking doesn't necessarily reflect their real feelings."

"There's hardly a family in this country that hasn't suffered a loss because of the war," said Mr. Williamson, a veteran of 11 years' work with the refugees in Laos.

"If every family in the United States lost somebody in a war, how would our morale be?"

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00[redacted]

PORTLAND, ORE.
OREGONIAN

M - 245,132
S - 407,186

MAR 3 1972

Morse stresses nation's need for free press

The American press must be kept free and must be kept competitive if self-government by a free people is to continue to exist, former U.S. Sen. Wayne Morse said Thursday.

Speaking to a radio sales seminar sponsored by Tacher, Inc., at the Ramada Inn, Morse said too many constitutional guarantees are being transgressed by all three branches of government.

Noting the press has served as a potent check and balance in America since its beginning, Morse added that the press is undergoing a technological revolution beyond the wildest imaginings of Thomas Jefferson's day.

A candidate for the Democratic U.S. Senate nomination in the May primary, Morse scored a trend toward press monopoly.

He said it could be as dangerous in the long run as possible restrictive actions by government.

"To put it another way, what I am stressing is that competition, although frequently economically wasteful, is essential to maintaining an open society. It is essential to political freedom," Morse declared.

"There is no substitute for the full disclosure of the public's business," Morse said. Americans must retrieve constitutional rights "which we as a people through our officials of government at all levels are permitting to be eroded away under our very noses."

"You are far down the road toward executive supremacy in the United States," Morse said.

If the 75 persons at the luncheon were asked 10 questions about what is really going on in American foreign policy, "you'd all flunk," he said. "So would the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."

Citing Laos as an example of a secret policy managed by the Central Intelligence Agency, Morse said, "We're conducting one war crime after another."

The most dangerous trend in the United States today is government secrecy, Morse said. "If you want to remain free, you'd better stop it."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
3 March 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
STATINTL

LAOS

Patriotic Front's Successes

WORLD attention continues to be focussed on Laos, which lies in the very heart of the Indochina Peninsula.

Over the last 26 years, the Laotian people have been waging a persistent struggle for their country's freedom and independence. The defeat of the US aggressors and their puppets by the Laotian patriotic forces in the Xiengkhouang area, the Valley of Jars, and the Boloven Plateau in December 1971 is fresh proof that US adventurist plans in respect of Laos have no prospects before them. In 1972, the patriots are still in complete command of the situation and continue to press their enemies and hit them hard. This is seen from the January offensive against Long Cheng, the US mercenaries' chief base.

Striving to turn Laos into a springboard for a drive against the national liberation movement of the Indochinese peoples, Washington has entangled the country in a web of economic and military aid, and flooded her with various "advisers", now numbering 12,000. The US Central Intelligence Agency maintains an invisible presence in all government establishments at Vientiane, builds secret airfields and bases, and prepares and carries out subversive acts. The 30,000-strong "secret army" of General Vang Pao is also a CIA creature, which needs $250 million a year to keep. This is the army on which Washington puts its stake in carrying out its "Vietnamisation" policy.

To achieve its aims in Laos, the USA has been making use of more than 20 battalions of Thai mercenaries, who act on the principle: kill everyone and burn and destroy everything in sight. But there is more to Thailand's participation in the undeclared war against the Laotian patriots: it also provides the Pentagon with bases for the air war against the Laotians.

Aerial warfare is a special aspect of the US aggression against Laos. The US military dropped their first bombs on her peaceful villages in May 1964. Since then, the US air force has become much more active. Over the last three years alone, it has dropped about 3 million tons of bombs on Laotian territory. The civilian population is being bombed with fragmentation, napalm and pellet bombs, and other latest "achievements" of the US arms industry. US bomber and fighter aircraft take part in all the operations launched by government troops, Vang Pao's bandits, other numerous mercenaries and the CIA. Hundreds of planes owned by the Air America and the Continental Air Services are engaged in ferrying troops and delivering arms and ammunition.

At present, Washington's policy in Laos has shown some new tendencies. There are plans to increase—at least to double—Vang Pao's "secret army" by including fresh detachments of Thai mercenaries and subversive groups from the Khmer-Krom nationality, recruited by the CIA in South Vietnam.

In February 1971, Washington made its first attempt to use the army of the puppet Saigon regime in extending its aggression in Laos. Southern Laos was invaded by over 40,000 US-Saigon troops under air cover from US helicopters and B-52 bombers. What is more, US diplomacy and the CIA have been trying hard to form another military bloc: the Saigon-Pnom Penh-Bangkok-Vientiane bloc. This would amount to Laos's membership of SEATO, the bloc being used by Washington in its aggressive Southeast Asian policy.

But neither bombs, shells, nor political guile on the part of US imperialism and its stooges can break the people's will. Led by the Patriotic Front of Laos, which was set up 16 years ago, the courageous people have been inflicting one defeat after another on the aggressors and their accomplices. Over the last 17 years, the Laotian patriots have killed a large number of US officers and men and something like 200,000 mercenaries, captured or put out of action about 64,000 weapons, and shot down over 2,200 aircraft.

The Laotian Patriotic Front is in control of two-thirds of the country's territory. In the liberated areas, the foundations of a future democratic, neutral and independent state are being laid. For example, despite the barbarous US bombings, the three-year national development plan for 1968-1970 was successfully carried out. In agriculture, the line is to set up collective labour groups, and the area under rice and other agricultural crops has been enlarged. Over 1,200 hydro-installations have been built, which have helped to irrigate 20,000 hectares of ricefields. Some 2,500 kilometres of new roads have been laid. Thus, the victories on the battle-field have been backed by successes in labour.

On the whole, the events in late 1971 and early 1972 have shown the Laotian patriotic forces' firm resolve to liberate the country from the US aggressors and their henchmen. The sympathies of the whole of progressive mankind are on the side of the fighting Laotian people.

Y. MARUNOV

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600

3 MAR 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Outmanned Laotians Retreat From Drive on Plain of Jars

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 2—A major Laotian force of irregulars and guerrillas is retreating under heavy pressure from North Vietnamese artillery and infantry on the southern end of the Plain of Jars, according to reliable reports reaching Vientiane from the scene.

The retreat ends a spoiling action that began two weeks ago in an effort to protect the Meo-CIA base complex at Long Cheng by secretly sending 3,000 to 4,000 guerrillas behind enemy lines. Their objective was to cut supply routes and silence the heavy artillery that has been pounding the government forces.

North Vietnamese gunners and infantrymen have hit the counterattacking guerrilla force far harder than was expected and the troops have had difficulty moving as planned. Sources here report that Communist forces far outnumber the pro-government troops in most engagements, and are inflicting large numbers of casualties.

More important, however, these sources say, is the generally low level of morale among the guerrilla units, some of which are reported refusing to move except in the presence of their commander, Gen. Vang Pao.

The retreat to Long Cheng is believed to have begun on Tuesday when, according to informed U.S. sources, two heavy attacks were launched against pro-government forces camped near Route 4 at the south end of the plain. Far outnumbered, the battalions were forced to retreat, touching off a general exodus.

Qualified military observers here who only last week were cautiously optimistic on the chances of the operation's success, noted that the guerrilla troops would have had to straddle Communist supply lines for at least four to six weeks to claim any success for the operation.

Continued construction by the North Vietnamese of a primitive road north of Long Cheng, driving toward the village of Sam Thong eight miles to the south, continues to worry U.S. military observers here.

The road can accommodate the big 130-millimeter guns, which devastated Long Cheng in January and are now being used with great effect against the progovernment troops on the Plain of Jars. It now appears that despite the efforts of the spoiling action over the past two weeks, the Communists are again poised to strike at Long Cheng with their guns and a road over which to move them.



March 3, 1972 The Washington Post

Map shows Plain of Jars and Long Cheng, to which Laotian troops are retreating under attack.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

LOS ANGELES, CAL.
HERALD-DISPATCH
MAR 2 1972
SEMIWEEKLY - 35,000

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"Earth" Mag. Says

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U.S. Spy Agency

CIA AGENTS PUSH DOPE

STATINTL

WASHINGTON, D.C.—If, and we have every reason to believe it's true, the charges made in the March, 1972 issue of "Earth Magazine," that the CIA is now, and has been in the past, dealing in the dope traffic, it's deplorable. Drugs and its danger was brought to the attention of the American people of the National HERALD-DISPATCH newspapers in 1960. We pointed out in our initial drive against dope, the fact that it destroys American youth.

Hence, if the CIA as charged and documented by "Earth Magazine" is dealing in the dope traffic, they are singularly destroying a whole generation of American youth. Dope destroys the brain cell, it renders the individual, regardless of race, creed, or national origin, useless and powerless to think clearly. Dope, as it was fed to American soldiers in Asia is despicable and deplorable. In Asia America's finest young manhood was destroyed before being sent into battle in a senseless, useless, racist war.

In the article titled "The Selling of the CIA" text by Morton Kondracke, offers documentation, photographs of former CIA spies. The spy was quoted, and we have no reason to believe that Earth is lying on the CIA, that its history is a sordid one.

The HERALD-DISPATCH has been aware for a number of years that the CIA has had stooges in the universities and colleges throughout the nation where they recruit brilliant young students. These students were used as spies to overthrow the African and Asian countries, to murder, assassinate, and destroy people.

"Earth" cites facts that the CIA is involved in the opium traffic with the "fertile triangle" in the border areas of Laos, Burma, Thailand and the Yunnan province of southern China. They say, "about twenty-five percent of the heroin sold in America comes through this Southeast Asian channel. Ironically, the American taxpayer foots a six billion dollar a year bill for running the dope—the CIA, an organization which answers to nobody, is intricately involved in the flow of opium [illegible] United States. U.S. tax mone

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AIR WAR

MAR 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

CIA and Mercenary Air Forces

[redacted]

CIA and local Asian air forces are playing a growing role in the air war as the Administration seeks to minimize overt American involvement. There is abundant documentation pointing to the participation of these air forces in opium smuggling as well as in combat. (See Ramparts, 4/71 for a fuller account.)

Local Asian air forces--supplied, maintained and directed by American "advisors"--are doing an increasing amount of the bombing. The size of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) has increased dramatically, and the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), and the Cambodian Air Force at slower rates. Although all the aircraft are piloted by Asians, Americans do everything else, from directing bomb loading to spotting for strikes.

Air America and Continental Airlines, privately owned, profit-making companies, operate under CIA direction and wage much of the supportive air war in Laos and Cambodia. The "charter" companies' planes perform troop transport and supply functions, spot for bombers, and engage in rescue operations for downed pilots. Air Force helicopters, helicopter gunships and giant C-130 cargo planes are "rented" to Air America for $1 a year in Laos.

ASIAN AIR FORCES

American aid to VNAF, FY 1970-72: $922 million
American aid to RLAF, FY 1970-72: $128 million
(DoD, CR, 8/3/71)

"The Nixon Doctrine . . . was premised on the assumption . . . of increased U.S. military assistance."
(Undersecy. of State U. Alexis Johnson, FY 1972 DoD Authorization Hearings)

"An important factor in carrying out the Nixon Doctrine will be our military assistance program. We are requesting 48 million for development and 70.4 million for procurement of the International Fighter. In addition, we are requesting 10 million for initial spares. This aircraft is needed to provide an air defense capability for [our] Asian allies."
(Secy. of Air Force Robert C. Seamans, FY 1972 Senate DoD Appropriations Hearings)

Sen. Symington: "Are we going to continue to put these billions into Southeast Asia? Is that the overall plan in the U.S. today?"
Secy. Seamans: "For the forseeable future we are going to continue to spend sizeable dollars in Southeast Asia."
(Ibid.)

VNAF INVENTORY

Year	Fixed Wing Attack Aircr.	Heli-copters	Total, inc. Cargo, recon.
1/69	approx. 100	approx. 125	approx. 575
1/72	(total FW & heli. 750+)		1,000+
1/73*	300-400	500-600	1,200

*projected
(1969 and 1973 figures, Cornell study. 1972 figures, DoD)

VNAF PERSONNEL

1968:	20,000 (slightly under)
1972 (Jan.):	45,000
1973*:	50,000

*projected
(Ibid.)

VNAF ATTACK SORTIES

Year	Indochina	Laos	Cambodia
1968	2,250/mo.	none	none
1970	3,150/mo.	none	820
1971*	3,490/mo.	40	1,100

*as of July, 1971
(Cornell study)

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

"South Vietnamese military officers continue to deal in large quantities of heroin and to transport it around South Vietnam in military aircraft."
(Rep. Robert H. Steele, House Subcommittee on Europe, 7/7/71)

"The South Vietnamese Air Force is the sixth largest air force in the world."
(Michael Getler, Post, 1/14/72)

"Mr. Seamans acknowledged that the Vietnamese 'will never be able to build the capability to do all that the United States Air Force has been doing in Laos. The Vietnamese Air Force . . . does not possess either B-52s or F-4s, the jet planes that do most of the trail bombing, and there are no plans,' Mr. Seamans said, 'to give it any.'"
(Craig Whitney, NYT, 12/6/71)

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"VNAF is being geared to fight a war where it will continue to have complete air superiority." [This superiority will apparently be provided by U.S. aircraft operating from Thailand and carriers in the South China Sea.]
(Brig. Gen. Kendall S. Young, chief Air Force officer for Vietnamization)

Gen. Ryan: "They will not be able to supplant the complete U.S. Air Force in South Vietnam."
Sen. Case: "At any time?"
Gen. Ryan: "That is correct."
(Gen. John D. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, Senate FY 1972 DoD Appropriations Hearings)

ASIAN BLOOD, AMERICAN MONEY

"Lao T-28 bombers have attacked towns, Saravane being a well-known case in point. . . Laos Air Force pilots are . . . paid a bonus for each sortie so that there is an incentive not to adhere strictly to the rules of engagement [forbidding random bombing]."
(Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on Laos, 4/71)

"There is a growing concern of the tendency of Laotian air force pilots from Luang Prabang and Long Cheng to dump their bomb loads on unauthorized targets, which is confirmed by U.S. military personnel. Only minutes after taking off the pilots reportedly hurry home to reload--and collect a dollar bonus for every sortie they fly. The indiscriminate bombing is causing loss of life on the ground and forcing villagers to flee their homes."
(D.E. Ronk, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/4/71)

"The VNAF bomb villages indiscriminately. They don't care where they bomb. A lot of times they'll wipe out a village because they or their commander has a grudge against it, maybe it wouldn't make the proper payoffs."
(Ronald Ridenhour, former G.I. whose insistent prodding broke the My Lai story, in a PAW interview)

CIA AIR FORCES

"There is a large U.S. civilian (paramilitary) fleet operating in Laos run by Air America, Continental Air and Lao Air Transport . . . under contract with AID, although funds are provided by AID, the DoD, CIA, and the State Department. The funding arrangements are worked out in Washington."
(Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on Laos, 4/71)

"Air America is under the management of George Dole, a CIA employee. . . . He is looking to the future, carefully developing the airlift capabilities of other companies he runs for the CIA, such as Southern Air Transport. . . . The sole purpose for the existence of SAT is that the agency be ready for the contingency that some day it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country . . . without of course having to contend with the Congress or anybody else."
(Victor Marchetti, highest ranking CIA official to "go public," a former participant in CIA daily staff meetings chaired by director Richard Helms.)

CIA-DIRECTED AIR FORCES IN LAOS

Inventory	
20	helicopters
12	C-123s*
7	C-7As*
10	Porters
7	C-46s
1	Volpar

Estimated Cost	
FY 1970:	$23 million
FY 1971:	$26.2 million

Personnel	
Air America:	276-415

(Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on Laos, 4/71)

"The CIA has changed its rules in an attempt to stop the use of its private airline, Air America, for transport of drugs [opium and heroin] in Laos. Although only two months ago CIA director Richard Helms adamantly denied there had been any agency involvement in this traffic, he is now said to have told a secret Congressional hearing that there was involvement but it has stopped."
(Flora Lewis, Post, 7/23/71)

"The CIA has involved us in this covert operation, an opium war. The clandestine yet official operations of the U.S. government could be aiding and abetting heroin traffic here at home."
(Sen. John Tunney in a campaign speech before the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce)

"John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in testimony before the House Select Committee on Crime, said that middle-level government officials and military men throughout Southeast Asia were deeply involved in the traffic in opium, the product from which morphine and heroin is refined."
(Felix Belair, NYT, 6/6/71)

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AIR WAR

The Third Indochina War

A HANDBOOK PREPARED BY

PROJECT AIR WAR AND THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER

MARCH 1972

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1322 18TH STREET, N.W.
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Project Air War and the Indochina Resource Center are projects of the Indochina Education Council which was established by agencies of the United Church of Christ, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., and the United Methodist Church to help meet the crucial need for informing the American people about the ongoing war in Indochina.

PROJECT AIR WAR

PROJECT AIR WAR is one of the major information centers in the country studying and analyzing the ongoing war, a conflict which has escalated in the air even as U.S. foot-soldiers have been withdrawn. The Project provides both authoritative statistical data about today's automated war and a tragic picture of what life is like for hundreds of thousands of Indochinese peasants living under constant bombing.

Project material has already appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Time, Boston Globe, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, Congressional Record, CBS *and* NBC *national news, the Mutual Radio network, transcripts of Congressional hearings, and a wide variety of other publications.*

Project staff members speak at community meetings, college campuses, and academic gatherings; are called upon frequently by congressional offices and media representatives for background information; and work closely with several national peace groups.

INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER

The INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER serves as an independent clearinghouse for information on contemporary Indochina. The Center incorporates nine general sponsors from the academic community and sixteen academic associates who provide a wide range of inputs.

The Center provides reliable, up-to-date information from specialists on the social, economic, cultural, political, and historical realities of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. This information, which is often otherwise unavailable, is made accessible to Congress, journalists, peace groups, and others concerned with Indochina through the twice-monthly newsletter, Indochina Chronicle, *in books and articles, as well as by direct contact. The Center also provides direct answers to specific requests, sets up briefings and seminars, and is currently developing a series of audio-visual exhibits on Indochina for loan.*

Cover and following essay by a 29 year old Lao refugee.

"There was a pagoda on the hill right next to my village. The airplanes shot it and started a fire. Two monks were killed there together. On account of the war. The planes thought that there were soldiers in the pagoda so they shot it. But there weren't any. Only the monks died.

--from Voices from the Plain of Jars, ed. by F. Branfman, Harper and Row, 1972. Original collection of essays and drawings by Laotian peasants.

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EARTH
March 1972

THE SELLING OF



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STATINTL

Text by Morton Kondracke
Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward

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Continued

STATINTL

EARTH
March 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

[redacted]

A Short History of CIA Intervention in Sixteen Foreign Countries

In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties:

1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concerning intelligence.

2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intelligence matters.

3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments.

4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."

5. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct."

In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, allowing the agency to disregard laws that required disclosure of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and purchases without advertising.

With such unprecedented authority, with unlimited access to money, with liberty to act without regard to scrutiny or review by either civilian or governmental organizations, the CIA has become a self-contained state. One observer ranks the CIA as the fourth world power, after the U.S., Russia, and China.

Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign countries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments—an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November.

What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation and drug addiction for political ends. Look at the record:

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continued

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RAMPARTS
March 1972

STATINTL

Heroin traffic: Some amazing coincidences linking the CIA, the Mafia, Air America, several members of the Brook Club, Chiang Kai-Shek, the Kuomintang, Prince Puchartra of Thailand, many banks and insurance companies — practically everyone except Richard Nixon. Wasn't he asked?

by Peter Dale Scott

Professor Samuel Eliot M
1903 Theodore Roose
national law and mor
US Navy to support the "r
Panama from Colombia. The
to the Canal Zone treaty, is de
"Panama businessmen, agen
[which stood to gain $40 mill
the treaty] and United States a
to add that the "agents" of
Company were New York in
Seligman and their Washingt
who organized and financed
suite in the Waldorf-Astoria.

In some ways, the Panar
partition is an instructive pre
involvement in Indochina.[2] Le
be different today; for many
preparing for revolution anc
lawed, under sections 956-6(
In theory, at least, responsibi
of American "interests" is nc
But in fact, the CIA still m
J. & W. Seligman and similar

These contacts have beer
from Wall Street which succ
CIA into its first covert ope
who created the CIA in 19
unhappiness at the deflection
gence function: "I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations."[3] His intentions, however, counted for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York corporation lawyer and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Administration became concerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian elections:

> Forrestal felt that a secret counteraction was vital, but his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effectively in private hands. He urged strongly that the government establish a covert organization with unvouchered funds, the decision was made to create it under the National Security Council.[4]

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EARTH
March 1972

SIATINIL

[redacted]

C I A DOPE CALYPSO

by Allen Ginsberg (for Peter Dale Scott)

IN NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY SIX
CHINA WAS WON BY MAO TSE-TUNG
CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S ARMY RAN AWAY
AND THEY'RE WAITING THERE IN THAILAND TODAY

SUPPORTED BY THE C I A
PUSHING JUNK DOWN THAILAND WAY

FIRST THEY STOLE FROM THE MEO TRIBES
UP IN THE HILLS THEY STARTED TAKING BRIBES
THEN THEY SENT THEIR SOLDIERS UP TO SHAN
COLLECTING OPIUM TO SELL TO THE MAN

PUSHING JUNK IN BANGKOK TODAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

BROUGHT THEIR JAM ON MULE TRAINS DOWN
TO CHIENG MAI THAT'S A RAILROAD TOWN
SOLD IT NEXT TO POLICE CHIEF BRAIN
HE TOOK IT TO TOWN IN THE CHOOCHOO TRAIN

TRAFFICKING DOPE TO BANGKOK ALL DAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

THE POLICEMAN'S NAME WAS MR. PHAO
HE PEDDLED DOPE GRAND SCALE AND HOW
CHIEF OF BORDER CUSTOMS PAID
BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'S U.S. AID

THE WHOLE OPERATION NEWSPAPERS SAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A

HE GOT SO SLOPPY & PEDDLED SO LOOSE
HE BUSTED HIMSELF & COOKED HIS GOOSE
TOOK THE REWARD FOR AN OPIUM LOAD
SEIZING HIS OWN HAUL WHICH SAME HE RESOLD

BIG TIME PUSHER A DECADE TURNED GREY
WORKING FOR THE C I A

THE WHOLE OPERATION FELL INTO CHAOS
TIL THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAME INTO LAOS
I'LL TELL YOU NO LIE I'LL SPREAD NO RUMOR
OUR BIG PUSHER THERE WAS SOUVANNA PHOUMA

THREE STRONG PRINCES IN A POWER PLAY
BUT PHOUMA WAS THE MAN FOR THE C I A

TOUBY LYFONG HAD WORKED FOR THE FRENCH
BIG FAT MAN LIKED WINE AND WENCH
PRINCE OF THE MEOS GREW BLACK MUD
OPIUM FLOWED THROUGH THE LAND LIKE A FLOOD

COMMUNISTS CAME AND CHASED THE FRENCH AWAY
SO TOUBY TOOK A JOB WITH THE C I A

AND HIS BEST FRIEND GENERAL VANG PHAO
RAN OUR MEO ARMY LIKE A SACRED COW
HELICOPTER SMUGGLERS FILLED LONG TIENG'S BARS
IN XIENG QUANG PROVINCE ON THE PLAIN OF JARS

IT STARTED IN SECRET THEY WERE FIGHTING
YESTERDAY
CLANDESTINE SECRET ARMY OF THE C I A

ALL THROUGH THE 'SIXTIES THE DOPE FLEW FREE
THRU TAN SON NHUT SAIGON TO MARSHALL KY
AIR AMERICA FOLLOWING THROUGH
TRANSPORTING CONFITURE FOR PRESIDENT THIEU

ALL THESE DEALERS WERE DECADES AND TODAY
THE INDOCHINESE MOB OF THE C I A

-- January 5, 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00[redacted]

GREENSBORO, N.C.
RECORD MAR 1 1972
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Editor, The Record:

Because Americans so much want to believe their president and want to believe that what is happening in Indochina is all right and that our position is improving, if slowly, it is hard to keep the basic facts of the situation in full perspective. What are these facts?

1. In Cambodia most of the countryside is in the hands of revolutionaries of many types, including hard core communists and also followers of Prince Sihanouk. They are consolidating their positions and setting up an infrastructure so that when they take over the capital that they can set up an effective government and resist attacks. The Lon Nol regime is maintaining its precarious position on the basis of support from the U.S., by using mercenaries and foreign troops, and by training Cambodian soldiers in South Viet Nam under the C.I.A.

2. Our clients in Laos are also in a steadily worsening position. The Royal Laotian Army is essentially moribund. The forces holding the communist Pathet Lao at bay are: a. Thai troops and the threat of further Thai commitments backed by the U.S., b. Meo tribesmen (an ethnic minority) under the pay, support and direction of the C.I.A., and c. U.S. air power. The Meo tribesmen have been worn down to using even nine year olds as soldiers. The communists now have sophisticated anti-aircraft defenses and, despite heavy air attacks, are making increasing use of artillery and tanks and thus overrunning government positions previously considered secure. Our bombing has depopulated much of northern Laos and caused intense hatred of remaining and displaced tribesmen.

3. In South Viet Nam the "new" army of Thieu and others has given up to sorties into Cambodia and other contested areas and has basically withdrawn behind a ring of American air power to take up defensive positions around population areas. Thieu has still not established any significant popular support other than the landlords, and has had to use extreme measures to repress students, workers, Buddhists and Catholics some of whom still dream of setting up a genuinely neutral "third force" government and thus stopping the killing.

In sum, the military, political and economic situation in all three of our client nations is not good, is deteriorating, and is being sustained by massive American aid. This situation is not deteriorating so fast that it will embarrass Nixon before November. His reelection game plan just might work. But let's be clear just what is happening. We are prolonging the agony of millions of local peoples in Indochina, killing and maiming untold numbers in our "uninvolved" air war. We are still draining our treasury and killing our youth. We are continuing to damage our military morale. We are still dividing our own nation in deep and long lasting ways. We are delaying return of American prisoners of war. We are deflecting national attention and energy from many severe domestic needs. We are prolonging the draft and all its attendant problems.

Is it worth all this just to get Nixon reelected? Can people really support a politician like Nixon who would place his own political future ahead of so many crucial national needs. The coming primaries in North Carolina will be a good indication of just how badly America wants to forget, to put out of mind, our national agony.

PATRICK W. CONOVER
Greensboro.

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THE SOUND
Seattle, Washington
March 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

CIA HOOKED SCANDAL

STATINTL [redacted]

E. B. del Rosario
Wash.-Alas. Regional Coordinator – V.V.A.W.

Part One

In any given weekend night at the Constellation Bar and Restaurant, even the most casual tourist may find himself rubbing elbows with agents of half a dozen countries. These agents go under various official titles and capacities, such as "information specialists," "rural development technician," or "embassy official," but most all of them can be placed into one occupational category – espionage. The main attraction of the Constellation is the agents, and not the music or the food; for at Suzanne's down the road, one can get better, especially food. But since there's not much happening in Vientiane, and there's few places to go to hide, the Constellation becomes the center of activity on weekends. After official working hours, this little city by the Mekhong River tries to become a miniature Saigon but without the wartime conditions of its bigger sister.

While the resident agents are pursuing the music, lights and slenderly built Lao "puying," another group of men are busy under bright flood lights at Wattay Airport, working hurriedly, but competently, to rpepare silver unmarked airplanes for early morning flights. At the ramps of Air America and Continental Air Services, Filipino, Chinese and Thai mechanics are checking, adjusting, tuning and reassemblying every functional part of the aircraft which must carry people and cargo over the entire length of Laos. One by one, the DC-3's, C-46's, C-123's, CAribous, Pilatus, Porters and Helio Couriers are checked and double checked, for these planes must fly over some of the most primitive terrain and under primitive conditions for four to ten hours daily. As each aircraft is released by the flight mechanics, other men take over the preparation of the plane. Lao laborers hump hundred-pount sacks of rice or cornmeal up the inclined belly of the C-46's or cargo of military wares into the Caribous and C-123's.

Before the first rays of sunlight break on the chedis of Buddhist monasteris, pilots are receiving their briefings and assignments from the operations sections. "Captina, you're on Sixty Zulu this morning. Your DZ's are Sixty-three, Eleven, Five and One-Seven-Three. Weather is overcast at four thousand, broken at twenty-five hundred. Double-check your recognition signal at Site Five . . . the Pathet Lao took Site Thirteen last night." "Jim, take Fourteen Tango to Lima Two-five and pick up customer cargo." Take off is at Zero-Six-Thirty."

The tone of the voice of the briefer is as casual as the night life of the espionage agents and as casual as a bus drive. The pilots of the aircraft fly cargos that would horrify the average United States citizen, the person who must pay for the operations of teh CIA's airlines. In the seemingly innocent briefing given to pilot Jim are words which may open congressional investigations which will make all other investigations into the U.S. overseas operations seem trivial. Broken down into layman's language, the briefing means, "Jim, fly the C-46 cargo plane to Ban Houie Sai and bring back a load of opium." On a flight between Ban Houie Sai, a town in the center of teh "Golden Triangle," the world's richest opium growing region, a C-46 aircraft can carry between 12,000 to 14,000 pounds of opium. On some days, three or four aircraft make such flights out of Ban Houie Sai.

Note About the Author: Del Rosario was an employee of Continental Air Services in 1967. As an "operations assistant" based out of Vientiane, Laos, he was responsible for the monitoring of all flights in Laos for that CIA-financed transport corporation and for the loading and unloading of all cargo. As an associate to a British citizen studying the languages of teh Meo and Yao hill tribes in the Golden Triangle, del Rosario was able to learn much about the opium culture of the region. On February 4, 1972, he testified in San Francisco before representatives of the national press and television networks about his observations in Laos. Parts of his testimony will be appearing in the next issue.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

THE SOUND
Seattle, Washington
March 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
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STATINTL

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

Earth's editor and publisher James Goode charged that the CIA-supported Air America airline is being used to ship opium from CIA bases in Laos and Thailand. Goode cited an article written by University of California professor Peter Dale Scott who said that opium is grown by CIA mercenaries, including the Meo tribesmen, in Southeast Asia. According to Scott, the opium is then shipped from the remote jungle areas aboard Air America planes.

A spokesman for Air America in Washington, D.C. also declined to comment on the story. He would say only that Air America is a "non-domestic airline owned by Americans which operates in Asia." He said he was unaware of any connections between the airline and the CIA.

Earth magazine's March issue accuses the CIA of controlling Air America – and charges that the airline operation is responsible for at least 25 percent of all heroin which reaches the United States.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

THE SOUND
Seattle, Washington
March 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

[redacted]

EARTH NEWS

Earth magazine charged that the Central Intelligence Agency is intimately involved in the smuggling of millions of dollars worth of heroin into the United States each year.

The magazine's editor James Goode announced at a press conference in San Francisco that the March issue of *Earth* documents a web of alliances which connect opium-growing Southeast Asian farmers to the CIA-sponsored Air America Airlines and big money interests in the eastern United States. Goode said that heroin-smuggling entanglements are carefully spelled out in an article written by University of California English professor Peter Dale Scott; Scott's eight-page article traces the connection between opium growers, CIA operatives, flights of CIA-controlled airlines and the eventual delivery of heroin to the U.S.

Goode further charged that the CIA-supported Meo tribemen and other opium growers located in Southeast Asia's "fertile triangle" are responsible for anywhere "from 25 percent to 80 percent of all heroin traffic reaching the United States."

The magazine editor stated tht Scott's article was "clearly the most dramatic documentation of CIA complicity in heroin trafficking yet published;" but he added that the CIA's involvement in smack smuggling has been suspected and reported about for years, adding: "Yet nothing has been done."

Goode announced that he was making all of his evidence immediately available to United States Senators – and that he is calling for a Senate investigation of the CIA's role in the underground heroin market.

Studies on the smack problem in the United States have indicated that up to $5 billion dollars is spent annually on heroin by 500,000 American addicts. More than half of the money spent each year on the purchase of heroin – or $2.5 billion – is obtained through theft by addicts. Medical authorities report that heroin presently caused more deaths to people between the ages of 18 and 35 than do wars or cancer or car accidents.

Said Goode: "I find it inconceivable that the hierarchy of the CIA and other agencies within our government have not cracked down on this source of smack."

Goode was asked about a suggestion voiced earlier this week by Senator Hubert Humphrey that the CIA be assigned the task of investigating and stopping the flow of illegal heroin.

"That's like appointing the SS to investigate atrocities at Dachau or Auschwitz," Goode said.

A 28-year-old Seattle resident who worked as a "civilian aide" to Continental Air Services in Thailand and Laos testified in San Franciscothat he witnessed opium being loaded aboard CIA-sponsored aircraft.

Enrique B. del Rosario said he watched as cargo, labeled as "miscellaneous," was put aboard Air America planes at the Ban Houie Sai base in Laos, and at two other bases in Thailand. Del Rosario said he had served as a "civilian understudy" at the bases in Southeast Asia between 1966 and 1970.

When asked if he was actually employed at the time by the CIA, del Rosario declined to answer, insisting that he was not "permitted to." He added that his wife and two children are currently in Thailand – and said that he did not want to say anything "which might jeopardize their safety."

However, del Rosario admitted that he had worked very closely with the Meo tribesmen and other CIA-supported tribes, and that he had seen literally "hundreds of acres of cultivated opium fields planted by the tribesmen." Del Rosario said that the opium was later harvested, and that he watched as Air American planes landed at Thai and Laos bases and loaded the "miscellaneous" cargo aboard.

Del Rosario, a former marine who served in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965, said that the opium growing was permitted by the Laos and Thailand governments as long as there was no outside pressure exerted. He explained that, occasionally, a complaint would be lodged about the amount of growing and smuggling, and that then the government would move in and demand a temporary halt to the opium cultivation.

CIA DENIES

The Central Intelligence Agency has refused to comment on charges voiced by *Earth* magazine that the CIA "is deeply involved in the smuggling of heroin into the United States."

A spokesman for the CIA, assistant director Angus Thuermer, insisted to *Earth News* that the intelligence agency "never comments on any charges or complaints made against the CIA." Thuermer added, however, that CIA director Richard Helms had specifically denied any CIA connection to the trafficking of heroin during a speech he made to newspaper editors in Washington, D.C. early last year. At that time, Helms, in reply to charges that the CIA was involved in moving opium from Southeast Asia to the United States, said: "We know we are not contributing to that problem."

(Ed. Note: Further information on CIA involvement in the opium trade is contained in an article by Enrique B. del Rosario in this issue of THE SOUND.)

[redacted]

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR
27 FEB 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

HANOI VS. GUERRILLAS

Mountain War in Laos Grim

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—Lao government guerrillas are fighting North Vietnamese regulars on the steep mountain slopes at the south edge of the Plain of Jars in an attempt to relieve pressure on Long Cheng, the lynchpin in the defenses of north Lao .

The effort is the biggest the Lao have launched, employing 15,000 guerrillas who sneaked up to the Plain of Jars 10 days ago.

The operation has been an outstanding success as far as relieving North Vietnamese pressure on Long Cheng, the operation's commander, Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, and American officials say.

Hanoi has moved parts of six regiments to defend its long-range artillery and road supply routes on the plain, leaving only parts of two regiments around Long Cheng to face numerically superior Thai and Meo forces.

The second part of the Lao guerrilla operation—to go onto the plain itself and destroy enemy artillery and supplies to buy another month's time for Long Cheng—has stalled on a series of mountain peaks here on the plain's south edge.

Vang Pao, dressed in a long, grey, woman's overcoat and pacing round the campfire in his 8,000-foot-high mountaintop aerie, said he is "not certain" his troops can advance onto the plain.

During this past week spent with the troops, and in night conversations with Vang Pao, the reasons things are not moving became apparent.

One very important reason is the tenacity of the North Vietnamese defending the plain and the heavy firepower they have.

Vang Pao's troops occupy a salient of mountains jutting onto the plain with Route 4 and the town of Xieng Khouang east of the salient. Hanoi's main supply route to Long Cheng is to the west.

In front of the salient is Theung Mountain. Here the North Vietnamese have installed anti-aircraft guns ranging from the lowly but effective 50 caliber machinegun to 23 and 37 mm. antiaircraft cannon. They have installed themselves in deep forest-hidden bunkers.

At the beginning of last week, Meo guerrillas and Lao Theung tribesmen slipped from helicopters on mountain top pads used for resupply down through old banana plantations.

The route was overgrown by secondary jungle growth, and vines twined around weapons and radios.

The guerrilla goal was Phou Teung, but the unit was beaten back by North Vietnamese troops before it got very far. North Vietnamese antiaircraft stopped Air America helicopters from picking up the wounded, forcing the retreating troops to carry them.

Vang Pao has six B52s he can call on most of the time, he said. This is 20 percent of the B52s available in Indochina.

Sometimes he gets additional B52 strikes which are ordered by U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley on targets of the ambassador's choosing.

But the big bombing attacks don't seem to shift the North Vietnamese from their positions. Last Wednesday, for example, I watched two B52 attacks against Phou Teung at 8:30 a.m. and at 10:10 p.m. Phou Teung changed from a green hill to a mass of brown dust, but the Vietnamese were firing again from there later in the day.

They are still there.

Then the Vietnamese moved to cut behind the mountain salient of Vang Pao. With 15-mile range 130-mm. guns and 120-mm. mortars, direct fire rockets and smaller mortars, they pounded Cobra Ridge overlooking their supply route to Long Cheng west of the salient.

A few hours before, I had talked to 16-year-old Bee Kar, a forward air guide.

Bee Kar spoke good English, which he learned in Bangkok. He and other forward air guides are products of one of the best U.S. training programs.

The boys are taught how to spot targets and direct U.S. Air Force "ravens" — forward air controllers in light aircraft — onto the target.

Bee Kar and his fellow forward guides spend most of their time close to enemy positions calling in strikes.

Helping them to spot targets is a "magic box" about eight inches square. It has around white plastic tube in front which Bee Kar points toward the enemy, then presses buttons and the distance is registered in hundreds of meters — up to 2,000 yards. It also registers whether the target is tanks, trucks or troops on a screen which lights up with a drawing of a tank, truck or soldier.

All this is transmitted to a U.S. Air Force "Spectre" gunship which automatically registers on the target.

Bee Kar, a Meo, claimed to be 18 years old, though the records showed it's 16.

He was tough and forthright. "Yes, you must come up here to see the terrain properly to understand," were his first words when I reached his mountaintop.

He described how he watched the lights of North Vietnamese trucks moving across the plain toward Long Cheng last night.

From time to time Communist artillery opened up on his position.

Bee Kar said 10 troops with him were killed and 15 were wounded the day before by shells exploding in their bunkers.

That night the Vienamese poured more than 500 shells into Bee Kar's position after I left.

One piece of mortar shrapnel entered Bee Kar's stomach but he walked out.

The next morning I was on an Air American helicopter to evacuate him. It was a special mission, for there were North Vietnamese all around. But Bee Kar is an American favorite and everyone from Vang Pao on down wants to get him out.

He was in a patch of bamboo amidst North Vietnamese troops, but the helicopter went in with U.S. Air Force Sky Raiders flying cover in abox pattern.

When we touched down, Bee Kar lurched out supported by two other soldiers, one of them also wounded. Everybody dove into the helicopter and we were off.

Bee Kar was in shock and his clothes were covered in blood. The doctors at the hospital said he will die.

Bee Kar insisted "I won't die." Two days later U.S. officials said he was alive in Undorn Hospital in northeast Thailand.

Bee Kar's position was lost, however, and the North Vietnamese were behind the guerrillas and advancing into the Plain.

Every day last week Communist shelling increased. On a helicopter pad overlooking the plain known only as "uniform Uniform". There was a distant boom, then a whistle and a rush about 20 feet over our heads as the first of three 130mm artillery shells came in.

They overshot slightly and no one was hurt by these or by two other shells fired by a patrol 30 minutes later.

As the shelling continued sporadically, it became apparent that the Meo guerrillas were not all they were cracked up to be.

They were in open positions atop hills. In between the shells they stood in bunches on the ridge lines, usually to watch the U.S. Skyraiders and jet fighters and Lao air force T28s attack North Vietnamese troops who advanced behind our position from fallen Cobra.

As the Skyraiders zoomed up after a strike, Vietnamese submachine guns and a heavy 50 caliber machine gun hammered at the aircraft without success.

The troops lacked discipline and their commanders seemed to have no intention of moving forward to attack. "The only thing that will move these people is if Vang Pao comes up"

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continued

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As Vang Pao climbed into the hills, the troops began moving forward again up the steep slopes of elephant grass bowed down by their gear.

Many of them would throw away equipment afterwards when Vang Pao was not around. I've seen them toss away shells and other ammunitions.

When Vang Pao saw anything like that discarded, he picked it up and slipped it back into the troops' packs.

"The army here is something like the American revolutionary army," said an American." "It fights for a while then the troops take off for two or three months. When you go to towns or villages there are a lot of deserters, but then you go to the front and you wonder why all these guys stay here and fight under these conditions for years and years."

Vang Pao said the irregulars are no longer a Meo army, but are made up of many nationalities. In this operation, he said, he has his Meos, people from Nam Yu and Lao from Savannakhet in south Laos. To the rear are Thai troops.

"The Meo move fast," Vang Pao said. "But the Savannakhet Lao are too slow. They go only three or four kilometers a day and they cannot carry food for 10 days on their backs. They eat it all, then ask for resupply by air and they stop and the planes give their positions away."

Vang Pao continued, "The Thais shoot off all their ammunition when the enemy sends small rocket teams against them, then the enemy puts an antiaircraft round in a Thai position when they think all the ammunition is finished and hit the Thais from two sides with a main force and wipe them out."

The enemy was getting smart Vang Pao said, and described how the Communists put radio aerials on a rock once to attract U.S. bombers then used the resulting caves for their headquarters.

American officials said the big problem is coordinating all the different nationalities and regions into a cohesive force.

All these problems—from stiffening North Vietnamese resistance to inter-tribal rivalries and poor discipline—combine to prevent Vang Pao's further advance.

American officials said it was necessary for the guerrillas to remain on the offensive in the dry season to buy sufficieent time to keep Long Cheng from falling. "It's the first time Vang Pao has fought back in the dry season," a U.S. source said.

"If any advance is to be made it is totally dependent on Vang Pao. If Vang Pao goes up to the front tomorrow and starts dropping shells into a mortar, the troops will move forward. If he doesn't they will stay where they are."

Long talks with U.S. officials and Vang Pao himself how that the only plans implemented will be ones Vang Pao supports or thinks he can carry out a close-up view of Vang Pao's operatios, the first ever provided to newsmen, indicates Vang Pao is the man who counts in the battle for northeast Laos on which the survival of the Lao government in its current form depend .

Yesterday the decision again rested with Vang Pao—go forward onto the plain to buy time for Long Cheng at a cost of possible heavy losses or hold off, satisfied with having drawn North Vietnamese infantry back to the plain from Long Cheng.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL [redacted] Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00 STATINTL [redacted]

LYNN, MASS NEWSPAPER

CIA Involved in Smuggling Heroin

While heroin addiction mounts among Vietnam vets and other young people in every community in America, evidence is mounting that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in buying the opium from which heroin is made.

According to a detailed analysis by Peter Dale Scott in the March issue of Earth magazine, possibly 25 per cent of the opium that enters this country as heroin, and nearly all the opium used by American GIs in Vietnam, is grown in Indochina by native Meo tribesmen, for whom opium is a major cash crop. The CIA's involvement with the Meo tribesmen is by now well-known. In a recent column, Jack Anderson reveals how "four years ago, the CIA recruited more than 14,000 Meo mountain men to fight under the brave but brutal Gen. Vang Pao. Fewer than 3,000 survive." Anderson shows how CIA agents, acting as paymasters, use "both persuasion and the purse to keep the troops in line."

"U.S. dollars have made Vang Pao a power in Laos," Anderson said. He cites a confidential report by the American Ambassador, describing Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma's dependence on two generals, Quan Rathikoun and Vang Pao. According to the Earth magazine article, Gen. Quan is said to have admitted in a recent interview that he was "the real boss" of opium operations in Laos.

A former Green Beret, Sgt. Paul Withers, testified about the opium traffic at the Winter Soldier Hearings in Boston last October. His comments are reprinted in a booklet entitled "The Opium Trail," published by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. Withers testified that he worked under CIA direction in Pak Seng, Laos. His mission was to hire and train local people to fight as mercenaries against the Pathet Lao guerillas. One of the main tasks was to buy up the entire local crop of opium.

About twice a week, Withers said, a plane from a private airline hired by the CIA would arrive with supplies and bags of gold dust. He gave the gold to the villagers in return for their bags of opium which were then loaded on the plane. The opium was flown to relay centers and processing plants in South Vietnam.

The CIA has been carrying on a "secret war" in Laos since 1962, at a cost to taxpayers of $500 million a year, according to Victor Marchetti, a former top-ranking CIA official, interviewed in the same issue of Earth magazine. This is just one of many examples of the clandestine activities the CIA engages in, in an effort to bolster corrupt regimes sympathetic to American business interests. The price of our continued support for these corrupt regimes is not only the taxpayers' money, but the lives of thousands of young Americans "strung-out" on heroin.

David Duboff

NEWPAPER

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(THE STAFF CHANGES WITH EACH ISSUE)

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
1 MAR 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]

CIA-Backed Laotians Face Hanoi's Best at Long Cheng

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONG CHENG, Laos — The little twin engine Piper groped through the smoke haze that blotted out the craggy terrain just south of the Plain of Jars.

"It's pretty bad today," said the Greek, "but we're flying by timed distance so we don't have to see the ground to know where we are . . . Wait a minute." He leaned forward and shouted to the pilot, "there's Peter Nob over on the right."

The silhouette of a nob-shaped mountain outcropping poked up through the haze and the plane took a steep dip toward a towering ridgeline which marks the vague boundary between the North Vietnamese infantry and the American-supported Laotian irregular army which have wrestled to a temporary standstill just northward.

"That's Skyline Ridge," said The Greek. "The North Vietnamese have their anti-air on the other side."

Another sharp dip and suddenly a valley popped into view, dotted with shacks, roads and a tiny air strip. The shacks were mostly deserted by the villagers who fled last month's North Vietnamese offensive and are still hiding out some 15 kilometers southward.

"Long Cheng,' announced The Greek.

In the seat behind us, Kayak looked up from his book. He is a tow-headed American with an earnest face who might pass for a scout leader in his olive twill uniform were it not for the ammunition and rifle and the .45 revolver that he wore along with it.

The two Air American pilots skimmed the Piper Baron nimbly downward along the hilltops to the landing strip of Long Cheng, the headquarters base of the tribal guerrilla army organized and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency and fleshed with Meo, Yao, as well as highland Lao volunteers, conscripts and confused-looking children.

Kayak and The Greek and the flight crew are part of the low profile American presence that provides the guns, ammunition, helicopters, transports, air strikes, medical evacuation—in short the wherewithal—that give the "friendlies" their plausibility as a military force.

Though much of the secrecy surrounding the CIA role in Laos has been lifted here under investigative prodding from Congress and instructions from the administration, there are still reminders that American participation is somewhat of a political liabilty.

"You can take all the pictures you want of the Lao," I was counselled, "but please, we don't want any photographs of Americans." I agreed and complied.

On the ground, Gen. Vang Pao, the gritty Meo commander of the irregulars, greeted his visitor with a surprisingly shy smile and handshake. His two visiting sons, Van Su, 3, and Cha Leune, 4, clowned and romped with their father's staff officers to his unalloyed delight.

Vang Pao is famous for his tough, soldierly talk, but today he reflected the seriousness of the state of affairs in the Plain of Jars.

"The North Vietnamese have artillery and they have tanks. Their artillery is bigger than what we have here —they have a 27 kilometer range and ours is 15 kilometers. Out there on the Plain of Jars we have no artillery at all. We have very few people and not enough materiel. It is getting very difficult to hold the situation."

Haze Hurts

"Yes, we have American air strikes. But look at that haze." He raised one hand to simulate an airplane and held out the other hand to represent the ground. "The airplanes can't see and if they come down too far for support operations, they either crash in the mountains or can get shot down." The upper hand smacked flatly against the lower hand which trailed toward the floor.

"The American B-52s did a very good job for us. We had our last B-52 strike just last week out along there." He gestured beyond Skyline Ridge. "Maybe we will have to call for more B-52 strikes.

"But the best thing would be to get talks started again among the nations that participated in the Geneva Conference. We must have the neutralization of Indochina. They must get together afid talk just once more."

In the past 10 years, the fighting has decimated the ranks of Vang Pao's Meos. His guerrillas once were almost 100 per cent Meo. But now they comprise less than 50 per cent of the force. The Meo mountain people have borne the brunt of the fighting and civilian casualties as well as the dislocation.

"We have some irregulars up here now from Saravane in the south. But they cannot walk in the mountains. They slow down our operations. A march that should take three days takes them nine days." He shook his head sadly.

World's Best

By the admission of some of the highest-ranking Americans in Vietnam, Vang Pao's guerrillas are facing in the Noth Vietnamese units across Skyline Ridge perhaps the best light infantry in the world.

Although road and ground-bound they are using newly supplied Soviet 130 millimeter cannons, the longest range artillery piece on either side in the war, with devastating effect. They are employing Soviet-supplied tanks as mobile gun platforms.

To bedevil American air reconnaisance, the Communists not only have succeeded in camouflaging their guns, but have fashioned dummy replicas of the guns visible from the air and can simulate secondary explosions with gunpowder firecrackers.

The enemy, declares U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, is a very formidable individual. Godley, who monitors the military conflict with a fervor that has earned him the nickname "Field Marshal Godley," concedes that the enemy's use of artillery and mortars is uncanny.

At Long Cheng one day last week there was a continuous shuttling of American helicopters, C-123 transports, observation craft and Laotian-flown T-28 jets over the 2,200-foot airstrip. Outgoing artillery pounded persistently at fixed targets on the other side of the ridge.

The C-123, a faithful workhorse that must land and take off on abysmally short runways, is the key to the mobility of men and supplies for the irregular army. Conspicuously posted inside the planes are signs in Thai, Laotian, Vietnamese and English warning that "the transportation of opium and other narcotic products is absolutely forbidden on this aircraft." The signs also admonish that all passengers are subject to search and removal by the Air America crews if they are found to be carrying opium.

Bracing for Attack

About the strip there was evidence of the most recent North Vietnamese

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060014000-3

THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
DAILY TROJAN
1 March 1972

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STATINTL

RICK GUDSTADT

Asia, CIA and dope: a big, happy family?

Not long ago the counter-culture's own superstar, Allen Ginsberg, appeared on the Dick Cavett Show. After first chanting a Hindu psalm for some two minutes (watch out, Dick, your ratings are slipping), Ginsberg began weaving an enchanting web of mystery, high intrigue and crash exploitation—a tale of the CIA's involvement in the heroin trade of Southeast Asia.

In a straight forward manner Ginsberg told of a cocktail party, a la radical chic, which he attended with the CIA's chief, Richard Helms. It seems the two made a friendly wager. Ginsberg accused the CIA of maintaining an open market for opium (from which heroin is derived) at Long Cheng, a CIA-built stronghold in Laos. Helms denied this, and so they made the bet. If Ginsberg lost, he was to turn over his Hindu scepter. If, however, Ginsberg's accusations were correct, Helms was to meditate every day for a year—a thought as frivolous as watching Richard Nixon turn on for a national television audience.

As Ginsberg was rapping this bit of people's folklore, he was all the time waving that very same Hindu scepter, as if he was exorcising the evil powers-that-be with a magic wand.

The rest of Ginsberg's story is history—past and future—as set out boldly in the May, 1971 issue of Ramparts.

Such an open market for opium, in the true capitalistic sense, does in fact exist at Long Cheng—with the open blessings of the powerful, clandestine CIA. This much has been told by as many as eight journalists who have managed to slip past the ultra-high security structure of Long Cheng, as the Far Eastern Economic Review reported last year.

Carl Strock, one of the reporters, gave an eye-witness account tells of "American crews loading T-28 bombers while armed CIA agents chatted with uniformed Thai soldiers and piles of raw opium stood for sale in the market (a kilo for $52) . . ."

Where much, if not most, of this money earned from opium goes is towards the support of "friendly" capitalistic governments in Southeast Asia. For example, Newsweek has said that General Ouane, former chief of the Laotian general staff, was forced into a premature retirement due to excessive exposure of his role in the opium trade. General Ouane, who, the New York Tomes said, "has never denied allegations that he is in charge of the opium traffic in Laos," even confided to newsmen that supporting opium traffic is a "good thing." Not only does this occupation provide the Meo tribesmen with a livelihood, Newsweek reported Ovane as saying, but it keeps them from the control of the Communist Pathet Lao. It is by now common parlor talk that these same Meo tribesmen are equipped and instructed for warfare, in a most thorough manner. by the "freedom-loving" CIA.

Although not as clearly documented, there is a preponderance of evidence of dealings in opium traffic at the highest level of South Vietnam's government. In a broadcast reported by the N.Y. Times, NBC charged President Thieu and Vice President Ky with profiting from the drug traffic, and the Vietnamese police were accused of pushing illegal drugs (note the parallel with New York City). In that same broadcast NBC reported that the biggest pusher was said to be Thieu's closest adviser and special assistant for military and intelligence affairs, Lieut-Gen. Dang Van Quang. All NBC's charges were attributed to "extremely reliable sources."

So much for a mere spattering of the suspected truth. What all this suggests, incredible as it might seem, is that the United States government, directly or indirectly, is supporting a procedure which results in the heroin addiction of hundreds of thousands of American citizens.

We should all know that Nixon has proudly proclaimed a "most significant" deal with Turkey, a country which, according to Nixon, exports two-thirds of the world's heroin. This fact is somewhat contradicted, however, by a report by the UN Commission on Drugs and Narcotics. Referred to by both Ramparts and Ginsberg, this report stated that since 1966, 80% of the world's 1,200 tons of illicit opium comes not from Turkey, but from Southeast Asia.

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060014000-3

STATINTL [redacted]

little on the side—but his government will be a lot easier to swallow. And if a truly fair distribution of the subsidy largesse is beyond his immediate grasp, the practical implication for the average man is that he had better get in there and scrap.

U.S. AID PROGRAM IN LAOS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a most interesting article on Laos, written by Mr. T. D. Allman, and published in the New York Times of Friday, February 25, 1972, be printed in the RECORD. I urge Senators to read the article carefully. It is highly educational and should be considered in relation to the U.S. aid program in Laos and very likely elsewhere.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IN LAOS AID MARCHES ON

(By T. D. Allman)

VIENTIANE, LAOS.—Some time ago, I had my introduction to the self-perpetuating interregnum of suspended time, space and perception occupied by the United States Agency for International Development, and its sister agencies, Clandestine Client State Division, when I paid my first call on the genial, perennial A.I.D. director in Laos, Charles Mann.

His office then was located in a small, misleadingly ramshackle building in the Na Hai Diao Compound in suburban Vientiane. The compound is a self-contained cantonment which shelters, besides A.I.D. headquarters, the centers of the C.I.A. bombing and military advisory efforts in Laos, a swimming pool, supermarket, American bar and restaurant, movie theater, popcorn machine and microwave tower, all encased in a six-foot chain link fence and patrolled by units of the U.S. Embassy's 500-man strong, blue-uniformed private army.

The most noticeable thing, upon first visit, about the compound was that in a country where every house is open to catch the faintest breeze, each American building was sealed off, windowless. When the buildings did have windows, they were painted over in white, locked, barred and curtained from the inside.

In Mr. Mann's office, there were no windows at all, just a series of maps, displaying neat arrows, insignae, code keys and statistics showing the visitor exactly what was happening in Laos from the vantage point of A.I.D. activities to command.

Mann, whose ability to attune A.I.D. activities to the requirements of U.S. intervention had made him A.I.D. direector in South Vietnam, Cambodia and the Congo, did not discuss his organization's activities as a front for the C.I.A. I had been told in advance.

However, his conversation—his talk, an explanation of how the U.S. supported the kip, the Laotian national currency, at a steady rate of 500 to the dollar was interesting enough. I was able to discern that the kip operation essentially consisted of exchanging annually $20 to $30-million for valueless kip, and burning the collected kip. The program acted as a straight-forward giveaway. It moved the Laotian economy no closer to self-sufficiency, indeed perpetuated dependence on the United States.

As a result, the country was flooded with imported consumer goods; "re-exportation" of some of them on the black market kept the business community content; there was little inflation. Laos, Mann seemed to be saying, for obvious reasons preferred living at a standard it could never by itself afford to the evils of Communist aggression.

I asked if the kip would have any value if the program ran out of money. Yes, he conceded, if the dollars were cut off the kip would not be worth the paper on which it was printed.

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The new windowless building is off-white, eyeless, bomb-proof, impregnable to climate and contains its own furnace for destroying secret documents. Hundreds of bureaucrats, their maps and coffee-makers, presumably could subsist within it, never leaving, for years.

ADDRESS BY SENATOR HANSEN BEFORE CALGARY, ALBERTA, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, on February 15, the distinguished Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN) addressed the Chamber of Commerce of Calgary, Alberta, Canada.

Senator HANSEN paid tribute to the high degree of good relations which have always existed between the governments and the people of Canada and the United States. He discussed the increasing importance of the need for energy supplies to support the growth of both nations.

Senator HANSEN illustrates the dependence of the Canadian crude oil production on United States markets and compares this to Canada's embargo, last November, on further natural gas exports to the United States. This, he observes, could affect United States contributions to both oil and gas exploration in Canada.

It was exactly this disparity of treatment which occasioned my introduction of Senate Resolution 208, on December 6, 1971, proposing studies to reach satisfactory trade relations between Canada and the United States for the long term. I am delighted to ask unanimous consent that Senator HANSEN's remarks be printed in the RECORD and to accept their support for my resolution.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHAT'S NEW IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

(Remarks by CLIFFORD P. HANSEN, U.S. Senator, Wyoming)

It is an honor, a great pleasure, and a very timely privilege to have this opportunity to talk to the business leaders who comprise the Chamber of Commerce in The Oil Capital of Canada.

Canada and the United States are bound together by many interests—in historical kinship, in our economic interests, in our political idealogies which value foremost the individualism and initiative of our people.

We are bound together in a mutuality of interest involving our joint security.

We are partners in freedom, and no two Nations have pursued their individual and joint commitments to freedom in closer proximity, with better cooperation, for longer years, in greater harmony, with better fruits to show for the effort.

I am pleased and proud that present U.S.-Canadian relationships, our historical ties, and cultural and ethnic commonalty have meant a great deal to our two countries.

There is evidence that we are continuing to establish mutually beneficial trade relationships, including auto and coal production and electrical power generation.

We must work to build on these on-going programs in order to establish a freer flow of commerce and exchange of technical and professional talents.

In this atmosphere of trust and cooperation, we can speak openly and candidly to each other. In that spirit, I would like very much to share with you some of my thinking on a very complex challenge in which the United States and Canada share a vital interest. That, stated simply, is the proposition of maintaining an adequate secure supply of the basic energy fuels that are so fundamental to our security, and to the continued economic progress of our industrialized societies.

An adequate energy supply means, basically, a capability to produce and deliver the oil and gas required to meet the rapidly accelerating demands for these fuels in the years just ahead.

To fulfill these needs will require a vigorously healthy and expanding petroleum producing industry both in the United States and in Canada. More and more, the hard dollar decisions by management as to whether to explore and develop turn on the energy policy decisions by Governments. This is true whether the Government is in Washington or in Ottwa—in Alberta or in Wyoming. In 1970 the world petroleum industry spent $21.5-billion in capital investment, but the expenditures for production were only $7.2 billion, and for exploration only $1.3 billion.

All other expenditures for processing, marketing and transportation were up from the previous years' level, while production and exploration expenditures were down. The funds spent on exploration and production represented the lowest proportion of capital spending on record. This does not bode well for the seventies when we know that we must more than double the capital expenditures of the sixties to find enough oil and gas to meet the growing demand.

However, rather than talk in terms of our growing needs for oil and natural gas, it is more accurate and realistic to talk in terms of our growing needs for liquids and

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160

BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER

M - 194,557
S 860,961
FEB 27 1972

Our system under fire

by Wilbur L. Jarvis

Uncommon Sense
by James MacGregor Burns
196 pp. Harper & Row $6.95

Most Americans would count common sense and practicality as among their cardinal virtues. They would attribute much of the nation's progress to a tough-minded approach to national problems, to the application of common sense, to the rolling up of sleeves and getting the job done. But in his new book "Uncommon Sense," James MacGregor Burns, a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and the Woodrow Wilson professor of government at Williams College, asserts that more than common sense has been necessary throughout the history of the nation, and that certainly more than common sense is needed to cope with the problems of this decade. It is, he contends, a time for uncommon sense.

He also observes that much of what has been regarded as practical progress has been more illusory than real. Too often we have not really solved a problem—we have simply muddled through a trying situation, temporarily relieving the pressure on us, but leaving the basic problem to be dealt with again and again. "The history of this nation," he writes, "is studded with actions that seemed wholly practical and beneficial at the time but, in the long run, left a residue of principles violated, hopes defeated, and tasks undone." To Professor Burns the American system is failing.

The failure is rooted in a way of thinking. We confuse the means with the ends, elevating the former to the status of the latter. And in our confusion we have assumed that the exercise of power is in conflict with principle. "The responsible wielder of power is expected to obscure values rather than illuminate them, to adapt principle to practice rather than practice to principle."

As an example, he points to the way we practice foreign policy: "... self-righteous crusades that have sought to establish American interests abroad in the guise of spreading and defending democracy.

"At the same time, our means have often contaminated our prime values. The cynicism and opportunism that embraced Franco, that failed to take a strong stand in the United Nations against anachronistic colonialism, that avoided significant action against South Africa, that would use almost any military means to win victory in Southeast Asia, that permitted the creation of a secret CIA army in Laos—these cannot defend themselves with an appeal to liberty and equality. Thus the pragmatic approach to our foreign policy has at the same time subverted our most enduring principles and weakened American prestige and power. In short, it does not work. It is unrealistic."

Professor Burns appeals for a realism in our political works that is beyond "some early concrete satisfaction for a specific person or group." He calls for a principled realism and knowing our lines of action directly and firmly from our most cherished values, as the Supreme Court, for example, has been doing from the values of liberty and equality in recent years. We then, to the degree possible, reorganize our means to fit our ends rather than the reverse."

The author finds confusion of means with ends across the political spectrum. Though America's "young revolutionaries" might agree with the indictment of our foreign policy, as quoted in a preceding paragraph, they will find little comfort in other parts of "Uncommon Sense." They are described as "cloudy or confused about means" and "vague to the point of being cryptic about their ends." Neither they nor the black militants "subject themselves to the discipline of hard thought," with the result that "revolutionary sentiments in this country ... take on a mindless and even banal quality. And a blatantly undemocratic one."

As a critic of the American system, Professor Burns is more than an erudite fault-finder. He prescribes remedies for the ills he diagnoses. He has anticipated that his fellow citizens, stung by his discerning analysis and assessment that the American system is failing, could well ask: "What would you do about it?"

His book gives his answer. Not only would he have us rethink our ends and reorder our priorities; he would have us recreate the national government. He would strengthen the presidency, and within the executive office he would set up task forces to provide continuous priority operations. And he would extend the task force concept into the states and localities through the establishment of "presidential" agencies throughout the country. They would be several hundred in number, and they would "work directly under the supervision of the president and his executive office, bypassing departmental and bureau levels if necessary."

Each agency would be headed by a single person directly responsible to the president, and he would be armed with powers delegated by the president. The agencies themselves would have real power, and while they would try to bribe, prod, inspire, and otherwise induce state and local agencies to do what

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000

NEW YORK TIMES
25 FEB 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

In Laos, A.I.D. Marches On

By T. D. ALLMAN

VIENTIANE, Laos—Some time ago, I had my introduction to the self-perpetuating interregnum of suspended time, space and perception occupied by the United States Agency for International Development, and its sister agencies, Clandestine Client State Division, when I paid my first call on the genial, perennial A.I.D. director in Laos, Charles Mann.

His office then was located in a small, misleadingly ramshackle building in the Na Hai Diao Compound in suburban Vientiane. The compound is a self-contained cantonment which shelters, besides A.I.D. headquarters, the centers of the C.I.A. bombing and military advisory efforts in Laos, a swimming pool, supermarket, American bar and restaurant, movie theater, popcorn machine and microwave tower, all encased in a six-foot chain link fence and patrolled by units of the U.S. Embassy's 500-man strong, blue-uniformed private army.

The most noticeable thing, upon first visit, about the compound was that in a country where every house is open to catch the faintest breeze, each American building was sealed off, windowless. When the buildings did have windows, they were painted over in white, locked, barred and curtained from the inside.

In Mr. Mann's office, there were no windows at all, just a series of maps, displaying neat arrows, insignae, code keys and statistics showing the visitor exactly what was happening in Laos from the vantage point of A.I.D. activities to command.

Mann, whose ability to attune A.I.D. activities to the requirements of U.S. intervention had made him A.I.D. director in South Vietnam, Cambodia and the Congo, did not discuss his organization's activities as a front for the C.I.A. I had been told in advance.

However, his conversation — his talk, an explanation of how the U.S. supported the kip, the Laotian national currency, at a steady rate of 500 to the dollar was interesting enough. I was able to discern that the kip operation essentially consisted of exchanging annually $20 to $30 million for valueless kip, and burning the collected kip. The program acted as a straight-forward giveaway. It moved the Laotian economy no closer to self-sufficiency, indeed perpetuated dependence on the United States.

"A.I.D. has learned that empire has its financial limitations."

As a result, the country was flooded with imported consumer goods; "re-exportation" of some of them on the black market kept the business community content; there was little inflation. Laos, Mann seemed to be saying, for obvious reasons preferred living at a standard it could never by itself afford to the evils of Communist aggression.

I asked if the kip would have any value if the program ran out of money. Yes, he conceded, if the dollars were cut off the kip would not be worth the paper on which it was printed.

Now, three and a half years later, things are a little changed in the Na Hai Diao Compound. A.I.D. headquarters has vacated the ramshackle building and settled a few yards away in Vientiane's most unusual indestructible building.

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Following the Senate vote, the U.S. Embassy devalued the kip by 20 per cent. Unless Congress has a change of heart, or the rich Japanese and Europeans pay more to keep it up, the kip will be devalued again, or be left to find its own value, and A.I.D.'s most cherished program will be gone.

The new A.I.D. headquarters gives the impression of eternity, if not grace. It has no windows at all, not even a painted-over one, throughout its three stories.

Locals call the new building "the white cube," "the cinder block," but most often "the windowless building." Its number on the embassy roster is 500—will they change the number with the devaluation to 600, I could not avoid wondering, and then perhaps to 1,000, to keep up with the kip? The building, A.I.D. officials say, cost only $394,000, and, one said, "will pay for itself in reduced air-conditioning charges." Unofficial estimates by local contractors put the building's cost at millions. The air-conditioning runs off A.I.D.'s private generators; the U.S. Mission consumes more electricity than the rest of the country combined. The A.I.D. telephone directory contains more entries than the Laotian Post and Telegraph telephone book, but the A.I.D. switchboard, preoccupied with internal communications, still cannot be reached from an outside line for most hours of the day.

The new windowless building is off-white, eyeless, bomb-proof, impregnable to climate and contains its own furnace for destroying secret documents. Hundreds of bureaucrats, their maps and coffee-makers, presumably could subsist within it, never leaving, for years.

T. D. Allman is a journalist who has worked in Laos for several years.

[redacted]

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
[redacted]
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

MONTGOMERY, ALA.
ADVERTISER
FEB 2 1 1972
M - 61,769
S - 80,831

A Light Checkrein On The CIA

THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency gets a large chunk of its funds through hidden channels.

A favorite method is for another agency's budget to be kited by a certain amount, then that amount is declared surplus and transferred to the CIA.

In this manner, only a handful of people know what has occurred, most of them in the Executive branch. There is an oversight committee of the Senate made up of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sen. John Stennis of Miss. presides over the group, which is supposed to monitor all CIA activities. Last year the oversight committee didn't meet a single time.

The Foreign Relations Committee members on the oversight panel are angry. They contend CIA activities around the world have a decisive effect on the conduct of U.S. diplomatic policy.

They have taken action to by-pass Stennis and to gain some measure of control over CIA funds, personnel and activities by writing new curbs into the foreign aid authorization bill.

The bill, signed by President Nixon the other day, requires for the first time a reduction in military personnel working for the CIA in activities similar to the assistance and advisory groups now operating in Cambodia and Laos.

It includes the CIA in the $341,000,000 ceiling on aid to Cambodia and requires CIA arms transfers to be counted against the military aid appropriation. The CIA is reported to have warehouses filled with arms at various points in Southeast Asia for distribution to anti-communist guerrillas.

The CIA will be forbidden to pay foreign troops — such as the 4,800 "volunteers" in Laos — more than their counterparts in the U.S. armed forces. The bill specifically places the CIA under existing restrictions on giving arms to forces in Asia.

It will require quarterly reports to Congress on Cambodia and annual reports on foreign aid. CIA assistance will be included in the totals, although it will probably not be pinpointed.

These regulations will increase congressional supervision over shadow wars, but the language is not so tight as to prevent some circumvention, if the CIA is supported by the White House.

The National Security Council, the President's consultative committee to which the CIA reports, has the final decision on the agency's activities.

However, the new controls should require the CIA to think twice before committing the U.S. to clandestine wars, as it has done all too often in the last several years.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

COLUMBUS, GA.
ENQUIRER
FEB 18 1972
M - 32,231

He Keeps on Fighting

This world can be too bland a place if we let it, and that is why we are glad that up in the mountains of landlocked Laos, there is yet a man who's not quite out of the mould of the times, Maj. Gen. Vang Pao of the Meos.

He is an ally of America, involved in fighting for independence for most of his adult life, a soldier, a tribal peer of the primitive Meo, and a kind of peppery joy to have in the bland personality stew we bewailed in the beginning.

He talks about his war against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao Communists like this:

"Win? Not sure. But we fight, sure."

Why?

"Hanoi wants to take our country."

Surrounded by the clandestine aid of America, with CIA advisers and assistance, he commented like this:

"Americans are not aggressive people. They help us defend our country but not to attack anyone else."

He is a most unlikely character for this time, most unlikely of all to find him in Laos, which is an unlikely place in almost every way for war to have been going on so long and implacably. His unique method of solving the political difficulties of leading a tribe with six major clans has the charm of swashbuckling simplicity to it, for example.

He simply married a wife from each of the tribe's subdivisions — six of them — and acquired a family of 27 children to cement his political relations with family relations.

He has been fighting Communists in Laos, and fighting for independence and the Meos people there, since 1946 when he was 16. He is fighting now, with North Vietnam's dry season offensive there costing him 1,000 of his Meos fighting men and threatening his mountain headquarters. He is a unique individual, but he is hardly in a unique situation, and the moral involved is that without the United States, he would have been dead and his people taken into the drab, anthill organization of Asian-style communism.

Communism can't abide the existence of a man like Vang Pao of the Meos. He is too effective an enemy and he has too much individual character. We should continue to help him because they hate him so much.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

WASHINGTON POST
18 FEB 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

Laos Attacks on Plain of Jars to Relieve Long Cheng

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. 17—A Laotian task force has mounted a major counter-offensive into the Plain of Jars area 100 miles northeast of Vientiane in an effort to relieve heavy enemy pressure on the Long Cheng-Sam Thong defensive line, highly reliable sources in Vientiane say.

A force of several thousand Meo, Lao, Theung and lowland Lao irregulars was secretly maneuvered into attack positions around the upland plain during the past 11 days, and is now attacking enemy troop concentrations and supply points in the area 20 miles northeast of Long Cheng. Sources here describe the effort as designed to break up a major offensive threat by North Vietnamese troops against the Laotian government's northern front.

The precise location of the task force's various elements and the results of early action are not available here because of tight security on the operation and the scattered nature of the attacks, but sources say the attacks have undoubtedly disrupted any intentions of the North Vietnamese to launch heavy attacks on Long Cheng and its sister village of Sam Thong.

A number of attack positions have been established across the southern end of the 30-square-mile plain since the irregular force began moving out from Long Cheng on Feb. 6.

Among the military objectives, according to reports in Vientiane, are limestone caves in the deep Xieng Khouang-ville valley area 10 to 15 miles east of the plain where CIA-supported intelligence patrols say they have located enemy supplies for the current push against Long Cheng and Sam Thong.

Other objectives of the task force are supply routes running southward across the plain from its northeastern corner and the artillery positions on the southernmost end.

The Laotian task force is the first major offensive action by progovernment troops in the Plain of Jars since communist forces captured it from General Vang Pao's army in late December after 48 hours of battle. From the plain the communist force then moved against the strategic Long Cheng base, forcing its evacuation as headquarters for the CIA and Vang Pao's pro-government Meo Army Communist forces briefly occupied Long Cheng itself in mid-January, but were forced into the hills between the base and plain, where they have been preparing for what U.S. military observers here feel wil be another major assault on the base. The base area is the key to the Royal Lao government's entire northern front.

An estimated three regiments of North Vietnamese, or about 6,000 infantrymen, are believed poised to the north and east of Long Cheng and Sam Thong.

From 10 to 12 130MM field guns, with a range of 17 miles, are in place to the east of Long Cheng. These are the forces that the operation into the Plain of Jars is attempting to disrupt. The task force's intention was to prepare in secret for simultaneous attacks [illegible] Scattered [illegible]

taken up by its troops over the past two weeks. The attack plan appears to have been accomplished.

To maintain secrecy before the attack, even supply drops to most of the task force were suspended during the entire period. Some units were supplied with food by quiet-flying Air America planes but only with limited amounts. Ammunition resupply was not required, sources say, because of lack of contact with the enemy.

Reliable sources here say that command of the operation was given to Gen. Thao Ly, commander of irregular forces in southern Laos, who is considered a highly competent soldier by most observers here. Aside from the Meo veterans at Long Cheng, Thao Ly's troops at Savannakhet are considered the best in Laos. Thao Ly may join his troops on the plain soon, sources here say.

To protect Long Cheng itself while the task force was maneuvering into place and beginning its attack, troops from southern Laos, including a substantial number of Thais were flown into Long Cheng-Sam Thong. Most of the so-called Thai irregulars in Laos —upwards of 9,000—are believed to be among those now holding the northern front. There are no Thais with the operation onto the Plain of Jars, informed sources here say.

Although information on the operation was kept in the highest secrecy, at least four newsmen in Vientiane learned about it the day military forces left Long Cheng when Meo tribesmen in the capital [illegible] operation. In the interest of safety for soldiers involved the newsmen withheld publication of the

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
OBSERVER

M - 174,906
S - 204,225

FEB 17 1972

The Congress And CIA Controls

The Central Intelligence Agency, a sort of world power unto itself these many years, is going to have to join the Union at last.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee put its foot down recently and slapped some new controls on the CIA when it prepared the foreign aid authorization bill. President Nixon signed the bill last week.

The controls mean the CIA will be limited in the number of military personnel it can use for its projects; in how much it can pay foreign troops; and in the amount of arms it can distribute in other countries.

One objective of the Foreign Relations Committee was to curb CIA activity in Cambodia, where the committee feared the agency might generate another war, as it helped to do in Laos. Thus, aid to Combodia is limited and the CIA must make quarterly reports on that country to Congress.

The new limitations are not air-tight. More are probably needed. But the Congress has at last put a firm hand on the reins for the first time since the CIA was created in 1947.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
[redacted]

PITTSBURGH, PA
PRESS FEB 17 1972
E - 346,090
[illegible]-732

GOP Parley To Be Peaceful, Spock Says Here

By SHERLEY UHL
Press Politics Editor

There may be more activity on the outside than on the inside at the Republican National Convention in August, but any demonstrations will be peaceful, Dr. Benjamin Spock predicted here today.

The widely recognized pediatrician, running for the presidency on the People's Party ticket, said anticipated protests in San Diego are "well along in plannings."

Permits Sought

He said youth groups even now are negotiating with officials there for permits and other arrangements necessary to conduct "nonviolent" demonstrations at the convention.

"It won't be a civil disobedience type of thing," he explained. Instead, he insisted, it will be an orderly attempt to "keep the pressure on" in demands for troop withdrawals and peace.

Spock said he is not aware of what might occur at the Democratic convention in Miami Beach, but he described the 1968 demonstrations in Chicago as "infinitely worthwhile."

"They radicalized tens of millions of young people," said Spock. "It was brutal . . . America will never be the same."

Spock, one of the godfathers of the youth protest movement, was in Pittsburgh to rustle up not only interest in his candidacy, but also signatures on petitions, required to put his name on the ballot.

March 8 Deadline

The peoples Party needs 36,000 signatures by March 8, and, said Spock, it probably will be necessary to collect 65,000 to overcome all challenges.

At a news conference, he outlined his platform, including an immediate halt in

DR. BENJAMIN SPOCK
Won't be "intimidated."

withdrawal of "troops, mercenary and paramilitary (Central Intelligence Agency) forces."

He also would withhold economic support from the Thieu government.

Spock contended it was "outrageous" for presidential assistant H. R. Haldeman and others to impute treasonous motives to war critics.

"The American people voted for his (Haldeman's) boss because Nixon promised a quick end to the war in Vietnam," said Spock. "I hope American people won't be intimidated by that kind of rubbish."

In response to questions, Spock said he is dedicated to the U. S. and, "It's our government that is lousing up our relations with other nations."

He speaks at 8 p. m. today at Lawrence Hall, Point Park College, downtown, and later will attend a beer fest at Peo[illegible] Party headquarters in Oakland.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

YORK, PA.
RECORD FEB 17 1972
M - 33,894

Curbs on the CIA

Through the efforts of a handful of U.S. senators, controls have at long last been placed on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. These curbs are contained in the foreign aid authorization bill signed last week by President Nixon.

Credited with providing the controls are Senators Clifford Case of New Jersey, Frank Church of Idaho and Stuart Symington of Missouri. All are members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Together with Sen. William Fulbright, committee chairman, they have protested increasingly that Congress has too little knowledge of the CIA's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.

According to the New York Times, Senator Case urged last summer a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material to other U.S. agencies. Senator Case, the Times said, insisted that the CIA be included lest U.S. involvement in Cambodia develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos.

Such restrictions, the senator said, "would prevent the circumvention of congressional intent in funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through the CIA rather than through more open government agencies."

A number of senators, particularly those serving on the Foreign Relations Committee, have complained over the years regarding the lack of congressional knowledge and control over military action abroad. The disastrous "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba soon after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961 was one of the major operations planned secretly by the Central Intelligence Agency. Since then the agency has been blamed or received credit for masterminding various coups and revolts in various parts of the world.

The CIA, by the nature of its intelligence work, must indeed have privacy. But when it comes to involving the nation in military operations abroad, and otherwise affecting foreign policy, the CIA should be responsible to Congress as well as the President for its actions. The curbs that were placed on the agency last week are a start in that direction.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
FEB 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0[redacted]

Bombing Is Linked to High Infiltration Rate

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 15—High-ranking sources report that the decision to bomb Communist base areas at the border of Laos and South Vietnam was based on intelligence reports showing that more North Vietnamese troops were moving south this month than in any previous month.

The sources said that American intelligence estimates of troop infiltrations from North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail toward Communist base areas below the demilitarized zone and in the Central Highlands indicated that 30,000 enemy soldiers would have infiltrated into South Vietnam by the end of February.

American intelligence officials have also reportedly predicted that by the end of April 70,000 to 80,000 North Vietnamese soldiers will have moved south —more than in all of last year —bringing the enemy's estimated main-force strength in South Vietnam to 120,000 to 130,000.

The intelligence data are not considered conclusive. Some predictions have not been borne out by reports from the field, but some American officials here believe that the reports reflect a clear determination by the North Vietnamese to undertake a major military effort in the South.

Two Dates Were Suggested

Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, have predicted an offensive timed for the Tet Lunar New Year, which began today, or for President Nixon's visit to Peking, which begins Monday.

The intensive American bombing, halted temporarily today for the Tet cease-fire, began Thursday with the sudden deployment of the aircraft carrier Constellation to join two others in the Gulf of Tonkin and with the reinforcement of the Strategic Air Command's Pacific B-52 fleet.

The bombing campaign, which directed almost a thousand fighter-bomber strikes and 75 B-52 missions principally against two North Vietnamese base areas near the Ashau Valley and west of Kontum in the highlands, was equally intensive just across the border in Laos. Before the raids were halted at 6 P.M. in South Vietnam for the 24-hour allied Tet truce, the Air Force and Navy jets had flown 242 strikes.

The bombing was initiated, according to observers here, because the Nixon Administration wanted to take no chances on the embarrassment of a major offensive while the President was in Peking if it could prevent one by bombing.

Not Just 'Tourist Trip'

An exceptionally well-informed analyst said: "We have discounted a major effort during Tet and think it will come later. We don't really think they will do it before Nixon's visit and think they would not be terribly interested in giving Nixon talking points in Peking by staging a big offensive while he is there."

"We think the final plan has not yet been determined," the source added, "but that in the meantime the enemy is getting his troops in position. They aren't sending these guys down here on a tourist trip."

Senior officials say that American inteligence officers have not found major evidence of Communist infiltration into the Saigon region from base areas in Cambodia. This is true, they say, eevn though South Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia last month to free airborne strategic reserves for possible deployment to the Central Highlands, where a principal enemy action is expected.

While the best estimate of the American intelligence community is reliably reported to be that a major countrywide offensive will not get under way immediately, local Vietcong units are said to have been lissued impressive orders that give them wide latitude but urge a three-phase political, military and diplomatic offensive this year.

However, the intelligence data appear to indicate that some attack will be made soon on South Vietnamese bases, border camps and cities in the Central Highlands, probably west of Kontum and Dakto around Fire Bases 5 and 6 and the Benhet ranger camp.

Those positions, which were also attacked heavily last March and April, are close to a major North Vietnamese base area known as No. 609, in the jungles and hills of the region where [illegible] Cambodia come together. The base area and infiltration routes out of it were a principal target of the bombing.

The North Vietnamese 28th, 66th and 95B regiments are believed to be in the base area and nearby in Kontum Province, along with nine independent battalions. The 3,700-man 320th North Vietnamese Division is also believed to have arrived in the base area recently.

Enemy Forces Listed

Three days ago three North Vietnamese prisoners captured in Kontum told interrogators they were from the 304B Division. It is believed here that they are part of a regimental-size force of about 1,500 men that is named after the more famous and older 304th Division.

That unit is believed to be on the move into the western part of the demilitarized zone in preparation for possible attack on the South Vietnamese artillery bases called Sarge and Fuller, which were attacked last June when the weather was dry there.

The North Vietnamese 308th Division has also moved south from the central provinces of North Vietnam closer to the demilitarized zone, the American sources say, probably to act as a reserve for the 304th and also to guard against a South Vietnamese attack across the zone up the coastal plain into the north.

The North Vietnamese are also reported to be building up their antiaircraft defenses in the southern part of their country, not only with antiaircraft guns but also with more surface-to-air missiles than have been there. The enemy has also begun moving some 130-mm. artillery pieces closer to the DMZ, according to American sources; with their 17-mile range they outdistance all but the most powerful Vietnamese artillery.

"They obviously contemplate doing something for which they expect a heavy bombing reaction," an official said.

Advance reconnaissance elements of another division, 324B, are believed to have begun moving south along a new road built by the communists in the western mountains of the two northern provinces of South Vietnam and to be moving into a base area, No. 611. The second of the two zones hit by the intensive bombing, it is in western Thua-thien Province [illegible] the imperial capital of Hue. Three North Vietnamese regiments already in that area are thought to be trying to move closer to Hue.

Despite all the reports of North Vietnamese troop movements, the only significant upsurge in fighting occurred last week in Binhdinh Province, where Communist forces, including three North Vietnamese regiments, launched a series of shelling and ground attacks.

Far to the south, in the Mekong Delta, which has been relatively calm for three years, a North Vietnamese regiment has been reported infiltrating into Dinhtuong Province west of Mytho.

A more immediate target is the base at Longtieng, in northern Laos, supported by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was nearly overrun by three North Vietnamese divisions last month and most senior officers here expect them to put heavy pressure on the Laotian and Meo defenders again soon.

Officials here also expect renewed attacks in Cambodia, which has been relatively quiet since December.

"If I were in the enemy's shoes, I think I would have to make some big effort before standing down for extended negotiations on a final settlement, and this is probably what he is getting ready to do now," an official said. "But I don't expect that final push now."

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cost of $19.8 million. The 418-foot vessel is scheduled for completion in 27 months.

Now if Congress will cooperate, the Wickersham's last two years in Alaska service should be good ones. The outlook is favorable that the waiver finally will be granted.

HELP YOUNG AMERICA WEEK

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, in the State of Missouri, the first week of February was declared "Help Young America Week."

The purpose of this special week was to promote the strengthening of ties between business, youth, and parents. This goal is most commendable.

The sponsors of this project have contributed $20,000 to each of the five most active nationwide youth organizations in America as a part of this program.

Through the fine work of the Boy Scouts of America, Girl Scouts of America, Girls and Boys Clubs of America as well as the Camp Fire Girls, the ideals of "Help Young America" will be reached. These organizations provide the guidance and leadership which helps contribute to the development of American youth.

Mr. Fred Bioren, of Kirkwood, Mo. is to be congratulated for his leadership in organizing support for these vigorous, outstanding organizations.

I wish to add my endorsement to the many others who are supporting the "Help Young America" campaign.

SCENARIOS FOR DISASTER: NOTES ON INDOCHINA 1972

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, Gen. Douglas MacArthur once had a secret plan to end the war in Korea. His strategy—not revealed publicly until 1964—began with the use of 30 to 50 atomic bombs on key targets in China; 500,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's troops would then be unleashed for a mainland invasion. To interdict further Chinese support to North Korea, MacArthur favored sowing the entire border along the Yalu River with radioactive cobalt material—thus creating, so he thought, an impassable barrier that would last for 60 years.

Today, as America's military position in Southeast Asia deteriorates, one may justifiably fear that Richard Nixon's secret plan to end the war will take some cues from the late general. Recent events in Indochina suggest a major crisis will occur during this election year, possibly within the next 2 months. This conclusion is based on the following facts and analysis:

First. Although Nixon wishes to minimize the effect of the war on the United States because of its political harm to his reelection effort, he is still committed to eventual victory in Indochina. "Victory" means a non-Communist Southeast Asia plus an anti-Communist South Vietnam open to U.S. political control and U.S. capital penetration. Acceptable in the interim is a protracted war of low visibility to the American public, fought with U.S. technology but not troops, limited in scope so as to pose no threat to Chinese interests; a war which the United States cannot win but at least does not lose before the 1972 election.

Second. In various meetings with American radicals, representatives of the PRG and the DRV have expressed their desire to see Nixon defeated in the 1972 election. Undoubtedly they know a major liability to Nixon would be a new NLF/NVA offensive throughout Indochina. A major attack, suggestive of the 1968 Tet offensive, would shatter the illusion that the North Vietnamese military strength has been crippled by the bombings, or that indigenous revolutionary cadres have been rooted out by pacification programs. Restraint on their part makes sense only if they have some reason for believing Nixon will actually withdraw after the 1972 election and halt all U.S. bombing and end de facto support for Thieu. No evidence suggests Nixon would do this. Wisely, the Vietnamese insurgents have never relied on the strength of the U.S. antiwar movement in planning and executing their struggle.

Third. The recent heavy air bombardment of North Vietnam underscores Nixon's determination to militarily protect the U.S. policy stated in No. 1 above—even if his actions are labelled "escalatory." Although the actions were serious, they should not have been unexpected; the week before the air strikes saw numerous warnings in the press by Government spokesmen that a major air strike against the North was in the making.

The exact reason for the strikes still remains unclear. The Nixon administration knows by now of its inability to substantially interdict supplies going south. After the raids ended, military sources told Washington Post writer Peter Jay that supples destroyed were "fairly far back in the pipeline," to be used months from now—thus the raids, even assuming their strategic success, did not alleviate present U.S. concern over the central highlands. More likely Nixon used the raids as a warning, sharp but still limited, to the North Vietnamese that the United States would respond to an offensive with sustained bombing of the North. By limiting all Christmas sorties to below the 20th parallel—approximately 80 miles south of Hanoi—Nixon has evoked the memory of Johnson's change in bombing strategy in March, 1968—only Johnson deescalated the bombing by limiting it to below the 20th parallel. The irony seems more than coincidence, and reinforces the implied threat of the U.S. air attacks. In this way Nixon hopes to buy the calm needed for his success in Peking and in the U.S. presidential primaries.

A secondary reason for the raids might be that Nixon is using them as a provocation of the North Vietnamese. The December 26 raids followed a 2-month period in which 40 U.S. air strikes hit North Vietnam. These, coupled with the obnoxious behavior of U.S. representative to the Paris peace talks, William J. Porter, might be an attempt to goad the North Vietnamese into walking out of the talks. This would undercut the significance of the U.S. refusal to respond to the PRG seven-point peace plan; it would also give the United States freer military rein to attack North Vietnam with impunity, should it be seen as necessary.

Fourth. The national press has repeatedly in the past 2 months carried front-page stories quoting unnamed military, intelligence, and diplomatic sources who predict a major Communist offensive in the near future. For example, an AP dispatch of December 13 reports:

> North Vietnam is preparing a major offensive into South Vietnam's Central Highlands, probably timed to embarrass President Nixon during his February visit to China, diplomatic sources said today.

These sources go on to predict a second major offensive after the major party conventions in the United States this summer. Similar warnings have been front-page news several times since then, with the January 2 Washington Post predicting more massive air strikes against the North in the near future.

Since the 1968 Tet offensive the United States has had an interest in leaking warnings of this kind around the first of the year; more than in the past, however, these Government briefings appear to be for the purpose of either defusing the potential political impact such an offensive would have at home or preparing the public for a major increase in U.S. war activity should Nixon think it necessary. All of the frantic speculation about the central highlands, however, may be a U.S. attempt to shift the American public's attention—and also perhaps the attention of the North Vietnamese—away from Laos and Cambodia, either of which could possibly fall to the insurgents this year.

Fifth. Thus, two events in Indochina could trigger a Nixon escalation. First, if the North Vietnamese and the NLF in fact decide to ignore Nixon's Christmas air-strike warning, a case can be made for a Communist offensive in late January or early February before the rainy season begins; to provoke China into canceling Nixon's invitation to Peking when the United States responds to the offensive; to influence the early primaries, particularly the New Hampshire primary where McCloskey is running a much stronger campaign than expected; and, to take advantage of recent military progress in Laos. If the insurgents are successful despite ARVN efforts and U.S. close air support—perhaps encouraging support actions in South Vietnamese cities—then Nixon will have difficulty in ignoring the attack. Second, if the insurgents win total control of Laos or Cambodia, Nixon will suffer the beginnings of defeat in Indochina, and the U.S. military situation will automatically worsen in South Vietnam. Nixon is convinced that evidence of U.S. military failure in Vietnam is as politically damaging to him as escalation—perhaps more so. He may try to play down an offensive's significance and publicly ignore it, but if forced to act he will move, as he stated in announcing his 1970 invasion of Cambodia, "decisively and not step by step." Such "decisive" action might be the bombing of Hanoi proper, the naval blockade or mining of Haiphong harbor, air raids on the North Vietnamese dike system. Behind these contingencies looms the specter which must be faced: the use of nuclear weapons, perhaps to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to demon-

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NEW YORK TIMES
13 FEB 1972
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

The New York Times/Nancy Moran

LAOTIANS ON THE MOVE: Soldiers board plane at Ban Xon, Laos, for flight to Long Tieng, a base operated by the Central Intelligence Agency that was recently under siege. The Airline, Air America, is also supported by C.I.A.

STATINTL

First Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on C.I.A.

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—The foreign aid authorization bill, signed by President Nixon on Monday, includes for the first time in a quarter-century new controls on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The controls, which thus far have attracted little public attention, are the first to be added since Congress creaoted the agency through the National Security Act of 1947, a measure that wsa amended in 1949.

This act exempts the CIA from most fiscal and personnel controls imposed on other federal agencies. Funds, personnel and material voted by Congress to other agencies, such as the Defense Department, can, for example, be switched legally to the C. I. A.

The controls were inserted at various points in this defense aid bill largely through the efforts of Senators Clifford P. Case, Republican of New eJrsey; Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri.

They are members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Together with the committee's Chairman, J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, they have protested increasingly in recent months that Congress has too little knowledge of, let alone control over, the agency's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Senator Case urged on July 12 a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material to other United States agencies. Mr. Case insisted that the C.I.A. be included in the restrictions lest United States involvement in Cambodia develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos.

The proposed restrictions, he said, "would precent the circumvention of Congressional intent in the funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through C.I.A. rather than through more open Government agencies."

"It would also," he said, "eliminate the possibility that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could be skirted by using C.I.A. personnel."

Stennis Their Irritant

The ire of the committee members is reported to be less against the C.I.A. itself than against Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and of the so-called "Oversight" Committee for the agency. The Oversight Committee comprises senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations committees plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is supposed to watch over all the agency's activities.

Under Senator Stennis's direction, however, it did not meet at all in 1971—to the annoyance of Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee, who contend that C.I.A. activities around the world intimately and sometimes decisively affect the conduct of United States foreign policy.

They have now moved to bypass Senator Stennis and to gain some control over the agency's funds, personnel and activities by writing controls into the aid bill. Some Congressional sources say, however, that there are still loopholes.

Specifically, according to legislative specialists, the new controls will require the following atcions:

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OMAHA, NEBR.
WORLD HERALD

M - 125,376
S - 273,394

FEB 13 1972

Saigon Still Has Haven

Embassy Fills I-House Gap

World-Herald Washington Bureau, Suite 1217 National Press Building.

"The International House is a haven away from the tedious grind of daily work and the horrors of war for many Americans and their friends."

This excerpt from a South Vietnamese, English-language newspaper in 1968 expressed the feelings of numerous "Saigon warriors" toward the restaurant and club affectionately called the "I-House."

It is gone now, closed in early 1970 after a U.S. Senate investigating committee discovered "irregularities" in its operating procedures.

An announcement by the Justice Department last week that two former I-House managers had been indicted in federal court for accepting kickbacks on meat purchases sered as a reminder to the club's better days.

Started in 1966, the I-House was run under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy and located on Nguyen-Hue Bouleard in the heart of downtown Saigon.

Bits of Americana

Memberships, always at a premium during the late 1960s, were held by State Department officials, military officers, newspaper and television correspondents, American business representatives, and even a few Central Intelligence Agency operatives.

Among its bits of Americana were a piano bar, slot machines and a grill that served hamburgers, french fries and chocolate shakes.

At one time, the I-House featured the only orchestra in town playing dance music.

The two-story building also housed a gift shop, a Stars and Stripes bookstore with the latest magazines from the United States, and a huge dining room.

Its Sunday buffets with American roast beef, turkey and ham drew praise even from the gourmets who normally preferred the excellent oriental restaurants in Saigon.

It may seem strange to some that such a place could exist in the midst of a war zone, but life in Saigon was always somewhat different than in the rest of the country.

Better Replacement

One soldier could be shot at by the Viet Cong in the jungles just a few miles away, while at the same time, another would be sipping a gin and tonic in the air-conditioned comfort of the I-House.

The club has been shut down nearly two years.

But the remaining Americans in South Vietnam's capital apparently have found a better replacement.

A State Department spokesman in Washington says the U.S. Embassy now provides a snack bar and swimming pool for those who feel the need to "get away from it all."

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THE STAFF
11 Feb 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
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CIA poppies make kiddies mummies

[redacted]

DON STRACHAN

George Orwell wrote 1984 in an era that was ignorant of ecology. Thus he was able to fantasize a whole proletariat segment of the population that was immune to the doomsday games of the main characters of the State and its minions.

Today we know better that we are all One. When Montrose Chemicals dumps DDT by the ton into Los Angeles Harbor, the brown pelican lays eggs without shells and passes from the parade. When consumptive Americans build and drive — what, 80 million? — cars, the ground is pumped hollow and its contents dispersed into the air. When capitalism becomes the system under which goods are distributed, men cease to be brothers and their minds turn from co-operation to crime and warfare as ways of relating to each other.

Thus it comes as no surprise that the March issue of *Earth* magazine documents that the CIA has been involved in opium traffic in Southeast Asia for the past 20 years.

And it is understandable that ripples from this innocent exploitation of southeast Asian growers and pickers have washed back home. Overcrowded Veterans' Hospitals are turning junkie ex-GIs away and strung-out adolescents wander vacantly under neon lights. They must pay with tortured and shortened lives — smack presently takes more 18- to 35-year-olds than war, cancer or cars — while some of us feel it so far only in the $2.5 billion junkies steal annually to feed their habits, in vice squad and hospital budgets.

The most incriminating article in *Earth* is by Prof. Peter Dale Scott, a friend of Allen Ginsberg. Ginsberg's own researches into CIA opium traffic were published in last May's *Ramparts*, and he recently updated it on the Dick Cavett show.

Scott's article traces how certain Wall Street interests that controlled the CIA in its early days used it to set up far Eastern fronts for financial operations. One of these front companies — Civil Air Transport (CAT), later known as Air America — supplied arms and other supplies to the Nationalist Chinese troops of General Li Mi in Burma.

Li Mi and his troops long ago eased up on their fighting and turned to the more lucrative business of opium farming. Moreover, in order to maintain political links with secret Chinese societies and keep them hostile to Mao's revolution, they took over the opium traffic in northern Thailand and Laos. Air America continued to make "supply runs" flying opium and its derivative, heroin, around the world.

To second Scott's researches, *Earth* held a press conference last week at which Enrique B. del Rosario, a former "civilian aide" to Congressman [illegible], Thailand and Laos, reported seeing opium loaded aboard Air America planes in Laos and Thailand. Del Rosario stated that he had seen cultivated opium fields planted by Meo tribesmen. He said that the opium was later harvested, labeled "miscellaneous" cargo, and loaded into Air America planes at military bases.

Scott's article asserted that in 1955 alone 200 to 400 tons of opium were harvested in the Burma-Laos-Thailand "fertile triangle," and only 100 tons of it were consumed in Thailand. He quotes Eliot Marshall's estimate in *The New Republic* that 25 percent of all the smack in the U.S. comes from there.

"Up until about 1964, however, the United States . . . complained officially and ostentatiously to the UN Narcotics Commission about 'Yunnan opium,' 'brand "999" morphine' and heroin from 'the Chinese mainland' as part of Peking's '20-year plan to finance political activities and spread addiction,' " Scott writes, while documenting that indeed many of the profits from smack sale went to finance the Nationalist China lobby in Washington which, until last year, successfully barred American recognition of the largest country in the world.

Scott is careful not to blow up the "personal venality of a US construction engineer or pilots dabbling in opium on the side" into a blanket condemnation of the CIA. "The CIA as an agency, it is true, cannot be identified with the narcotics trade any more than can the whole of the Kuomintang," he writes; and he admits that "the embarrassing links between Air America and CATCL (Air America) have been diminished in the last five years."

"But," he concludes, "the opium-based economy of Laos is still being protected by a coalition of opium-growing CIA mercenaries, Air America planes and Thai troops." And *Earth* editor James Goode angrily points out how corruption abroad has brought disaster back home:

"The CIA helped put our kids in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic turned them on to smack," he said at the press conference. "And we're paying the CIA $6 billion a year for these services."

Scott's article, although unfortunately peppered with rumors, "it is claimed's" and "said to be's," like most muckraking exposes is unassailably documented and almost unreadably intricate. Its basic premise seems sound. Anyway, I believe it, if only because it fits the *zeitgeist*. As they say at another of those untrustworthy three-letter institutions — IBM — information overload equals pattern recognition. The amount of official skulduggery to hit the fan in recent years is such that once someone suggests that the CIA is trafficking smack, I'd be surprised to learn it was *not* so.

To me, the most enlightening comment on the CIA's workings appears in a companion article in *Earth*, "The Selling of the CIA," by Victor Marchetti, a former executive assistant to the number two man in the CIA. "It's interesting how the CIA liberals justify murder," he writes. "They hire the guy who hires the guy who actually commits the act, but they pretend they had no part in it."

This indirect inhumanity is most certainly a national, and maybe a human, failing. It's been reiterated over and over in connection with the Vietnam war: we are all guilty if we so much as participate in the economic system or pay our taxes. Capitalism: the economy is dependent on the war; crime: capitalism teaches the competitive ethic; war: the extension of crime by legal means.

It's so easy to lose sight of connections. When I was a kid, as simple a thing as an ice cream cone brought instant joy. It doesn't now; and what does? Almost nothing, unless I'm stoned or feeling really good. I do notice that if I get up briskly in the morning, do my yoga, keep busy and alert and exercise my mind, I have a general feeling of well-being; and that if I'm sluggish and lazy I become despondent and depressed. But I discover this only through recollection in tranquillity; I can't feel the direct connection. Shrinks call this losing touch with your feelings, but if it's a mental problem we all share the sickness. It comes, I suppose, partly from aging, partly from cultural demands for insensitivity.

So it goes in our relations with each other. We're rude to the waitress without thinking that she'll go home, listen and holler at her kid who will beat up his brother who will.... We drive cars and complain about the pain in our lungs. We commit petty larceny from our employer who after all is exploiting us anyway. But we draw lines, however jagged and arbitrary they may be.

The only difference I can see between these irregular moral boundaries and the immorality of the millionaire opium czars who feel no compunctions about poisoning and murdering their fellowmen in order to keep up their consumptive and tyrannical habits is that the villains have questioned the capriciousness and hypocrisy of those lines. Why preach ethical vegetarianism while contributing to the deaths of refugees by paying taxes to back dictatorial governments? Why cry for cleaner air on newsprint which people will burn? Why pay

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

STATINTL

Reds Press Offensive In Laos

Chicago Daily News

WASHINGTON — Employing light tanks and rapid-firing heavy artillery, North Vietnam has launched a dry-season offensive that presents a "serious" threat to Laos, U.S. officials said today.

The North Vietnamese have encircled an important base at Long Tieng, about 75 miles north of the Laotian capital of Vietiane and placed it under siege.

In the southern part of Laos, a Communist drive is only 20 miles from Pakse, the second largest city in the mountainous country.

Although the North Vietnamese and their Laotian allies have attacked at the start of every dry season in recent years, the latest offensive has advanced faster than before.

IN ADDITION, U.S. officials have noted with concern the use of light tanks, large numbers of troops and fast-firing 130mm artillery in the new drive.

A Pentagon spokesman said royal Lao forces of American-backed premier Souvanna Phouma were "in effect, driven off" both the Plain of Jars and the Bolovens Plateau.

American warplanes came to the rescue of the 30,000 troops and a handful of American advisers besieged at Long Thieng, silencing some of the 130mm guns that have been pumping shells into the base.

The air support may have staved off temporarily the reported plans to evacuate the base — a key to the defense of northern Laos and a psychologically important stronghold.

"THE SITUATION is a serious one," said a Pentagon spokesman.

"We have responded to the request of the royal Lao government to provide air support. We will continue to do that."

U.S. military advisers working for the Central Intelligence Agency were reported to be with the besieged garrison. A State Department official said there are "very few" Americans there, however.

At Pakse, dozens of American women and children were evacuated as a precautionary measure. U.S. military advisers remained to help meet the threat posed by the advancing North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao guerrillas.

"Things don't look very good," a State Department aide said.

Other officials cautioned, however, that the Communists have held considerable territory in Laos in previous years and then relinquished it later. Pakse itself fell to the Communists last June but then was retaken by the Lao government troops.

U.S. spokesmen said they could not tell if the North Vietnamese want to thrust toward Vientiane or would follow their familiar pattern of withdrawing from captured territory at a later date.

But the intensity of the attack so far may put the United States under greater pressure to aid the royal Lao forces now that the war seems to be "winding down" in South Vietnam.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

10 FEB 1972

Peek at CIA base in Laos



Most "super-secret" CIA activities in Laos are still a mystery to the American public, despite the opening of the CIA-supported Long Cheng guerrilla base to newsmen. Daniel Southerland reports that newsmen were allowed on the scene only after North Vietnamese troops had already succeeded in driving most CIA equipment and personnel out of Long Cheng to other still-secret bases. He says many newsmen who visited Long Cheng suspect it was opened for a political reason: to reduce the publicity impact if the base is captured by the North Vietnamese.

Tour of 'secret' base tells little

U.S. lifts corner of Laos CIA veil

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Vientiane, Laos

Newsmen now have made two group trips to the "super secret" U.S. Central Intelligence Agency-supported base at Long Cheng in northern Laos.

But they are still not sure why the American Government decided to open the base to them.

The most widely accepted theory is that the government decided to make Long Cheng seem less mysterious—and thus less important—by giving it some exposure. If the North Vietnamese succeed in permanently expelling Maj. Gen. Vang Pao and his CIA supporters from the base, the psychological and political shock waves may be lessened, because Long Cheng now has lost some of the aura of secrecy which surrounded it in the past.

"They are trying to prevent it from looking like a Dien Bien Phu," said one resident newsman in Vientiane after a group of 14 newsmen was allowed to visit Long Cheng on Jan. 19. A second group of 11 newsmen flew to the base on Feb. 2.

Secrecy whetted interest

Of course, Long Cheng has never amounted to anything approaching a Dien Bien Phu, but the veil of secrecy that was imposed over the past decade did tend to enhance Long Cheng's headline value.

Another well-accepted theory is that the Nixon administration is concerned about possible congressional cuts in foreign aid to Laos and wants to generate support for the Royal Laotian Government by demonstrating that it is the North Vietnamese who are the "aggressors" in Laos.

One way of doing this would be to get newsmen up to Long Cheng, where the North Vietnamese have been much in evidence lately.

In the dry season offensive in northern Laos, which began in December, it has clearly been North Vietnamese units which have done the heaviest fighting.

As far as most observers can determine, the attacks on the Plain of Jars and against Long Cheng have been strictly a North Vietnamese show, with virtually no participation by the Pathet Lao troops native to Laos.

Effort stepped up

The North Vietnamese have been using more troops and heavier artillery pieces than ever before. They have also been inflicting greater casualties on the Lao Government Army than in previous years.

"This is a North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, and there's no point in keeping you people from seeing it for yourselves," said a high-ranking American official at Long Cheng, when asked by reporters why they were being given a tour of the previously restricted base.

What the newsmen saw during their two tours of Long Cheng has not greatly added to the public knowledge of what has gone on there. Because of North Vietnamese pressure on the base, sophisticated American electronic equipment had already been withdrawn from Long Cheng before the arrival of the newsmen.

The North Vietnamese had succeeded, in fact, in putting the base out of action by the

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
9 FEB 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

VIETNAM

U.S. fears of an offensive by liberation forces in South Vietnam continue to mount. Tad Szulc of the New York Times reported in the Jan. 30 edition that, according to U.S. intelligence sources, political officers among liberation military units are saying that "decisive blows" must be dealt against U.S. and Saigon troops. The same sources, presumably the CIA, also told Szulc, that the flow of "troops down the Ho Chi Minh Trail" has been 30,000 higher from October to now than during the same period a year earlier. The release of this "information" and numerous similar reports from the U.S. and Saigon military commands in South Vietnam reflect a real fear of a damaging offensive in South Vietnam. At the same time, the predictions appear to be self-serving pretexts to justify heavy U.S. bombing.

On Jan 31-Feb. 1, the U.S. stepped up the bombing of North Vietnam again, carrying out the heaviest raids since last December. Such attacks could not possibly have a significant effect on an imminent offensive in South Vietnam and they may have increased in intensity, in yet another effort to force Hanoi to meet U.S. terms for a settlement. There have also been heavy U.S. bombings in the demilitarized zone and South Vietnamese central highlands by U.S. B-52s and fighter-bombers, with American aircraft dropping an estimated 700-900 tons of bombs on these areas Jan. 30-31, according to an AP report.

Testifying in Washington, following a recent visit to South Vietnam, Dr. E. W. Pfeifer of the University of Montana, stated that there are an estimated 23 million craters left from bombs dropped by B-52s in South Vietnam. The deep craters make land unsuitable for rice cultivation and fill up with water and provide "a perfect breeding ground for disease-bearing mosquitoes." Noting that 5.5 million acres of South Vietnamese forests were destroyed by chemical defoliation until it was halted eight months ago, Pfeifer reported that the U.S. now is destroying forests by bulldozers. Five U.S. companies, he said, using 150 tractors working from dawn to dusk, destroy about 1000 acres per day.

In the second of two articles on the Mylai massacre, Seymour Hersh wrote in the New Yorker that members of Army's Americal Division destroyed documents about the incident to protect officers involved. Basing his report on transcripts of the Army inquiry panel headed by Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, Hersh states that the Peers commission was unable to find how the Mylai 4 files had disappeared, although 400 witnesses were questioned. Peers suspected, according to Hersh, that the implicated officers themselves were among those responsible for the disappearance of the records. Furthermore, Hersh wrote, "The truth was more damaging to the Army's system than Peers could imagine: that subsequent officers of the Americal Division, who had no direct involvement with Mylai 4...had destroyed evidence to protect the officers who preceded them." Hersh also stated that at least one Saigon officer wrote a report that Americans had killed more than 400 persons in the Mylai area, and at the time American intelligence officers dismissed the report as "Vietcong propaganda."

LAOS

Heavy U.S. bombing attacks are continuing, augmented by air strikes by U.S.-supplied aircraft of the Saigon air force. It was officially admitted on Feb. 1 that Saigon planes have been bombing in Laos since December. In the ground fighting, at latest reports, the siege was continuing at the former secret CIA base at Long Chieng, south of the Plain of Jars. Pathet Lao forces have reportedly cut the road between Vientiane and the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The area of the royal capital was also said to be under attack by liberation forces....The official revelations of CIA activity in Laos is considered part of an administration effort to get more funds for U.S. operations in Laos. Meanwhile, the numbers of Thai mercenaries being hired by the CIA to fight in Laos is steadily rising.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
MINNESOTA DAILY
9 Feb 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

editorials

Eye on high

STATINTL [redacted]

With the electronic battlefield fast becoming a reality, and the Navy planning to wire the northern quarter of Wisconsin to make the world's largest radio antenna, it should come as no surprise to good citizens that federal technocrats have devised the ultimate weapon in the war against illegal drug trafficking: "Space Narc."

Space Narc is the nickname for a planned orbiting satellite capable of detecting fields of marijuana and opium poppies from 100 miles above the earth. Ian Fleming couldn't have done better.

The U.S. Treasury Department's bureau of narcotics and dangerous drugs is currently spending $2 million on the project to determine methods by which the plants can be identified by the satellite.

The Department of Agriculture is cooperating with the bureau by growing three large fields of marijuana in Texas, Arizona and Florida to serve as test targets for Space Narc's eye.

Should the satellite prove to be effective it might also prove embarrassing for another governmental agency, the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA), if there is any truth in the charges made last week by the editor of Earth magazine that the agency is involved in the smuggling of millions of dollars worth of heroin into the United States each year.

The magazine cited a study conducted by a professor at the University of California that traces the connections between opium growers, CIA operatives, flights of CIA-controlled airlines and the eventual delivery of heroin to the United States.

A former civilian aide to Continental Air Services (a CIA organization) said in San Francisco Friday that he witnessed opium being loaded aboard aircraft in Laos and Thailand and that he had seen hundreds of acres of cultivated opium fields planted by the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen.

A former member of the U.S. Special Forces also said this week he was assigned by the CIA to trade arms for opium grown by the Meo tribesmen, who would then fight for the CIA against the revolutionary forces in the area.

The possibility that the bureau of narcotics will use Space Narc to uncover the double-handed dealings of the CIA however, is obviously naive. Space Narc, if successful, will undoubtedly circle the earth indicating field after lush field of taboo weed in every country graced with a suitable climate. This information, however, is neither new nor useful. The government knows already that opium-growing and exporting is a major industry in many Asian countries. Aside from general discouragement and threats of foreign aid stoppage, there is little the U.S. has done, or for that matter, can do about it.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
9 FEB 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Secret Meo Army Is at All-Time Low

By Jack Anderson

The secret army of Meo tribesmen, which the U.S. has fielded and financed in faraway Laos, has been cruelly devastated.

Four years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency had recruited more than 14,000 Meo mountain men to fight under the brave but brutal General Vang Pao. Less than 3,000 survive.

Vang Pao has been forced to bolster his ranks with native Laotians, probably the world's most gentle people, who literally would rather make love than war. They now vastly outnumber the Meos in the secret CIA army.

All of this has reduced its fighting ability to an all-time low. The latest Communist attacks, according to the daily secret battle reports to CIA headquarters, have left Vang Pao's forces badly disorganized and demoralized. Casualties have been high.

The CIA "advisers," most of them veteran ex-servicemen, are trying desperately to rally Vang Pao's army. They use both persuasion and the purse to keep the troops in line.

No Boom, No Rice

"No boom boom, no rice," they tell the bedraggled soldiers. If they refuse to fight, in other words, they will get no food nor pay.

CIA agents serve as paymasters, making sure that Vang Pao's officers don't pocket the pay that is supposed to go to the soldiers. A rifleman draws about $25 a month.

For a time, the CIA brought a new prosperity to the impoverished Meo tribes. But the plight of the tribesmen is now grave. North Vietnamese soldiers and American bombs have pushed the Meos from place to place, causing thousands to die from illness and starvation.

The U.S. dollars, however, have made Vang Pao a power in Laos. A former sergeant in the French Army, the tart-tongued Meo commander has become a legend in Laos.

American Ambassador George McMurtie Godley, in a confidential report to the State Department on the recent National Assembly elections in Laos, described Premier Souvanna Phouma's dependence on two generals, Ouan Rathikoun and Vang Pao.

"International pressures require that Souvanna not publically acknowledge disappearance of the neutralist position," Godley cabled, "and the result has been a neglect of old neutralist vehicle and tacit acceptance of Generals Ouan and Vang Pao as basis of domestic support.

"There are indications Souvanna is not comfortable with public image of dependence on them no matter how necessary. . ."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601[redacted]1-3

7 FEB 1972

Cocktail Circuit Protocol

Envoys in Laos Use Neutrality As Social Ploy

VIENTIANE, Laos — (AP) — "If you are neutral, you have lots of friends."

A Laotian official was talking about the collection of diplomatic envoys in this capital.

For example, North Vietnam, represented by a charge d'affaire, Nguyen Giap, has over 50,000 troops fighting in Laos against the government.

South Vietnam's ambassador, Hoang Co Thuy, is on cordial terms with the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma even though the South Vietnamese army launched Operation Lam Son 719 into Laos over Prince Souvanna's protests.

Communist China is building an all-weather road through Pathet Lao territory in northern Laos, while it keeps a large diplomatic staff in Vientiane.

THE SOVIET Union, whose PT 76 tanks spearheaded the North Vietnamese conquest of the Plain of Jars in December, has a large embassy within shouting distance of the prime minister's residence.

Even the Pathet Lao — the leftist party that is at open war with the government — has an official mission in Vientiane.

"We all spend a lot of time tapping each other's telephones," one embassy official conceded, "but in the end it probably comes out about the same."

The North Vietnamese embassy is the center of attention. It receives visits from American prisoners' wives. Occasionally it gets grenades, thrown into the yard by Laotian soldiers.

Hanoi's diplomats — in their conservative business suits and black Mercedes Benz — are a cool lot, respected for their professionalism. At cocktail parties they talk mostly to the Chinese and Russians, pretending that their South Vietnamese counterparts don't exist.

The Communist giants — the USSR and China — barely acknowledge each other's existence. They shake hands twice a year — on the respective anniversaries of their revolutions.

THE RUSSIANS' favorite ploy for opening a conversation with an American is to tell an anti-Chinese joke. The U. S. Information Service reciprocates by distributing anti-Chinese material based on information from Moscow's Novosti agency.

The smoothest Russian in Vientiane is a multilingual man reputed to be the local head of the KGB, or Soviet secret police. He can tell dirty jokes in fluent English.

WHEN A Pathet Lao dignitary arrives at the airport the Communists have to perform some diplomatic acrobatics to satisfy protocol.

A Pathet Lao Central Committee member, Prince Souk Vongsak, flew in from Hanoi for talks with Premier Souvanna. He leaped into an embrace with the Soviet ambassador, Victor Minine. The Russians were greeted first because they were led by an ambassador.

After all Russian hands were pumped and cheeks kissed, Souk suddenly appeared to notice Chinese charge de'affaires Kuo Ying and repeat the ritual with him. It was the Russians' turn to stare into space. Hanoi's boys came third.

STANDING ON the sidelines for that and every other International Control Commission flight to Hanoi were two observers — a Novosti press correspondent believed to work for the KGB, and an American CIA agent. They apologized and shook hands.

Americans and Russians are friendly to the point required by protocol. Americans and Chinese seem to bend with the winds of politics.

Before the ping pong breakthrough, an American official who speaks fluent Chinese found himself standing next to the Chinese charge at a British reception. The American introduced himself in Chinese but Kuo Ying pretended not to understand and asked for a translation. That given, Kuo turned a cold shoulder.

BUT WHEN the two met again recently they greeted each other like old friends.

Not all Chinese contacts are governed by ideology. At a French reception Kuo Ying was smiling broadly as he chatted with Prince Boun Oum na Champassak, 360-pound feudal leader of the Laotian right wing.

Not all Laotians are happy with this diplomatic variety. Rightt generals constantly urge Prince Souvanna to break relations with Hanoi. He insists that Laos' only future is as a neutral buffer, whatever the present anomalies.

"We have so many friends," mused a Laotion officer, "but we are still at war."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 FEB 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

Edgar Buell:

The Indiana farmer who finally left the hills of Laos

Edgar Buell, a retired U.S. farmer, spent more than a decade working with the Meo tribesmen of Laos. To the Meos Mr. Buell was 'Tan Pop' — 'he who was sent from above.'

By Daniel Southerland

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Vientiane, Laos

"POP" BUELL HAS COME DOWN out of the mountains, and this time it's for keeps.

Edgar Buell, a retired Indiana farmer who spent more than a decade as a refugee relief worker and adviser to the Meo hill tribesmen in the mountains of northeastern Laos, has finally been forced to give up the hard work he's done for so long.

The man who became a legend among the Meo has taken a desk job in the Laotian capital of Vientiane.

Mr. Buell, who is approaching 60, finds himself unable to climb hills and mountains the way he used to.

Cautious decision

For months, Mr. Buell's employers at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) held off making an official announcement of his new status for fear of the effect it might have on the morale of the Meo, particularly at a time when they are facing the most serious North Vietnamese threat to date.

Finally, on Jan. 24, a brief notice from Charles Mann, the AID director for Laos, was posted on bulletin boards in Vientiane. It said Pop Buell would be leaving his job as area coordinator for the AID program in Xieng Khouang Province. He was being given a new job in Vientiane as an adviser to Mr. Mann and as a deputy assistant director for the Laos AID program.

The announcement provoked a number of phone calls to Mr. Buell from old friends and associates. Most of the calls [illegible] someone saying to Mr. Buell: "You in a desk job? I don't believe it."

The Meo, who know that Mr. Buell is in Vientiane these days, still consult him regularly on a host of problems. While Mr. Buell was being interviewed in his office here, half a dozen Meo waited outside for a chance to see him.

A complete change

The short, homely, bespectacled Mr. Buell, with his down-to-earth Indiana way of talking, hardly looks or sounds godlike. But the Meo revere him.

They call Mr. Buell "Tan Pop." As Don Schanche explains in his book on Mr. Buell, entitled "Mister Pop," "Tan" is a Lao honorific, and "Pop" a Meo deific word meaning "sent from above." For years now, to the Meo, Mr. Buell has been "He who was sent from above."

Edgar Buell first came to Laos in 1960 as a low-paid ($65 a month) field worker for the International Voluntary Service. He had lost his wife a year before and wanted a complete change of environment. So he turned over to his son his 250-acre farm near Metz, Ind.

His first job in Laos was in a tiny village located just east of the Plain of Jars called Lhat Houang.

In the years that followed, Mr. Buell learned the Meo language and organized emergency airlifts of food, blankets, and clothing to Meo refugees.

Doubts overcome

He started schools for the Meo and helped them organize an army in the face of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacks. He became a close friend of the Meo Gen. Vang Pao, whom he constantly refers to as "V.P."

In 1962, overcoming an Indiana farmer's misgivings about government, Mr. Buell joined AID and has worked for it ever since.

Mr. Buell's comments in an interview seemed particularly timely in view of this year's heavy North Vietnamese attacks a the tragic situation of the Meo, who m someday be completely driven out of th beloved mountains.

Mr. Buell scoffed at the speculation th links the early start of this year's No Vietnamese dry-season attacks in Laos w President Nixon's forthcoming trip to P king.

"They planned this offensive long befo anybody dreamed of Nixon visiting Pekin he said.

"They are out to gain territory and to pu their doctrine. So they want to wipe out t strongest forces standing against them, a that happens to be Vang Pao and his army."

Confidence expressed

But contrary to some predictions of imm nent disaster for the Meo now circulating Vientiane, Mr. Buell does not think the No Vietnamese are capable of throwing the M completely out of the mountains this year.

He said that even if the North Vietnam succeed in permanently pushing Vang P out of Long Cheng, where the Meo gene has long had his headquarters and throu which he is supported and supplied by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the M could retreat to other positions and hold o the mountains for another year.

Mr. Buell said that despite the heavy blo which the North Vietnamese have deliver to the Meo in this year's offensive, he h seen their morale in the past at a po "many, many times lower" than it is now.

The lowest point, he said, came on Ma 17, 1970, when the North Vietnamese dr the Meo out of Sam Thong, located six mi north of Long Cheng.

Mr. Buell had established a college, hos tal, and refugee center at Sam Thong, wh served as his headquarters in northeaste [illegible] Typically, Mr. Buell w among the last to leave Sam Thong, escapi

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
6 FEB. 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

The Secrecy Dilemma

● You can't run the Government if every important secret is going to be handed over to the press

● You can't run a free press if it is a crime to publish everything the Government stamps secret

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Jr.

A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.
—JAMES MADISON (to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822).

IT says in the 29th chapter of Deuteronomy, "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God." This has not been a view, however, wholly accepted by the American press. Last month, when Jack Anderson published classified documents showing how the Nixon Administration really felt about the Indo-Pakistani war, he observed an established tradition of journalism. At the same time he transgressed an established tradition of government. Here were the two solemn principles, disclosure and confidentiality, equally portentous and equally venerated, in sharp collision. The conflict of principles left many Americans, I would think, considerably baffled.

The recent publication of secret documents has produced a collision between two equally venerated principles—disclosure and confidentiality

It should have given some too a sense of intellectual discomfiture. Republicans who denounced Anderson might have remembered their own delight when The Chicago Tribune printed secret defense plans of the Roosevelt Administration shortly before Pearl Harbor. Democrats who applauded Anderson might have remembered their intense displeasure over equivalent journalistic audacity when they were in power. Still, both Republicans and Democrats probably agree that you cannot run a government if every internal memorandum is promptly handed to the press. And both probably agree that you cannot run much of a press if it is a crime to publish anything stamped secret by the Government. The question is whether between these extremes it is possible to discern further guiding principles.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Jr. is Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York.

One principle surely is that the Government's case for a measure of secrecy is not altogether frivolous or self-serving. "The Federalist" is generally worth consulting on these matters; and its authors clearly specified two fields where secrecy seemed to them essential. The first was diplomatic negotiation: "It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect *secrecy* and immediate *dispatch* are sometimes requisite." Woodrow Wilson, it is true, later appeared to repudiate this doctrine when he said that "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view" and called for "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." Before World War I the French Assembly did not know the secret clauses of the Franco-Russian alliance; nor did the British Foreign Secretary inform even his own Cabinet of the military understandings between the British and French General Staffs. This is what Wilson hoped to abolish.

But, as he himself made clear at Versailles, he really meant by "diplomacy" not the processes but the results of negotiation. In practice he favored plenty of talk out of "the public view" but no concealment of results—i.e., open covenants secretly arrived at. As for the negotiating process, Jules Cambon, who was French Ambassador to Berlin before World War I and whom that acute student of diplomacy Harold Nicolson regarded as perhaps the best professional of the century, was only mildly exaggerating when he wrote, "The day secrecy is abolished, negotiation of any kind will become impossible." His recent trans-Atlantic shuttling suggests that Henry Kissinger would agree. Whether blowing the secrecy destroys his capability for future private negotiations is a problem that one hopes Mr. Kissinger has pondered.

A second field noted in "The Federalist" as requiring secrecy was that of intelligence: "There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery." Contemplation of these two fields led "The Federalist" to conclude: "So often and so essentially have we heard that too much [illegible] from the want of secrecy and dispatch, that the Constitution would

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
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Laos: The Question Is How To Get Off The Tiger

By Stacy B. Lloyd

The author, a freelance writer, served in Laos as an AID community development adviser from 1963 to 1966 and with the U.S. Information Agency from 1966 to 1968.

THE SIGNIFICANCE of recent events in Laos for the United States lies in the decreasing ability of the U.S.-backed Royal Lao Government forces to maintain a military balance of power with the North Vietnamese and Chinese. As a result it is increasingly difficult for the United States to help support the neutral Lao government, to which the United States is under no obligation, legal or moral. And there is now a good chance that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma may decide to come to a political settlement with his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Pathet Lao forces.

Recent weeks have been unusually grim for the government forces. The war in northern Laos has escalated far beyond its usual range for this time of year. Two weeks ago Long Cheng, long the central headquarters for Gen. Vang Pao and the CIA-backed tribal forces, was almost overrun. Vang Pao's temporary headquarters, Ban Son, some 20 miles to the southwest, has been under mortar attack. The recent capture of the Sala Phou Khoun road junction on Route 13 by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, and the fall of the military post and airstrip of Moung Phou 28 miles to the southeast plus the season's first mortar attack on the Luang Prabang airport Jan. 28 are other signs of enemy confidence. On Jan. 22, the Lao Defense Ministry reported a recent Pathet Lao ambush of five civilian vehicles along Highway 13, 90 miles from Vientiane, which could signal the start of a terror campaign between the major towns along the Mekong River. On Jan. 28 the government imposed a curfew in Vientiane.

In the south, the enemy has already wiped out the government's military presence on the strategic Bolovens Plateau, coming to within 20 miles of Pakse. US. dependents have been evacuated and many Lao are leaving Pakse.

To make matters worse, North Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles have been placed in southern Laos and have been fired at U.S. fighter-bombers. This represents a real threat to Lao T-28s and U.S. forward air controllers. And, for the first time, North Vietnamese Mig-21s have been seen over Laos. In the north, in the Plain of Jars, the North Vietnamese have almost completed a road system capable of sustaining traffic through the rainy season. Newer tanks and heavier artillery are involved—155-mm. guns with a range of 30 miles, far exceeding the 105-mm. guns usually employed by the government troops.

Enemy forces have swelled from a March, 1968, estimate of 91,690 (40,045 North Vietnamese, 51,645 Pathet Lao) to an April, 1971, estimate of between 114,765 and 139,000 (100,000 North Vietnamese and 39,000 Pathet Lao), according to a staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In addition, the Chinese have increased their activity in the northwest, where their road-building crews are now protected by radar-directed anti-aircraft weapons, including 85-mm. and 100-mm-guns, the latter said to be effective up to 68,000 feet. From an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 in 1969, the Chinese troops had increased to between 14,000 and 20,000 by last April. Their road, extending from Ming La in China's Yunnan Province, reaches down the Moung Houn valley to Pak Beng, 20 miles from Thailand, with an east-west section from Dienbienphu in North Vietnam to Ban Houei Sai, bordering on Thailand and Burma.

Surge and Countersurge

THE ANNUAL dry season North Vietnamese offensives matched by Royal Lao Government counteroffensives in the rainy season have occurred since 1962. At that time the Neutralists under Capt. Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma were allied with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese against the Royal Lao Government forces of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan. But the Neutralists soon balked at the Pathet Lao's demands for continued military support and were pushed into a holding area at Moung Soui and Vang Vieng.

Since 1963, the enemy's ability to sustain its lines of communication from North Vietnam has grown each year. In 1964, increased North Vietnamese attacks resulted in the Royal Lao Government under Souvanna Phouma asking for U.S. reconnaissance flights. As the war in South Vietnam focused on the need to halt NVN supplies moving to the south, the North Vietnamese reacted to increased U.S. bombing of its trail system by striking at secret radar guidance bases in north and central Laos.

By June, 1967, the Royal Lao forces had come to within 17 miles of the North Vietnamese border. Na Khang, the northernmost CIA-Meo guerrilla staging point and U.S. Air Force search and rescue area, was retaken by the government and Gen. Vang Pao came within reach of Sam Neua city, a Pathet Lao headquarters.

The government's success lasted about a year. In 1968, the North Vietnamese sent in 11 new battalions and began the offensive that today has gained them the ground they need as a buffer against Thailand and as a sanctuary for their supplies moving south.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR
6 FEB 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Official U.S. Secrecy Persists in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star Staff Writer

VIENTIANE — U.S. official secrecy in Laos continues to a considerable extent, despite some recent relaxation of press restrictions by the U.S. Embassy here.

American sources said some influential U.S. officials in Vientiane still believe secrecy is the best policy and can't bring themselves to open information doors more than a crack.

"Part of it is they are afraid of the limelight focusing on this place, and they feel they don't want to bow to any press or Senate pressures. Secrecy is so deeply ingrained here it's become a habit," one said.

'Small Step at a Time'

Other Americans said the U.S. mission to Laos is split on press policy and, therefore, any improvements will come "only one small step at a time." Some encouraging steps have been taken.

On Jan. 19, a press group representing U.S. wire services, national dailies and television was allowed into Long Cheng, the CIA, U.S.A.F. base 75 miles northeast of Vientiane which have been off limits to all but a few of the U.S. press since the start of its operation in late 1962.

U.S. officials who normally work there were present, and they went about their business pretty much as usual, without hiding. Later, Air America crewmen who say they long have been under instruction to keep their mouths shut, talked openly about combat experiences.

Ground Rules Outlined

All this was done under a series of quite sensible ground rules given to the press on deep background. Ground rules were that U.S. personnel supporting irregular troops are not to be filmed, photographed or otherwise identified by name or function. They may, however, be quoted or referred to as U.S. officials. The Rules were acceptable to most of the press because they meant the press would have more access to information on Laos war at the price only of dropping any mention of U.S. intelligence bodies. It was specified also on deep background that the press could describe what a "U.S. official" was doing.

A second press trip was permitted to Long Cheng last week, and during this it became evident that official secrecy still was very much around.

Trip by Copter

As in the first visit, the press went up in a helicopter chartered from Air America and flew to Long Cheng accompanied by U.S. officials and a Lao general.

Although combat action has shifted from the Long Cheng area, newsmen were taken to the same places as on the previous trip. Requests to go to other places were turned down on the grounds the helicopters would be endangered.

A request by this reporter to remain at Long Cheng overnight was agreed to by Meo commander Vang Pao and top U.S. officials and then suddenly rejected.

The fact that all newsmen wanting to go to the Long Cheng area were made to go together on the same day picked well in advance, and that a single newsman is not allowed to go to the area on U.S. transport traveling constantly between Long Cheng and Vientiane, can only give rise to suspicion that the U.S. is sanitizing the area on specified days for the purpose of press junkets aimed at showing secrecy has stopped.

Reasons Given

U.S. officials here said that U.S. air transport is limited and in great demand, and that a continuous flow of press in the area would waste the time of U.S. officials and others.

Aircraft leaving Vientiane, however, often have one or two empty spaces and Van Pao and U.S. officials would not have to lay on elaborate briefings for one or two people who are interested in reporting what they see of the war.

U.S. officials have hinted at various reasons why secrecy has been lifted even to a small extent.

One reason, of course, was that North Vietnamese military pressure on Long Cheng made it practically unusable as a base for covert U.S. military activities, and there are few places left in Laos to which the United States could move to be out of reach of both the North Vietnamese and the U.S. press.

Another possible reason is that the United States has already overspent the ceiling of $350 million allowed by Congress to fight the war here, and U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley is preparing a request for additional money.

Secrecy here has angered Congress in the past, and to continue it could mean Congress would not vote additional funds.

Also some U.S. officials are coming to realize that Laos secrecy has benefited no one but Hanoi. Secrecy meant the U.S. press was impelled to uncover what was going on, concentrating on U.S. military activities here and less on the much larger Hanoi military activities.

Despite all this, much secrecy remains. The U.S. government still is not admitting that many of the Thai forces fighting in Laos paid for and sometimes led by Americans, are regular Thai army troops on temporary detachment. U.S. officials still insist on calling them "volunteers."

The U.S. still does not admit to all American casualties in Laos. It will give air casualties on U.S. missions originating in Laos, but not from the 7th Fleet, Vietnam or Thailand and downed in Laos.

U.S. air attaches here refuse to talk to the press. Saigon gives some of the U.S. air losses but no details of the sorties.

U.S. forward air controllers and combat airmen continue to fly in unmarked aircraft on Laos missions. Skyraiders from Thailand with U.S. pilots, Lao air force T28s sometimes flown by Americans, [redacted] controllers, do not carry American markings.

These craft fly in various Southeast Asian countries, but can be flown by pilots of many nationalities, and it is not clear just whose air force they belong to and U.S. aid officials cover up corruption among local government officials.

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STATINTL

[redacted]

OAKLAND, CAL.
TRIBUNE

E - 225,038
S - 251,534
FEB 5 1972

CIA Dope Tie in Charged

A University of California professor, a magazine publisher and a former civilian aide in Thailand and Laos have joined to charge that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States Government is involved in the deadly traffic in opium in Southeast Asia.

Peter Dale Scott, professor of Medieval History at U.C., said wealthy New York investment interest collaborated with the CIA in setting up Air American, a Taiwan-based airline, established after the fall of China. He claims the firm is a front for the opium dealings.

Scott said the CIA's alleged involvement is more than just to shore up the economy of the countries of Southeast Asia.

"While the goal is not the infusion (of drugs) into the GI ranks, if the opium trade were not built up as it is the problem would not be nearly so acute as it is," he told a press conference at the San Francisco Press Club. He is the author of a soon to be published book titled "War Conspiracy."

Enrique B. del Rosario, a former civilian aide in Thailand and Laos and now regional coordinator for Vietnam Veterans Against the War, said he worked closely with Meo tribesmen and had seen cultivated opium fields planted by the tribesmen. He said the opium later was harvested and that he watched it being put into warehouses operated by wealthy Chinese at Ban Houie Sai base in Laos as late as 1967.

He said he couldn't give any specific evidence of CIA complicity in the heroin traffic, adding, somewhat cryptically, "I can't say more. It depends on the future."

He indicated he was not afraid for his life, but that he has a wife and two children still living in Thailand.

James Goode, editor and publisher of Earth magazine, whose March issue details the alleged involvement of the CIA in the dope traffic, said the area described by Del Rosario produces only two products, chili peppers and opium.

"The only possible product air lifted out of there would be opium, and the CIA controls 90 per cent of the airlines," he declared.

He said he did not know where the suit will be filed or how much money it would seek.

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[redacted]

FYI: This is the type of advertising going on.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

EARTH PRESS

STATINTL

[redacted]

PRESS RELEASE ON THE CONTENTS OF THE MARCH, 1972 ISSUE OF EARTH MAGAZINE

STATINTL

[redacted]

FOR RELEASE: FEBRUARY 4, 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

HEROIN: SOME AMAZING LINKS BETWEEN THE CIA, THE MAFIA, CHINESE NATIONALIST OFFICERS -- AND A FEW BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES

According to detailed evidence in the March issue of EARTH magazine, the CIA is involved in opium traffic from the "fertile triangle" in the border areas of Laos, Burma, Thailand and the Yunnan province of southern China. About twenty-five percent of the heroin sold in America comes through this Southeast Asian channel. Ironically, the American taxpayer foots a six billion dollar a year bill for running the dope -- the CIA, an organization which answers to nobody, is intricately involved in the flow of opium out of the Asian hills and into the United States. U.S. tax money started Air America, the largest airline in Southeast Asia, used to supply and maintain opium growers, and also used for smuggling opium out of the triangle to Saigon and Hong Kong. The CIA claims other reasons for their huge operations, but as EARTH magazine points out in Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott's thorough article, the agency is party to pushing dope around the world.

Scott's article, supported by over 80 footnotes, is especially sobering in that it reveals a set of international alliances ranging from Chiang Kai Shek's brother-in-law to members of the Royal Laotian family to Wall Street lawyers

(continued...)

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Contact: Holly Reppert (415) 989-4300; Earth Magazine, The Agriculture Building, The Embarcadero at Mission, San Francisco, California 94115

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

and bankers, all of whom have either profited from the opium traffic or who have sanctioned its operation by their silence.

In tandem with Scott's article are: "CIA DOPE CALYPSO," a new poem by Allen Ginsberg; "A SHORT HISTORY OF CIA INTERVENTION IN SIXTEEN FOREIGN COUNTRIES," which runs down CIA action from the Congo to Costa Rica; and "THE SELLING OF THE CIA," in which Victor Marchetti, a sometime master spy, tells how the CIA "liberals" came to power, how they justify murder, and why they must be brought under control.

Another enemy of the American public, almost as nasty as the CIA, is the oil industry. Robert Sherrill's lead piece in the review section of the March EARTH concerns the proceedings of a conference on oil spills. The information that spills out isn't reassuring. Valdez Harbor, at the end of the trans-Alaska pipeline, will suffer spillage of 73,000 barrels annually, without accidents. Similar "natural" spillage at Puget Sound will amount to 100 barrels a day. And that's only a small part of it. Every year, 1.25 billion gallons of "waste" oil drains from American automobiles. Where does it go? The oil industry hasn't bothered to find out. A good guess is: in your waterways.

Not everything in the March EARTH is apocalyptic. "L.A. FINE ARTS SQUAD" brings you in contact with a group of painters whose thing involves putting eye-deceiving images right out in public, on the walls of buildings. "YVONNE WESTBROOK" introduces you to a black teenager in San Francisco who's trying to make the political system work for the people. "VINCENT'S CASTLE" is a pictorial fantasy set in the French Alps. A four-page "LEGAL GUIDE" lists Civil Rights and ACLU organizations, plus outfits that are trying to change drug laws or help poor people. Plus, there are EARTH's continuing Underguides to cities and colleges. It's all for 75¢ in the March issue, on sale nationally February 4.

# # #

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

The CIA put your brother in Vietnam.

CIA heroin traffic turned him on to smack

You are paying the CIA $6 billion a year for these social services.

March 1972 EARTH magazine



FOR RELEASE: FEBRUARY 4, 1972

The above 48-foot billboard appears for the first time on Friday, February 4, at 8878 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, delivering a message from the contents of the March issue of EARTH magazine.

The issue contains an article by Peter Dale Scott on CIA involvement in heroin traffic in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The editors of EARTH magazine believe that this is the first time billboards have been used for the exposure of government practices. One hundred similar billboards in the Los Angeles area will carry the same message for a period of 30 days.

Contact: Holly Reppert, EARTH Magazine, The Agriculture Building, Embarcadero at Mission, San Francisco, Calif. 415/989-4300

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
FEB 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3
STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Some POW Families to Fight Nixon

By Jack Anderson

Those familiar wih the details of Henry Kissinger's secret negotiations to end the Vietnam War have reached one dismaying conclusion.

They are convinced that the 460 American prisoners, known to be in Communist custody in Vietnam, are being held for ransom and won't be released until the full political price is paid. The price: total, unconditional withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.

Here's what President Nixon is doing, meanwhile, about the prisoners:

- He has made overtures to Hanoi through every possible channel to find out who is being held and to negotiate for their release. Approaches have been made through diplomats, Red Cross officials, Swiss bankers, trade representatives, newsmen and anti-war groups.
- Every American, who is known to be going to Hanoi, is asked to inquire about the prisoners. He is furnished with Hanoi's November, 1970, POW list, is encouraged to seek interviews with the prisoners and is asked to bring out POW mail.
- A special, secret effort has been made to find out what has happened to U.S. pilots and CIA soldiers who have been lost in Laos. Visitors to Hanoi are urged to drop by the Lao Popular Front's information office in Hanoi and try to pump some prisoner information out of Phau Phimpachanh, the Pathet Lao spokesman.

POW Families Split

Meanwhile, the President's report to the nation on the secret Vietnam negotiations has left the families at home as splintered as a broken windshield. Most belong to the moderate, 2,500-member National League of Families, which has put its trust in the President's negotiations.

But a militant minority have opened a Washington office to campaign against Mr. Nixon in 1972. Some are talking about civil disobediance at the White House to force the President to get out of Indochina in a flat exchange for the prisoners.

The league, incidentally, is operating hand-to-mouth after nearly going broke this month. For a time, the wives and mothers at the Washington office were paying out of their own meager allowances for stamps for mailings.

The financial crisis was caused by an ill-conceived $80,481 fund drive. Trips for wives to plead in far places with Communist envoys completed the treasury drain.

There is still wishful talk inside the league of a $120,000 advertising campaign, a $35,000 educational drive and another $12,000 to promote a day of world prayer. But the league is hard-pressed to raise the petty cash to keep the Washington office open.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
2 FEBRUARY 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

STATINTL

Guardian

CIA admits it runs a base in Laos

By Richard E. Ward

President Nixon's latest "plan to end the war now" is proven to be yet another hoax by the administration's efforts to salvage its puppet regime in Laos.

On Jan. 19, a selected group of U.S. journalists was brought into Laos by the CIA contract airline, Air America, for the first officially authorized view of the once top-secret U.S. base at Long Chieng.

The base has been under siege by forces of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) for more than a month during one of the most important battles in the long struggle between liberation forces and U.S.-backed military elements.

In other recent briefings, U.S. officials have largely lifted the remaining secrecy about U.S. military operations in Laos being directed by the CIA.

CIA operations in Laos and elsewhere in Indochina are not new. As early as 1950, French officials detected a U.S. effort to use intelligence operatives posing as economic aid officials to undercut the French and to develop a pro-U.S. military and political base in Indochina. French suspicions were not unfounded, as the CIA established the Ngo Dinh Diem fascist regime in South Vietnam between the time of the French defeat at Dienbienphu in May 1954 and the signing of the Geneva Accords on July 20 of that year.

This CIA effort to maintain the Diem regime caused the war that has continued to the present and which has been extended by the U.S. to the whole Indochina peninsula. Eventually, CIA control of U.S. military operations in Vietnam was transferred to the Defense Department, but the CIA still directs ground operations of U.S.-backed forces in Laos and it controls a portion of U.S. activity using planes of Air America and Continental Airlines.

With pilots paid $40,000 per year, the U.S. planes bring supplies to the CIA-directed armed forces in Laos, spot targets for U.S. bombers and carry out a variety of other operations, including the maintenance of assassination teams and espionage bases in the liberated zone, now comprising three-fourths of the country.

During the 1960s, the CIA created a secret army that at its peak had nearly 40,000 mercenaries, mainly of the Meo minority, under the command of Gen. Vang Pao. From 1968 to the present this army has been successively shattered by Pathet Lao offensives to the point where the Meo [illegible] more than 4000. The U.S. has attempted to make up for these losses by introducing large numbers of CIA-commanded Thai mercenaries, whose exact number remains unknown, but is estimated at 5000-10,000. In recent weeks, top U.S. military leaders in Southeast Asia have gone to Bangkok and Vientiane to arrange a further augmentation of Thai mercenaries in Laos.

With recent Pathet Lao victories at the Plain of Jars, the Bolovens plateau and in other areas, and the continuing siege at Long Chieng, the situation confronting the U.S. in Laos has never been more acute. The military usefulness of the Long Chieng CIA base has been ended, although the battle there continues with the remnants of Vang Pao's troops reinforced with Thai mercenaries and forces of the Royal Laotian army, also completely U.S.-financed.

The latest reports from Laos state that the Pathet Lao forces hold the initiative and have the capability of maintaining a long siege, despite heavy U.S. bombings against the liberation forces encircling Long Chieng. Because of the heavy fighting U.S. journalists could not land and had to survey the battle scene at Long Chieng from the air.

They saw the battered remains of what was once one of the largest military installations in Laos, including the former headquarters of the CIA's secret army, an airstrip and a town housing about 30,000 civilian dependents of the mercenaries. The dependents have been evacuated, but reportedly about 6000 pro-U.S. forces are still trying to prevent a complete defeat that could have shattering effects on the morale of the remaining U.S.-backed forces and the Vientiane puppet regime itself.

About the only remaining "secret" about U.S. operations in Laos was the name of CIA station chief. The Pathet Lao radio, however, revealed that he is Hugh Tovar, officially the first secretary in the U.S. embassy.

In the past, Western correspondents in Vientiane, including Americans, have had to keep some of their knowledge of CIA or other U.S. activities to themselves or risk expulsion or possibly imprisonment by the puppet authorities.

Prominent Laotian opponents of U.S. intervention in Vientiane have faced almost certain imprisonment and in some cases death. For example, Quinim Pholsena, an authentic neutralist and foreign minister of the tripartite government of national union established in 1962, was assassinated in Vientiane in 1963 by rightist henchmen of the CIA, according to the Pathet Lao. That assassination effectively ended the coalition government in Vientiane, which since 1964 has been completely dominated by the U.S. Prince Souvanna Phouma, prime minister of the Vientiane regime, who claims to be a neutralist, has sanctioned all the U. S. interventionary activities in Laos, at least since 1963

The only conceivable reason for the U.S. secrecy was to hide from the American people that the U.S. was intervening in Laos in total violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords on Laos. The secrecy was part of the U.S. propaganda effort to disguise U.S. aggression in Indochina behind charges against North Vietnam. The U.S. bombing of Laos, which began in May 1964 and was not officially admitted by Washington until April 1970, has devastated large portions of the country. About half the total population have been refugees at one time or another, fleeing from U.S. bombs or forcibly removed to internment camps by the U.S.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601
Feb 1972

[redacted]

The Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, at Six Billion Dollars a Year

Edward K. DeLong
United Press International
Washington, D.C.

"Whenever you are working on a problem that the military is deeply interested in — because it's affecting one of their programs . . . and you're not saying what they want you to say, the browbeating starts . . . the pressure to get the report to read more like they want it to read."

[redacted]

STATINT

(Based on a dispatch distributed by UPI on October 3, 1971)

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it — that is, dissident student groups and civil rights organizations — Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U.S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA — and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations) — and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

Running Operations Against Domestic Groups

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who — if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like — are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, (Va.), a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating cum laude in 1956 with degrees in Russian studies and history.

Offer of Job in CIA

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of — an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Moving Up

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

I Began To See Things I Did Not Like

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization — the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

[redacted] world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen

continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
1 Feb 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL [redacted]

THE CIA: A VISIBLE GOVERNMENT IN INDOCHINA

STATINT [redacted]

Fred Branfman and Steve Cohn
New York, N.Y.

"The CIA may or may not be an invisible government here at home . . . but to those close to the war it is one of the most visible – and important – governments in Indo-China today."

[redacted]

As American soldiers are withdrawn from Indochina, the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) is increasing. The C.I.A. may or may not be an invisible government here at home. But to those close to the war, it is one of the most visible — and important — governments in Indochina today.

CIA Secret Army

As we shall explain further in weeks to come, the C.I.A.'s budget in Laos and Cambodia exceeds those of the Laotian and Cambodian Governments by 20 or 30 to 1; the C.I.A. recruits, supplies, and directs a polyglot "Secret Army" of 100,000 men that does most of the front-line fighting in these two nations; C.I.A. photo interpreters and intelligence operatives control targetting, the most important part of the air war; C.I.A. political operatives are the main day-to-day intermediaries between the U.S. Government and local Lao and Cambodian politicians and generals.

And, of course, normal espionage, sabotage, assassination, and extortion — the C.I.A.'s standard fare anywhere — continue as usual (see Pentagon Papers memos No. 15 and No. 22 for Colonel Lansdale's descriptions of such activities as long as 10 and 20 years ago.)

In South Viet Nam, the C.I.A. role is also rising. The "pacification" program has taken on greater importance under Richard Nixon, and this of course is under the direct control of the C.I.A. through the deputy ambassador for pacification, always a C.I.A. man.

Phoenix Project

The key aspect of pacification is the Phoenix Project, an admitted program of murder and torture of civilians suspected to be working for the National Liberation Front. Since Phoenix's inception, it openly admitted that the C.I.A. has killed and abducted more civilians than even the U.S. Government claims have been similarly mistreated by "Viet Cong terrorists" (see accompanying chart).

In discussing the role of the C.I.A. in Indochina today, let us note at the outset that this is not an aberration: the C.I.A. devotes most of its budget and personnel to waging political and military warfare in all corners of the globe, with only a small percentage going into strict intelligence-gathering.

Carefully Cultivated Myth

STATINTL

This is not generally known, of course, for one of the most carefully cultivated myths in America today is that the C.I.A.'s main job is to prepare intelligence estimates for the President — the only job it is legally mandated to perform.

Whether in a recent Newsweek cover story on C.I.A. chief Richard Helms, or in a speech by Helms himself to an association of newspaper editors earlier this year, the theme is constantly repeated that the C.I.A.'s major role is merely to provide estimates of things such as Russian missile strength or morale in North Viet Nam.

In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth.

Highly informed sources reveal that of 18,000 people employed directly by the C.I.A. today, no more than 2,000 are actually involved in intelligence gathering and analysis. The vast majority are engaged in C.I.A. covert operations stretching from Bolivia to the Congo to Iran to Viet Nam.

Four Major Divisions

The C.I.A. is divided into four major divisions:

(1) The DIRECTORATE OF PLANS (cover name for the division of covert operations or clandestine services) — 6,000 people;

(2) The DIRECTORATE OF SUPPORT (the division providing logistics support to the Directorate of Plans) — 6,000 people;

(3) The DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY — 4,000 people;

(4) The DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE — 2,000 people.

Thus fully two thirds of the C.I.A.'s direct-hire employees — and a far higher percentage of its estimated two- to six-billion dollar budget — go to waging political and/or military warfare.

(Reprinted from the American Report: Review of Religion and American Power, Vol. 2, No. 11, Dec. 10, 1971, published by Clergy and Laymen Concerned, a non-profit national committee, 637 West 125 St., New York, N.Y. 10027)

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

continued

STATINTL
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

PHILADELPHIA
BULLETIN

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

JAN 30 1972

Air America Pilots Aging In Laos War

Vientiane, Laos — (AP) — They fly long hours in the flak-filled skies of Laos and play hard in exotic Oriental fleshpots.

But behind the swashbuckling facade, Air America pilots are often men with mortgages, sagging waistlines and even grandchildren. The soldiers of fortune are going gray. They now have something to lose.

If they get shot down, their lives are only worth two kilograms of gold — worth about $3,300 in Europe. This reward is offered to primitive hill tribesmen for surviving crew members by the private company, a civilian contractor which takes orders from the Agency for International Development.

"The average age of my pilots is 43," said James Cunningham, the Air America chief in Laos. "They're still wild, some of them still break the rules all the time and fly by the seat of their pants. But they're also serious family men with business interests.

125 Professional Pilots

Often called the CIA airline because of its contract work for Washington's paramilitary involvement in Laos, Air America has 125 professional pilots flying 35 fixed-wing planes and 36 Thailand-based helicopters.

Cunningham pooh-poohs talk of clandestine "spook missions" and "black operations" allegedly performed in China and North Vietnam.

"That's a lot of drivel," he said. "We haul passengers, fuel and supplies, any cargo required by the services of this country. I'm not saying there isn't a CIA presence in Laos, but if I found any of my pilots taking orders from the CIA they'd get canned.

"You see those planes out there? At 125 knots they wouldn't last five minutes over China or North Vietnam."

'Pretty Spooky'

However, the pilots have some pretty spooky passengers on occasion — strange Americans with code names, unidentified Asians from several different countries, men with guns who ask to be landed at little-known airstrips in the jungled mountains behind enemy lines.

"I don't know who they are and I don't want to know," said one pilot. "All I know is a guy could get fired talking about them."

Pilots also have helped rescue downed U.S. Air Force fliers.

Air America itself has lost five planes in the past two months and nearly 50 have been shot up by antiaircraft fire. Pilots also are being buzzed by Soviet-built MIGS of the North Vietnamese air force.

Danger Is Rife

Antiaircraft sites are so thick in Laos that some areas are technically off limits to unarmed civilian aircraft. But "there's written policy and unwritten policy," explained one Air America man.

"We fly anywhere, and it's getting worse all the time," he added. "This country is going to hell. No place is safe any more."

Flying in high-risk areas and earning night differential, some of the pilots make $40,000 a year.

"I earn every penny of it," said pilot James Russell, 49, a decorated World War II bomber pilot.

"I fly where other pilots don't fly because I need the money," the Texan said. "I have several deals cooking. I have a wife and three beautiful children to support. I want to expand my cattle ranch," a 25,000-acre spread in Brazil.

Plane Destroyed

Last week Russell's plane was destroyed on the ground by enemy mortar fire. He was on a clandestine mission involving six unidentified Asians, including a CIA agent code-named Swamp Rat. Russell outran pursuing North Vietnamese soldiers for two miles before a helicopter picked him up.

"Right now there's a well-dressed North Vietnamese wearing a singed $65 flying jacket," he drawled. "I'd just bought that damn thing in Hong Kong and like a fool I

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

ECONOMIST
29 JANUARY 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00[redacted]

Laos

Too dry for comfort

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

The Laotians are becoming war-weary. Leading government figures, including the prime minister himself, have been wondering how much longer the bloodshed can be tolerated. There is even talk among some army officers about trying to make a deal with the communists, and in the recent parliamentary elections, hardline right-wingers were in several cases unseated. Partly the pessimism reflects the fact that the communists now seem more determined than before. The fighting is heavier, the casualties higher. For the first time, North Vietnamese troops in Laos have used heavy 130-millimetre guns, and Mig fighters and heavy anti-aircraft fire have disrupted allied air support.

The North Vietnamese offensives in both northern and southern Laos, although tactically dissimilar, are apparently part of a communist plan for all-out victory in Indochina next year. By far the more serious situation is in the north, where an unusually early dry season allowed the communists to overrun the Plain of Jars just before Christmas. General Vang Pao's army of Meo tribal guerrillas, supported by Lao volunteers recruited in Thailand, was driven back to its mountain redoubts south-west of the plain, notably Long Cheng.

The communists quickly surrounded Long Cheng and occupied Skyline Ridge, which commands its northern defences. After Vang Pao had withdrawn from Long Cheng rather than have his forces needlessly destroyed, communist troops briefly entered the town, which has long served as a secret CIA electronic listening post. A skilful guerrilla counter-attack on Skyline Ridge, supported by massive American bombing, enabled Vang Pao to regain control of the area. But the communists still had several regiments poised east of Long Cheng ; and they had sent other units farther west to seize the junction of Routes 7 and 13, thus cutting the road between Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang.

The situation is no worse than it has been in some previous years, but this year the communists have struck very early in the dry season, and they still have three or four months of good weather in which to make further gains. They could take Luang Prabang, or they could move southwards through Vang Vieng on to the Vientiane plain. Their main aim is probably to push Prince Souvanna Phouma into asking the Americans to stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh trails in southern Laos. Falling morale in Vientiane could increase the pressures on him to accept this precondition for negotiations. Not that the Americans would stop the bombing even if the prince did ask them; but it would be an embarrassment to Washington.

The communist offensive in southern Laos, although militarily serious, is much less worrying to the government politically. North Vietnamese forces have again retaken the Bolovens plateau without much difficulty, and now occupy a village only a few miles east of Pakse. But fears of an attack on Pakse have receded, and military observers think the communists simply wish to maintain control of the plateau as an insurance against ground attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trails.



Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

DAILY WORLD
27 JAN 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00060

Hall warns of new attempt by Nixon to escalate war

NEW YORK, Jan. 26 — President Nixon's so-called "peace plan" may well be an excuse to escalate the war, declared Gus Hall, Presidential candidate of the Communist Party.

In a statement today, Hall, general secretary of the CP, issued the following warning:

"Having knowledge of the unprincipled, irresponsible nature of Nixon, the American people should be on guard. The Nixon broadcast last Tuesday night may well be a cover, an excuse to escalate the war. At the very least it is a cover to continue the aggression.

"The so-called 'peace plan' is an election campaign demagogy. It is not even a basis for negotiations.

"It is a demand for the unconditional surrender of the National Liberation Front to the defeated, despised U.S. puppet, the Thieu dictatorship.

"The Nixon broadcast was a typical Tricky Dick performance. Nixon promised everything except an end to the United States aggression in Indochina.

"The 'hooker' in Nixon's demagogy is the proposal for a Vietnamese ceasefire. In return for laying down their arms the people of Vietnam were promised:

- "A Thieu-style election.
- "Possible troop withdrawals six months later.
- "But in the meantime the United States would continue indefinitely to surround Vietnam by a ring of total military power.
- "Indefinitely to maintain the ships and the war planes of the Seventh Fleet on the Tonkin Gulf.
- "Indefinitely to maintain the huge bomber fleets in half a dozen large bomber bases in Thailand. Indefinite maintenance of the B-52 bomber fleets in Thailand.
- "Indefinitely to maintain in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia the huge armed counter-insurgency forces of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- "Indefinitely to maintain the forces of aggression in Laos and Cambodia.

"To accept the plan would be to accept the American people for an escalation of the war." Nixon had said he would meet "head on" any new military action by the patriotic forces in Indochina.

It has also been noted that the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. William Westmoreland, flew into Saigon at the same time Nixon was speaking on Tuesday night; Westmoreland's mission has been shrouded in secrecy.

Saigonese skeptical

In Saigon, the populace in general apparently was distrustful of Saigon President Nguyen Van Thieu's purported offer to quit his office one month before the proposed "elections."

"Everybody thought he was too power-hungry to even mention quitting," a Saigon shopkeeper on busy Tu Do Street told a UPI reporter.

George Vickers, executive co-secretary of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, said in New York yesterday, "There's nothing new in Nixon's plan. It repeats his old proposal of reaching a settlement first and then setting a date for U.S. withdrawal. It says nothing about ending the bombing.

"Nixon says it has been demanded that the U.S. 'overthrow the Saigon government.' This is untrue: what is called for is an end to U.S. support" of the Thieu regime."

Vickers also pointed out that Thieu's promise to resign before the "elections" is meaningless "as long as his opposition remains in jail. His opponents in the last elections are still in jail."

Trudi Young, co-director of Clergy and Laymen Concerned, said the Nixon speech did not mention the U.S. air war against Indochina, "which is incredible. The heaviest bombing since 1968 took place last weekend. Unless he talks about the air war, Nixon just isn't serious."

Mike Zagarelli, educational director of the Young Workers' Liberation League, said that "Nixon's speech was aimed more at bringing in the votes than bringing an end to the war."

NLF. "This factor makes it impossible to consider free and full elections going forward."

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif) voiced a widespread fear that the Nixon plan was not any kind of peace offer but on the contrary was intended "to prepare the

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

ALTON, ILL.
TELEGRAPH
JAN 11 1972
E - 38,102

Dominos still shaky?

Efforts by terrorists to blow up B52 bombers in Thailand appear to indicate that massive air raids may have been taking a heavy toll in North Vietnam.

Presently, Thailand is relatively secure.

However, continual growth of guerrilla groups there will intensify the problem of security for the bombers and U.S. forces in Thailand.

As our troop withdrawals in Vietnam continue, it is likely more pressure on our CIA advisors in Laos and the Air Force installations in Thailand will continue.

The toppling domino theory may still be more true than untrue, despite the billions of dollars and thousands of lives we have poured into Vietnam.

PAUL S. and STEPHEN A. COUSLEY

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Not Yet the Last Mile

IN THE NATION

By TOM WICKER

President Nixon, with understandable satisfaction, remarked during his Tuesday night broadcast that it was "difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position on the war, could now say that we have not gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair to everybody concerned."

That well may be a prophetic political statement. The proposals Mr. Nixon disclosed himself to have made —and, even more important, the fact that he had made them—are likely to appeal to the war-weary American people as the most any President could be expected to do. There will also be those to whom it will seem that he now has done as much as any of his potential Democratic opponents have said they would do.

Nevertheless, the last mile remains somewhere ahead of us. For one thing, despite all the advance leaks to set up the assumption, Mr. Nixon's proposals did not set a date for American withdrawal in return for the release of American P.O.W.'s by the same date; rather the President offered to withdraw six months after the other side agreed in principle to release the P.O.W.'s, to stop shooting, and to accept elections as a means of determining the future of South Vietnam.

Later clarifications by Dr. Henry Kissinger may suggest that the withdrawal-prisoner deal could be arranged separately; but that is not the wording of the text, nor was it the apparent meaning of the President in his speech. This is a point that needs to be cleared up, but as it now stands there is no such thing as a direct pledge to withdraw, provided only that the prisoners are released.

There was no mention, moreover, of the withdrawal of the powerful air units in Thailand that have done so much of the bombing of Laos and North Vietnam; or of the equally powerful naval air units that have so often pummeled North Vietnam; or of the C.I.A.-financed army in Laos; and the withdrawal offer was coupled with the assertion—which Mr. Nixon's text also seemed to say would have to be agreed upon "in principle" before the American withdrawal—that all North Vietnamese forces would have to be withdrawn within that country's borders.

This is a demand that Hanoi agree to give up its military positions in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam and accept aerial encirclement from Thailand and the Gulf of Tonkin, in return for elections to determine the future of South Vietnam. The resignation of President Thieu before those elections would scarcely sweeten this bitter pill; he could still run for re-election, his whole administrative apparatus would still be in office, including the powerful province chiefs, and the whole thing would take place within the framework of his Constitution. In his own speech in Saigon, Mr. Thieu made it clear also that the Vietnamese Communists could participate in the elections only if they laid down their arms and renounced violence. What about his own army and internal police?

But the real reason why these latest proposals are not yet "the last mile" lies in the assumptions and attitudes of those who put them forward—in Mr. Nixon's insistence, for example, that his plan is "fair to everybody concerned." Whether or not that is correct, such proposals would be appropriate and necessary when two equivalent positions were in deadlock and an even-handed compromise could both rescue the situation and provide justice. The hard truth is that this is not the case in Indochina.

The Nixon proposals, like every American peace plan ever put forward, assume that the United States is as much in the right in the war as Hanoi or the Vietcong; they assume that American forces have as proper a place in Indochina as do those of North Vietnam; they assume that North and South Vietnam are separate and equal nations, a dubious proposition historically, politically and legally; and while this latest plan asserts the right of the Vietnamese people to determine the future of South Vietnam, it also assumes that the United States has a right to say how that determination ought to be arrived at—by elections.

Above all, therefore, those who made this peace proposal assume either that this war has been rightly waged, or that the American people are not willing to be told that it has been wrongly waged. They are insisting upon a settlement that cannot be interpreted as a defeat or as the abandonment of a war that cannot be won. They are trying to find some way to make it appear, in the end, that the lives sacrificed to this war have not been wasted, and that worthy objectives have been attained.

That is understandable politically, and it may even be that no President could take any other attitude and survive. But until some President does—until the truth is admitted that this is a war that should not have been fought, and should be fought not a day longer—the last mile will not have been walked.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

CHICAGO, ILL.
TRIBUNE
M - 767,793
S - 1,016,275
JAN 26 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

[redacted]

Viet Nam's Unprobed Story

Is the Air War Paying for Its Costs?

By Donald Kirk

Mr. Kirk is Far Eastern correspondent of The Tribune.

TOKYO—The most exciting—and deadliest—chapter of the Indochinese conflict may never be revealed in purloined Pentagon documents or exposes of the inner councils of the White House.

It has never been covered by any of the hundreds of newsmen assigned to the war, and it may never be written in comprehensive form by any of its principal participants. They are all either sworn to secrecy and or biased by the vantage point from which they view the carnage around or beneath them.

It is the hourly drama of the bombing of Laos and Cambodia, plus more dangerous diversions over North Viet Nam, by U. S. Air Force and Navy pilots flying from bases in Thailand or carriers in the South China Sea. It may mean the difference between victory and defeat for America's allies in Indochina—or go down in military history as a colossal failure, an example of the inability of air power to subdue highly motivated, well-disciplined men on the ground.

"Always the Question"

"There's always the question of whether bombing is enough to defeat ground forces," acknowledged an Air Force general who had participated in developing some of the science-fiction devices the U. S. now uses to determine the whereabouts of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. "Critics of air power have raised that question in every war in which it's been used."

The question has seemed more pertinent than ever in the Indochinese war as American planes, beginning in 1965, dropped far more bombs, in terms of both tonnage and number, over both Viet Nams, Laos, and Cambodia than in all of World War II. The United States ceased most of the bombing of North Viet Nam in 1968, but the U. S. has more than compensated, in terms of tonnage, by expanding [illegible] both Laos and Cambodia.

The inescapable irony of all the bombing is that, beside forcing hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Cambodians and Laotians to flee their homes, it has failed to result in any gains in territory for American-supported ground forces in those countries.

Nor has it stemmed the flow of men and materiel from North Viet Nam, over the Ho Chi Minh trail network thru Laos to South Viet Nam, as indicated by mounting fears that the North Vietnamese will launch a fresh winter offensive in the next two or three weeks.

Targets Off Limits

"We can't bomb towns where we know damn well they've got the stuff piled up in buildings that look like schools and hospitals."

It would be difficult to contest the argument that North Viet Nam has carefully shielded its supplies, as would any country, and that its losses would have been higher if American policy had not precluded the deliberate bombing of towns and villages. The latter aspect of the Indochinese air war alone differentiates it from the bombing in World War II, in which allied warplanes purposely blasted population centers as well as military targets.

"You know how a military man thinks," said a senior Air Force officer who had flown fighter planes in Korea. "We think the politicians should have stayed out of this war and let us bomb Hanoi, Haiphong, and all military shipping into North Viet Nam. Maybe we should have bombed China, too.

"We also could have used small nuclear weapons to blast out the Ho Chi Minh Trail system—make it completely impassable."

Diplomats and politicians would argue, of course, that the military advantages of such an approach would soon have been countered by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Basic Value Doubted

On military grounds alone, however, the record of the air war, even in the context of restrictions on bombing more than carefully selected targets in circumscribed swatches of jungle, raises questions about its basic value.

Despite new sensor devices, capable of locating the movement of the majority of men and trucks from North Viet Nam, the enemy has slowly increased its presence in mountainous regions of South Viet Nam no longer patrolled by American troops.

American officials claim the sensor system, in which planes drop all manner of electronic gear onto the trail network, has resulted in the annihilation of perhaps 80 per cent of the enemy's supplies en route thru Laos.

The Pentagon and White House are so sensitive to the political ramifications of the bombing, however, that they refuse to let reporters interview the pilots, much less investigate the sensors that are essential to their success.

Reporters have occasionally flown over the trail in lumbering propeller-driven gunships or highly maneuverable light observation planes based in South Viet Nam, but the Air Force has a convenient excuse for keeping newsmen from so much as talking to the pilots who fly the F-4 Phantoms, mainstay of the air war.

A Disillusioned Major

The bases in Thailand from which they operate are all technically under control of Thai authorities, who, on American advice, seldom permit newsmen on the premises.

Even when newsmen do get permission to visit a Thai base, the pilots, under strict orders from their superiors, are extremely circumspect in their descriptions of what they are doing. The only pilot in Thailand who ever spoke frankly with me was a drunken, disillusioned major, whom I cornered one night for the duration of a couple of beers just off one of the bases.

He told me a number of hair-raising tales about near misses, clashes with enemy artillery and planes, rescue at-

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

continued

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
8 JAN 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006[redacted]

STATINTL

world in revolution

Laos

The Pathet Lao siege of the CIA-mercenary base at Long Chieng was continuing as of Jan. 18. The Long Chieng base, 80 miles northeast of Vientiane, reportedly was at the point of collapse when the U.S. brought in 3000 additional Thai mercenary reinforcements. At one point in the fighting, Pathet Lao forces occupied the home of Gen. Vang Pao, who commands the mercenaries under the CIA. At that time, Vang Pao was said to have fled to Thailand but, according to latest available reports, he returned to Long Chieng with the reinforcements. On the night of Jan. 13, wrote D.E. Ronk of the Washington Post, Pathet Lao guerrillas raided Ban Son base, 20 miles south of Long Chieng, where the CIA established its temporary headquarters after evacuating Long Chieng. The base was shelled for 20 minutes with rockets, inflicting light casualties on pro-government forces, according to Ronk's sources in Vientiane. "No damage was inflicted on the facilities at Ban Son, the sources said, but it is believed in Vientiane that the attack. . .will be the first of many in the near future and will force removal of the CIA headquarters soon."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

CHICAGO
NEWS

E - 434,849

JAN 25 1972

STATINTL

Laos leaving Ho Trail area for U.S., Reds to fight over

By Larry Green
Daily News Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Laos — Despite mounting pressure from Communist forces, the government in Laos has no plans to ask the United States to stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail to gain a cease-fire.

In fact, it appears from statements by Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma that his government has abandoned any political claim to the land covered by the trail.

"We have no means to control it," Souvanna told a small group of Western correspondents. "The government leaves this part of Laos to the United States and North Vietnam.

"This area is not too populated and we have no forces to control either North Vietnamese from moving through the trails or to stop the United States from bombing.

"If there were no more North Vietnamese troops on the trail, then there would be no more bombing."

THE PRINCE said that the current level of U.S. aid to Laos was not sufficient but he did not plan to ask for more right now.

Congress has imposed a $350 million limit on all aid for Laos through the end of next June.

"We need more aid because the last offensive in the Plain of Jars showed a marked increase in the weapons used by the Communists," Souvanna said.

He was referring to the introduction of 130-mm field guns, which can outshoot any ground weapons supplied to Laos by the United States.

"But before we ask we will see if the situation gets worse," he said. "We shouldn't act too hastily. If we can settle the problem peacefully, we will."

THE PRINCE, who spoke in French with reporters for 45 minutes in his modest single-story home on the edge of Vientiane, said he didn't think the peaceful capital would be threatened in the current offensive, which is the biggest attack by the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese in 10 years.

"There are no roads to get to Vientiane from Long Cheng," the prince said. Long Cheng, the site of a former supersecret U.S. CIA base and training center, is the scene of heavy fighting, often hand to hand, as Laotian government troops try to push back at least 6,000 Communist troops.

SOUVANNA said the current offensive was designed to show both the United States and Mainland China that before there can be any settlement of Indochina's problems, Hanoi must be dealt with.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Signs of the Time

Every year about this time, U.S. military men in Saigon begin playing a nerve-racking game sometimes called "Tonight's the Night." The rules are simple enough: as the Tet celebrations approach, U.S. officials declare that there is mounting evidence of a large North Vietnamese buildup. And thereafter, day after day, they suggest that "this might be the night" the Communists will strike. Inspired by the bloody Tet offensive of 1968, such predictions have had a somewhat hollow ring in the last few years. But this year there has been a renewed interest in the game among even the coolest observers. For with Tet still a month away, there are not only signs that the Communists will show up, but that they have already made their first moves.

Among the more ominous straws in the wind last week:

■ At the mammoth U.S. military installation at Utapao, 90 miles south of the Thai capital of Bangkok, Communist sappers planted explosive devices under several B-52 bombers. Two of the 45 big jets at the base were damaged and U.S. officials admitted that the Communists had the capability to strike again.

■ Under orders to fall back to protect Saigon, the South Vietnamese Airborne and Eighteenth Infantry divisions pulled out of the town of Krek in eastern Cambodia and headed for home. No sooner had they left than the 2,400 men of the 22nd Cambodian Brigade scampered across the border right behind them. "The commandant told us we were not strong enough to fight," said one Cambodian soldier. "He said we should all leave Krek. So we did."

■ Over the past few weeks, advancing North Vietnamese forces have driven most of the Meo tribesmen who constitute the CIA's "secret army" in Laos out of their base at Long Tieng in northern Laos. Last week, with only a handful of Meo mercenaries continuing to contest the Communists in the surrounding hills, Long Tieng—once the center of the unavowed U.S. war effort in Laos—was all but defenseless. Its fall would offer the Communists practically an open road to the capital of Vientiane 70 miles away.

In short, across the length and breadth of Indochina last week, there seemed little doubt that the Communists had begun to orchestrate a major offensive. And it appeared equally obvious that the far-flung campaign was calculated to build to a crescendo within the next month—at the very kickoff of the Presidential election campaign in the U.S., and just before President Nixon arrives in Peking. Moreover, the Communists had chosen their targets shrewdly. For in concentrating on Laos and Cambodia, they were hitting where the Administration was barred from committing ground forces and where Washington's local allies were the weakest.

By so doing, the Communists, psychologically at least, had thrown Washington on the defense. In an apparent attempt to counter the spate of gloomy headlines from Indochina, Mr. Nixon decided to announce the latest phase of U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam several weeks earlier than had been expected (page 10). And in another indication of Administration concern, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird took the withdrawal statement as an occasion to boast again about the progress of Vietnamization.

There may well have been some truth in his claims. But in fact, for the time being at least, the focal point of Communist pressure was not in South Vietnam but in Cambodia and Laos—two countries that until a couple of years ago had been considered only sideshows to the larger drama in Indochina. Ironically, it was the Nixon Administration's decision to "buy time" for South Vietnam by expanding the war into the rest of Indochina that permitted Hanoi to dramatize the vulnerability of the President's policy.

UPI

Retreating Cambodian. son in South Vietnam

In Cambodia, the cost of that policy has been particularly steep. Over the past few weeks, units of tough North Vietnamese troops have pummeled the hapless Cambodian Army in battle after battle. Although no official casualty figures are available, nearly 1,000 men were said to have been lost in a single recent operation along Route 6 just north of Phnom Penh. As a result of such setbacks, many Cambodian units are gravely demoralized. Moreover, despite American efforts to train and equip the Cambodians, they have been unable to stop the Communists from using Cambodia as a sanctuary and supply route for attacks on South Vietnam. Indeed, as a result of the fighting that has swept through their country in the past two years, the Cambodians find that well over 50 per cent of their land area and more than 20 per cent of their population is under Communist control. And, unhappily, in the target areas for the allied invasions—the so-called sanctuaries adjacent to South Vietnam—the Communists appear to be operating with as much effectiveness as ever before.

In Laos, the story is not appreciably better. There, too, the Communists have totally blunted the aims of earlier allied incursions. Just a year ago, the U.S. Command sent South Vietnamese Army units into the Laotian pandhandle to destroy North Vietnamese supply routes and to establish fire bases around the key crossroads town of Tchepone. But the ARVN suffered stunning military reverses in that operation and since then the Communists have moved to expand the vast Ho Chi Minh Trail network. Last week, the U.S. Command announced that the North Vietnamese have recently installed a battery of SAM surface-to-air missiles near Tchepone. To counter that buildup, U.S. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand has reportedly urged the South Vietnamese to go back into Laos. The ARVN answer so far: no way.

Poised: Indeed, the South Vietnamese have more than enough problems at home to keep them busy for some time to come. In the central highlands, in particular, there are numerous signs of an impending Communist offensive. According to U.S. intelligence reports, some 50 North Vietnamese tanks have already surrounded the ARVN base camp at Ben Het. At the same time, Hanoi's crack 320th Infantry Division has begun to move south from the Demilitarized Zone and is soon expected to join up with the five regiments already poised west of the key provincial capitals of Kontum and Pleiku.

Despite this rapid buildup, the U.S. Command in Saigon insisted last week that the South Vietnamese could hold their own in a head-on clash with the North Vietnamese. And, without exception, the U.S. brass professed to believe that the Communists could not mount a campaign on the scale of the 1968 Tet offensive. As always, however, that confidence was tinged with some doubt. "They could overrun Ben Het or someplace like that if they wanted to," said Brig. Gen. George E. Wear, the top U.S. adviser in the highlands, "but I don't see how that would have much political impact. And if we keep Pleiku screened, they shouldn't be able to really get in on us. But then they shouldn't have been [illegible] they did."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160

[redacted]

STATINTL

LANSING, MICH.
JOURNAL
JAN 23 1972
E - 81,637
S - 83,576

Major Refugee Area Once a Tiny Village

By ANNE DARLING
State Journal Special Writer

BAN ZONG, Laos—The unlikely assortment of people who cross paths each day at this dusty valley outpost in northern Laos includes soldiers, refugees, American public health and relief workers, Central Intelligence Agency employes, pilots, Filipino construction workers and a Chinese restaurateur.

Three years ago there was one tiny village in the valley and a bamboo pole with a flag on it. Now, where the pole was, is an airstrip long enough to accommodate bulky C-130 cargo planes. Refugee settlements are scatted across the valley. There are schools, prefabricated houses, a 140-bed hospital and a snack bar called Pop's Palace.

WHEN SAM Thong, to the north, fell to the North Vietnamese, this became the new base of operation for the refugee relief program of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Now that Long Cheng, south of Sam Thong, is threatened military operations for the region are being carried out from here as well.

The Americans fly into Site 272, Ban Zong's code name, and the refugees come by foot. But all are here because of the war.

The refugees, estimated at 10,000, are Meo tribesmen for the most part. Some have been here long enough to plant rice on the hillsides. Others fled their villages recently, in the wake of advancing North Vietnamese units.

"EVERY DAY they come through looking for a plane ride to Vientiane," said one pilot of the dozens of women and children sitting alongside the airstrip next to meager bundles of household belongings. "But we aren't evacuating now. So they stay and we feed them or they move on by foot."

All of the equipment in sight at Ban Xong—from the jeeps and choppers and small planes that line the busy runway to the surgical tools at the hospital—were paid for by American dollars.

The primitive but clean little hospital is "full up these days," said Dr. Gene Kirkley of the USAID public health staff. About half of the patients were wounded in battles or in accidents with weapons. The rest suffer from malaria, pneumonia, parasites and malnutition.

"THEY'RE SICK all right," said Kirkley. "As sick as any people I've ever seen anywhere."

'As one 28-year-old Meo woman with malaria lay on a hospital bed, a man prepared an opium pipe for her to smoke. The doctor said the woman "may be smoking to relieve pain but she looks like an addict."

Across from her was a 12-year-old boy shoe hand was blown off in a grenade explosion. "It's a wonder they don't all get kill," said Kirkley.

DOWN A hill from the hospital is the snack bar in stilts, gathering place for the Americans. The men in grey uniforms work for Air America, the private CIA airline that also serves USAID on contract.

Pilots for Air American and Continental Airlines fly in daily with military supplies and foodd for refugees. They fly out often with the sick and wounded, those cases too serious for Kirkley's staff to handle.

Many of the USAID relief workers have been in Laos for years and are able to speak Lao. The soldiers at Ban Xong are Lao and Thia. The CIA people, many of whom were in Vietnam and now are on contract to the Agency, are assigned to Lao army units.

MOST OF the pilots and CIA employes wear their "pound of gold," chunky 18-carat ID bracelets. One young CIA adviser entered Pop's in a turtleneck sweater and bell bottom dungarees, with bullet clips criss-crossing his chest and pistol and knife slung low on his hips. Another, with sliced-back hair and daggar tatto on his forearm, carried a pistol in a shoulder holster beneath a sheepskin vest to which was pinned a big silver star that read "Sheriff."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 JAN 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

[redacted]

More North Vietnamese Units on March Than Ever Before

Saigon Intelligence Baffled by Movements of 14 Divisions, Dozens of Battalions in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—Somewhere within the North Vietnamese Defense Ministry in Hanoi there is certainly a top-secret war room.

It is safe to guess that one end of the room is covered by the sliding panels and multicolored maps without which even Hanoi's generals would find the Indochina war baffling.

It is no guess at all that these maps now show more major North Vietnamese units on the move and in "foreign" territory than at any time during the war.

With major subordinate commands operating from the Plain of Jars in Laos to the Elephant Mountains 600 miles to the south in Cambodia, it is evident that Hanoi's military brass is staying busy—and this without even considering operations in South Vietnam.

At a time when American ground combat strength has fallen to 12 infantry battalions, Hanoi's commander in chief, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, is directing the affairs of 14 divisions (not counting his reserve forces and militia troops inside North Vietman.)

In addition to these division-sized units, Giap's "order of battle" includes literally dozens of infantry, artillery and sapper regiments and battalions operating independently.

Since many of these units are well below strength—and some are "paper" outfits mainly intended to spook enemy intelligence officers—it is hazardous to use them as a base to estimate Giap's manpower. Consensus estimates, however, indicate that North Vietnam's expeditionary forces number perhaps 150,000 combat troops and about 100,000 supply and service people.

On paper, the North Vietnamese are overwhelmingly outnumbered by their opponents. South Vietnam alone has 1 million regular and militia forces under arms. Cambodia's armed forces number 200,000. Even Laos can muster 100,000 regulars, tribal guerrillas and militia forces. (American forces in South Vietnam numbered 148,100 Monday. However, only one of 12 is an actual gun-toting infantryman. In fact, most casualties nowadays are helicopter crewmen.)

In practice, these numbers have less meaning.

Only South Vietnam's thinly spread regular army of 500,000 men has developed an ability to stand up to Hanoi's regulars, and even Saigon's regulars couldn't do it consistently without air power.

The hastily mustered Cambodian army, which mushroomed from a poorly trained force of 35,000 only 18 months ago, is far from ready. Though it is getting one freshly trained battalion each week from U.S.-financed training camps in South Vietnam, its overall performance is rising slowly.

Lao Army Reluctant

Among the peaceful people of Laos the royal army and militia forces never cared much for fighting. In the old days, before the North Vietnamese intervened, some kind of "arrangement" was almost invariably worked out with the indigenous Pathet Lao guerrillas. The Meo tribal forces led by Gen. Vang Pao and financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, are rated as top-notch guerrilla fighters in their own jungled country, but much less effective as stand-up warriors. Their number, now perhaps 20,000, has been dwindling each year.

One major aim of this year's campaign in the Plain of Jars was to deal a possibly lethal blow to Vang Pao's forces. That would leave only the ineffectual royal Lao forces in North Vietnam's path—with the likely result that Hanoi could bring unbearable pressure against the royal Lao government in Vientiane.

In the fighting so far in the Plain of Jars and around the CIA-Vang Pao base at Long Cheng the North Vietnamese have yet to commit all the forces they have on hand—the 312th and 316th regular divisons plus at least three more regiments made up into a still unidentified division.

It was the movement of these units from bases closer to the North Vietnamese frontier that opened this season's campaign about four months ago.

While these movements had been expected (the 316th and 312th have traditionally operated in Laos), Hanoi soon upset Saigon's intelligence community with more movements—some of which are still puzzling.

They began cautiously moving up reserve units that had been generally out of the "order of battle" since the bloody fighting last February when South Vietnam invaded the Laotian panhandle.

Bugs on Supply Trail

"They were shifting around sort of like the defensive men in a football game," one analyst said. "First they would dodge here and then there. It was hard to figure out what they were going to do."

Aerial photos and such exotic devices as sensors which can pick up voice conversations on the Ho Chi Minh Trail have now given Saigon's military intelligence people a fair handle on these movements.

While officers at headquarters profess no alarms, they admit, "We haven't seen this much movement in a long time."

In addition to Laos—where the weather for campaigning will be more or less favorable until April — the likely flashpoints are:

—The B-3 front — This is the name applied to the jungled area of the Central Highlands where the borders of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam meet. In this area elements of the North Vietnamese 304th and 308th divisions are already installed.

February Attacks

A third division—the 320th—is en route down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into the B-3 area. The Communist troop concentration, backed by tank units, is the greatest ever known in the area. Although some of these men may infiltrate farther south it is more likely that they will launch attacks on the spot,

Continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
23 JAN 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3
STATINTL

Souvanna Phouma Says More U.S. Help Isn't Needed Yet

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 22—Despite the most serious North Vietnamese campaign of recent years in northern Laos, the Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, said today that his Government would not ask the United States for more military aid, "unless the situation gets worse."

Speaking at a news conference, Prince Souvanna Phouma said that the North Vietnamese forces were equipped with new and better arms—130-mm long-range artillery, provided by the Soviet Union—while "we are still equipped with old arms."

The North Vietnamese have driven the Government's troops and American-supported irregular forces off the Plaine des Jarres and have forced the abandonment of most operations at the Long Tieng base, about 30 miles south of the plain.

American officials here have said that even under the current aid program, because of heavy losses of equipment and casualties suffered by Government troops and Thai "mercenaries," as the Premier called them today, they may ask Congress for more money above the $350-million annual ceiling imposed by the Senate last October.

These losses include 20 artillery pieces left by the 8,000 Thai and Laotian forces swept off the plain last month, outgunned by the North Vietnamese.

Yesterday, according to authorities here, four more 155-mm guns were lost when North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops drove the defenders from Government positions at Phou Khoun, northwest of Long Tieng, 100 miles north of Vientiane and south of the royal capital at Luang Prabang.

Fighting Heavy on Ridge

At Long Tieng itself, heavy fighting between the Government forces and North Vietnamese regulars continued yesterday on the bombed-out Skyline Ridge, which dominates the northern side of the base. Government forces lost one position on to po fthe ridge yesterday morning, but then recaptured it in the afternoon at a wounded, according to informants here.

Many of these troops are regular Laotian troops and the Meo special forces that used to operate there.

The base's purely military significance has been greatly diminished since early January, when the Central Intelligence Agency withdrew its communications and surveillance equipment from Long Tieng and planes stopped landing on the airstrip because of Communist artillery fire.

An American pilot stationed here said that United States Air Force search-and-rescue helicopters which used to pluck downed American pilots out of the jungle, had also been stationed at Long Tieng but had has withdrawn to bases far to the south of Thailand. The crew of an Air Force Phantom jet bomber that was shot down Thursday in the mountains near the Plaine des Jarres had to be rescued by a civilian Air America helicopter, the pilot said.

Policy Stands, Prince Says

Prince Souvanna Phouma, who has allowed the United States to conduct bombing in his country since May, 1964 said today that he had not changed his conditions for acceding to Communist demands for an end to the bombing. His position has been that he would not order an end to the bombing until the North Vietnamese withdrew their forces, estimated at 50,000 to 90,000 men, from his country, both in the mountains to the north and on the Ho Chi Minh supply trails in the south.

But on Jan. 14 the Premier told a correspondent of the Voice of America that "we would agree to a cessation of the bombing if we had a guarantee that the North Vietnamese would not reinforce their troops in Laos," which suggested to many diplomatic observers here, a shift in emphasis.

Nixon's Trip Is Cited

Most Western diplomats here believe that there are two principal reasons for the current North Vietnamese offensive.

First, they say, tthe North Vienamese want an end to the bombing of their supply trails. Second, as one European ambassador put it, "They want to show their allies in Moscow and Peking, before President Nixon makes his visits there, that the North Vietnamese have their own independent foreign policy and will accept no settlement made behind their backs."

73 of Foe Reported Slain

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 22 (AP)—The South Vietnamese command reported that 35 enemy soldiers were killed in a series of skirmishes in South Vietnam today, and South Korean headquarters said its troops had killed 38 more of the enemy.

The heaviest ground fighting, the Saigon command said, came in the coastal province of Binhdinh, long considered a Vietcong stronghold.

Military spokesmen said the most severe South Vietnamese losses were suffered when two militia outposts two miles apart near Annhon in Binhdinh were attacked simultaneously. The spokesmen said four militiamen had been killed and four wounded but that at least 28 Vietcong had been killed.

The United States Command announced the loss of a light-observation helicopter in the Central Highlands in Pleiku Province and that one crewman had been killed and another wounded. It was the fourth American helicopter reported lost to enemy fire in five days.



The New York Times/Jan. 23, 1972
Enemy forces took over Phou Khoun (1) in Laos and hit near Annhon (2) in central South Vietnam.

Mansfield Doubts Increase

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22 (AP)—The Senate Democratic Leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, said today that he doubted that Congress would approve additional funds for operations in Laos and Cambodia. "The Senate wouldn't stand for increased involvement in either of these two countries," he said.

Report Airfield Falls

VIENTANE, Jan. 22 Agence France-Presse)—The airfield and military post of Mouong Phou, 28 miles southeast of the key road junction at Phou Khoun, fell to North Vietnamese and other Communist forces today, military sources reported here.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

23 JAN 1972

Thai Coup Has Caused Few Changes

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service

BANGKOK, Jan. 22—Since their coup against Parliament two months ago, Thailand's ruling generals have declared themselves against crime, pollution and late night drinking and in favor of efficiency in government.

The streets are cleaner and, one is told blandly, the trains are running on time.

The generals, a Bangkok English language newspaper observed the other day, have "absolute power. . . (and) the only good thing about absolute power is that it can act with speed and precision."

In all, the junta has issued 47 major decrees, including ones dissolving political parties, abolishing local elections and prohibiting strikes.

When the occasion demands, justice also has become a summary proposition.

A pimp named Thep Kwankeo charged with murdering an American Air Force colonel near one of the bases used by U.S. bombers was ordered executed the next day by a firing squad. The shooting was broadcast live on television.

That was calculated, successfully it turns out, to discourage crime. As for pollution, the generals announced heavy penalties for vehicles and boats whose noise or fumes were excessive. Their latest edict will close all bars and restaurants at night.

The stern, new drinking hours are intended to help the Thais save money. The various proprietors are predictably dismayed.

Their complaints, however, are virtually the only significant response recorded so far to the flurry of activity. By and large, the coup seems to be accepted for what it was, a return to the old ways with the same leaders and no more nagging, squabbling parliamentarians.

It had, after all, been only three years since the country's first elections and the public had little reason to be impressed with what the widely corrupted elected representatives had accomplished.

The economy was in a slump because of the low world price for rice and lagging tourism; Communist insurgencies in the north, mortheast and south were still small but getting worse.

On the diplomatic side, the United States, Thailand's mentor, was pulling out of Southeast Asia, leaving war raging just beyond the 700 miles of Thai border with Laos and Cambodia.

At the same time, the United States was flirting with China, Thailand's neighbor to the north that has been building a road straight through Laos, now reaching to only a few miles from the Thai frontier. The cumulative effect of it all was unsettling, even to the easy-going Thais.

So on the evening of Nov. 17, the generals eliminated the legislature, cabinet and constitution. They imposed martial law and proclaimed themselves a revolutionary party. That title was subsequently modified to "National Executive Council."

To date, in spite of all the decrees, the generals haven't really changed very much.

Security remains, exactly as it was before, the province of Field Marshal Thanom Kittakachorn and the other principal figure in the junta (some say the real strongman) Gen. Prapass Charusathien.

If anything, the insurgencies have flared up more than ever lately. This week there were two incidents involving the deaths of a total of 28 policemen, with one incident involving an ambush on Thanom's own bodyguards.

The war in Laos has also taken a turn for the worse, requiring, according to U.S. sources, that more CIA-supported Thai volunteers be sent to fight there, bringing the total to about 10,000.

Another disturbing note is that North Vietnamese radio propaganda against the regime has picked up sharply, analysts here say. The broadcasts are directed against the presence of U.S. bombers at five Thai bases from which the bulk of the air campaign against Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam is conducted. In all, the number of U.S. forces in Thailand still stands at 32,000.

Foreign policy has remained essentially static because the Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, was removed and not replaced. The official stand on China as expressed by the National Executive Council is:

"If China is not hostile to us, we are ready to be friends and we will respond to them."

That view does not reflect, as some thought likely, any great reversal of the tentative steps taken by Thanat toward improving relations with Peking. Nor does such a reversal seem likely.

When Thailand's United Nations delegate Sanga Kittikachorn returned from the General Assembly session last month, much was made in the press of a cocktail chat, described as "cordial," he had with a Chinese representative.

On the other hand, nothing substantive on the subject of China is likely to happen either, because, as one Thai journalist pointed out with a smile, "Thanat is the only one smart enough to know what to do."

Thanat, a French-educated lawyer who had been foreign minister since 1958, is now meditating in a monastery. But it seems possible that the junta will recall him because they can't think of anyone better qualified.

As yet, neither the insurgencies, nor the greater questions of diplomacy have had any effect on the lives of most of the 35 million Thais, struggling to get along as rice farmers and earning an annual per capita income of $175.

To counter uncertainty about the future sale of rice, the junta announced a plan to provide a guaranteed price to farmers and a system of agricultural credits. A 20-man committee was appointed to oversee the measure and observers predict that the effort will get bogged down in procedure.

Corruption remains a serious problem. The junta moved to correct that by promising raises to civil servants, but after tallying the costs, it announced that the raises would have to wait until next year.

When they staged their coup, the generals talked about restoring a cabinet and an interim constitution paving the way to new elections in a matter of months. There is still no cabinet, and no one even speculates seriously on when the first steps back to democracy will be made.

"It's still a matter of months," said one ranking American with a wink.

Even a Thai university professor named Sulak Siveraksa, who considers himself one of the most outspoken critics of the junta concedes, "We are not too bad off compared with our neighbors. My objection is that we don't know how to handle what we've got."

The insurgents, many of whom are tribal highlanders long abused by the Bangkok authorities, are a genuine opposition, but they number no more than 5,000. Americans say the Thais can take care of the guerrillas.

With the events of Nov. 17, Thailand's experiment in democracy failed and, for the moment at least, the Thais seem content to leave it at that.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON STAR
8 JAN 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00
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Indochina War Showdown Expected Soon In Congress

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

The signs are growing on Capitol Hill that the Nixon administration faces an early 1972 showdown on the war in Indochina.

Administration officials, reportedly through Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley in Laos, have begun suggesting publicly that the ceilings on American expenditures in Laos and Cambodia endanger the security of both countries.

And the leading opponents of the war in the Senate are preparing for a pitched battle with the President to maintain the ceilings at their present levels.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, D-Mont., plans to address the Senate tomorrow on the deteriorating military situation in Laos and Cambodia.

There for the Grabbing

Yesterday in an interview Mansfield said that both countries were "there for the grabbing" by Communist forces, that he doubted that the Congress would approve more funds above the ceilings set last year for American aid and that "the Senate wouldn't stand for increased (American) involvement in either of these countries."

Mansfield said that recent military pressure from the Communist forces in both Laos and Cambodia indicated to him "they are still in good shape and they are going to keep on coming. The war will wind down only when there is a complete American withdrawal from all of Indochina."

He said he would reintroduce "at the first propitious opportunity" his amendment calling for complete force withdrawals within six months. The Mansfield amendment was approved unanimously last week by the Democratic Policy Committee of the Senate, and it may be voted on at a party caucus, where it could be expected to pass overwhelmingly.

SEN. MIKE MANSFIELD

President Nixon signed a modified version of the amendment last year as part of the military procurement act, but he announced at the time that he would ignore it as having "no force and effect."

Mansfield said he was disturbed at "statements emanating out of Laos by some U.S. officials to the effect that $350 million is not enough and may well be responsible for the advance of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops."

"That kind of reasoning is very shallow. It sounds like an excuse for their failures," he added.

In the last session of Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote limitations into the U.S. expenditures for both Laos and Cambodia. The figure or Laos was $350 million and for Cambodia $341 million, but in each case the ceilings were considerably modified to exclude American expenditures for bombing and for support of South Vietnamese troops in the two neighboring countries.

The language of the cutoff proposals made it illegal for the administration to transfer funds above the ceilings into Laos or Cambodia from some other appropriation.

In both cases the ceilings represented approximately the amount of money the administration had asked for. But in past years the administration has spent beyond its appropriation and returned to Congress for the money after the fact.

Ambassador Godley, who usually talks to reporters only on a basis where he cannot be identified, was quoted in a number of news accounts appearing in U.S. newspapers Friday.

Strategic Base Visited

The Central Intelligence Agency, which has about 300 men operating in Laos, invited newsmen last week to visit the well known but highly secret base at LongCheng,which resulted in a number of stories reporting that the strategic base was in danger of being overrun.

Godley said the ceilings on U.S. expenditures in Laos "may cause difficulties for this mission in maintaining its assistance to the Royal Laotian government."

And an unidentified official, also believed to be Godley, told reporters "Maybe one of the reasons the enemy is attacking so heavily here now is because of this amendment," meaning the ceiling on expenditures. "It just shows the tragedy of trying to put a ceiling on the war."

These remarks, as reported by the New York Times, were reprinted in the Congressional Record yesterday along with an attack on them by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., a sponsor of the ceiling, and Majority Whip Robert C. Byrd, D-W. Va., a generally conservative ally of President Nixon on matters such as the Indochina war.

The ceilings were approved last year with a wide spectrum of support in the Senate, and it is likely that the administration would have great difficulty in getting them removed.

Byrd told his colleagues on the floor Friday: "The reason Congress feels impelled to place ceilings on such amounts derives from the very fact that we do have such bureaucrats . . . who place no rein or check on their visionary activities."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

22 JAN 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0006 STATINTL
STATINTL

Nixon's 'State of Union' message

AN 'OUTLINE FOR WAR,' U.S. COMMUNISTS SAY

NEW YORK, Jan. 21—Gus Hall, Communist Party candidate for President, today blasted the Nixon "State of the Union" speech as "an outline for a generation of wars and aggression," and branded as "nonsense" the comment of the Democratic candidates that the speech was "empty and hollow."

Emphasizing that the Nixon message was an outline for a generation of wars and aggression, Hall continued:

"That is the meaning," said Hall, "of statements like 'nuclear deterrent for U.S. or our allies,' 'faithfully honoring all our treaty commitments,' 'we will act to defend our interests wherever and whenever they are threatened any place in the world.'

"These treaties and commitments are all a part of the worldwide network of U.S. imperialist aggression and oppression.

"'We will act wherever or whenever' is the voice of imperialist aggression.

"'Where our treaty commitments are not involved our role is limited' is the voice of the CIA and its unpronounced act of aggression. It is the voice of infiltration. It is the plan for the Laos-type of aggression which the CIA has conducted for the past 10 years without the knowledge of the American people.

Voice of monopoly

"The Democratic candidates for President all stated that Nixon's State of the Union remarks were empty and hollow. This is nonsense. Nixon's statement to the joint session of Congress is a concrete outline for the escalation of a reactionary program of big business. It was the voice of monopoly capital for more profits. It was an unprecedented [illegible]

"Never in the history of the country has a President used the State of the Union message to publicly attack a strike, as he did in his attack on the West Coast Longshoremen. It was a call for more anti-labor legislation. It was a call for more wage cuts.

"What's empty about that?

"Nixon's message was a call for more taxes on the people. Behind talk of eliminating property taxes, what Nixon is really after is the elimination of corporate property taxes. It is clear he plans to propose more and new taxes on the people.

"What's empty about that?

Free hand to racists

"He outlined a program of retreat on civil rights. A program of retreat for civil rights is a policy of giving the racists a free hand.

"What's empty about that?

"There was much talk of peace

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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WASHINGTON POST
22 JAN 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

Laos to Get More Thai Mercenaries

By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service

BANGKOK, Jan. 21—The number of CIA supported Thai soldiers serving in Laos will be increased in the coming months to contend with the worsening military situation there, according to senior U.S. sources here.

The sources declined to say how many additional Thais would be sent, but unofficial estimates are that the present total, fixed variously at from 4,800 to 6,000, may be as much as doubled.

The Thai battalions have been taking very heavy casualties in the Communist dry-season offensive that began in mid-December, so the first job is to reorganize existing units and bring them up to strength.

Like those Thais already there, the reinforcements will be "volunteers," ostensibly recruited from outside the regular Thai Army and trained by the CIA to serve as mercenaries attached to the Laotian government forces.

Placing them officially under Laotian command (although each unit has Thai officers) is a technicality designed to meet the letter of Congressional restrictions on American financing of third-country forces in Cambodia and Laos.

The United States role in mounting the Thai contingent has been bitterly criticized by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A staff report said the CIA supervises and pays for the training of the Thais and "provides their salary, allowances. . . and operational costs in Laos."

Committee sources said last summer that the United States may have spent as much as $35 million to finance the Thais in Laos—roughly $7,000 per man a year.

Until very recently, Thailand maintained about 10,000 regular troops in South Vietnam, but the Thais have scrupulously avoided any official connection with the troops in Laos.

The repeated assertions of government leaders here have been that any Thai nationals serving in Laos have simply chosen on their own to work for the Laotians. Sometimes it is added that by battling the Communists in Laos, these patriots are helping meet the threat against Thailand.

Geneva Accords

By disassociating themselves from the troops, Americans here explain, the Thais cannot be accused of violating the provisions of the 1962 Geneva accords which prohibited introduction of foreign forces into Laos.

"From start to finish, the whole business is diplomatic and military sleight of hand," said a long-time American expert in Thai affairs. (For their part, the North Vietnamese also will not admit to having many thousands of troops in Laos.)

On the whole, Thais have greeted the issue of the troops lackadasically. Certainly the families of casualties know who they are and one Thai-owned English-language paper printed a news agency account of 200 Thais being killed in one battle at Paksong.

But no local opposition to the Thais being in Laos has been recorded. Indeed, Thai journalists and intellectuals interviewed in the past few days agreed that the presence of troops there would probably be applauded if Thai public opinion could be accurately tested.

Nagging Insurgency

With war raging just beyond Thai borders and nagging insurgency within them, popular sentiment appears to favor whatever steps are necessary to preserve the country's peace and relative prosperity.

In the past month or so while the situation in Laos has deteriorated, there has been an upturn in the number of incidents attributed to guerrillas in Thailand's northern and southern regions.

Some of the incidents have been serious. Yesterday, for example, 16 policemen were killed in an attack on a "special operations base" in a remote northern district. Police said about 200 Communist Meo hill-tribesmen were involved, armed with B-40 rockets.

Then too, there was a demolition team attack earlier this [illegible] in which a B-52 was slighly damaged. One day in Kembern in scattered fighting 35 Thai security forces were killed.

Analysts think any connection between external and internal events should not be exaggerated, but do note that North Vietnamese propaganda against the Thai regime has been harsher and more persistent lately.

U.S. Bombers

The vitriol has been primarily directed at the presence of American bombers in Thailand. The broadcasts threaten "punishment" to the Thais for allowing "American use of Thailand as a springboard."

"Putting it all together," said one American diplomatic source, "I guess you could say there is a kind of offensive under way here, but, of course, it doesn't begin to compare with what is happening in Laos."

So far the government has dispatched more gunboats to the Mekong River with Laos and has placed troops in critical areas on alert, but neither step is regarded as especially meaningful.

"Why they've been having red scares for so long, no ones knows what they mean anymore," said one young Thai civil servant, "How can we tell the difference between what is always serious and what is very serious?"

Thai Concern

There are indications, however, that the Thai leadership is very concerned about the implications of the worsening situation in Laos.

"It is our first line of defense," commented one Thai official," If it falls, we must be prepared."

Earlier this month, Prime Minister Thanom Kiitakachorn met with Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, to discuss what was officially described as "the war situation in Laos."

Details of the session were never made public, but informed Thai sources said various "contingency plans" were discussed, along with the question of sending the Laotians more "volunteers."

The Thai battalions already serving in Laos have been located at firebases in the northeast on the Plain of Jars and around the embattled CIA base at Long Cheng. In the south, they operated on the Bolovens Plateau.

In the very heavy fighting on the Plain of Jars last month, sources in Vientiane reported, the Thai casualties outnumbered those of the Laotian irregulars by about two-to-one. The same was generally true in the south.

Some observers speculated that the Communists might be bearing down particularly hard on the Thais in an effort to discourage others from coming. Another theory has it that the Thias were merely poorer, less disciplined fighters than their Laotian and Meo allies.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
22 JAN 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601
STATINTL

Laotian Base Reported Overrun, Then Retaken

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 21—The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency base in Long Cheng was apparently overrun by Communist forces at least one day last week despite denials by U.S. spokesmen in the Laotian capital.

Reports gathered by a group of foreign journalists who visited the scene with CIA representatives earlier this week suggested that the Communists took over the base, 78 miles north of here.

Current defense positions in the base which the Laotians once more hold and disclosure by CIA sources at Long Cheng that the strategic defenses had been abandoned, but never announced here, led knowledgable analysts to concede that Radio Pathet Lao was correct in announcing the Communist seizure of the base on Jan. 12.

The report was later substantiated by Laotian sources on the scene. But U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane denied that the base had been captured.

Although progovernment troops under command of Gen. Vang Pao have retaken all of Long Cheng valley, and claim control of Skyline, a ridge along the north side of the base, the enemy holds mountains north and northeast of Long Cheng, making the entire defense network questionable, qualified analysts say.

[Enemy forces overran some government position on the ridge and hand-to-hand fighting was reported for the control of the Long Cheng base, AP reported from Vientiane.

[The enemy attack began last night with a heavy bombardment by North Vietnamese mortars and artillery followed by an infantry assault against the government-held bunker complex, the agency said.]

Long Cheng is a complex defense network encompassing about 15 square miles centered around the former base of operation for the CIA-supported army of Gen. Vang Pao. Vang Pao's headquarters, along with that of the CIA, have been moved 20 miles southwest of Long Cheng.

Last month's Communist offensive that recaptured the Plain of Jars and cost the Laotian force at least 1,000 dead and wounded in two days of combat drove the army completely within the headquarters complex, which itself was being torn apart by the advancing enemy.

According to information released by both Laotian and American government spokesmen here, however, a tenable defense system closed in behind the retreating Meo-Thai force and blunted the enemy advance.

More recent information from other sources, however, indicates that Skyline itself was taken by the enemy, Long Cheng valley was under their control for at least one day and Communist forces, stretched thin in their rush on Long Cheng valley from the Plain of Jars, were advancing beyond the valley when the offensive was blunted by Laotian and Thai reinforcements assitsed by heavy bombing, including B-52 strikes.

By the time reporters were flown to Long Cheng for the first time this week the enemy advance had been rolled back to Skyline where progovernment troops were continuing to counterattack to gain control of the high ground commanding the valley.

Beyond Skyline, however, the enemy waits in strength, holding the high ground gained more than a week ago but never announced by Laotian authorities as abandoned.

Based on briefings from CIA officials (who could not be identified under the ground rules) on the scene at midweek, observers here say that less than half the 15 square miles of the Long Cheng complex remains in progovernment hands and that its defenders depend heavily upon American air strikes to maintain that hold.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

STATINTL

further promote equal employment opportunities for American workers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair announces that the Senate will resume the consideration of amendment No. 611.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Colorado is recognized.

(The remarks of Mr. DOMINICK when he introduced S. 3056 are printed in the routine morning business section of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

LAOS AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, it was indeed disturbing to note some of the comments contained in an article in the New York Times this morning with respect to the current situation in Laos and the possible future effect of the $350 million "ceiling" which Congress placed on U.S. expenditures in that country for this current fiscal year.

Of particular concern was an incredible quote from a high-ranking official who the Times said asked not to be identified. This official said:

> Maybe one of the reasons the enemy is attacking so heavily here now is because of this amendment. It just shows the tragedy of trying to put a ceiling on any way.

Anyone familiar with the situation in Laos would have little difficulty in identifying this so-called high-ranking official who insists on hiding behind the much-too-frequently-used "background-er wall;" and the fact that he—in view of his knowledge about the details involved in adopting this amendment—would make such a statement is hard to understand.

In the first place, this informant is well aware that this $350 million ceiling excludes the costs of United States bombing in Laos, by far the greatest part of the continuing American air war in that country.

Second, it should be pointed out that this amendment was accepted in the Senate by a vote of 67 to 11. We were told at that time that this amount was what the administration expected to spend in the next fiscal year in Laos; again, exclusive of the bombing. The ceiling figure, also accepted by the House and now a matter of law, is therefore that of the administration, not the Congress.

In addition, at the time this amendment was considered it was made clear that if the administration found that additional funds were needed, a supplementary request could be made to the Congress.

The language of the legislative provision itself—

> No funds may be obligated or expended for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act.

It clearly shows that there is nothing to prevent this administration from making an additional request for funds to carry out United States operations in Laos.

This Times story quotes Ambassador Godley by name as saying that:

> The amendment may cause difficulties for this mission in maintaining its assistance to the Royal Laotian Government.

What difficulties? The difficulty of coming to the Congress and saying, "The amount of money we told you was needed is not enough"? The difficulty of telling the Congress and the American taxpayer what these funds are to be used for?

I ask unanimous consent that the article in question—"Laos Losses Spur Calls for More Aid"—be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LAOS LOSSES SPUR CALL FOR MORE AID—AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ENEMY'S DRIVE—SOME SECRECY LIFTED

(By Craig R. Whitney)

VIENTIANE, LAOS, Jan. 20.—Concern about the unusually powerful and early Communist offensive in Laos has grown so intense that the United States Government has lifted much of the secrecy it maintained over its efforts here and is saying that, far from doing too much, the Americans are doing too little and the Administration may ask for more money.

The American establishment in Vientiane—including the Ambassador, G. McMurtrie Godley, about 300 men of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the more than 100 Army and Air Force attaches—does not normally speak for attribution. In recent private background interviews, however, and during a trip that the intelligence agency sponsored to the long-secret guerrilla base and airfield at Long Tieng, officials made their concern clear.

A senior American official said that the embassy would probably run out of military and economic aid money for Laos well before the end of the fiscal year this June unless Congress raised the $350-million ceiling on it. The reason, he said, was the serious toll of the American-backed guerrilla and regular Laotian forces since the intense Communist attack began last month and the need for bullets, bombs and artillery shells. The Administration may have to ask for more, the official added.

The Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, is aware of the restrictions on American aid. A European diplomat who saw him recently said today that the Prince was growing discouraged and reported: "He says, 'What can we do? Maybe we'll have to give up.'"

The $350-million limit was imposed by Congress as an amendment to the Administration's military procurement bill last fall. It covers the costs of all forms of military assistance and weapons and about $50-million in economic aid that the Administration said it planned to spend in Laos in the current fiscal year. But it does not cover the costs of American bombing here, the largest part of the continuing American air war in Indochina.

"Maybe one of the reasons the enemy is attacking so heavily here now is because of this amendment," a high-ranking official said in an interview in which he asked not to be identified. "It just shows the tragedy of trying to put a ceiling on any war."

Ambassador Godley said today: "The amendment may cause difficulties for this mission in maintaining its assistance to the Royal Laotian Government."

Since the North Vietnamese began attacking in unusually large force across the Plaines des Jarres in northern Laos and drove the C.I.A. group and its Laotian defenders out of the Long Tieng base, which is 80 miles north of Vientiane, much though not all of the reticence of the official establishment about its activities has fallen off.

EMBASSY ARRANGED TOUR

This was dramatically apparent yesterday when, for the first time, the embassy, at the Ambassador's direction, arranged for reporters to charter airplanes and helicopters from the Government contractor, Air America, to fly to Long Tieng to see the scope and nature of the American-supported Laotian effort in defense of the base.

An American official accompanied the reporters and allowed them to go anywhere they wanted, but did not permit his name to be published. He said that one reason for finally granting access to the base—after all the C.I.A.'s sensitive radio and other communications equipment had been taken out before the high point of the Communist attack Jan. 12—was that, in his view, much nonsense had been written about Long Tieng "and we thought you should see it for yourselves."

What was there was nothing extraordinary—an airfield, probably used by Laotian T-28 propeller-driven bombers, since it was too short for American jets; a handful of American civilians with radios helping the Laotians on air strikes they could not handle with their own air force, and a large, almost completely abandoned, village where dependents of the guierrilla army of Meo tribesmen had lived before the North Vietnamese swept down from the Plaine des Jarres and began shelling the Long Tieng Valley on New Year's Eve.

The enemy attackers were still on a craggy limestone ridge at the southeast end of the base yesterday. Airplanes do not land on the airstrip now for fear of ground fire but drop supplies by parachute.

It was apparent at the command post overlooking the ruggedly beautiful valley that if the base was ever exclusively run for Maj. Gen. Vang Pao's Meo irregulars, it is no longer. The General whom the Americans in civilian clothes fondly called "V.P." was there, cheerful and natty in a dark brown safari suit with stars on each collar, but he was surrounded by other regular Laotian generals and by the Laotian Defense Minister, Sisouk na Champassak.

In fact, the Meos did bear a heavy burden of the fighting in northern Laos for many years during the so-called secret war of the nineteen-sixties. Long Tieng is a mountain country south of the Plaine des Jarres, which is their ancestral homeland, and may explain why they have been fighting so hard for so long.

But now, according to Americans here, they are weakened, and are believed to number only about 2,000 of the 6,000 or so troops that are fighting on the high ridges overlooking Long Tieng.

There were 400,000 Meos there before the war but only 200,000 are believed there now, through combat losses and the traumas of annual forced migrations, as they lost ground militarily in the dry season and then took it back again when the rains came in summer.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

Hanoi aim: damaging headlines

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Military commanders in South Vietnam and in the Pentagon are convinced that the North Vietnamese cannot mount any attacks of telling military significance next month. But there is less certainty over political and psychological impacts.

It is fairly certain that Hanoi will aim for damaging headlines and prime-time news reports to further American discontent with the war.

Just as certainly, the American administration is hoping that the troops in the field will be able to handle situations in such a way that the damaging effects back home can be blunted.

Readiness for action

Although it is not yet absolutely clear what the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops will attempt, one official here said, "The North Vietnamese have shown that they will do what they have to do to be ready."

Thus, it is assumed here that the North Vietnamese have well-defined objectives, and that they do have the equipment and manpower necessary to move along with their battlefront plans.

The most dramatic move seen here as likely is an attempt at seizure of a good-sized town in South Vietnam. Both Kontum in the central highlands and Tay Ninh City near the Cambodian border are mentioned as potential targets. Sources here claim there is hard intelligence information available to back this up. Although the North Vietnamese have about three divisions in Cambodia within operating range of Tay Ninh they are not now credited with the ability to take it, even briefly.

Kontum is another matter. The South Vietnamese regulars assigned to the region around Kontum are not considered very capable.

The Saigon government can be expected to use reserves, such as the South Vietnamese Airborne Division, if necessary to prevent disaster.

Of course, the Americans and South Vietnamese would much rather the Communist forces not have anything they can point to in the next few months or so as a major victory.

They are hopeful that any Communist military gains will be purely temporary ones, and demonstrably temporary at that.

South Vietnam remains the main Indo-China contest, even if Laos is the main show. There is unanimity here that the North Vietnamese will continue to give priority to South Vietnam until some outcome is reached. It is not likely that the fighting in South Vietnam will stop anytime soon.

Withdrawal preoccupation

But with the Americans now preoccupied with their withdrawal, the war, so far as Saigon and Washington are concerned, has become quite a Vietnamese affair. Few here believe that the U.S. has sufficient leverage remaining to force the Saigon government into any agreements it does not genuinely support.

As a result, prospects are for a solution worked out between the two Vietnams at some point when Hanoi is as interested in stopping the fighting as is Saigon. That point is not near, from all appearances.

In Laos, sources here say, the North Vietnamese have just about given their current strategy away in recent fighting. If the goal were to take over Laos, with all the attendant problems, the fighting would undoubtedly have been much different. An attempt to wrest the Mekong River valley from the neutralist regime and to press both the administrative and royal capitals would have been in order.

This approach has not been taken. Instead, the Plain of Jars was seized. Royal Lao and CIA-paid Meo irregulars and Thai troops have been scrambling to put together a hasty defense ever since.

Apparently, sources here believe, the main North Vietnamese objective in Laos for the time being appears to be to disrupt the non-Communist forces and possibly force Gen. Vang Pao, chief of the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen, to withdraw from the fighting. It is also possible that Hanoi would like the Meo elders to lose confidence in Vang Pao and take his command away.

Either way, there would be an undoubted drop in the fighting ability of the non-Communist forces. And the U.S. would have to import and pay more Thais to replace the Meos. That practice has been the subject of considerable debate in the U.S. Congress—a fact not lost on Hanoi.

Peril ebbing

Non-Communist forces in Laos appear safe from disaster for the moment. It may be that in a few months matters will have settled back down and the fighting there will be back to its typcial ebb and flow.

In Cambodia, the North Vietnamese still appear content to harass and disrupt, making some gains here and there. But there is no attempt so far to bring on a military collapse and take over the government.

More than likely, the North Vietnamese are primarily interested in holding enough land without contest from the Cambodians to weaken the governmental position and provide staging room for the war in Vietnam.

The thinking in Hanoi probably is that there is no reason really to deal with Cambodia now—that it can wait while attention is focused on Vietnam.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

DAILY WORLD
20 JAN 1972
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601[redacted]3

Helicopter view of Long Cheng base in Laos where the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been training "special forces" of Meo tribesmen an Thai mercenaries to fight against liberation troops who have finally wrested the base from the U.S.

UPI photo

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

NEW YORK TIMES
21 JAN 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

LAOS LOSSES SPUR CALL FOR MORE AID

Americans Are Concerned About Enemy's Drive—Some Secrecy Lifted

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 20—Concern about the unusually powerful and early Communist offensive in Laos has grown so intense that the United States Government has lifted much of the secrecy it maintained over its efforts here and is saying that, far from doing too much, the Americans are doing too little and the Administration may ask for more money.

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The Coalition That Died

The clandestine army was set up largely for political reasons. Laos is in theory a neutral kingdom and has been since 1962 when, under international supervision, the indigenous Pathet Lao Communist, the rightist military faction and the neutralists formed a coalition under Prince Souvanna Phouma that collapsed in fighting that year.

Pathet Lao officials left the Government then and their positions have not been filled since. Fighting between the Government forces, quietly supported by the Americans, and the Pathet Lao, supported and now vastly outnumbered by the North Vietnamese Army, has been going on since 1963.

American intelligence here, backed by independent diplomatic sources, says that there are 80,000 to 90,000 North Vietnamese troops in the country [illegible] in the Pathet Lao forces, which do not do the bulk of the fighting.

On March 6, 1970, President Nixon put on the record the previously known but officially unacknowledged facts that American Air Force and Navy planes had, with Prince Souvanna Phouma's consent, been bombing North Vietnamese supply trails in southern Laos for years and that they had been flying air support for the Royal Laotian forces in the north as well.

Now, with the latest North Vietnamese attack — 6,000 to 9,000 superbly trained and equipped combat troops with again as much support are estimated to be in the van in the Long Tieng fighting — American officials have apparently concluded that they have nothing to lose by putting more information out in the open.

"It's a North Vietnamese invasion, the most serious attack they've ever made here," one official said at Long Tieng the other day. "They are more determined to knock these people out than they have ever been before."

So the Americans have now allowed reporters to see how they support General Vang Pao and the regular and irregular Laotian forces. Yesterday at Long Tieng, the roar of American Air Force F-105 and F-4 fighters often resounded through the valley as they flew combat-support missions, and the American civilians were planning more big strikes by B-52's. All the planes are from bases to the south, in Thailand.

That support does not come under the Congressional $350-million limit, but the bombs dropped by the 40-plane Laotian Aid Force do come under it.

So did the $1-million for ammunition that blew up at Long Tieng when it was struck by North Vietnamese sheils and so did hundreds of thousands of dollars represented by about 20 guns of 105 and 155 millimeters that were captured by the enemy when the Plaine des Jarres was overrun last month.

So too does the money that pays the 3,000 to 4,000 Thai soldiers—the exact number is not known—who have been manning artillery positions here and are described by the American authorities as volunteers paid by the United States through the Laotian Government.

Of these men, 1,000 or 2,000 are still in Laos, in positions around Long Tieng, and others have suffered heavy casualties in fighting farther south on the Boloven Plateau.

[illegible] growing feeling of futility among the Americans

continued

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160[redacted]

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004
JAN 2 1 1972

More Cash Asked For Laos Fighting

VIENTIANE (Laos) — (CDN) — The Nixon Administration, prohibited by Congress from spending more than $50 million for aid to Laos this year, is preparing to ask for additional funds, informed sources said here.

The deteriorating military situation in Laos will be given as the reason.

The money would be used for additional military aid and, in effect, to shore up the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Prime Minister Souvanna is also expected to make a pitch for additional military aid when he meets with American newsmen over the weekend.

American officials in Laos are known to feel it will be impossible to live within the restricted funds, which include all forms of U.S. military and economic assistance and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency here.

Ground work for the request apparently included an effort to create favorable public and congressional reaction by opening up the previously secret war in Laos to American correspondents this week.

For the first time in 10 years they were allowed to travel to the embattled base at Long Cheng, which until two weeks ago was a super-secret CIA training center for Laotian guerrillas.

It is now virtually deserted.

Intense Fighting

The hills around the base are the scene of some of the most intense fighting in Laos, as government troops push back North Vietnamese forces who took the base more than a week ago.

It is believed Defense Sec. Melvin Laird will ask for the additional money when he gives Congress a six-month accounting of spending in Laos.

Laird will report that slightly less than half the money allocated for the year has been spent.

However, he will also report that it was spent before the current enemy offensive and that the remaining funds are not sufficient to sustain military operations, which could last anohter five months, sources said.

Air Exemption

Of the $350 million, roughly $200 million is spent for weapons, ammuntion and other military needs, $50 million for economic aid and the remaining $100 million for CIA operations, an embassy source said.

The restrictions setting a ceiling on spending in Laos were imposed last October by an amendment to the 1971 Military Procurement Act.

[illegible] operations flowing from bases outside Laos are exempted.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600140001-3

WASHINGTON POST
21 JAN 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-016

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

United Press International

BATTERED BASE — This helicopter view shows Long Cheng, the badly damaged secret military base in Laos maintained by the CIA to help Laotian irregulars battling Communist forces. The base includes a mile-long paved runway, reloading facilities and stores of bombs for Laotian T-28 bombers and housing for 30,000 civilians.

Downed U.S. Pilot Rescued in Laos

By Jack Foisie
Los Angeles Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 20—Jim Russell is one lucky fellow. He is 49 and beefy, but he outran North Vietnamese soldiers for two miles today through Laotian jungle and was lifted to safety by a fellow Air America pilot.

James W. Russell is a seven-year veteran of Indochina flying. He makes about $40,000 a year for doing what almost caused his death today for Air America, which is operated for the CIA.

"It was one of those bad days, maybe the worst."

Authorized by his bosses to talk about it, Russell related how his small "Porter" transport plane had been destroyed by mortar fire after landing on a remote dirt strip 100 miles northeast of this Laotian capital. He and five Laotians who were his "customers" ran through mortar and rifle fire for more than one hour.

"They set a trap to catch an American pilot on the ground, and they almost succeeded," he said.

"I was working with a Lao who I know only as 'swamp rat.' He said to shut down the engine while they got some bundles ready for paradrop.

'Not My Element'

"The moment my prop stopped turning, the bad guys knew they had me on the ground—and that's not my element," Russell said. "The first mortar riddled the aircraft, the second dropped me to the ground. Swamp rat and the others and I started running for the jungle.

"They knew they had an American and those little fellows (the North Vietnamese) took after us. They were shouting and shooting. It was tough getting through the bamboo. I cursed myself because I had been slipshod. I hadn't my gun strapped on and I didn't have any smoke to signal a rescue helicopter. But I knew where I was and I headed for some high ground with a bare spot on it."

Russell activated his pocket emergency radio and contacted a helicopter. It was flown by his fellow pilots, "Frenchy" Smith and J. J. McCauley. "They said they were coming to pick me up. It's lucky we all knew the area."

Russell and the Laotians reached a clearing by the creek. Two of the Laotians formed a rear-guard team to hold off the North Vietnamese. Russell plunged into the creek. "Man, I'd been running for an hour. I was so dehydrated I drank the jungle water." They could hear the North Vietnamese troopers crashing through the bamboo.

War Hotter

"But Frenchy and J. J. got there first. They hauled me up on a cable. It broke when they tried to pick up my customers but another chopper came and got them, too."

Air America pilots are finding the Laotian war hotter than ever. Twenty-four of these CIA-chartered aircraft were hit by ground fire in December and three were shot down. The record in January is described by [illegible] as even worse.

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